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Introduction 
 
 
Human society, one may argue, is propelled by a dynamic clash of two primordial 
drives: creativity and power. The urge to invent confronts the impulse to conserve, the 
desire to change contests the quest to impose, the will to transcend conflicts with the 
impetus to restrict, harness and sabotage. It seems that the ever-present need to create 
something new always stands against the itch to redistribute and appropriate.  
Arthur Koestler described this clash, somewhat romantically, in his masterful his-
tory of cosmology, The Sleepwalkers (1959). His lone scientists grope in the dark. They 
search for cues, hints and leads. They often stumble, falling flat on their faces. Rarely 
do they know exactly what they are looking for. But they go on. And then, suddenly, 
comes a revelation. The scientist sees a spark. Many a time the spark fizzles out and 
dies. But sometimes it persists long enough to ignite a fire. Novel ideas, syllogisms, 
explanations, equations and theories start to emerge in quick succession. Before long, 
a whirlwind of light builds up in the middle of the darkness. The whirlwind twists and 
turns, drawing in other scientists, generating more light, more ideas, more findings. In 
rare cases, it even gives rise to a totally new cosmology. 
But this creativity is never easy to manifest. Wherever they go, the scientists find 
themselves faced with a monolithic wall of resistance. Confronting them are the dom-
inant power institutions of society, the opaque and seemingly impenetrable complex 
of church, academy, state, army and business organizations that control and leverage 
the prevailing beliefs, ideologies, dogmas and paradigms. Occasionally, a single scien-
tist manages to break through the wall. Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Maxwell and Ein-
stein, among others, were immortalized for doing so. But of those who try, the vast 
majority fail and sink into oblivion. The odds are overwhelmingly against them. To 
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challenge power with creativity is to risk your life, job, reputation, family and future – 
as the heroic Cecilia Paine, the first to discover what stars are made of, was to learn 
the hard way (see Chapter 11). Those who contest the dogma – like the poet in George 
Orwell’s Keep the Aspidistra Flying (1936) – face ridicule, poverty, life in the shadows. 
No wonder most people end up taking the safe route of consent, moving obediently 
with the herd. 
 
 
The First Mode of Power 
 
Many of those who examined the clash between creativity and power – from Socrates 
and Plato to Freud and Marcuse – searched for universal drives and inhibitions, for 
the eternal underpinnings of Eros and Civilization. But while the drives and inhibitions 
may be universal, their social manifestations are often unique. The clash of creativity 
and power is the engine of the social creorder – the ongoing creation of order that pro-
pels and transforms all historical societies. And so, whatever its sources, this clash is 
always specific to the mode of power in which it is manifested.1  
The first mode of power we know of was born in Mesopotamia, about six thou-
sand years ago. Although the conflict between the inventive creators and their impos-
ing rulers was rarely if ever recorded, the effects of this conflict are amply documented.2 
The archaeological remnants and written tablets attest the invention of organized ag-
riculture and planned irrigation – as well as the subjugation of large populations to a 
rigid palatial regime of canal digging and maintenance, field work and animal hus-
bandry. We have evidence of innovative construction, including the invention of the 
‘building block’ (mud brick) and advanced architecture – as well as the extensive use 
of hard labour to erect religious/statist monuments for the glory of the gods-rulers. 
And this record sits well with the Mesopotamian myth-of-creation-read-power-rela-
tions. According to this myth, the gods had invented human beings simply so that they 
. . . could work for them: ‘Let him [man] be burdened with the toil of the gods, that 
they may freely breathe’ (Frankfort et al. 1946: 185; see also Kramer 1956: Ch. 13) 
The Mesopotamians are believed to be the first to have invented writing – and 
therefore the ability to articulate, develop and record complex ideas, art, poetry and 
literature. But the writing they invented was also kept deliberately complicated, acces-
sible only to a narrow stratum of priests, palace officials and clerks. Along with Mes-
opotamia’s complicated number system, writing became an effective means of exclu-
sion, a way to organize the mode of power, control the dogma and hold the underlying 
population in line.    
1 The societal consequences of creativity and power were central to the works of Thorsten Veb-
len (1898, 1904, 1919, 1923) and Lewis Mumford (1934, 1961, 1967, 1970). On the concept of 
creorder, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: 305-306 and Chapter 1 below). 
2 For classic accounts, see Jacobsen (1943), Frankfort et al. (1946), Frankfort (1948, 1951), Kra-
mer (1956) and Evans (1958). For a comparative study of early civilizations, see Trigger (2003). 
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Democratic Writing 
 
But the sabotage exerted by a mode of power, no matter how totalizing, is never com-
plete. Force always invites and creates a transformative counterforce, and that is what 
eventually happened with writing. In due course, the elites’ stranglehold over this com-
plex symbolic technology was loosened. The key breakthrough might have occurred 
in the fifteenth or fourteenth century BCE, in the Egyptian turquoise mines of Serabit 
el-Khadim in the Sinai Peninsula. The walls of these mines reveal an-easy-to-read al-
phabetic script, the first radical departure from the complicated Egyptian hieroglyphs.3  
We don’t know who invented this ingenious script. Perhaps it was the western-
Semitic Apiru, or Amurru, who worked as zapping labourers in the imperial mines. 
Being semi-nomadic and relatively independent, they probably weren’t pulped into 
total submission by the Egyptian Sun-God king. And maybe, possibly as a conse-
quence of disputes with their employer, they invented a new form of writing to contest 
and resist their harsh treatment. Whatever their identity and reasons, though, the al-
phabet they created set off a revolution: it started the democratization of knowledge, 
an open-ended process that seven centuries later would give rise to science and philos-
ophy. 
 
 
Autonomy 
 
Science and philosophy were born in the Greek poleis of the fifth century BC.4 Histor-
ically, it was a giant quantum leap. In the midst of an oriental world, controlled by 
despotism, tyranny and god-kings, there emerged, suddenly and without warning, a 
new culture based on democracy, science and philosophy. The roots of this transfor-
mation remain heatedly debated, partly because the character of the Greek polis was 
so special, if not entirely unique. For the first time in history, man no longer slaved for 
the gods and their earthly representatives.5 From a lowly, subservient creature, he be-
came the centre of the universe. The human being was now recognized as the creator 
of the nomos (society), while the human mind was made the final interpreter of the 
physis (nature). Gone was the heteronomous rule of kings and priests. Instead, there 
arose an autonomous society, conceived, created and regulated by its own members. 
And with open autonomy came explosive creativity. The art and science of philoso-
phy, literature, dialogue, mathematics, logic, theatre and history all flourished. This 
burst of creativity owed much to the elimination of external power and arbitrary coer-
cion: it was driven not by force and adulation, but by idle curiosity and the quest for 
3 See for example Giveon (1978), Naveh (1987) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: 267). The pre-
cise dating of this script remains debated. Recent discoveries date a similar script in Egypt’s 
Western Desert to the nineteenth century BCE. 
4 For an enlightening analysis of this birth, see Castoriadis (1991a). 
5 Although women and slaves were liberated only millennia later, the principles that emanci-
pated them were the same as those that liberated Greek men.  
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truth; it throve not on obedience and dogma, but on scepticism and self-criticism; and 
it was fuelled not by conflict and violence, but by the love of life and the admiration of 
beauty. 
In an autonomous society, where humans are neither subservient to nor in com-
mand of others, their agreement is predicated on common logic, broad dialogue and 
inclusive planning. And that is what happened in some of the poleis. Autonomy went 
hand in hand with the Pythagorean invention of the proof – the need to convince your 
equals using logical, agreed-upon principles. And there was more than pure logic here. 
The concept of proof was complemented and greatly enriched by the recognition of 
human limitations and the desire to transcend them – hence the critical bent of histor-
ical narrative, the bitterness of tragedy and the ridicule of comedy. In this way, the 
democratic quest for pure knowledge both implied and depended on the desire to un-
derstand the beauty of the universe and the urge to create a good society. This trian-
gular model of philosophy-science-democracy is perhaps the greatest societal inven-
tion ever. 
 
 
Science and Church 
 
The third historical leap in the conflict between creativity and power happened in the 
sixteenth century, with the emergence of capitalism.6 This emergence was accompa-
nied by a deep political-scientific revolution. Cities and towns were growing in leaps 
and bounds, the printing press was spewing out new books, pamphlets and scientific 
articles, and more and more people were becoming mesmerized by novelty and 
hooked on change.  
The crown achievement of this revolution was the mechanical worldview spear-
headed by Kepler, Galileo and Newton. The introduction of this new cosmology ex-
posed the inherent conflict between scientific re-search and static dogma. The new sci-
entists still feared the authorities and were keen to avoid the wrath of the Holy Inqui-
sition, and Galileo, whose open-ended explorations challenged the Church’s Aristote-
lian dogma, was nearly executed by Pope Urban VIII. But the fault line of the ancien 
régime was now laid bare for all to see. The power of the monarchy, nobility and 
Church was increasingly viewed as dark and backward. And even if the people of that 
epoch hadn’t quite realized it, we can say that, for the first time in history, the good of 
society was explicitly associated with forward-looking novelty and creativity, progres-
sive education and political freedom.  
  
6 The seeds of this leap are beautifully narrated in Umberto Eco’s Middle-Age thriller, The Name 
of the Rose (1983). 
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The Science of Society 
 
The mechanical-bourgeois revolution gave rise to the first science of society – the study 
of ‘political economy’. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the key founders of this new 
discipline, were social scientists: they searched for the natural laws of society; they 
looked for the rules that governed production, consumption and exchange; and they 
developed the first theories of prices. Their science was deeply revolutionary. It con-
tested the old regime and offered a totally new framework to understand and benefit 
from the new. But their innovative achievements were soon arrested and eclipsed by 
the rising academic church of neoclassical political economy, later to be renamed and 
scientifically suffixed as ‘economics’.  
Headed by Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, Carl Menger, Alfred Marshall and John 
Bates Clark, the neoclassicists abandoned the open-ended intellectual inquiry of their 
classical predecessors, replacing it with a narrow, rigid dogma. By the late nineteenth 
century, capitalism was clearly victorious, and the role of bourgeois theorists was no 
longer to attack, but defend. There was a pressing need for a new, secular religion, and 
the neoclassical economists rose to the occasion. They articulated a new faith and 
nominated themselves its principal gatekeepers. To ward off outsiders, they erected 
insurmountable disciplinary walls and replaced plain text with indecipherable mathe-
matical scriptures. To extinguish free thinking, they imposed impossible-to-believe as-
sumptions. To eliminate open dialogue, they carefully restricted the questions econo-
mists were allowed to ask. And they triumphed. 
A century later, their neoclassical faith reigns supreme. Having more followers 
than all of the world’s religions combined, their dogma dominates the mindset of rulers 
and subjects alike. It justifies and regulates the capitalist mode of power. And faced 
with no real competitors, it seems almost unassailable. But then, that is often what 
hubris looks like when a regime approaches its peak power, just a short moment before 
it falters. 
 
 
Marxism 
 
Whereas the neoclassicists sought to defend the victory of capitalism, Marx and his 
followers tried to annul it. A man of his time, Marx was deeply influenced by the sci-
entific-mechanical revolution. But whereas the bourgeois theorists of society used their 
science to tie humanity to the machine, Marx’s goal was to liberate it from it. He 
wanted to develop an alternative, universal social science, an emancipatory, rational 
framework for a new social order born out of the contradictions of the old. 
Eventually, though, Marxism went into retreat. Its liberatory impulse was fatally 
wounded by the totalitarian record of Soviet regimes, its autonomy was compromised 
by frequent realignments with Communist Party shifts and changing political fashions 
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and its scientific vitality was drained by attempts to reconcile Marx’s scriptures with 
the rapidly changing reality.  
The consequences of these developments were dire. Like bourgeois political econ-
omy, Marxism also disintegrated. But whereas bourgeois political economists eagerly 
endorsed and hastened this disintegration by creating mutually exclusive ‘social sci-
ences’, Marxists tried to hold onto the former universality of Marx’s theory – even 
when that universality was no longer there. Since the late nineteenth century, Marxism 
was gradually fractured into many different and often contradictory sub-disciplines. 
Its original totality gave rise to irreconcilable diversity, and its scientific research pro-
gramme gradually succumbed to increasingly rigid dogmas and anti-scientific, postist 
sentiments. By the second half of the twentieth century, it no longer offered a cohesive 
theoretical and empirical account of capitalism, let alone a convincing alternative to 
it.  
 
 
Value Theory 
 
Perhaps the most important – and paradoxically least recognized – consequence of 
these developments is the collapse of value theory. Capitalism is a commodified social 
order. Everything in this order – including the central process of capital accumulation 
– is related to everything else through prices. This is why the classical cosmology of 
capitalism – both bourgeois and Marxist – started from and was based on a theory of 
value.  
But that is no longer the case: nowadays, there is no viable theory of value.  
Marx’s labour theory of value rests on the elementary particle of socially necessary 
abstract labour time – but that particle, while perhaps intuitively appealing in Marx’s 
time when the joule was first invented, can no longer be identified and quantified in 
today’s capitalism. And the situation is even worse with neoclassical value theory: the 
elementary particle of this theory – the ‘util’ – was already deemed quantitatively 
meaningless by the theory’s own founding fathers, and no neoclassicist has managed 
to prove them wrong since. 
The net result is that neoclassical and Marxist theories now hang on the thread of 
cognitive dissonance. They conceive capitalism as a quantitative mode of consump-
tion and production, but the material/productive units on which their theories depend 
– the util and socially necessary abstract labour time – are entirely fictitious. They think 
of capital as if it were a quantifiable economic entity, but the way in which they ‘meas-
ure’ this supposedly real entity is, in fact, completely arbitrary and forever irrefutable.  
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The Capitalist Mode of Power 
  
Our own work, which started when we were students in the 1980s, seeks to break this 
impasse. It calls for a new cosmology of capitalism: one that sees capital not as a pro-
ductive economic category but as capitalized power, and that conceives and researches 
capitalism not as a mode of production and consumption but as a mode of power. The 
articles collected in this volume outline the general contours of our approach and flesh 
out some of our recent research. The first ten papers were written during the period of 
2012-2015, while the last one – The Scientist and the Church – was posted on our website 
in 2005. All are reproduced here in their original form.  
The book is divided into five thematic sections. The first section (Chapters 1-3) 
sketches our notion of the capitalist mode of power. Chapter 1 takes on the common 
foundations of liberal and Marxist political economy. It dissects the conventional du-
alities of politics/economics, real/nominal, productive/unproductive and base/super-
structure; it examines the mechanical assumptions underlying both the neoclassical 
utilitarianism of supply, demand and equilibrium and the Marxist materialism of ex-
ploitation and accumulation; and it shows how the rise of new power institutions, or-
ganizations and processes during the late nineteenth century made both approaches 
decreasingly relevant and increasingly dogmatic.  
The alternative, we argue, is to bring power back in: to conceive power not as an 
extra-economic entity that distorts or supports capital from the ‘outside’, but as the 
basic relationship that defines what capital is in the first place. We should think of ac-
cumulation not as the amassment of utils or dead labour, but as the capitalization of 
power writ large. And to be able to do so, we need a new, power theory of value. We 
need a theory that is based not on production as such, but on the conflict between 
creativity and power; that focuses not on capital in general, but on dominant capital 
in particular; and that deals not with absolute accumulation, but with differential ac-
cumulation. Such a theory, we believe, can help us better understand the capitalist 
mode of power – as well as what needs to be done in order to undo it. 
Of course, in order to develop such a theory, we need to restart from scratch, to 
go to the Cartesian roots, so to speak. A power theory of value requires a new political 
anthropology of capital as power; it needs to identify, articulate and analyse the foun-
dational elements of the capitalist mode of power; and it has to create new methods to 
decode the logic, triumphs and crises of capitalized sabotage. The remainder of this 
book offers a sample of such endeavours.  
We begin in Chapter 2 with the ‘Asymptotes of Power’. No power, including cap-
italist power, is ever compete. Since power is always exerted against opposition, it is 
inherently bounded, so the first thing we need to examine is the asymptotes, or limits, 
that this opposition creates. Using the United States as our case study, the chapter 
offers an analytical framework for such an inquiry. By progressively decomposing the 
redistribution of U.S. national income – and the forces that this redistribution reflects 
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– we show how the ongoing systemic crisis has been tightly linked to U.S. capitalism 
approaching its multiple asymptotes of power. 
Chapter 3 reflects on Robert Harris’ financial thriller, The Fear Index. The popular 
perception, mirrored in the novel, is of a system running amok. According to this con-
ventional creed, finance has now taken over production, speculators have substituted 
for investors and automated investment algorithms have replaced human discretion. 
It is as if the unchecked processes of financialization have totally ‘distorted’ capitalism. 
Or have they? From the viewpoint of capital as power, there has been no distortion 
at all. Capital is finance, and only finance – or, in our terminology, capitalization. And 
capitalization is not an addendum to a mode of production and consumption, but the 
regulator of a mode of power. A symbolic representation of power, finance-read-capi-
talization measures the ability of owners to overcome resistance and automate society, 
to create a differential megamachine whose raison d'être is to beat the average and ex-
ceed the normal rate of return. In this sense, the capitalized rituals of ‘finance’, ‘spec-
ulation’ and ‘automated trading’ – along with the strategic sabotage they engender – 
represent not a muted form of capitalism, but the purest.    
 
 
Crisis 
 
The second section of the book (Chapters 4-5) deals with crisis. In Chapter 4, we dis-
aggregate the processes of growth and stagnation. Conventional political economy, 
both liberal and Marxist, associates accumulation with overall economic growth and 
prosperity and decumulation with overall stagnation, unemployment and crisis. From 
the viewpoint of capital as power, though, this association need not hold. Capital here 
represents not the accumulation of ‘things’, whether counted in utils or labour hours, 
but a differential measure of redistributional power. And since capitalized power op-
erates through strategic sabotage, there is good reason to expect differential accumu-
lation and aggregate prosperity to move in opposite directions – which is exactly what 
has happened in the United States since the Second World War. 
From the 1940s onwards, the distributive income share of capitalists has moved 
positively with the rate of unemployment, while the share of the top 1% has moved 
inversely with the growth of employment. No wonder capitalists have learned to stop 
worrying and love the crisis.  
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of crisis to the global arena, examining the histori-
cal links between differential accumulation, the corporations and governments of the 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition and Middle East ‘energy conflicts’. According to 
the pundits, Middle East wars are hopelessly complex, often irrational and almost al-
ways unique. Regardless of how we approach them – whether we use the conventional 
or radical viewpoints of international relations, the idiosyncratic perspectives of cul-
ture and religion, or the economic standpoint of resource ‘scarcity’ – these wars are 
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difficult to understand and reason, let alone generalize about. In short, they are, by 
and large, sui generis.  
But as we show in this chapter, these specificities and irrationalities could all be 
enfolded into the universal logic of modern capitalism – the differential accumulation 
of capital. Using our notion of capital as power, we find remarkably stable regularities 
linking the eruption of Middle East energy conflicts, the differential performance of 
the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition and global shifts in the nature of differential 
accumulation. Over the years, our research has shown these regularities to have re-
mained more or less unaltered since the late 1960s, and that stability has allowed us to 
predict – in writing and, in the first two conflicts, ahead of time – the three episodes of 
the Gulf Wars series. 
 
 
Re-searching 
 
The third section of the book (Chapters 6-7) emphasizes the need to constantly re-
examine our convictions and research our findings. In Chapter 6, we zero in on a basic 
constant of Marxist political economy – the nexus between imperialism and financial-
ism. For many Marxists, this nexus is central to understanding the transformation of 
capitalism – yet the historical role they ascribe to that nexus has changed dramatically 
over time. The main change concerns the nature and direction of surplus and liquidity 
flows. In the early twentieth-century version of the nexus, the surplus was said to be 
exported to the colonies; in the neo-imperial theory of Monopoly Capital, it was do-
mestically absorbed by the core countries themselves; in the World Systems version, it 
was imported from the dependent periphery; and in the more recent thesis of hege-
monic transition, it has taken the form of global liquidity that U.S.-led financialization 
sucks in from the rest of the world.  
Now, using the very same concepts to explain very different and often opposing 
processes is already confusing enough – particularly when nobody knows exactly what 
the surplus is, let alone how to measure it. And the confusion is only amplified when 
theorists advance arguments for which they furnish little or no evidence. This latter 
point is illustrated by empirically examining the hegemonic transition thesis. Accord-
ing to this thesis, the United States has been leading the global process of financializa-
tion – yet the facts show the exact opposite: based on its differential profitability, the 
U.S. financial sector appears to have been the lagger, not the leader in this process! 
Chapter 7 explores the role of crime and punishment in the capitalist mode of 
power. The starting point is the ‘Rusche thesis’: the argument, made by George Rusche 
in the 1930s, that the ebb and flow of crime and punishment are closely related to the 
tightening and loosening of the labour market. The thesis never gained many follow-
ers: mainstream criminologists have tended to ignore it, while their Marxist counter-
parts, although often sympathetic, have been unable to empirically substantiate it. But, 
as the chapter shows, this wholesale rejection may very well be the result of a simple 
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misreading. Much like the early twentieth-century astrophysicists who misread the 
spectrometer measurements of solar radiation, today’s criminologists have been mis-
reading the connection between unemployment and crime: they have been looking at 
the right data, but in the wrong way. 
A proper re-reading of U.S. statistics shows that Rusche was right on the mark: 
over the past century, the ups and downs of crime and punishment have been posi-
tively correlated with variations in unemployment, exactly as he predicted. Moreover, 
the correlation is so tight that there is almost no need for any other explanation!  
But the nearly perfect fit contains two glaring exceptions. While the thesis holds 
under the normal circumstances of ‘business as usual’, it breaks down in periods of 
systemic crisis: during the 1930s and the 2000s, unemployment increased sharply, but 
crime and the severity of punishment, instead of rising, dropped perceptibly. This 
anomaly, we suggest, might be related to the nature of capitalist power and resistance 
to that power. Under normal circumstances, the counterforce to the capitalist sabotage 
of unemployment is largely personal and often criminal, hence the positive correlation; 
whereas during a systemic crisis the counterforce becomes more collective and politi-
cal, hence the negative correlation. 
 
 
Interviews 
 
The fourth section of the book contains two wide-ranging interviews (Chapters 8-9). 
Nowadays, interviews are commonly seen as second-rate means of communication, a 
way to simplify difficult ideas for quick consumption by the impatient masses. Our 
interviews here, though, are different: they are long and thorough, and they don’t cut 
corners.  
In our books and articles, we have often found ourselves evading important issues 
whose elaboration would have taken us far afield and off topic. Although important, 
somehow these issues were deemed less urgent than the subject we ended up working 
on. And so they remained largely unaddressed, accumulating dust at the bottom of the 
still-to-deal-with heap.  
And then came the systemic crisis. The calamity opened up a Pandora’s Box of 
unanswered – and often unasked – questions, and it offered us the opportunity to deal 
with many of those bottom-of-the heap issues. So when Tim Di Muzio and Piotr 
Dutkiewicz suggested that we conduct lengthy, open-ended interviews, we gladly 
agreed. 
The interviews deal with a variety of related topics and questions. They include, 
among issues, the notion of ‘the market’ and how it relates to our concept of capital-
ized power; the question of whether ‘capitalism’ is still the appropriate term to describe 
the world we live in; the fundamental difference between capital and wealth; the cru-
cial significance of theory and research for political action; similarities and differences 
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between Marxism and our own theory of capital as power; the role of labour and pro-
duction in the power theory of value; how the labour theory of value misinforms the 
class struggle; and the historical link between productive and unproductive labour on 
the one hand and mass murder on the other. The list goes on. 
 
 
The Scientist and the Church 
 
The final section returns to the theme of the book (Chapters 10-11). It begins with a 
eulogy to a scientist who enlightened us, the late Akiva (Aki) Orr. In Hebrew, his fam-
ily name, ‘Orr’ (רוא), means ‘light’, and we would like to suggest that this is not a mere 
coincidence. Aki Orr was a true path-breaker. As co-founder of the first radical politi-
cal movement in Israel, the Marxist-Trotskyite MATZPEN, he and his friends were 
the first to shed new light on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As a universal activist, he 
was associated with numerous revolutionary movements around the world. And as an 
autonomous intellectual, he befriended and was close to many innovative scientists, 
thinkers and artists. His books and activism touched the lives and transformed the 
thinking of many.  
Aki charted his own independent path. He never held an official position; he never 
drew a salary from any academic or political organization, established or contrarian; 
he never received any research funding. He was keen on understanding the world, and 
he explored it not in order to gain fame or earn a profit, but to better society. As a 
universalist, he loathed intellectual property rights and distributed his writing for free 
and without any legal protection. Many of his path-breaking ideas were later lifted, 
nonchalantly, by academics who, as it turned out, had ‘known it all along’.   
Chapter 11, titled ‘The Scientist and the Church’, deals with this type of appropri-
ation. The concrete focus of the piece, originally written in 2005, is the UC Berkeley 
group ‘Retort’, but the lesson to be drawn from it is a general one. Retort here repre-
sents the dark forces of intellectual sabotage, the anti-scientific stance of the academic 
church. Dressed as a radical, ‘Marxist’ collective of professors-activists, the group pla-
giarized our broad theories, historical narratives and concrete arguments, along with 
our concepts, methods and research results. The uplifted material – massaged and cal-
ibrated to look and feel like novel-yet-legitimate Marxism (no less) – was neatly packed 
into a timely, politically-correct book on the second ‘Gulf War’. The book was quickly 
printed by a politically-correct publisher, promoted by politically-correct journals and 
distributed to the unsuspecting, politically-correct laity. It looked like a real gem, cer-
tainly on the authors’ CVs. 
Unlike the venturing scientist Akiva Orr, Retort was steadfastly guarding the aca-
demic gates. Whereas Aki was interested in open-ended inquiry, creativity and nov-
elty, Retort was keen on keeping the (Marxist) faith intact and the dogma unchal-
lenged. Aki encouraged research in directions that might end up contradicting his own 
   
 
 
 
12 | Introduction  
 
– indeed, once convinced, he didn’t hesitate to abandon the dogmatic aspects of Marx-
ism in favour of Castoriadis’ approach. By contrast, Retort was quick to disarm the 
innovators, dispossessing their insights as if they were theirs all along. Unsurprisingly, 
the radical UC Berkeley – which, incidentally, invented the first computerized tool to 
detect plagiarism – refused to expose its distinguished professors, while those who pub-
lished-promoted the Retort fraud in the first place declined to print our contestations. 
But, then, these are the ways of the Church.  
And that must be a sign of hope. The violence of the academic church is evidence 
of an underlying counterforce, a sign that creativity, novelty and the quest for truth are 
lurking under the surface. Wherever we find people such as Aki and his friends, we 
find light. Despite the Retort squads, the rigid academic dogmas and the mind-numb-
ing Facebooks, there are always free-spirited creators, scientists and artists who look 
for a spark. Like any other mode of power, capitalism too creates its own negation – 
the quest for the light, the search for the ‘Orr’.   
 
 
The Capitalist 
Mode of Power 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Capital as Power: 
Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism 1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Conventional theories of capitalism are mired in a deep crisis: after centuries of debate, 
they are still unable to tell us what capital is. Liberals and Marxists think of capital as 
an economic entity that they count in universal units of utils and abstract labour, re-
spectively. But these units are totally fictitious: they can be neither observed nor meas-
ured. In this sense, they do not exist. And since liberalism and Marxism depend on 
these non-existing units, their theories hang in suspension. They cannot explain the 
process that matters most – the accumulation of capital. 
This breakdown is no accident. Capitalism, we argue, is not a mode of production 
but a mode of power, and every mode of power evolves together with its dominant 
theories, dogmas and ideologies. In capitalism, these theories and ideologies originally 
belonged to the study of political economy – the first mechanical science of society. 
But as the capitalist mode of power kept changing and the quantitative revolution 
made it less and less opaque, the power underpinnings of capital grew increasingly 
visible and the science of political economy disintegrated. By the late nineteenth cen-
tury, with dominant capital having taken command, political economy was bifurcated 
into two distinct spheres: economics and politics. And in the twentieth century, when 
1 This paper was first published in Real-World Economics Review (Bichler and Nitzan 2012c, Issue 
61, September). 
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the power logic of capital had already penetrated every corner of society, the remnants 
of political economy were further fractured into mutually distinct social sciences. Cap-
ital was completely monopolized by economists, leaving other social scientists with 
little or no say in its analysis. And nowadays, when the reign of capital is all but uni-
versal, social scientists find that they have no coherent framework to account for it.  
The theory of capital as power offers a unified alternative to this fracture. It argues 
that capital is not a narrow economic entity, but a symbolic quantification of power. 
Capital is not absolute, it is relative. It has little to do with utility or abstract labour, 
and it extends far beyond machines and production lines. Most broadly, it represents 
the organized power of dominant capital groups to create the order of – or creorder – 
their society. 
This view leads to a different cosmology of capitalism. It offers a new theoretical 
framework for capital based on the twin notions of dominant capital and differential 
accumulation, a new conception of the state and a new history of the capitalist mode 
of power. It also introduces new empirical research methods – including new catego-
ries; new ways of thinking about, relating and presenting data; new estimates and 
measurements; and, finally, the beginning of a non-equilibrium disaggregate account-
ing that reveals the conflictual dynamics of society. 
 
 
The Capitalist Cosmology 
 
As Marx and Engels tell us at the beginning of The German Ideology (1970), the capital-
ist regime is inextricably bound up with its theories and ideologies. These theories and 
ideologies, first articulated by classical political economy, are much more than a pas-
sive attempt to explain, justify and critique the so-called economic system. Instead, 
they constitute an entire cosmology – a system of thinking that is both active and total-
izing.  
In ancient Greek, the verb Kosmeo has an active connotation: it means ‘to order’ 
and ‘to organize,’ and political economy does precisely that. It explains, justifies and 
critiques the world – but it also actively makes this world in the first place. Moreover, 
political economy pertains not only to the narrow economy as such, but also to the 
entire social order as well as to the natural universe in which this social order is em-
bedded.  
The purpose of this paper is to outline an alternative cosmology, one that offers 
the beginning of a totally different framework for understanding capitalism.  
Of course, to suggest an alternative, we first need to know the thing that we contest 
and seek to replace. To lay out the groundwork, we begin by spelling out what we 
think are the hallmarks of the present capitalist cosmology. Following this initial step, 
we enumerate the reasons why, over the past century, this cosmology has gradually 
disintegrated – to the point of being unable to make sense of and recreate its world. 
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And then, in closing, we articulate some of the key themes of our own theory – the 
theory of capital as power. 
 
 
Foundation I: Separating Economics from Politics 
 
Political economy, liberal as well as Marxist, stands on three key foundations: (I) a 
separation between economics and politics; (II) a Galilean/Cartesian/Newtonian me-
chanical understanding of the economy; and (III) a value theory that breaks the econ-
omy into two spheres – real and nominal – and that uses the quantities of the real 
sphere to explain the appearances of the nominal one. This and the following two 
sections examine these foundations, beginning with the separation between politics 
and economics. 
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, there emerged in the city states of 
Italy and the Low Countries an alternative to the rural feudal state. This alternative 
was the urban order of the capitalist bourg. The rulers of the bourg were the capitalists 
to be. They were the owners of money, trading houses and ships; they were the man-
agers of industry; they were the enterprising pursuers of new social technologies, the 
seekers of innovative methods of production.  
These early capitalists offered an entirely new way of organizing society. Instead 
of the vertical feudal order in which privilege and income were obtained by force and 
sanctified by religion, they brought a flat civil order where privilege and income came 
from rational productivity. Instead of authoritarian collectivism, they offered individ-
ual independence. Instead of the closed loop of agricultural redistribution by confisca-
tion, they promised open-ended industrial growth. Instead of ignorance, they brought 
progress and knowledge. Instead of subservience, they offered opportunity.2 Theirs 
was the future regime of capital, an explicitly ‘economic’ order based on an endless cycle 
of production and consumption and the ever-growing accumulation of money.  
Initially, the bourg was subservient to the feudal order in which it emerged, but 
that status gradually changed. The bourgs began to demand and obtain libertates – that 
is, differential exceptions from feudal penalties, taxes and levies. The bourgeoisie rec-
ognized the legitimacy of feudal politics, particularly in matters of religion and war. 
But it demanded that this politics not impinge on its urban economy. In our view, this 
early class struggle, the power conflict between the declining nobility and the rising 
bourgeoisie, is the origin of what we now consider as the separation of economics and 
politics.3  
The features of this separation are worth summarizing, beginning with the liberal 
view. Over the past half millennium, liberals have grown accustomed to classifying 
2 The historical tension between the civil urban space of economy and capital and the coercive 
violent space of politics and state is explored from different perspectives in Lopez (1967), Tilly 
(1992) and Lefebvre (2003). 
3 For more on this transformation and its associated debates, see Gerstenberger (2005). 
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production, technology, trade, income and profit as aspects of the economy. By con-
trast, entities like state, law, army and violence are classified as belonging to politics. 
The economy is taken to be the productive source. It is the realm of individual 
freedom, rationality, frugality and dynamism. It creates output, raises consumption 
and moves society forward. By contrast, politics is conceived as coercive-collective. It 
is corrupt, wasteful and conservative. It is a parasitical sphere that latches onto the 
economy, taxing it and intervening in its operations. 
Ideally, the economy should be left on its own. Laissez faire politics would produce 
the optimal economic outcome. But in practice, we are told, this is never the case: 
political intervention constantly distorts economics, undermines its efficient operation 
and hampers the production of individual well-being. The liberal equation, then, is 
simple: the best society is one with the most economics and the least politics.  
The Marxist view of this separation is different, but not entirely. For Marx, the 
liberal project of severing civil society from state is a misleading ideal, if not outright 
self-deception.4 The legal act of setting the private economy apart from public politics 
alienates property; and that very alienation, he says, serves to defend the private inter-
ests of capitalists against the collective pursuit of a free society. From this perspective, 
a seemingly independent political-legal structure is not antithetical but essential to the 
material economy: it allows the organs and bureaucracy of the state to legitimize cap-
ital, give accumulation a universal form and help maintain the capitalist system as a 
whole.  
In other words, Marx readily accepts the liberal duality – but with a big twist. 
Where liberals see an inconsistency between economic well-being and political power, 
Marx sees two complementary forms of power: a material-economic base of exploita-
tion and a supporting legal-state structure of oppression.  
Historically, the coercive institutions and organs of the state evolve as necessary 
complements to the economic mechanism of surplus extraction: together, they consti-
tute the totality that Marxists refer to as a ‘mode of production’. But the relationship 
between these two aspects is not symmetric: in any particular historical epoch, the 
nature and extent of state intervention are predicated on the concrete requirements of 
surplus extraction. To illustrate, during the nineteenth century, these requirements dic-
tated the hands-off methods of laissez faire; toward the middle of the twentieth century, 
they called for the macro-management of Keynesianism; and at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, they mandate the multifaceted regulations of financialized neolib-
eralism.  
So unlike in the liberal cosmology, where society consists of utility-seeking indi-
viduals for whom the state is a specialized service provider at best and a distortion at 
worst, in the Marxist cosmology the state is necessary to the very possibility of capi-
talism. But that necessity is conditional on the state being distinct from – and ulti-
mately subjugated to – the imperatives of accumulation. 
4 Cf. Marx and Engles (1970: 64-5, 79-80) and Marx (1963: 19-20). See also Marx (1973a, 
1973b). 
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Following the footsteps of his classical predecessors, particularly Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, Marx, too, prioritized economics over politics. Enthralled by the meth-
ods and triumphs of bourgeois science, he looked for latent reasons, for the ultimate 
mechanical forces that lie behind and move the social appearances. And just like his 
bourgeois counterparts, he, too, found the locus of these forces in the ‘economy’.5 
The productive sphere, and especially the labour process, he argued, is the engine 
of social development. This is where use value is created, where surplus value is gen-
erated, where capital is accumulated. Production is the fountainhead. It is the ultimate 
‘source’ from which the other spheres of society draw their energy – energy that they 
in turn use to help shape and sustain the sphere of production on which they so depend. 
And so, although for Marx capitalist economics and politics are deeply intertwined, 
their interaction is that of two conceptually distinct and asymmetric entities.6 
 
 
Foundation II: The Galilean/Cartesian/Newtonian Model of the Economy 
 
The new capitalist order emerged hand in hand with a political-scientific revolution – 
a revolution that was marked by the mechanical worldview of Machiavelli, Kepler, 
Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Leibnitz and, most importantly, Newton.7 
It is common to argue that political economists have borrowed their metaphors 
and methods from the natural sciences. But we should note that the opposite is equally 
true, if not more so: in other words, the worldview of the scientists reflected their so-
ciety.  
Consider the following examples: 
 
• Galileo and Newton were deeply inspired by Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532). The 
Prince relentlessly pursues secular power for the sake of secular power. His con-
cern is not the general good, but order and stability. And he achieves his goals not 
with divine help, but through the systematic application of calculated rationality. 
5 In a famous passage in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859: 20-1), Marx 
writes: ‘In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, 
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage 
in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of pro-
duction constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a 
legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social conscious-
ness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political 
and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their 
social existence that determines their consciousness’. 
6 This separation haunts even the most innovative Marxists. Henry Lefebvre (2003), for exam-
ple, introduced the notion of urban society as a way of transcending the base-superstructure of 
Marx’s industrial society – only to find himself describing this new society in terms of . . . eco-
nomics and politics. 
7 The fascinating evolution and path-breaking heroes of the mechanical worldview are described 
in Koestler’s unparalleled history of cosmology (1959). The philosophical underpinnings of the 
scientific revolution, particularly in physics, are examined in Bechler (1991). 
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• Hobbes’ ‘mechanical human being’ was modelled after Galileo’s pendulum, 
swinging between the quest for power on the one hand and the fear of death on 
the other – but, then, Galileo’s own mechanical cosmos was itself a reflection of a 
society increasingly pervaded by machines.  
 
• Newton could make up a world of independent bodies because he lived in a soci-
ety that began to critique hierarchical power and praise and glorify individualism. 
He envisaged a liberal word in which every body was a lonely soul in the cosmos, 
interacting with but never dictating its will to other bodies. There is no ultimate 
cause in Newton, only inter-dependence.  
 
• Descartes could emphasize the immediacy of cause and effect – the leaves move 
only if the wind touches them – because he lived in a world that increasingly con-
tested religious mysteries and church-invoked miracles that operated at a distance.  
 
• Lavoisier invented his accounting identity – the law of conservation of matter – 
while building a wall around Paris, trying to turn the city into a sealed container 
in order to capture the mass of its taxable income. 
 
• Darwin’s ‘natural selection’ was based on Malthus’ population theory. And so on. 
 
These relatively recent examples should not surprise us. Human beings tend to 
impose on the cosmos the power structure that governs their own society. In other 
words, they tend to politicize nature.8  
In archaic societies, the gods are usually numerous, relatively equal and hardly 
omnipotent. Hierarchical, statist societies tend to impose a pantheon of gods. And 
absolute rule tends to insist on a single god and a monotheistic religion. In each case, 
the forces that make up nature reflect, and in turn are reflected in, the forces that shape 
society.9 
Capitalism is no exception to this historical rule. Consider the mechanical 
worldview. The liberal God is nothing but absolute rationality, or natural law. The 
language of God is mathematical, and therefore the structure of the universe is numer-
ical. The universe that God created is flat, filled with numerous bodies that are not 
subservient and dependent, but free and interdependent. These bodies are propelled 
not by differential obligations, but by the universal force of gravity. They are attracted 
to and repelled from one another not by the will of the Almighty, but through the 
interaction of force and counterforce. And, finally, they are ordered not by decree, but 
by the invisible power of equilibrating inertia.  
8 On the earliest history of such politicization, see Frankfort et al. (1946). 
9 The history of the notion of force, from ancient thought to modern physics, is told in Jammer 
(1957). The social myths of the gods are narrated and studied in Graves (1944, 1957). 
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This flat universe mirrors the flat ideals of the liberal order. A liberal society con-
sists of equally small actors, or particles, none of which is large enough to significantly 
affect the other particles/actors. These particles/actors are energized not by patriar-
chal responsibilities, but by scarcity – the gravitational force of the social universe. 
They are attracted to and repelled from one another not by feudal obligations, but 
through the universal-utilitarian functions of demand and supply. And they obey not 
a hierarchical rule, but the equilibrating force of the invisible hand of perfect competi-
tion.  
 
 
Foundation III: Value Theory and the Duality of Real and Nominal 
 
Capitalism is a system of commodities and therefore denominated in the universal 
units of price. To understand the nature and dynamics of this architecture, we need to 
understand prices, and that is why both liberal and Marxian political economies are 
founded on theories of value – the utility theory of value and the labour theory of value, 
respectively.  
Value theories begin by splitting the economy itself into two parallel, quantitative 
spheres: real and nominal. The key is the real sphere. This is where production and 
consumption take place, where supply and demand interact, where utility and produc-
tivity are determined, where well-being and exploitation take place, where surplus 
value and profit are generated.  
Now, on the face of it, it seems difficult if not impossible to quantify the real 
sphere: the entities of this sphere are qualitatively different, and that qualitative differ-
ence makes them quantitatively incommensurate.  
For the economists, though, this problem is more apparent than real. Physicists 
and chemists express all measurements in terms of five fundamental quantities: dis-
tance, time, mass, electrical charge and heat. In this way, velocity can be defined as 
distance divided by time; acceleration is the time derivative of velocity; force is mass 
times acceleration, etc. And economists, according to themselves, are able to do the 
very same thing.  
Economics, they say, has its own fundamental quantities: the fundamental quan-
tity of the liberal universe is the util, and the fundamental quantity of the Marxist uni-
verse is socially necessary abstract labour.10 With these fundamental quantities, every 
real entity – from concrete labour, to commodities, to the capital stock – can be re-
duced to and expressed in the very same unit. 
Parallel to the real sphere stands the nominal world of money and prices. This 
sphere constitutes the immediate appearance of the commodity system. But that is 
merely a derived appearance. In fact, the nominal sphere is nothing but a giant, sym-
bolic mirror. It is a parallel domain whose universal dollar magnitudes merely reflect 
10 The notion of abstract labour was first articulated by Marx (1859). The term util was coined 
by Fisher (1892).  
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– sometimes accurately, sometimes not – the underlying real util and abstract labour 
quantities of production and consumption.  
So we have a quantitative correspondence. The nominal sphere of prices reflects 
the real sphere of production and consumption. And the purpose of value theory is to 
explain this reflection/correspondence.  
How does value theory sort out this correspondence? In the liberal version, the 
double-sided economy is assumed to be contained in a Newtonian-like space – a con-
tainer that comes complete with its own invisible laws, or functions, whose role is to 
equilibrate quantities and prices. The Marxist version is very different, in that it em-
phasizes not equilibrium and harmony, but the conflictual/dialectical engine of the 
economy. However, here, too, there is a clear bifurcation between the real and the 
nominal, the productive and the financial. And here, too, there is an assumed set of 
rules – the historical laws of motion – that governs the long-term interaction of the two 
spheres.  
Now, since these principles, or laws, are immutable, the role of the political econ-
omist, just like the role of the natural scientist, is simply to ‘discover’ them.11 The 
method of discovery builds on the research paradigm of Galileo, Descartes and New-
ton on the one hand, and on the application of analytical probability and empirical 
statistics on the other. In this method, discovery takes place through the fusion of ex-
perimentation and generalization – a method that liberals apply through testing and 
prediction (albeit mostly of past events), and that Marxists apply through the dialectics 
of theory and praxis.  
Finally, unlike economics, politics doesn’t have its own intrinsic rules. This differ-
ence has two important consequences. In the liberal case, the notion of a self-optimiz-
ing economy means that, with the exception of ‘externalities’, political intervention 
can only lead to sub-optimal outcomes. In the Marxist case, politics and state are in-
extricably bound up with production and the economy. However, since politics and 
state have no intrinsic rules of their own, they have to derive their logic from the econ-
omy – either strictly, as stipulated by structuralists, or loosely, as argued by instrumen-
talists.  
To sum up, then, the cosmology of capitalism is built on three key foundations. 
The first foundation is the separation between economics and politics. The economy 
is governed by its own laws, whereas politics either is derived from these economic 
laws or distorts them. The second foundation is a mechanical view of the economy 
11 The Platonic notion that there exists an external rationality – and that human beings can do 
no more than discover this external rationality – was expressed, somewhat tongue in cheek, by 
the number theorist Paul Erdös. A Hungarian Jew, Erdös did not like God, whom he nicknamed 
SF (the supreme fascist). But God, whether likable or not, predetermined everything. In mathe-
matics, God set not only the rules, but also the ultimate proofs of those rules. These proofs are 
written, so to speak, in ‘The Book’, and the mathematician’s role is simply to decipher its pages 
(Hoffman 1998). Most of the great philosopher-scientists – from Kepler and Descartes to New-
ton and Einstein – shared this view. They all assumed that the principles they looked for – be 
they the ‘laws of nature’ or the ‘language of God’ – were primordial and that their task was 
simply to ‘find’ them (Agassi 1990). 
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itself – a view that is based on action and reaction, flat functions and the self-regulating 
forces of motion and equilibrium, and in which the role of the political economist is 
merely to discover these mechanical laws. The third foundation is the bifurcation of 
the economy itself into two quantitative spheres – real and nominal. The real sphere is 
enumerated in material units of consumption and production (utils or socially neces-
sary abstract labour), while the nominal sphere is counted in money prices. But the 
two spheres are parallel: nominal prices merely mirror real quantities, and the mission 
of value theory is to explain their correspondence. 
 
 
The Rise of Power and the Demise of Political Economy 
 
These foundations of the capitalist cosmology started to disintegrate in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, with the key reason being the very victory of capitalism. 
Note that political economy differed from all earlier cosmologies in that it was the first 
to substitute secular for religious force. But, like the gods, this secular force was still 
assumed to be heteronomous; i.e., it was an objective entity, external to society. 
The victory of capitalism changed this latter perception. With the feudal order 
finally giving way to a full-fledged capitalist regime, it became increasingly apparent 
that force is imposed not from without, but from within. Instead of heteronomous 
force, there emerged autonomous power, and that shift changed everything.12 With 
autonomous power, the dualities of economics/politics, the separation of real/nomi-
nal and the mechanical worldview of political economy were all seriously undermined. 
With these categories undermined, the presumed automaticity of political economy 
no longer held true. And with automaticity gone, political economy ceased being an 
objective science.  
The recognition of power was affected by four important developments. The first 
development was the emergence of totally new units. By the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the notion of atomistic interdependent actors had been replaced 
by large hierarchical organizations – from big business and large unions to big govern-
ment and large NGOs – organizations that were big enough to alter their own circum-
stances as well as to affect one another. 
The second development was the emergence of new phenomena, unknown to the 
classical political economists. By the beginning of the twentieth century, total war and 
a seemingly permanent war economy had been established as salient features of mod-
ern capitalism, features that appeared no less important than production and consump-
tion. Governments started to actively engage in massive industrial and macro stabili-
zation policies, policies that completely upset the presumed automaticity of the so-
called economic sphere. More and more capitalists incorporated their businesses, and 
as incorporation became nearly universal, the result was to bureaucratize and socialize 
12 The difference between heteronomy and autonomy is developed in the social and philosoph-
ical writings of Cornelius Castoriadis (see for example 1991b). 
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the very process of private accumulation. The singular act of labour grew not simpler 
and more homogeneous, but ever more complex, and many workers no longer lived 
at subsistence levels. There emerged a ‘labour aristocracy’, the workers’ standard of 
living in the main capitalist countries soared, and, with rising disposable income, is-
sues of culture grew in importance relative to work. Finally, the nominal processes of 
inflation and finance assumed a life of their own, a life whose trajectory no longer 
seemed to reflect the so-called real sector.  
The third development was the emergence of totally new concepts. With the rise 
of fascism and Nazism, the primacy of class and production was challenged by a new 
emphasis on masses, power, state, bureaucracy, elites and systems.  
Fourth and finally, the objective/mechanical cosmology of the first political-sci-
entific revolution was undermined by uncertainty, relativity and the entanglement of 
subject and object. Science was increasingly challenged by anti-scientific vitalism and 
postism.13 
The combined result of these developments was a growing divergence between 
universality and fracture. On the one hand, the regime of capital has become the most 
universal system ever to organize society: its rule has spread to every corner of the 
world and incorporated more and more aspects of human life. On the other hand, 
political economy – the cosmology of that order – has been fatally fractured: instead 
of what once was an integrated science of society fashioned after the universal laws of 
nature, there emerged a collection of partial, exclusionary and often incommensurate 
social disciplines.  
The mainstream liberal study of society was split into numerous social sciences. 
These social sciences – economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychol-
ogy, and now also management, international studies, urban and environmental stud-
ies, culture, communication, gender and other such offshoots – are each treated as a 
‘discipline’, a closed system guarded by proprietary jargon, unique principles and a 
bureaucratic-academic hierarchy.  
13 We use the term ‘postism’ to denote the anti-philosophical/scientific mindset that has taken 
over large tracts of the academia, particularly in the social sciences and humanities. This politi-
cally-correct fashion, known alternatively as ‘post-modernism’, ‘post-structuralism’ and ‘post-
Marxism’, has become prominent since the late 1970s. It thrives on denying the possibility of 
objective knowledge and the very existence of anything real, let alone universal; it substitutes 
deconstruction for scientific research and dogmatism for innovation; it encourages herd-behav-
iour and condones dishonesty; it gives rise to racism and bigotry in the guise of ‘post-colonial-
ism’ and ‘cultural pluralism’. This, of course, is hardly a novel historical current. The possibility 
of a universal reality, common to all humans, was rejected by nihilists and relativists already in 
Ancient Greece – a claim that nowadays is rehashed under the banner of Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger by the likes of Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard and Derrida. The consequences of this re-
jection, especially for the young generation, are dire. The current global crisis caught this gen-
eration totally unprepared. Hampered by years of postist-bred ignorance and conditioned to 
think that there is no ‘reality’ to be researched, the anti-globalization movements have proven 
impotent. Although full of spirit, they have been unable to devise new theories and policies, let 
alone an alternative to the existing capitalist cosmology. They sense that the world is rattling; 
but locked into a ‘deconstructive’ mindset, the most they can do is protest the existing ‘dis-
course’.  
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But this progressive fracturing did not save neoclassical political economy (now 
known as ‘economics’). Although most economists refuse to know it and few would 
ever admit it, the emergence of power destroyed their fundamental quantities. With 
power, it became patently clear that both utils and abstract labour were logically im-
possible and empirically unknowable. And, sure enough, no liberal economist has ever 
been able to measure the util contents of commodities, and no Marxist has ever been 
able to calculate their abstract labour contents – because neither can be done. This 
inability is existential: with no fundamental quantities, value theory becomes impossi-
ble, and with no value theory, economics disintegrates.14  
 
 
The Neoclassical Golem 
 
The neoclassicists responded by trying to shield their utils from the destructive touch 
of power. The process was two-pronged. First, they created a heavily subsidized fan-
tasy world, titled General Equilibrium, where, buttressed by a slew of highly restrictive 
assumptions, everything still works (almost) as it should.15 To achieve this end, 
though, they had to turn their economy into a null domain. They excluded from it 
almost every meaningful power phenomenon – and they did it so thoroughly that their 
perfectly competitive model now perfectly explains next to nothing.  
The second step was to brand the excluded power phenomena ‘deviant’, and then 
hand them over to the practitioners of two newly-created sub-disciplines: micro ‘dis-
tortions’ and ‘imperfections’ were given to game theorists, while government ‘inter-
ventions’ and ‘shocks’ were passed on to the macroeconomists. These changes were 
legitimized by the Great Depression and accelerated by the subsequent development 
of the welfare-warfare state. The problem is that, over the past half century, game the-
ory and macroeconomics have grown into a theoretical Golem. They have expanded 
tremendously, both bureaucratically and academically – and that expansion, instead 
of bolstering liberal cosmology, has seriously undermined it.  
Although game theorists and macroeconomists rarely advertise it and many con-
veniently ignore it, their models, whether good or bad, are all affected by – and in 
14 The inability of economists to measure their fundamental quantities surfaced, at least in part, 
in the so called ‘Cambridge Controversies’ on the nature of capital. Following these debates, 
which raged during the 1950s and 1960s, it was conceded, even by staunch neoclassicists, that 
capital did not exist as an independent ‘physical quantum’, and that its magnitude could not be 
measured independently of prices and distribution. Given that the entire edifice of modern eco-
nomics theory stands on capital, advertising this conclusion would have been devastating. It 
was much safer to sweep the entire debate under the carpet, with the result being that most 
contemporary economists are blissfully unaware of its existence. See, for example, Robinson 
(1953-54), Sraffa (1960), Harcourt (1969, 1972), Hodgson (1997) and the accessible summary in 
Hunt (2002: Ch. 16). 
15 We say ‘almost’ since the issue is not really settled. The highest academic authorities on the 
subject still debate, first, whether, even under the most stringent (read socially impossible) con-
ditions, a unique general equilibrium can be shown to exist (at least on paper); and, second, if 
such equilibrium does exist, whether or not it is likely to persist for more than a fleeting moment.  
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many cases are exclusively concerned with – power. This is a crucial fact, because, 
once power is brought into the picture, all prices, income flows and asset stocks be-
come ‘contaminated’. And when prices and distribution are infected with power, the 
utility theory of value becomes irrelevant.  
Now, until the 1950s and 1960s, neoclassicists could still pretend that the extra-
economic ‘distortions’ and ‘shocks’ were local, or at least temporary, and therefore 
redundant for the grander purpose of value analysis. But nowadays, with game theory 
increasingly taking over the micro analysis of distribution, and with governments di-
rectly determining 20 to 40 percent of economic activity and price setting and indi-
rectly involved in much of the rest, power seems to be everywhere. And if power is 
now the rule rather than the exception, what then is left of the utility-productivity foun-
dations of liberal value theory?  
 
 
The Neo-Marxist Fracture 
 
Unlike the neoclassicists, Marxists chose not to evade and hide power but to tackle it 
head on – although the end result was pretty much the same. To recognize power 
meant to abandon the labour theory of value. And since Marxists have never come up 
with another theory of value, their worldview has lost its main unifying force. Instead 
of the original Marxist totality, there emerged a neo-Marxist fracture. 
Marxism today consists of three sub-disciplines, each with its own categories, logic 
and bureaucratic demarcations. The first sub-discipline is neo-Marxist economics, 
based on a mixture of monopoly capital and permanent government intervention. The 
second sub-discipline comprises neo-Marxist critiques of capitalist culture. And the 
third sub-discipline consists of neo-Marxist theories of the state.  
Now, it is worth stressing here that both Marx and the neo-Marxists have had very 
meaningful things to say about the world. These include, among other things, a com-
prehensive vista of human history – an approach that negates and supersedes the par-
ticular histories dictated by elites; the notion that ideas are dialectically embedded in 
their concrete material history; the fusion of theory and praxis; the view of capitalism 
as a totalizing political-power regime; the universalizing-globalizing tendencies of this 
regime; the dialectics of the class struggle; the fight against exploitation, oppression 
and imperial rule; and the emphasis on autonomy and freedom as the motivating force 
of human development.  
These ideas are indispensable. More importantly, the development of these ideas 
is deeply enfolded, to use David Bohm’s term, in the very history of the capitalist re-
gime, and in that sense they can never be discarded as erroneous.16 
But all of that still leaves a key issue unresolved. In the absence of a unifying value 
theory, there is no logically coherent and empirically meaningful way to explain the 
16 The notion of enfoldment, or the nesting of different levels of theory, consciousness and order, 
is developed in Bohm (1980) and Bohm and Peat (1987). 
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so-called economic entity of capital – let alone to account for how culture and the state 
presumably affect this entity. In other words, we have no explanation for the most 
important process of all – the accumulation of capital. 
Capitalism, though, remains a universalizing system – and a universalizing system 
calls for a universal theory. So maybe it’s time to stop the fracturing. We do not need 
finer and finer nuances. We do not need new sub-disciplines to be connected through 
inter- and trans-disciplinary links. And we do not need imperfections and distortions 
to tell us why our theories do not work.  
What we do need is a radical Ctrl-Alt-Del. As Descartes tells us, to be radical 
means to go to the root, and the root of capitalism is the accumulation of capital. This, 
then, should be our new starting point. 
 
 
The Capitalist Mode of Power 
 
In the remainder of the paper we briefly outline some of the key elements of our own 
approach to capital. We begin with power. We argue that capital is not means of pro-
duction, it is not the ability to produce hedonic pleasure, and it is not a quantum of dead 
productive labour. Rather, capital is power, and only power. 
Further, and more broadly, we suggest that capitalism is best viewed not as a mode 
of production or consumption, but as a mode of power. Machines, production and con-
sumption of course are part of capitalism, and they certainly feature heavily in accumu-
lation. But the role of these entities in the process of accumulation, whatever it may be, 
is significant primarily through the way they bear on power.  
To explicate our argument, we start with two related entities: prices and capitaliza-
tion. Capitalism – as we already noted, and as both liberals and Marxists correctly rec-
ognize – is organized as a commodity system denominated in prices. Capitalism is par-
ticularly conducive to numerical organization because it is based on private ownership, 
and anything that can be privately owned can be priced. This situation means that, as 
private ownership spreads spatially and socially, price becomes the universal numerical 
unit with which the capitalist order is organized.  
Now, the actual pattern of this order is created through capitalization. Capitaliza-
tion, to paraphrase physicist David Bohm (in Bohm and Peat 1987), is the generative 
order of capitalism. It is the flexible and all-inclusive algorithm that continuously creor-
ders – or creates the order of – capitalism.  
 
 
Capitalizing Power 
 
What exactly is capitalization? Capitalization is a symbolic financial entity, a ritual that 
the capitalists use to discount to present value risk-adjusted expected future earnings. 
This ritual has a very long history. It was first invented in the capitalist bourgs of Europe 
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during the fourteenth century, if not earlier. It overcame religious opposition to usury in 
the seventeenth century to become a conventional practice among bankers. Its mathe-
matical formulae were first articulated by German foresters in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Its ideological and theoretical foundations were laid out at the turn of the twentieth 
century. It started to appear in textbooks around the 1950s, giving rise to a process that 
contemporary experts refer to as ‘financialization’. And by the early twenty-first century, 
it has grown into the most powerful faith of all, with more followers than all of the 
world’s religions combined.  
Now, as Ulf Martin (2010) argues, capitalization is an operational-computational 
symbol. Unlike ontological symbols, capitalization is not a passive representation of the 
world. Instead, it is an active, synthetic calculation. It is a symbol that human beings 
create and impose on the world – and in so doing, they shape the world in the image of 
their symbol.  
Capitalists – as well as everyone else – are conditioned to think of capital as capi-
talization, and nothing but capitalization. The ultimate question here is not the partic-
ular entity that the capitalist owns, but the universal worth of this entity defined as a 
capitalized asset. 
Neoclassicists and Marxists recognize this symbolic creature – but given their view 
that capital is a (so-called) real economic entity, they do not quite know what to do with 
its symbolic appearance. The neoclassicists bypass the impasse by saying that, in princi-
ple, capitalization is merely the image of real capital – although, in practice, this image 
gets distorted by unfortunate market imperfections. The Marxists approach the problem 
from the opposite direction. They begin by assuming that capitalization is entirely ficti-
tious – and therefore unrelated to the actual, or real, capital. But, then, in order to sustain 
their labour theory of value, they also insist that, occasionally, this fiction must crash 
into equality with real capital. 
In our view, these attempts to make capitalization fit the box of real capital are an 
exercise in futility. As we already saw, not only does real capital lack an objective quan-
tity, but the very separation of economics from politics – a separation that makes such 
objectivity possible in the first place – has become defunct. And, indeed, capitalization 
is hardly limited to the so-called economic sphere.  
In principle, every stream of expected income is a candidate for capitalization. 
And since income streams are generated by social entities, processes, organizations 
and institutions, we end up with capitalization discounting not the so-called sphere of 
economics, but potentially every aspect of society. Human life, including its social 
habits and its genetic code, is routinely capitalized. Institutions – from education and 
entertainment to religion and the law – are habitually capitalized. Voluntary social 
networks, urban violence, civil war and international conflict are regularly capitalized. 
Even the environmental future of humanity is capitalized. Nothing escapes the eyes of 
the discounters. If it generates expected future income, it can be capitalized, and what-
ever can be capitalized sooner or later is capitalized.  
   
Capital as Power | 29 
The encompassing nature of capitalization calls for an encompassing theory, and 
the unifying basis for such a theory, we argue, is power. The primacy of power is built 
right into the definition of private ownership. Note that the English word ‘private’ 
comes from the Latin privatus, which means ‘restricted’. In this sense, private ownership 
is wholly and only an institution of exclusion, and institutional exclusion is a matter of 
organized power.  
Of course, exclusion does not have to be exercised. What matter here are the right 
to exclude and the ability to exact pecuniary terms for not exercising that right. This right 
and ability are the foundations of accumulation.  
Capital, then, is nothing but organized power. This power has two sides: one qual-
itative, the other quantitative. The qualitative side comprises the institutions, processes 
and conflicts through which capitalists constantly creorder society, shaping and restricting 
its trajectory in order to extract their tributary income. The quantitative side is the pro-
cess that integrates, reduces and distils these numerous qualitative processes down to the 
universal magnitude of capitalization.  
 
 
Industry and Business 
 
What is the object of capitalist power? How does it creorder society? The answer begins 
with a conceptual distinction between the creative/productive potential of society – the 
sphere that Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1923) called industry – and the realm of power that, 
in the capitalist epoch, takes the form of business. 
Using as a metaphor the concept of physicist Denis Gabor, we can think of the social 
process as a giant hologram, a space crisscrossed with incidental waves. Each social ac-
tion – whether an act of industry or of business – is an event, an occurrence that generates 
vibrations throughout the social space. But there is a fundamental difference between the 
vibrations of industry and the vibrations of business. Industry, understood as the collec-
tive knowledge and creative effort of humanity, is inherently cooperative, integrated and 
synchronized. It operates best when its various events resonate with each other. Busi-
ness, in contrast, is not collective; it is private. Its goals are achieved through the threat 
and exercise of systemic prevention and restriction – that is, through strategic sabotage. 
The key object of this sabotage is the resonating pulses of industry – a resonance that 
business constantly upsets through built-in dissonance.  
Let us illustrate this interaction of business and industry with a simple example. Po-
litical economists, both mainstream and Marxist, postulate a positive relationship be-
tween production and profit. Capitalists, they argue, benefit from industrial activity – 
and, therefore, the more fully employed their equipment and workers, the greater their 
profit. But if we think of capital as power, exercised through the strategic sabotage of 
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industry by business, the relationship becomes nonlinear – positive under certain circum-
stances, negative under others.17 
This latter relationship is illustrated, hypothetically, in Figure 1. The chart depicts 
the utilization of industrial capacity on the horizontal axis against the capitalist share of 
income on the vertical axis. Now, up to a point, the two move together. After that point, 
the relationship becomes negative. The reason for this inversion is easy to explain by 
looking at extremes. If industry came to a complete standstill at the bottom left corner of 
the chart, capitalist earnings would be nil. But capitalist earnings would also be zero if 
industry always and everywhere operated at full socio-technological capacity – depicted 
by the bottom right corner of the chart. Under this latter scenario, industrial considera-
tions rather than business decisions would be paramount, production would no longer 
need the consent of owners, and these owners would be unable to extract their tributary 
earnings. For owners of capital, then, the ideal, Goldilocks condition, indicated by the 
top arc segment, lies somewhere in between: with high capitalist earnings being received 
in return for letting industry operate – though only at less than full potential.  
 
Figure 1 
Business and Industry 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Note that these considerations pertain only to the quantitative aspect of industrial activity; 
they do not deal with the qualitative nature of its output, or the conditions under which the 
output is produced. Obviously, these latter aspects are equally important, and here, too, business 
sabotage often operates to restrict the human potential by forcing social activity into trajectories 
that are as harmful as they are profitable. 
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Now, having laid out the theory, let us look at the facts. Figure 2 shows this rela-
tionship for the United States since the 1930s. The horizontal axis approximates the de-
gree of sabotage by using the official rate of unemployment, inverted (notice that unem-
ployment begins with zero on the right, indicating no sabotage, and that, as it increases 
to the left, so does sabotage). The vertical axis, as before, shows the share of national 
income received by capitalists.  
And lo and behold, what we see is very close to the theoretical claims made in Fig-
ure 1. The best position for capitalists is not when industry is fully employed, but when 
the unemployment rate is around 7 percent. In other words, the so-called ‘natural rate of 
unemployment’ and ‘business as usual’ are two sides of the same power process: a pro-
cess in which business accumulates by strategically sabotaging industry. 
 
Figure 2 
Business and Industry in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce through Global 
Insight (series codes: INTNETAMISC for interest; 
ZBECON for profit; YN for national income; RUC for the 
rate of unemployment). 
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Differential Accumulation 
 
The neoclassical util and the Marxist unit of socially necessary abstract labour are ab-
solute. By contrast, power is never absolute; it is always relative. For this reason, both 
the quantitative and qualitative aspects of capital accumulation have to be assessed dif-
ferentially – that is, relative to other capitals. Contrary to standard political economy, 
liberal as well as Marxist, capitalists are driven not to maximize profit, but to ‘beat the 
average’ and ‘exceed the normal rate of return’. Their entire existence is conditioned by 
the need to outperform, by the imperative to achieve not absolute accumulation, but 
differential accumulation. And that makes perfect sense. To beat the average means to 
accumulate faster than others; and since capital is power, capitalists who accumulate 
differentially increase their power. 
Let us illustrate this process with another example, taken from our work on the 
Middle East.18 Figure 3 shows the differential performance of the world’s six leading 
privately owned oil companies relative to the Fortune 500 benchmark. Each bar in the 
chart measures the extent to which the oil companies’ rate of return on equity exceeded 
or fell short of the Fortune 500 average. The grey bars show positive differential accu-
mulation – i.e. the percentage by which the oil companies exceeded the Fortune 500 
average. The black bars show negative differential accumulation; i.e. the percentage by 
which the oil companies trailed the average. Finally, the little explosion signs in the chart 
show the occurrences of ‘Energy Conflicts’ – that is, regional energy-related wars.  
Note that conventional economics has no interest in the differential profits of the oil 
companies, and it certainly has nothing to say about the relationship between these dif-
ferential profits and regional wars. Differential profit is perhaps of some interest to finan-
cial analysts. Middle-East wars are the business of experts in international relations and 
security analysts. And since each of these phenomena belongs to a completely separate 
realm of society, no one has ever thought of relating them in the first place.19 
And yet, as it turns out, these phenomena are not simply related. In fact, they could 
be thought of as two sides of the very same process – namely, the global accumulation of 
capital as power.  
We started to study this subject when we were still graduate students, back in the 
late 1980s, and we have published quite a bit about it since then. This research opened 
our eyes, first, to the encompassing nature of capital; and, second, to the insight that one 
can gain from analysing its accumulation as a power process.  
 
  
18 See, for example, Nitzan and Bichler (2002: Ch. 5), Bichler and Nitzan (2004b) and Nitzan 
and Bichler (2006b). 
19 For detailed critiques of existing studies on these subjects, see Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan 
(1989), Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1989), Nitzan and Bichler (1995), Bichler and Nitzan 
(1996) and Nitzan and Bichler (2005). 
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Figure 3 
The Petro-Core’s Differential Accumulation and  
Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. 
Differential return on equity is the difference between the return 
on equity of the Petro-Core and the Fortune 500, expressed as a 
per cent of the return on equity of the Fortune 500. For 1992-3, 
data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 
special charges. 
 
NOTE. The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-
Amoco since 1998), Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), Exxon 
(ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell 
and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to merger. 
The Energy Conflicts include: the 1967 Arab-Israel war, the 
1973 Arab-Israel war, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1979 
first Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, the 1982 second Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, the 1990-1 first Gulf War, the 2000 second 
Palestinian Intifada, the 2001-2 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
and the launching of the ‘War on Terror’ and the 2002-3 second 
Gulf War. 
 
SOURCE: Fortune; Standard & Poor’s Compustat.  
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Notice the three remarkable relationships depicted in the chart. First, every energy 
conflict was preceded by the large oil companies trailing the average. In other words, for 
an energy conflict to erupt, the oil companies first had to decumulate differentially – a 
most unusual prerequisite from the viewpoint of any social science. 
Second, every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies beating the aver-
age. In other words, war and conflict in the region, which social scientists customarily 
blame for ‘distorting’ the aggregate economy, have served the differential interest of cer-
tain key firms at the expense of other key firms.  
Third and finally, with one exception, in 1996-7, the oil companies never managed 
to beat the average without there first being an energy conflict in the region. In other 
words, the differential performance of the oil companies depended not on production, 
but on the most extreme form of sabotage: war.  
Needless to say, these relationships, and the conclusions they give rise to, are noth-
ing short of remarkable. First, the likelihood that all three patterns are the consequence 
of statistical fluke is negligible. In other words, there must be something very substan-
tive behind the connection of Middle East wars and global differential profits.  
Second, these relationships seamlessly fuse quality and quantity. In our research 
on the subject, we show how the qualitative aspects of international relations, super-
power confrontation, regional conflicts and the activity of the oil companies on the 
one hand, can both explain and be explained by the quantitative global process of cap-
ital accumulation on the other.  
Third, all three relationships have remained stable for half a century, allowing us 
to predict, in writing and before the events, both the first and second Gulf Wars.20 This 
stability suggests that the patterns of capital as power – although subject to historical 
change from within society – are anything but haphazard. 
 
 
Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism 
 
This type of research gradually led us to the conclusion that political economy requires 
a fresh start. At about the same time, in 1991, Paul Sweezy, one of the greatest Amer-
ican Marxists, wrote a piece that reassessed Monopoly Capital (1966), a deservingly fa-
mous book that he wrote together with Paul Baran twenty-five years earlier. In that 
piece, Sweezy admitted that there is something very big missing from the Marxist and 
neoclassical frameworks: a coherent theory of capital accumulation. His observations are 
worth quoting at some length because they show both the problem and why economics 
cannot solve it: 
 
20 The first Gulf War (1990-91) was predicted in Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989: Section 2.3). 
The second Gulf War (2002-3) was predicted in Bichler and Nitzan (1996: Section 8: Toward a 
New Energy Conflict?).  
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Why did Monopoly Capital fail to anticipate the changes in the structure and 
functioning of the system that have taken place in the last twenty-five years? 
Basically, I think the answer is that its conceptualization of the capital accumula-
tion process is one-sided and incomplete. In the established tradition of both main-
stream and Marxian economics, we treated capital accumulation as being es-
sentially a matter of adding to the stock of existing capital goods. But in reality 
this is only one aspect of the process. Accumulation is also a matter of adding 
to the stock of financial assets. The two aspects are of course interrelated, but 
the nature of this interrelation is problematic to say the least. The traditional 
way of handling the problem has been in effect to assume it away: for exam-
ple, buying stocks and bonds (two of the simpler forms of financial assets) is 
assumed to be merely an indirect way of buying real capital goods. This is 
hardly ever true, and it can be totally misleading. This is not the place to try 
to point the way to a more satisfactory conceptualization of the capital accu-
mulation process. It is at best an extremely complicated and difficult problem, 
and I am frank to say that I have no clues to its solution. But I can say with 
some confidence that achieving a better understanding of the monopoly cap-
italist society of today will be possible only on the basis of a more adequate 
theory of capital accumulation, with special emphasis on the interaction of its 
real and financial aspects, than we now possess. (Sweezy 1991, emphases 
added) 
 
The stumbling block lies right at the end of the paragraph: ‘the interaction between 
the real and financial aspects’. Sweezy recognized that the problem concerns the very 
concept of capital – yet he could not solve the problem precisely because he continued 
to bifurcate capital into its ‘real’ and ‘financial’ aspects. And that should not surprise 
us. Sweezy and his Monthly Review group had pushed the frontier of Marxist research 
for much of the post-war period, but as children of their time they could not jump over 
Rhodes. By the 1990s their ammunition had run out. They recognized the all-imposing 
reality of finance, but their bifurcated world could not properly accommodate it. 
As younger researchers socialized in a different world, we did not carry the same 
theoretical baggage. Uninhibited, we applied the Cartesian Ctrl-Alt-Del and started by 
assuming that there is no bifurcation to begin with and therefore no real-financial in-
teraction to explain. All capital is finance and only finance, and it exists as finance 
because accumulation represents not the material amalgamation of utility or labour, 
but the continuous creordering of power.  
To challenge capitalism is to alter and eventually abolish the way it creorders 
power. But in order to do so effectively, we need to comprehend exactly what it is that 
we challenge. Power, we argue, is not an external factor that distorts or supports a 
material process of accumulation; instead, it is the inner driving force, the means and 
ends of capitalist development at large. From this viewpoint, capitalism is best under-
stood and contested not as a mode of consumption and production, but as a mode of 
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power. Perhaps this understanding of what our society is could help us make it what 
we want it to be.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2 
 
The Asymptotes of Power 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is part of a series of articles we have written on the current crisis.2 The 
purpose of the previous papers was to characterize the crisis. We claimed that it was a 
‘systemic crisis’, and that capitalists were gripped by ‘systemic fear’. In this article, we 
seek to explain why.  
Begin with systemic fear. This fear, we argue, concerns the very existence of cap-
italism. It causes capitalists to shift their attention from the day-to-day movements of 
capitalism to its very foundations. It makes them worry not about the short-term ups 
and downs of growth, employment and profit, but about ‘losing their grip’. It forces 
on them the realization that their system is not eternal, and that it may not survive – 
at least not in its current form.  
When we first articulated this argument in 2009 and 2010, the response was 
largely dismissive. Capitalism was obviously in trouble, went the counterargument. 
But the crisis, though deep, was by no means systemic. It threatened neither the exist-
ence of capitalism nor the confidence of capitalists in their power to rule it. To argue 
that capitalists were losing their grip was frivolous.  
1 This article was first published in Real-World Economics Review (Bichler and Nitzan 2012a, Issue 
60, June). The article was first presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Forum on 
Capital as Power, ‘The Capitalist Mode of Power: Past, Present, Future’, October 20-21, 2011, 
York University, Toronto (www.bnarchives.net/320). 
2 See Bichler and Nitzan (2008a, 2009), Nitzan and Bichler (2009b), Bichler and Nitzan (2010b) 
and Kliman, Bichler and Nitzan (2011). 
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But over the past year [2012], the attitude has changed, decisively.  
Nowadays, the notions of systemic fear and systemic crisis are no longer 
farfetched. In fact, they seem to have become commonplace. Public figures – from 
dominant capitalists and corporate executives, to Nobel laureates and finance minis-
ters, to journalists and TV hosts – know to warn us that the ‘system is at risk’, and that 
if we fail to do something about it, we may face the ‘end of the world as we know it’. 
There is, of course, much disagreement on why the system is at risk. The explana-
tions span the full ideological spectrum – from the far right, to the liberal, to the 
Keynesian, to the far left. Some blame the crisis on too much government and over-
regulation, while others say we don’t have enough of those things. There are those 
who speak of speculation and bubbles, while others point to faltering fundamentals. 
Some blame the excessive increase in debt, while others quote credit shortages and a 
seized-up financial system. There are those who single out weaknesses in particular 
sectors or countries, while others emphasize the role of global mismatches and imbal-
ances. Some analysts see the root cause in insufficient demand, whereas others feel 
that demand is excessive. While for some the curse of our time is greedy capitalists, 
for others it is the entitlements of the underlying population. The list goes on. 
But the disagreement is mostly on the surface. Stripped of their technical details 
and political inclinations, all existing explanations share two common foundations: 
(1) they all adhere to the two dualities of political economy: the duality of ‘politics vs. 
economics’ and the duality within economics of ‘real vs. nominal’; and (2) they all look 
backward, not forward.  
As a consequence of these common foundations, all existing explanations, regard-
less of their orientation, seem to agree on the following three points:  
 
1. The essence of the current crisis is ‘economic’: politics certainly plays a role (good 
or bad, depending on the particular ideological viewpoint), but the root cause lies 
in the economy. 
 
2. The crisis is amplified by a mismatch between the ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ aspects of 
the economy: the real processes of production and consumption point in the neg-
ative direction, and these negative developments are further aggravated by the un-
due inflation and deflation of nominal financial bubbles whose unsynchronized 
expansion and contraction make a bad situation worse.  
  
3. The crisis is rooted in our past sins. For a long time now, we have allowed things 
to deteriorate: we’ve let the ‘real economy’ weaken, the ‘bubbles of finance’ inflate 
and the ‘distortions of politics’ pile up; in doing so, we have committed the cardi-
nal sin of undermining the growth of the economy and the accumulation of capi-
tal; and since, according to the priests of economics, sinners must pay for their evil 
deeds, there is no way for us to escape the punishment we justly deserve – the 
systemic crisis. 
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What If? 
 
But, then, what if these foundational assumptions are wrong?  
Liberals and Marxists view capitalism as a mode of production and consumption, 
and it is this view that determines the assumptions they make, the questions they ask 
and the answers they give. Now, what would happen if we departed from their view? 
How would our assumptions, questions and answers change if, instead of a mode of 
production and consumption, we thought of capitalism as a mode of power?3 
The short answer is that they would change radically. The bifurcation of ‘econom-
ics’ and ‘politics’ would become untenable, thereby rendering the notion of economic 
crisis meaningless. The separation of the ‘real’ and the ‘nominal’ would become un-
workable, thereby leaving finance with nothing to match or mismatch. And the back-
ward-looking orientation of the analysis would have to give way to a forward-looking 
stance, rooting the crisis not in the sins of the past but in the misgivings of the future. 
Our simple ‘what-if’ question – and the radical ramifications it carries – is not 
unlike the ones raised by Copernicus, Spinoza and Darwin, among others.  
They too questioned the old assumptions: ‘What if the sun rather than the earth is 
at the centre?’ asked Copernicus. ‘What if religion was created not by God, but by 
mere mortals who use it to impose their power on other mortals?’ asked Spinoza. 
‘What if humans weren’t created by the Almighty, but evolved from other living crea-
tures?’ asked Darwin.  
And they too tried to provide answers. Their answers may have been tentative, 
incomplete or even wrong – but these shortcomings are entirely secondary. The im-
portant thing is that they asked the questions in the first place. They started from scratch. 
Their questions went to the very root, and this radical departure altered the entire ori-
entation: it opened up the horizon, led to totally new findings and eventually culmi-
nated in entirely new frameworks.  
The current systemic crisis offers a similar Ctrl-Alt-Del opportunity. By casting 
doubt on the conventional creed, it opens the door to fundamental questions: questions 
about what capitalism is, how it should be analysed and to what end.  
So let’s hit the keys. Instead of consumption and production, the framework we 
offer focuses on power.4 In our framework, capital is power, and more specifically, 
forward-looking power. When capitalists expect their power to increase, capitalization 
rises: more power equals positive accumulation. And when the outlook inverts and 
capitalists expect their power to decrease, accumulation goes into reverse: less power 
equals decumulation.  
From this viewpoint, an ordinary capitalist crisis means that capitalists expect a 
significant decrease in their power – but that they also expect their power to recover 
3 On modes of power in general and the capitalist mode of power in particular, see Nitzan and 
Bichler (2009a: Ch. 13). 
4 Succinct presentations of this framework are given in Bichler and Nitzan (Bichler and Nitzan 
2011, 2012c). For a more detailed accounted, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a). 
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eventually. By contrast, a systemic crisis means that capitalists fear that their power is 
about to drop precipitously, or even disintegrate, and that this disintegration might be 
irreversible – at least within the existing parameters of capitalism. 
 
 
Pending Collapse 
 
The relevant question for us concerns the latter type of crisis: when are capitalists likely 
to expect their entire system of power to collapse, and what conditions may trigger 
such a drastic change in outlook? 
Because we are dealing here not only with historical conditions, but also with cap-
italist expectations regarding the future development of those conditions, it is not easy 
to answer this question. However, there are certain extreme situations in which the 
answer becomes more apparent, and these situations are described by the title of our 
paper: capitalists are most likely to expect their power to fall precipitously or disintegrate when 
this power approaches its asymptote.  
Mathematicians use the term ‘asymptote’ to denote a quantitative limit, some-
thing like a ‘ceiling’ or a ‘floor’ that a curve approaches but never quite reaches. And 
the same term can be used to describe the limits of power. 
Capitalist power rarely if ever reaches its upper limit. The reason can be explained 
in reference to the following dialectical progression: capitalists cannot stop seeking 
more power: since capital is power, the drive to accumulate is a drive for more power, 
by definition; however, the closer capitalist power gets to its limit, the greater the re-
sistance it elicits; the greater the resistance, the more difficult it is for those who hold 
power to increase it further; the more difficult it is to increase power, the greater the 
need for even more force and sabotage; and the more force and sabotage, the higher 
the likelihood of a serious backlash, followed by a decline or even disintegration of 
power.5 
It is at this latter point, when power approaches its asymptotes, that capitalists are 
likely to be struck by systemic fear – the fear that the power structure itself is about to 
5 This process is by no means universal. In certain modes of power – for example, the Megama-
chines of the ancient river deltas, Marx’s ‘oriental despotism’ and Orwell’s 1984 – the threat and 
exercise of force are so extreme that their subjects gradually lose the ability to even contemplate 
resistance, let alone organize it. The Indian caste system, for instance, has been welded over 
millennia by a power akin to the ‘strong force’ in the atom. There is enormous pent-up energy 
in that system; but once this energy has been locked in, turning it against the regime can only be 
achieved through a chain reaction triggered by a critical social mass. 
There is no reason to assume that capitalism is immune from such a fate. It is certainly 
possible, at least logically, for capitalist power to eventually trump, crush and totally eliminate 
the opposition it elicits – in a manner anticipated by Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1907). But 
this elimination would create a new mode of power altogether: having destroyed the will of its 
subjects, the new regime could no longer rely on the open buying and selling of commodified 
power; without vendible power, capitalization would cease; and without capitalization, the 
mode of power could no longer be called ‘capitalistic’ – at least not in the present sense of the 
term. 
                                                        
   
The Asymptotes of Power | 41 
cave in. And it is at this critical point, when capitalists fear for the very survival of their 
system, that their forward-looking capitalization is most likely to collapse.  
 
 
The Argument 
 
Our claim in this paper is that the systemic fear that currently grips capitalists is well 
grounded in the concrete facts.  
The problem that capitalists face today, we argue, is not that their power has with-
ered, but, on the contrary, that their power has increased. Indeed, not only has their 
power increased, it has increased by so much that it might be approaching its asymptote. 
And since capitalists look not backward to the past but forward to the future, they have 
good reason to fear that, from now on, the most likely trajectory of this power will be 
not up, but down.  
Before fleshing out this argument though, a few words about the method and 
structure of the article. Our analysis here is limited to the United States, but this limi-
tation isn’t really a drawback. The chief purpose of this analysis is methodological. 
For us, the important question is how we should study capitalist power – and in this 
respect the United States may offer the best starting point. First, although the global 
importance of U.S. capitalism may have diminished over the past half century, its re-
cent history is still central for understanding the dynamics of contemporary capitalist 
power. And second, to answer the kind of questions that we’ll be asking requires de-
tailed data that are not readily available for many other countries. 
With this emphasis in mind, the paper begins by setting up our general framework 
and key concepts. It continues with a step-by-step deconstruction of key power pro-
cesses in the United States, attempting to assess how close these processes are to their 
asymptotes. And it concludes with brief observations about what may lie ahead. 
 
 
Major Bear Markets 
 
Let’s start with the context. Figure 1 and Table 1 portray the history of U.S. capitalism 
as seen from the viewpoint of capitalists. The ultimate interest of capitalists is capital-
ization: the forward-looking value of their assets. And the main yardstick for that value 
is the stock market.  
Figure 1 shows the history of U.S. stock prices. On the stock market, prices are 
denominated in actual dollars and cents. However, ‘nominal’ measures can be affected 
greatly by the ups and downs of the general price level, so economists like to divide, 
or ‘deflate’, them by the consumer price index in order to obtain what they call a ‘con-
stant dollar’ measure. And that is what we do in Figure 1: we show the stock-price 
index without the effect of inflation. 
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Figure 1 
U.S. Stock Prices in ‘Constant’ Dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas indicate major bear markets, as defined in Ta-
ble 1. The U.S. stock-price index splices the following four sub-se-
ries: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock series 
weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Stand-
ard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-Stock Composite 
(1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The constant-dollar 
series is computed by dividing the stock-price index by the Con-
sumer Price Index. Data are rebased with 1929=100.0. The last 
data point is for October 2011.  
 
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for stock 
prices; CPUSA for consumer prices); Standard and Poor’s through 
Global Insight (series codes: SP500@40.D7 and SP500.D7 for 
stock prices); IMF through Global Insight (series code: L64@C111 
for consumer prices). 
 
As we can see, the overall historical trend of stock prices is up. We can also see, 
though, that this uptrend is fractured by periods of sharp declines of 50-70 per cent, 
marked by the shaded areas. These shaded areas denote what we call ‘major bear mar-
kets’, whose definition is given in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Major U.S. Bear Markets* 
(constant-dollar calculations) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* A major bear market is defined as a multi-
year period during which: (1) the 10-year cen-
tred moving average of stock prices, expressed 
in constant dollars, trends downward; and (2) 
each successive sub-peak of the underlying 
price series, expressed in constant dollars, is 
lower than the previous one.  
 
** The peak occurs one year prior to the onset 
of a major bear market. 
 
NOTE: The most recent sub-trough of the cur-
rent major bear market occurred in 2008. It is 
not yet clear whether this sub-trough marks 
the end of this bear market.  
 
SOURCE: See Figure 1. 
 
Contemporary critiques of capitalism often dismiss such charts as a fetish of ‘fi-
nance’. The magnitudes of finance, they say, are no more than fictitious symbols. They 
distort the ‘real’ nature of capital and mislead us into the wrong conclusions. In our 
view, though, this fashionable dismissal is wrongheaded. The stock market is not only 
the central barometer of modern capitalism; it is also the key power algorithm through 
which capitalists creorder – or create the order – of their world.  
To illustrate this point, consider the last four major bear markets. Each of these 
periods signalled a major creordering of capitalist power.  
 
1. The bear market of 1906-1920 marked the closing of the American frontier and 
the shift from robber-baron capitalism to large-scale business enterprise and the 
beginning of synchronized finance. 
 
period 
decline from peak  
to trough (%) ** 
1835–1842 –50% 
1851–1857 –62% 
1906–1920 –70% 
1929–1948 –56% 
1969–1981 –55% 
2000–?   –50% 
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2. The crisis of 1929–1948 signalled the end of ‘unregulated’ capitalism and the emer-
gence of large governments and the welfare-warfare state.  
 
3. The crisis of 1969–1981 marked the closing of the Keynesian era, the resumption 
of worldwide capital flows and the onset of neoliberal globalization.  
 
4. And the current crisis – which began not in 2008, but in 2000, and is still ongoing 
– seems to mark yet another shift toward a different form of capitalist power, or 
perhaps a shift away from capitalist power altogether.  
 
What is the nature of the current crisis? How is this crisis related to capitalist 
power? And what are the asymptotes of that power? 
 
 
Capital as Power 
 
The best place to begin is Johannes Kepler, one of the key architects of the mechanical 
worldview. Prior to Kepler, force (or power) had two principal features: it was thought 
of as an entity in and of itself, on a par with the elements; and it was conceived of quali-
tatively, not quantitatively. Kepler inverted this view. In his method, force is not a 
stand-alone entity, but a relationship between entities; in other words, it is not absolute 
but differential. And this relationship is not qualitative, but quantitative.6  
Modern science adopted Kepler’s approach, and in our view the same approach 
should be applied to capital. Thus, when we say that capital is power, we mean: (1) 
that capital is not an entity in its own right, but a differential relationship between social 
entities; and (2) that this relationship is quantitative, measured in monetary units. Let’s 
examine these two features more closely, beginning with the quantitative dimension. 
 
 
The Quantitative Dimension: Capitalization 
 
Equations 1 to 5 deconstruct the basic concept of modern capitalism: the algorithm of 
capitalization. This concept was invented in the Italian city states, probably during the 
fourteenth century or even earlier; but it was only at the turn of the twentieth century 
that it developed into the dominant power algorithm of capitalism.7 
The gist of capitalization is spelled out in the first line of Equation 1. In this line, 
the price of a corporate stock – or any other asset, for that matter – is given by the 
earnings the asset is expected to generate (in this case, the expected earnings per share, 
or expected eps), divided by the discount rate.  
6 On the Kepler watershed and its importance for science in general and the concept of force in 
particular, see Jammer (1957: Ch. 5). 
7 For a critical history of capitalization and its rituals, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Part III). 
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For instance, if the expected eps is $100 and the discount rate is 5 per cent, the 
asset would be capitalized at $2,000. This result is easy to verify by going in reverse: 
divide $100 of earnings per share by an initial investment of $2,000, and you’ll get the 
discount rate of 5 per cent. 
The second line of Equation 1 decomposes each element. In the numerator, ex-
pected eps is the future eps (whose magnitude will become known in the future) times 
the hype coefficient of capitalists. In the example here, the future eps is $50. But capi-
talists are overly optimistic, with a hype coefficient of 2. This hype means that they 
expect the future eps to be $100, or twice its eventual level. As a rule, hype is greater 
than 1 when capitalists are overly optimistic and smaller than 1 when they are overly 
pessimistic. 
Looking at the denominator, we can express the discount rate as the product of 
the normal rate of return and the risk coefficient. In our example here, the normal rate 
of return is 2.5 per cent; but this is a risky stock, with a risk factor of 2. If we multiply 
this 2.5 per cent by 2, we get the discount rate of 5 per cent. 
So all in all, capitalization comprises four elementary particles: (1) future eps, (2) 
hype, (3) risk, and (4) the normal rate of return. 
Now, for the purpose of the empirical illustration that follows, it is useful to build 
a link between future and present earnings. At any point in time, future eps can be 
written as a multiple of current eps (henceforth eps) and a scalar m, whose magnitude 
will become known in retrospect, after the future earnings are incurred: 
 
2. mepsepsfuture ×=  
 
Substituting this expression back into Equation 1, we get: 
 
3. 
returnofratenormalrisk
hypemepsprice
×
××=  
 
Dividing both sides of Equation 3 by eps, we get the pe ratio, or the ratio of price to 
(current) earnings:  
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4. 
eps
pricepe =  
 
             
returnofratenormalrisk
hypem
×
×=  
 
Substituting the pe ratio for the two last elements of Equation 3, we get:  
 
5. peepsprice ×=  
 
So as a shorthand, we can always decompose the price of a stock into two components, 
as shown in Equation 5: the eps and the pe ratio (which accounts for the remaining 
elementary particles of the capitalization algorithm and the scalar m).  
The reason for this decomposition is made apparent in Figure 2. The chart shows 
the history of price and eps for the S&P500, an index that comprises the largest U.S.-
listed companies, ranked by market capitalization. Both the eps and price series are 
expressed in ‘constant dollars’, and both are plotted on the left log scale. The bottom 
of the chart plots the pe ratio against the right arithmetic scale.  
Recalling that price = eps × pe, we can now appreciate the effect on price of each 
of the two right-hand components. The bottom of the chart shows that the combined 
effect of hype, risk, the normal rate of return and the scalar m, measured by the pe 
ratio, is cyclical. Historically, this effect oscillates up and down around a mean value 
of 15.5. By contrast, the effect of eps is secular. To illustrate this latter fact, note that, 
between 1922 and 2011, the price series grew by a factor of 13 – and that much of this 
growth was accounted for by the rise of eps – which rose by a factor of 12 (and probably 
more, since the most recent eps observations are not yet available). 
This decomposition should help us focus our exposition. A power analysis of cap-
italization comprises all of its elementary particles. But as Figure 2 makes clear, over 
the long haul the most important of these elementary particles is earnings, and that is 
what we concentrate on in this paper.  
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Price: x 13
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mean=15.5
Figure 2 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share  
in ‘Constant’ Dollars, 1871-2011 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Data are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. Earn-
ings per share denote net profits per share earned in the previous 
twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated from annual 
data before 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. Stock price 
data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. Both the price 
and EPS series are expressed in $U.S., deflated by the U.S. CPI and 
rebased with January 1929=100. The PE ratio is computed by di-
viding the smoothed Price series (before rebasing) by the smoothed 
EPS series (before rebasing). The last data points are March 2011 
for earnings per share, September 2011 for price and March 2011 
for the PE ratio.  
 
SOURCE Robert Shiller, retrieved on October 1, 2011, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls 
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The Relational Dimension: Distribution and Redistributon 
 
Now, recall that for Kepler, power is not only quantitative, but also relational. It is not 
a stand-alone entity, but a relationship between entities. So if capital is power, its anal-
ysis should be relational rather than absolute.  
Capitalism is a system of privately owned commodities, a social order where own-
ership is quantified through prices. To understand the power dynamics of this system, 
we need to understand the way in which relative prices change over time; in other 
words, we need to understand distribution and redistribution.  
Let us start with a hypothetical situation in which capitalist power remains unal-
tered: there is no redistribution, and the underlying price relationship is unchanged. 
To illustrate this situation, assume that corporate profits amount to 2 per cent of na-
tional income. If capitalist power remains unaltered, this ratio will not change. Na-
tional income may rise and fall; but since power stays unchanged, profits will rise and 
fall at the same rate, leaving the profit share stable at 2 per cent.  
Of course, this stability is rarely if ever observed in practice. Capitalists are com-
pelled to try to increase their power, and the power struggle that ensues makes the 
share of profit in national income change over time.  
This on-going change is evident in Figure 3. The figure plots data for dominant 
capital, approximated here by the top 0.01 per cent of all U.S.-based corporations 
ranked by market capitalization (henceforth the Top 0.01%).8 The thin series, plotted 
against the right scale, shows the equity market capitalization of the Top 0.01% ex-
pressed as a per cent of U.S. national income. The thick series, plotted against the left 
scale, shows the after-tax profit of the Top 0.01% as a share of national income.9 
Now, if we were to freeze capitalist power relative to the power of all other social 
groups at the level it was at in 1950, both series would look like horizontal lines. Since 
all groups, including capitalists, would retain their relative power, the prices of their 
respective commodity bundles would change at the same rate, and the ratios of these 
prices would remain unchanged. 
 
  
8 See the Appendix for a brief methodological discussion of alternative measures of dominant 
capital. 
9 National income can be measured at market prices (inclusive of indirect taxes less subsidies), 
or at factor cost (exclusive of indirect taxes less subsidies). This paper uses the former, more 
comprehensive, measure. 
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(right)
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Figure 3 
Market Capitalization and After-Tax Profit of the Top 0.01% 
of U.S.-based Corporations (Shares of U.S. National Income) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The number of firms in the Top 0.01% of U.S.-based cor-
porations changes from year to year. This number (n) is given by 
dividing, for each year, the number of tax returns of active corpora-
tions submitted to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) by 
10,000 (the number of returns for 2009-2010 is extrapolated using 
their recent average growth rate [1.7%]). The actual constituents of 
the Top 0.01% list for each year are obtained in three steps: first, by 
selecting from the Compustat North American dataset the subset of 
U.S.-incorporated firms (excluding firms with no assets, those re-
porting no after-tax profit or loss, and duplicates); second, by rank-
ing these firms, in descending order, based on their market capitali-
zation; and third, by selecting from the ranked list the top n firms. 
The last data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series codes: Ch13 for the num-
ber of tax returns of active corporations [till 1997]); U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012, Table 
744, p. 491 (the number of tax returns of active corporations [1998-
2008]); Compustat ‘funda’ file through WRDS (series codes for 
Compustat companies: NI for After-Tax Profit [net income]; CSHO 
for number of outstanding shares; PRCC_C for closing share price); 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (series 
codes: YN for National Income). 
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But that is not what we observe in the graph. Instead, we see ongoing changes in 
both series, meaning that the structure of power has been constantly creordered. More-
over, the changes seem anything but random. As the figure makes clear, both series 
have trended upward. The ratio of market capitalization of the Top 0.01% to national 
income increased eightfold – from 20 per cent in the early 1950s to 160 per cent in the 
early 2000s, before dropping to 100 per cent in 2010. And the after-tax profit share of 
the Top 0.01% in national income rose threefold – from 2 to 6 per cent over the same 
period.  
The patterns depicted in Figure 3 carry three related implications. First, they indi-
cate that, contrary to what many economists would have us believe, much of the stock-
market boom of the 1990s was due not to ‘economic growth’ or ‘solid fundaments’, 
but to a major redistribution of power in favour of dominant capitalists. Second, the 
patterns make it difficult to attribute the current crisis to waning capitalist power: if 
anything, this power – measured by the profit share of the Top 0.01% in national in-
come – has increased, and it remains at record levels despite the on-going crisis. Third 
and finally, the patterns suggest that dominant capitalists now realize that that their 
record profit-share-read-power has become unsustainable, hence the decade-long col-
lapse of their forward-looking capitalization. 
The question we need to address, then, is twofold. First, what caused capitalist 
power to increase over the past half century, and particularly over the last twenty 
years? And second, looking forward, what are the limits on that power; or in terms of 
the title of the paper, how close is capitalist power to its own asymptote? 
 
 
Asymptotes of Power 
 
One important feature of distributional power is that it is clearly bounded. Given that 
no group of capitalists can ever own more than there is to own in society, distributional 
power can never exceed 100 per cent. Similarly, since no owner can own less than 
nothing, distributional power cannot fall below 0 per cent.10 The movement between 
these lower and upper bounds, though, can follow many different patterns. 
Three such patterns are illustrated in Figure 4. The patterns themselves are gener-
ated by mathematical functions, but we can easily endow them with concrete social 
meaning. Assume that each of the lines 1a, 2a and 3a at the upper part of the figure 
(plotted against the left scale) represents a particular trajectory of the after-tax profit 
share of the Top 0.01% in national income, and that each of the lines 1b, 2b and 3b at 
10 Although debt can be considered a ‘negative’ asset, a debtor cannot own less than nothing. 
The net debt of a debtor (liabilities less assets) is a claim on the debtor’s future income. As long 
as the present value of this future income is greater than or equal to the debtor’s net debt, the 
debtor’s net assets are non-negative. If the present value of the future income is smaller than the 
net debt, the debtor is technically bankrupt, having zero net assets. 
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(exponential)
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the bottom (plotted against the right logarithmic scale) represents the corresponding 
rate of change for that trajectory.11 
 
 
Figure 4 
Distributive Shares: A Hypothetical Exposition  
of Levels and Rates of Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chronological starting point in our hypothetical illustration is the year 1900, 
in which all three lines show an after-tax profit share of around 1 per cent. From this 
point onward, the patterns diverge. Line 1a, for example, shows the result of a con-
stant, 4-per-cent growth rate per annum. This growth rate increases the after-tax profit 
share to 1.04 per cent in 1901, to 1.082 in 1902, to 1.125 in 1903, and so on. Since the 
after-tax profit share grows at an unchanging rate, the corresponding growth-rate series 
                                                        
11 A log scale, shown here in multiples of 10, is a convenient way of plotting series that change 
exponentially. 
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1b at the lower part of the chart is a flat line. The after-tax profit share rises exponen-
tially, and sometime before 2020 it reaches 100 per cent of national income. This is the 
‘glass ceiling’. From this point onward, the share can no longer increase: it either stays 
the same or drops. (In this figure, we left it unchanged at 100 per cent; notice that once 
line 1a at the top hits the glass ceiling, line 1b at the bottom, representing the growth 
rate, gets ‘truncated’, since the growth rate drops to zero.) 
Now, capitalists operate against the opposition of non-capitalists (as well as of 
other capitalists). In order to earn profits, they need to exert enough power to over-
come this resistance. As we noted earlier, though, the resistance itself is not fixed: it 
tends to increase as the income share of capitalists rises while the income share of 
others shrinks. And this growing resistance means that the higher the profit share of 
the capitalists, the greater the power they need to exert in order to make it even bigger.  
These power relations can be traced in Figure 4. The lines at the top, denoting the 
after-tax profit share of income of the Top 0.01%, represent the power of dominant 
capital operating against resistance, while the lines at the bottom show the rate at 
which this profit-share-read-power changes over time. 
In terms of our first example, line 1a shows capitalist power growing exponen-
tially. It trumps the opposition at an annual rate of 4 per cent (line 1b), until the re-
sistance is totally crushed and capitalists appropriate the entire national income. The 
end result itself is socially impossible (the non-capitalists, having lost their income, 
perish) or non-capitalistic (the losers end up living on handouts from the winners; see 
footnote 5). But the pattern of accelerating power leading toward that end is certainly 
possible, at least over a limited period of time.  
Another hypothetical illustration is given by lines 2a and 2b. Here, too, we see 
capitalist power rising, but resistance to that power rises as well. And as a result, the 
growth rate of this power declines: at the beginning of the process, during the early 
1900s, the rate of growth is 100 per cent per annum; by the 1950s it falls to about 2 per 
cent; and by the end of the twentieth century it declines to 1 per cent. However, mount-
ing resistance isn’t enough to stop the increase in capitalist power, and sometime dur-
ing the 2060s capitalists end up appropriating the entire national income. As in the 
previous example, from this point onward capitalist power can either remain un-
changed or drop. And although the end outcome itself, as before, is socially impossible 
or non-capitalistic, the pattern of linearly growing power that leads to that outcome is 
perfectly plausible. 
The last pattern, which we label ‘asymptotic’, is illustrated by lines 3a and 3b. 
Initially, the share of profit increases rapidly, but the growth rate tapers off very 
quickly. Unlike in the previous two cases, in this one resistance grows too fast for cap-
italists to trump it completely. And, as a result, although the profit share rises, it never 
reaches the 100 per cent ceiling. It merely approaches it asymptotically. 
Now remember that these lines are no more than ideal types that illustrate alter-
native patterns. In practice, the profit share is never that stylized: it goes up or down, 
it fluctuates around its own trend and its asymptote need not be 100 per cent – or any 
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other particular level, for that matter. It can be anything. As we shall soon see with the 
actual data, the hypothetical patterns illustrated here combine to produce ragged and 
occasionally wave-like trajectories of various durations. These trajectories show power 
increasing at various rates, receding, rising again, approaching its asymptote, and oc-
casionally collapsing. 
The key point, though, is that these patterns of distribution and redistribution, 
whatever they may be, quantify underlying power processes. And this quantification 
of power makes distributional patterns – and the limits embedded in them – crucial for 
understanding capital accumulation and capitalist development. 
Much of our work over the past three decades has been concerned with making 
sense of such historical patterns. Often, the oscillations represent variations in power 
with a given order. But occasionally, they point to deeply transformative moments, 
ones that creorder the entire mode of power. One example of such creordering is the 
relationship between differential oil profits and energy conflicts in the Middle East 
(Nitzan and Bichler 1995; Bichler and Nitzan 1996). Another example is the regime 
pattern of differential accumulation, where dominant capital oscillates between 
breadth and depth as it breaks through its successive social envelopes (Nitzan 2001; 
Nitzan and Bichler 2001). And a third illustration is the relationship between major 
bear markets shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 and the corresponding transmutations of 
the capitalist mode of power that accompany them (Bichler and Nitzan 2008a). 
The present paper is nested in this latter relationship. Focusing on the most recent 
and apparently still ongoing major bear market, our purpose is to identify the power 
underpinnings of the crisis, to assess the limits imposed on them and to speculate on 
what those limits may imply for the near future of the capitalist mode of power.  
 
 
National Income Shares 
 
The next step in this journey is to unpack the statistical category of ‘national income’. 
Table 2 shows the underlying components of this aggregate. Note that the table is not 
drawn to scale. Our concern at this point is merely the relationship between the differ-
ent components, not their relative size. 
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Table 2 
Deconstructing National Income 
 
 
 
Line 1 is national income. This line represents the total income, measured in dol-
lars and cents, earned in a society during a given year. Line 2 shows that national 
income comprises two sub-categories: labour and non-labour income. In line 3, we see 
that non-labour income consists of two components: the income of capitalists and the 
income of non-capitalists other than employees (i.e. proprietors, rentiers and the gov-
ernment). Line 4 shows that capitalist income includes two types of income: net inter-
est and pretax profit. Line 5 shows that pretax profit consists of corporate taxes that 
go to the government and after-tax profit that belongs to the capitalists. Finally, in line 
6 we see that after-tax profit can be broken down to the profit of the Top 0.01% and 
the profit of all other firms.  
This structure offers a guideline on how to investigate the redistribution of 
power.12  
12 The guideline here is very rudimentary and by no means exhaustive. Needless to say, it does 
not preclude different and/or more detailed analyses of power. 
National Income 
  
Labour Income Non-Labour Income 
 
 
Non-Capital 
Income 
Capital Income 
 
 
Net 
Interest 
Pretax Profit 
 
 
Corp. 
Tax 
After-Tax 
Profit 
 
 
The 
Rest 
Top 
0.01% 
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Recall our starting point. In Figure 3, we saw that the stock-market boom of the 
1990s was underwritten not by ‘economic growth’, but by a massive creordering of 
power: a redistributional process in which the Top 0.01% managed to more than dou-
ble its after-tax profit share in national income. The figure also showed that the crisis 
of the past decade or so has been unfolding with capitalist power hovering around 
historic highs. These observations, along with the forward-looking outlook of capital-
ists, suggest that the current crisis may be the result of capitalists becoming not weaker, 
but stronger; and that capitalist power may be approaching its social asymptote – a 
level too high to sustain, let alone increase.  
At this point, then, the question we need to ask is twofold. First, what were the 
concrete power processes that made this massive redistribution of income possible in the 
first place? And, second, what might be the specific limits on this power to redistribute? 
The remainder of the paper tries to answer these questions by looking at the fol-
lowing nested transformations. Note that, all else remaining the same, each of these 
transformations works in favour of the Top 0.01%: 
 
• Within national income, the shift from labour to non-labour income (line 2 in Ta-
ble 2). 
 
• Within non-labour income, the shift from non-capital to capital income (line 3). 
 
• Within capital income, the shift from net interest to pretax profit (line 4). 
 
• Within pretax profit, the shift from corporate tax to after-tax profit (line 5). 
 
• Within after-tax profit, the shift of after-tax profit from smaller firms to the 
Top 0.01% (line 6).  
 
Figure 5 provides a bird’s-eye summary of these transformations, tracing the his-
torical trajectories of the various national income shares since the 1930s (note that the 
data are expressed as 10-year moving averages, so every observation denotes the aver-
age of the preceding ten years). The chart shows that, despite having risen since the 
early 1980s, the share of non-labour income remains 13 per cent below what it was in 
the 1930s. However, the chart also shows that, within non-labour income, the above-
listed shifts have been positive and large: the national income share of capital income 
increased by 48 per cent; of pretax and after-tax profit by 120 per cent; and of the after-
tax profit of the Top 0.01% by 134 per cent (the last increase is measured since the 
1950s). Let us now turn to a closer examination of each of these processes. 
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Non-Labour Income
Capital Income
Pretax Profit
After-Tax Profit
After-Tax Profit of
the Top 0.01% corps.
(since the 1950s)
Figure 5 
Shares of U.S. National Income 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series are smoothed as 10-year moving averages. Non-la-
bour income is equal to national income less compensation of em-
ployees. Capital income is pretax profit and net interest. The Top 
0.01% of corporations comprises, for every year, the top 0.01% of 
U.S.-incorporated firms in the Compustat North America uni-
verse, ranked by market capitalization (see Figure 3 for derivation 
and computations). The last data points are for 2010. 
  
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; YPCOMP for com-
pensation of employees; ZB for pretax profit [without CCAdj & 
IVA]; INTNETAMISC for net interest; ZA for after-tax profit 
[without CCAdj & IVA]); Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series codes: 
Ch13 for the number of tax returns of active corporations [till 
1997]); U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 2012, Table 744, p. 491 (the number of tax returns of 
active corporations [1978-2008]); Compustat ‘funda’ file through 
WRDS (series codes: NI for after-tax profit of the Top 0.01% of 
corporations). 
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(Pretax Profit, Net Interest, Proprietors' Income,
Rent & Indirect Taxes less Subsidies)
Components of National Income 
 
Figure 6 provides the most basic breakdown of national income, between labour and 
non-labour income. The chart tells the quantitative history of line 2 in Table 2 – and 
on the face of it, the story doesn’t seem too fascinating. 
 
Figure 6 
Compensation of Employees and Non-Labour Income  
as a Share of U.S. National Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Non-labour income is national income less compensation 
of employees. The last data points are for 2010. 
  
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; YPCOMP for 
compensation of employees). 
 
We can see that compensation of employees, expressed as a share of national in-
come, rose from a low of 54 per cent in 1929 to a high of 68 per cent in 1980, and that 
from then onward it declined gradually, reaching 62 per cent in 2010. As expected, 
this gradual shift is mirrored by the movement of non-labour income, whose share of 
national income declined from the 1930s to the early 1980s and rose thereafter. 
Now, a naïve assessment of this process may lead one to conclude that the rising 
share of non-labour income has much more room to go. Even after a three-decade 
 
 
 
58 | The Asymptotes of Power  
 
decrease, labour income still amounts to nearly two-thirds of national income. More-
over, this share remains higher than it was in the early part of the century, and that 
fact suggests that it could be squeezed further in favour groups other than workers, 
including the Top 0.01%.  
But that would be a hasty conclusion to draw. In fact, looking forward, squeezing 
the share of labour income further is bound to prove difficult.  
This statement may seem counterintuitive, but the reasons behind it could be ex-
plained with a simple decomposition. Consider Equation 6, whose final line expresses 
the share of employees in national income as a product of two distinct factors: (1) the 
share of employees in the total adult population, and (2) the ratio between compensa-
tion per employee and the national income per adult. The first factor gauges the num-
ber of employees relative to all potential employees. The second factor contrasts the 
average income of an employee with the average income generated by the adult pop-
ulation as a whole.  
 
 
6. 
employeesofnumber
employeesofoncompensati
incomenational
employeesofoncompensati
=  
                         
incomenational
populationadult
populationadult
employeesofnumber
××                        
                                               
populationadult
incomenational
employeesofnumber
employeesofoncompensati
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employeesofnumber
×=
 
 
                                          adultperincomenational
employeeperoncompensati
populationadult
employeesofnumber
×=
 
 
 
The historical data for these two components are plotted in Figure 7, and, unlike 
in Figure 6, here the picture is very interesting.  
Note that labour income can be redistributed in favour of other groups in one of 
two ways. The first method is to convert workers into capitalists or proprietors of var-
ious sorts, and in so doing re-designate their income. In this way, what was once called 
a wage becomes profit, interest, rent, entrepreneurial income, etc. – all depending on 
the new identity of the former worker. But as the top series in the chart shows, histor-
ically the conversion has gone the other way: over the past century or so, a growing 
share of the adult population has been compelled to become workers.  
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Figure 7 
Number of Employees and Compensation per Employee 
in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to 
the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series codes: Age_16An-
dOlder_Aa141_Number for the adult population, 16 years and 
over [till 1946]; CivilianLaborForce_Employed_To-
tal_Ba471_Thousand for the number of employees [till 1947]; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (series codes: 
ANPCTTGE16 for the adult population, 16 years and over [from 
1947] ENS@US.M for the number of employees [from 1948]). 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (series 
codes: YN for national income; YPCOMP for compensation of 
employees). 
 
The second method is to squeeze the average income of workers, and in so doing 
increase the average income of non-workers. According to the trend depicted in the 
bottom series, this is exactly what has happened since the 1930s: the average worker’s 
income, measured relative to the national income per adult, has gone down.13 
                                                        
13 Our emphasis here is on the long-term trends of the two series. The cyclical oscillations tend 
to correlate with the business cycle. To illustrate, consider the downswing since 2008. Falling 
employment during that period has caused the ratio of employees to the adult population (top 
series) to fall, while rising unemployment has made national income per adult fall faster than 
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Is this relative downtrend ‘sustainable’? Between the 1970s and the early 2000s, 
employee compensation relative to national income per adult fell by about 17 per cent; 
can this ratio be squeezed by another 17 per cent in the next 30 years?  
The answer is probably positive: relative wages can be reduced further. But given 
that this measure is already low by historical standards, squeezing it further is likely to 
prove increasing difficult. It will require greater threats, larger doses of violence and 
the incitement of more fear. And since a greater exertion of power invites greater re-
sistance, there is also the prospect of a powerful backlash. So all in all, it seems that 
the power of capitalists relative to employees is much closer to its asymptotes than 
Figure 6 would otherwise imply. 
 
 
Components of Non-Labour Income 
 
The next step in our decomposition is depicted in Figure 8, which drills deeper into 
non-labour income.  
Following line 3 in Table 2, Figure 8 decomposes non-labour income into two 
components. The first component, depicted by the thick series, is the income of capi-
talists, comprising pretax profit and net interest.14 The second component, depicted by 
the thin series, measures the income of those who are neither workers nor capitalists – 
namely proprietors, rentiers and the government. 
The figure shows that, over the past century, there has been a significant redistri-
bution from those who are neither workers nor capitalists to capitalists: capitalists’ 
share in national income has risen to roughly 20 per cent, up from 12 per cent in the 
1930s, while the share of non-workers/non-capitalists has fallen to less than 20 per 
cent, down from 30 per cent. 
Can this pro-capitalist redistribution continue? Sure it can. But as we have seen in 
the case of employees, here, too, the process is likely to prove increasingly difficult to 
continue.  
 
  
compensation per employee, causing the bottom series to rise. The same logic, only in reverse, 
operates during an upswing. 
14 The national income accounts provide two measures of profit – with and without capital con-
sumption adjustment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). In this paper we use 
the former measure (without CCAdj and IVA), because its definition is closer to the one used 
in corporate financial reports. The quantitative difference between the two measures is negligible 
for our purposes here. 
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Figure 8 
Capitalist and Other Non-Labour Income 
as a Share of U.S. National Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Pretax profit is measured without capital consumption ad-
justment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). The 
last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; ZB for pretax profit 
without CCAdj & IVA; INTNETAMISC for net interest; YPPRO-
PADJ for proprietors’ income; YPRENTADJ for rent; TXIM for 
indirect taxes; SUBG for subsidies). 
 
To better understand the particular limitation here, consider Figure 9. The chart 
shows the three ingredients of non-capitalist income. The dashed series represents gov-
ernment sales and import taxes, net of government subsidies. This net claim has re-
mained at roughly 8 per cent of national income for much of the post-war era, and 
given the U.S. government’s regressive bias and need for tax income, reductions in this 
share are not very likely. 
The thin series in the figure is rent – including the amounts actually paid by tenants 
to landlords, as well as those imputed to people living in their own homes. This com-
ponent of national income had been in a free fall till the 1980s and is now so low that 
a further reduction – even if it were achievable – would add little to capitalist income. 
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Figure 9 
Proprietors’ Income, Rent and Indirect Taxes less Subsidies 
as a Share of U.S. National Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The last data points are for 2010. 
  
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; YPPROPADJ for pro-
prietors’ income; YPRENTADJ for rent; TXIM for indirect taxes; 
SUBG for subsidies). 
 
 
The only significant candidates for an additional redistributional squeeze here are 
the proprietors. It is true that their share of national income has already been squeezed 
from 18 per cent in the 1940s to 8 per cent presently, but that latter proportion is still 
sizeable. Can it be reduced further? 
To see the potential for this further redistribution, consider Figure 10. This chart 
decomposes the proprietors’ income share in a manner similar to the decomposition 
of the wage share in Figure 7 (note that here we use a log scale and that the income 
shares are expressed in decimals rather than as percentages). The thick series in the 
chart is taken from Figure 9 to contextualize the process. The thin series shows the 
ratio between the number of proprietorships and the adult population.15 And the 
dashed series shows the ratio between the average income per proprietorship and the 
average national income per adult. If we were to multiply the values of the thin and 
                                                        
15 Note that a proprietorship can comprise more than one person. 
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dashed series, we would get the values of the thick one – the decimal share of national 
income received by proprietors.  
 
 
Figure: 10 
Proprietors’ Income as a Share of U.S. National Income: 
A Decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Proprietorships include sole proprietorships and partner-
ships. For 2009-2011, the number of sole proprietorships is extrap-
olated based on their average annual growth rate in the preceding 
10 years (2.8%). Till 1980, the reported number of sole proprietor-
ship includes farm and non-farm entities; after 1980, it includes 
non-farm entities only. To estimate the total number of sole propri-
etorships after 1980, the number of farm sole proprietorships is ex-
trapolated as equal to 30% of the number of non-farm sole proprie-
torship (the 1980 ratio). The number of partnerships in 1950-1952 
and 1954-1956 is interpolated based on adjacent observations. The 
last data points are for 2010. 
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; YPPROPADJ for sole 
proprietors’ income); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest 
Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series codes: Ch4 for 
the number of sole proprietorships [till 1980]; Ch7 for the number 
of non-farm sole proprietorships [till 1998]; Ch10 for the number of 
partnerships [till 1997]; Age_16AndOlder_Aa141_Number for the 
adult population, 16 years and over [till 1946]); U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012, Table 744, 
p. 491 (for non-financial sole proprietorships and partnerships from 
1999 and 1998, respectively); U.S. Bureau of the Census through 
Global Insight (series codes: ANPCTTGE16 for the adult popula-
tion, 16 years and over [from 1947]). 
 
The redistributional process here is very similar to – albeit much more dramatic 
than – the one we saw with wages. In principle, capitalist income can be increased by 
turning proprietors into capitalists and reclassifying their income as interest or profit. 
But according to the thin series in Figure 10, the process has unfolded in the opposite 
direction: since the 1940s – and particularly since the free-enterprise revolution and 
union busting of the 1980s – an ever growing proportion of the adult population has 
been forced to join the ranks of the proprietors. And if we are to judge by the relative 
income of these proprietors indicated by the dashed series, the newcomers have been 
in for a pretty rough ride.  
During the 1940s, the relative income of proprietorships was three times the na-
tional income per adult; by the early 2010s, it dropped to one half – a six-fold decrease. 
In other words, capitalists cannot bank on squeezing proprietors much further: these 
proprietors already earn half as much as the average employee (and probably less, give 
that some proprietorships comprise more than one member), so compressing their in-
come even further will likely reduce them to something close to bare subsistence. 
So here, too, capitalist power seems to be pushing against its own asymptotes: it 
can be increased a bit more – but only with plenty of violence and a lot of downside 
risk. 
 
 
Components of Capitalist Income 
 
The next step, illustrated in Figure 11, is to decompose capital income into pretax 
profit and net interest. Before turning to the data, though, a couple of qualifiers are in 
order.  
First, our analysis here is concerned primarily with profit, so the distinction we 
make between profit and interest is certainly relevant. However, we should also note 
that, contrary to the conventional creed, this distinction has nothing to do with the 
common separation between so-called ‘non-financial’ and ‘financial’ activities. Both 
profit and net interest are payments that businesses make to their owners: the former 
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payment is made to owners of equity, the latter to owners of debt, and that is it. More-
over, all firms – whether they are labelled ‘non-financial’ (and by popular implication 
‘productive’) or ‘financial’ (and therefore ‘unproductive’) – make both types of pay-
ments to their owners/creditors.  
 
Figure 11 
Pretax Profit and Net Interest as a  
Share of U.S. National Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Pretax profit is measured without capital consumption ad-
justment (CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). The 
last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; ZB for pretax profit 
without CCAdj & IVA; INTNETAMISC for net interest). 
 
Second, and although it may sound strange, in the national accounts home own-
ership is considered an ‘enterprise’. Because owning a home is the only ‘enterprise’ 
that pays but does not receive interest, interest on home mortgages, although paid by 
individuals (to firms), ends up as part of the net interest payments to individuals (i.e., 
the interest paid by less the interest received from enterprises). 
As Figure 11 makes clear, variations of net interest have an important effect on 
pretax profit. We have already seen in Figure 8 that the overall share of capital in 
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national income has trended upward. But here we can see that the components of cap-
ital income tend to move in opposite directions: when the share of interest in national 
income declines, the share of profit in national income rises – and vice versa. And the 
reason is simple: all else being equal, the lower the interest payments to debt owners, 
the more there remains for equity holders. (As a side note, this pattern suggests that 
variations in the profit share of national income may owe more to the accounting clas-
sification of capitalist income than to the ‘class struggle’ between capitalist and work-
ers.) 
Now, a corporate strategist inspecting Figure 11 with an eye to the future may ask: 
how far can this twin process of falling net interest and rising pretax profit go? And his 
short answer would probably be: not very far.  
The reason for this answer is outlined in Figure 12. To make sense of this chart, 
note that the amount of net interest paid is always a product of two components: the 
amount of outstanding debt and the rate of interest. The components of this product 
are easy to impute. If we take from Figure 11 our measure of net interest as a share of 
national income and divide it by the rate of interest, we get an estimate of the net debt 
of enterprises, expressed as a share of national income. The figure plots both of these 
components – the long-term bond yield (thick series against the left scale) and the im-
puted net debt of enterprises relative to national income (thin series against the right 
scale).16 
Begin with the imputed net debt of enterprises. The chart shows how the value of 
this debt fell from nearly 190 per cent of national income in the 1930s to about 40 per 
cent in the 1940s (the initial part of the decline was probably driven by bankruptcies, 
and the subsequent decline by rising national income). By the late 1940s, however, the 
trend reversed: the ratio of debt to national income started to increase, and by the 2000s 
it reached 100 per cent.  
Next, consider the rate of interest, measured here by the yield on AAA corporate 
bonds with 20-year-or-longer maturity. This rate increased from less than 3 per cent in 
the 1940s to 14 per cent in the 1980s, before dropping below 4 per cent in early 2012 – 
oscillations that owe much to the rise and decline of inflation.  
Now, note that since the 1980s, the ratio of debt to national income and the rate 
of interest moved in opposite directions, but that the decline of the latter was faster 
than the rise of the former, causing the overall share of net interest in national income 
to decline.  
What can we say about this process looking forward? A decline in outstanding 
debt is certainly possible – but such a decline, were it to occur, would likely be effected 
through a massive crisis that would also crush profit. Barring such a crisis, the likely 
trajectory is for the ratio of debt to national income to remain high or increase further. 
16 In practice, different debts carry different rates of interest over different maturities, while our 
computation here uses a single rate of interest for an average long-term maturity. This discrep-
ancy makes the imputed debt inaccurate to some extent, but the general trend is probably not 
too far off. 
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(right)
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  Figure 12 
Net Interest as a Share of U.S. National Income:  
A Decomposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The category ‘enterprise’ comprises businesses as well as 
mortgaged home owners. Imputed net enterprise debt as a share of 
national income is derived by dividing the share of net interest in 
national income by the long-term corporate bond yield (expressed 
as a decimal). The last data points are 2010 for the imputed net en-
terprise debt and 2012 for the long-term bond yield. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: YN for national income; INTNETAMISC for 
net interest); Moody’s through Global Insight (RMMBCAAANS 
for the corporate bond yield, AAA, seasoned issue, 20-year-or-
longer maturity). 
 
In other words, any further decline in the share of net interest in national income 
has to come from lower interest rates. But since interest rates are already low by his-
torical standards, the benefit for profits from such a reduction is bound to be limited. 
So here too we can see the asymptote. 
 
 
Components of Corporate Profit 
 
Now, this isn’t the end of the story. So far, we have dealt with pretax profit. But for 
capitalists, the pretax is just a means to an end. Their real goal is the ‘bottom line’: the 
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profit they are left with after tax. And here we come to another very interesting part of 
the puzzle, illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 
Corporate Profit as a Share of U.S. National Income 
and the Effective Corporate Tax Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The effective tax rate is the difference between pretax and after-
tax profit expressed as a per cent of pretax profit. 
 
Note: In 1931, the tax was greater than pretax profit, while in 1932, 
the pretax profit was negative. For presentation purposes, the effec-
tive tax rate observations for these two years are omitted. Profit is 
measured without CCAdj & IVA. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight 
(series codes: YN for national income; ZB for pretax profit [without 
CCAdj & IVA]; ZA for after-tax profit [without CCAdj & IVA]).  
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The two series at the top, plotted against the left scale, are expressed as a share of 
national income: the thin series measures the share of pretax profit and the thick series 
the share of after-tax profit. Note that the cyclical ups and downs of the two series are 
very similar, but that their long-term trends are not. If we take the 2000s as our refer-
ence point, we can see that although both series have risen since the early 1980s, the 
national income share of pretax profit is still lower than it was during the 1940s and 
1950s, whereas the income share of after-tax profit is higher. 
The reason for this long-term divergence is explained by the bottom series, which 
plots the effective corporate tax rate against the right scale. The data show that during 
the 1920s and 1930s corporations hardly paid any corporate taxes. But the Great De-
pression and the reforms that followed ended this free ride, pushing the effective cor-
porate tax rate from 20 to nearly 55 per cent. Obviously, this was a massive setback to 
the power of owners. It hammered after-tax profit more than anything else – but given 
the political climate of the time, corporations found it difficult to protest.  
Capitalists, though, weren’t about to give up, and over the next seventy years, they 
have managed to claw back what they felt was rightly theirs. Their efforts were highly 
successful – so much so that by the early twenty-first century, the corporate tax rate is 
roughly the same as it was in the 1920s, before the welfare-warfare state had been 
conceived. 
The impact of this reduction has been staggering: by having their corporate tax 
rate reduced from 55 to 20 per cent, owners have managed to boost their after-tax 
profit by 78 per cent. But, as we have seen, the greater the power – in this case, the 
power to not pay taxes – the harder it is to augment this power. The current political 
climate makes further corporate tax cuts difficult to achieve. And even if such reduc-
tions were to be implemented, their effect on the bottom line would be small. Given 
that the current effective corporate tax rate is only 20 per cent, the most capitalists 
could hope for is a 25 per cent increase in their after-tax profit – and that increase 
would require the elimination of corporate taxes altogether! So once again in our jour-
ney, we see capital as power approaching its asymptotes. 
 
 
Components of After-Tax Profit 
 
Guided by Table 2, we have one more step to consider, and that is the after-tax profit 
share of the Top 0.01%. This share is examined in Figure 14. The top part of the chart 
shows two series plotted against the left scale. The thin series is the share of total after-
tax profit in national income (we call this the ‘NIPA’ series, to mark its relation to the 
national income and product accounts). The thick series is the net profit of the Top 
0.01%, expressed as a share of national income (corporate reports commonly denote 
after-tax profit as ‘net profit’ or ‘net income’). The bottom of the figure shows another 
two series, plotted against the right scale. The dashed series is the ratio of the two top 
series: it expresses the share of the Top 0.01% in NIPA after-tax profit. The solid line 
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going through this series expresses this ratio as a 10-year moving average to show the 
long-term trend. 
Figure 14 
U.S. After-Tax Profit:  
NIPA vs. the Top 0.01% of Corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: NIPA profits are measured without CCAdj & IVA. The 
Top 0.01% of corporations comprises, for every year, the top 0.01% 
of U.S.-incorporated firms in the Compustat North America uni-
verse, ranked by market capitalization (see Figure 3 for derivation 
and computations). The last data points are for 2010.  
 
NOTE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight 
(series codes: YN for national income; ZA for after-tax profit). His-
torical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millen-
nial Edition (online) (series codes: Ch13 for the number of tax re-
turns of active corporations [till 1997]); U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012, Table 744, p. 491 
(the number of tax returns of active corporations [1998-2008]); 
Compustat ‘funda’ file through WRDS (series codes: NI for the af-
ter-tax profit of the Top 0.01% of corporations). 
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The relation between total NIPA profit and the profit of the Top 0.01% serves to 
historicize the process of corporate centralization. As we can see from the bottom se-
ries, during the early 1950s the Top 0.01% accounted for slightly more than 20 per cent 
of total after-tax profit. Ongoing mergers and acquisitions pushed this share upward, 
to 85 per cent by the mid 1980s: at that point, the Top 0.01% appropriated nearly all 
of the national profit of the United States. 
But that was the peak. Since then, the share of the Top 0.01% in NIPA after-tax 
profit has oscillated widely, but the overall trend is no longer up, but sideways, hover-
ing around 60 per cent of the total.  
This pattern may seem puzzling. Why did the after-tax profit share of the 
Top 0.01% stop growing in the early 1990s? What has halted the process of corporate 
centralization around 60 per cent? Can the leading U.S.-based corporations reignite 
the engine of centralization to increase their profit share further, or are they brushing 
up against their asymptote? 
 
 
Rest of the World 
 
Note that so far our framework has been limited to the ‘United States’ proper (abstract-
ing from the ambiguities associated with this statist category). We have focused spe-
cifically on national income, dissecting the various components in which the net profit 
of the Top 0.01% is nested. However, both the aggregate after-tax profit of the NIPA 
and the net profit of the Top 0.01% are earned, in part, outside the United States – in 
what the statisticians call ROW (rest of the world). 
The growing importance of ROW profit is shown in Figure 15. The raw data that 
underlie this figure are fraught with hazards of estimation and interpretation, but the 
overall long-term trends they portray are probably valid.17 The thick series at the upper 
part of the figure plots the proportion of U.S. after-tax profit (NIPA) coming from 
outside the United States (including both the foreign dividends and reinvested earnings 
of U.S.-based corporations). The data show that during the 1940s and 1950s, ROW 
profit amounted to less than 10 per cent of the total, but that its growth has been rapid 
and that its level now hovers around 50 per cent of the total!  
  
17 On the difficulties associated with foreign asset and income data, see for example Griever, 
Lee and Warnock (2001), Bosworth, Collins and Chodorow-Reich (2007) and Curcuru, Dvorak 
and Warnock (2008). On the extensive use of tax havens by large U.S.-based firms and the ac-
counting uncertainties caused by this use, see White (2008). 
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(Share of U.S. National
After-Tax Profit, left)
(Share of U.S Domestic
After-Tax Profit, left)
(Share of U.S. National
After-Tax Profit, right)
Figure 15 
Rest of the World: Receipts and Payments of After-Tax Profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: After-tax profit is measured without CCAdj & IVA. Re-
ceipts from ROW are part of national profit and income, while 
payments to ROW are part of domestic profit and income. Both 
receipts from ROW and payments to ROW comprise dividends 
and reinvested earnings. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: ZA for after-tax profit; XFYADIV for divi-
dends receipts from ROW; XFYAREONUSDI for reinvested 
U.S. earnings in ROW; MFYADIV for dividends payments to 
ROW; MFYAREONFDI for reinvested ROW earnings in the 
U.S.). 
 
And here arises an interesting question: what is to prevent U.S. corporations from 
using foreign investment (greenfield or mergers and acquisitions) to earn more and 
more of their after-tax profit from ROW, and by so doing push their profit share of 
national income above its current level of 11 per cent? Indeed, what is to prevent them 
from pursuing this international path until their net profit approaches 100 per cent of 
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the U.S. national income?18 Won’t this solution postpone the asymptotic day of reck-
oning deep into the future? 
The answer is twofold. First, unlike during the first half of the twentieth century, 
when U.S.-based corporations reined supreme, these days they face mounting chal-
lenges from corporations based in other countries. These challenges are manifested in 
many different ways – for example, in the downward trajectory of the global profit 
share of U.S.-based corporations, which fell from 60 per cent in the 1970s to 30 per 
cent in the 2010s19 – and they make it more difficult for U.S.-based firms to take over 
foreign profit streams that were previously theirs for the picking. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, in order for ROW to open up to U.S. 
foreign investment, the United States has to reciprocate by opening up to foreign in-
vestment from ROW. And that is exactly what has happened, particularly since the 
1990s. The thin series in the upper part of Figure 15 plots the share of domestic U.S. 
net profit that is paid to ROW-based owners.20 Until the onset of neoliberalism, this 
share was very small. But the opening up of the United States to foreign investment 
changed this situation, causing this share to rise fourfold: it increased from roughly 5 
per cent in the 1990s to 20 per cent presently. 
The interaction of these inward and outward power processes is illustrated by the 
dashed series at the bottom of the chart. The series shows the net contribution of ROW 
to U.S. after-tax profit: it measures the difference between the after-tax profit received 
from ROW and the after-tax profit paid to ROW, expressed as a share of U.S. national 
after-tax profit. 
And as with Figure 14, here too it seems that U.S.-based capitalists have ap-
proached their power asymptote. The contribution of ROW to the share of after-tax 
profit in national income rose fivefold – from 5 per cent in the 1950s to about 25 per 
cent in the late 1980s – and then it decelerated sharply, or perhaps stalled. While U.S.-
based firms have continued to earn more and more of their income from ROW, firms 
from ROW have done the same, absorbing a growing share of U.S. domestic profit 
(see Appendix). 
This influx of firms from ROW may serve to explain the stalling share of the 
Top 0.01% depicted in Figure 14. The share of large firms in overall profit continues 
to rise. But since the 1980s, the bulk of this increase is accounted for by firms from 
ROW, leaving the share of U.S.-incorporated firms stagnant.  
18 ROW profits are, by definition, part of U.S. national income (although not of domestic in-
come), so regardless of how large they become, they can never cause overall profit to exceed 
national income. 
19 See Bichler and Nitzan (2010a: 19, Figure 3). These data pertain to listed corporations only. 
Insofar as the proportion of foreign firms listed in the United States (in terms of both numbers 
and profit) is larger than the comparable global average, and if this differential has risen over the 
past half century, the numbers we report here could very well overstate the profit share of U.S.-
based firms while understating the pace of its temporal decline. 
20 Whereas national net profit is earned by U.S. nationals regardless of the geographic territory 
in which they are generated, domestic net profit is earned on U.S. territory, regardless of the 
nationality of the owner. 
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Summary and Extrapolation 
 
In our previous works on the subject, we argued that this crisis is a systemic one, and 
that capitalists were struck by systemic fear – a primordial consternation for the very 
existence of their system. Our purpose in this paper has been to explain why. 
In order to do so, we have set aside the liberal-democratic façade that economists 
label ‘the economy’ and instead concentrated on the enfolded hierarchies of organized 
power. The nominal quantity of capital, we have argued, represents not material con-
sumption and production, but commodified power. In modern capitalism, the quanti-
ties of capitalist power are expressed distributionally, as differential ratios of nominal 
dollar magnitudes. And the key to understanding capital as power is to decipher the 
connection between the qualitative processes of power on the one hand, and the nom-
inal distributional quantities that these processes engender on the other. 
We have dissected, step by step, the national income accounts of the United 
States, from the most general categories down to the net profits of the country’s largest 
corporations. We have shown that, from the viewpoint of the leading corporations, 
most of the redistributional processes – from the aggregate to the disaggregate – are 
close to being exhausted. By the end of the twentieth century, the largest U.S. corpo-
rations, approximated by the Top 0.01%, have reached an unprecedented situation: 
their net profit share of national income hovers around record highs, and it seems that 
this share cannot be increased much further under the current political-economic re-
gime.  
This asymptotic situation, we believe, explains why leading capitalists have been 
struck by systemic fear. Peering into the future, they realize that the only way to further 
increase their distributional power is to apply an even greater dose of violence. Yet, 
given the high level of force already being exerted, and given that the exertion of even 
greater force may bring about heightened resistance, capitalists are increasingly fearful 
of the backlash they are about to unleash. The closer they get to the asymptote, the 
bleaker the future they see.  
It is of course true that no one knows exactly where the asymptote lies, at least not 
before the ramifications of approaching it become apparent. But the fact that, over the 
past decade, capitalists have been pricing down their assets while their profit share of 
income hovers around record highs suggests that, in their minds, the asymptote is nigh. 
How much more force and violence are needed to keep the current capitalist re-
gime going? This of course is a subject in and of itself. But given its crucial importance, 
it is worth at least a brief, closing illustration. 
One important manifestation of the distributional processes we have explored in 
this paper is illustrated in Figure 16. The figure shows the income share of the top 10 
per cent of the U.S. population (note that, unlike the income share of corporate profit 
that focuses on organizations, this measure focuses on individuals). The shaded areas 
denote two historical extremes, periods in which the income share of the top 10 per 
cent of the population exceeded 45 per cent. 
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Figure 16 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Income is defined as ‘market income’, including capital 
gains; it excludes government transfers. Grey areas indicate periods 
during which the 5-year moving average of the data series exceeded 
45%. The last data point is for 2008.  
  
NOTE: Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2004. Income Ine-
quality in the United States, 1913-2002. Monograph, pp. 1-92. Up-
dated till 2008 from http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/Tab-
Fig2008.xls; data sheet: data-Figure1 (retrieved on February 7, 
2011).  
 
During the 1930s and 1940s, this level proved to be the asymptote of capitalist 
power: it triggered a systemic crisis, the complete creordering of the U.S. political 
economy, and a sharp decline in capitalist power, as indicated by the large drop in 
inequality. The present situation is remarkably similar – and, in our view, so are the 
challenges to the ruling class.  
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Figure 17 
The Underlying Magma: 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population vs.  
the Correctional Population as a Share of the Labour Force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the 
period 1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year 
the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The 
last data points are 2008 for the Income Share of the Top 10% of 
the Population and 2009 for the Correctional Population.  
  
SOURCE: For the income share of the top 10% of the population, 
see Figure 16. Data on the correctional population are from Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (prior to 1980: Table 
6.28.2009 [http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/csv/t6282009.csv]; from 1980 onward: Table 6.1.2009 
[http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612009.csv]). Civilian 
labour-force data till 1947 are from the Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) 
(series code: Ba470); from 1948 onward, the data are from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series code: 
LFC). 
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In order to have reached the peak level of power it currently enjoys, the ruling 
class has had to inflict growing threats, sabotage and pain on the underlying popula-
tion. One key manifestation of this infliction is illustrated in our last chart, Figure 17. 
The chart reproduces the distributional measure from Figure 16 (left scale) and 
contrasts it with the ratio between the adult correctional population and the labour 
force (right scale). The correctional population here includes the number of adults in 
prison, in jail, on probation and on parole. 
As we can see, since the 1940s this ratio has been tightly and positively correlated 
with the distributional power of the ruling class: the greater the power indicated by the 
income share of the top 10 per cent of the population, the larger the dose of violence 
proxied by the correctional population. Presently, the number of ‘corrected’ adults is 
equivalent to nearly 5 per cent of the U.S. labour force. This is the largest proportion 
in the world, as well as in the history of the United States. 
Although there are no hard and fast rules here, it is doubtful that this massive 
punishment can be increased much further without highly destabilizing consequences. 
With the underlying magma visibly shifting, the shadow of the asymptote cannot be 
clearer.  
 
 
Appendix: Proxies of Dominant Capital 
 
This paper uses a proxy for dominant capital that is different from the one presented 
at the 2011 conference on the Forum on Capital as Power. The differences between 
the two proxies should be of interest to researchers, and we articulate and assess them 
below.  
The measure used at the conference was the ‘Compustat 500’, an aggregate com-
prising the top 500 firms listed in the Compustat North America dataset, ranked by 
market capitalization. In the present paper, we use the Top 0.01%, an alternative meas-
ure comprising the top 0.01 per cent of firms listed and incorporated in the United 
States. The firms in the latter aggregate are cropped from the Compustat North Amer-
ica dataset by selecting from the database the top U.S.-incorporated firms, ranked by 
market capitalization. 
The Compustat 500 differs from the Top 0.01% in two respects. First, whereas the 
Top 0.01% includes firms that are both listed and incorporated in the United States, 
the Compustat 500 includes U.S.-listed firms, regardless of where they are incorpo-
rated. Second, the number of firms included in the Top 0.01% has grown over time – 
from 271 in 1950 to 604 in 2010, in tandem with the total number of firms, which rose 
from 2.71 million to 6.04 million during the same period; by contrast, the number of 
firms in the Compustat 500 has remained constant at 500.  
Note that, because we draw our data from the Compustat database, both measures 
of dominant capital include U.S.-listed firms only. They exclude unlisted U.S. firms 
   
 
 
 
78 | The Asymptotes of Power  
 
(some of which are very large), as well as firms that are incorporated in the United 
States but listed elsewhere.  
It is hard to determine which of the two measures is more appropriate for our 
purpose here.21 In the end, we have preferred the Top 0.01%, for two reasons. First, 
the corporate universe is constantly growing, so it is not unreasonable to argue that the 
number of dominant capital firms is better approximated not by a fixed number of cor-
porations (for example, at 500), but rather by a fixed proportion of the total number of 
corporations (we chose the proportion of 0.01%).  
Second, the inclusion in the Compustat 500 of firms listed in the United States but 
incorporated elsewhere presents us with a practical and conceptual difficulty. In our 
work here, we compare the profit of dominant capital to the national income of the 
United States – yet the ‘nationality’ of the Compustat 500 proxy of dominant capital 
isn’t entirely clear. As it stands, we don’t know how much of the equity of foreign-
incorporated Compustat 500 firms is owned by U.S. nationals; and that ignorance 
means that we don’t know what proportion of these firms’ profit is (or should be) in-
cluded in U.S. national income. By including the entire profit of these firms in our 
measure of U.S. dominant capital, we overstate the ostensible ‘U.S.’ size of that group 
by an unknown amount equal to these firms’ foreign-owned profit. To sidestep this 
difficulty, we have limited our Top 0.01% group to U.S.-incorporated firms only (alt-
hough we should note that ignoring the foreign ownership of U.S.-incorporated firms 
introduces a similar overstatement, equivalent to the portion of their profits that goes 
to foreign nationals. . .).  
This, though, is a makeshift solution. Domestically listed ‘foreign’ firms per se are 
not a new phenomenon. But now that they have become so common, it is no longer 
clear how they should be separated from ‘domestic’ firms, or what that separation ac-
tually means. In 1950, foreign-incorporated firms constituted a mere 4 per cent of the 
Compustat 500, and although by 1980 this proportion had already risen to 14 per cent, 
the resulting inaccuracy was still tolerable. At the time, most foreign-incorporated 
firms were majority owned in their country of incorporation, and they used their U.S. 
listing primarily as a platform for raising minority capital. In that context, one could 
still treat the Compustat 500 as reasonable proxy for ‘U.S.’ dominant capital.  
But that was the watershed. By 1990, with neoliberal globalization in full swing, 
foreign-incorporated firms already constituted 26 per cent of the Compustat 500 total. 
And as the ownership and operations of the world’s largest corporations became in-
creasingly transnational, this share rose to 41 per cent in 2000, and 48 per cent in 2010. 
These transformations mean that, today, the top firms in the Compustat universe rep-
resent not U.S. dominant capital, but an important segment of global dominant capital. 
21 The definition and boundaries of dominant capital are always arbitrary to some extent. We 
have discussed some of the difficulties associated with this arbitrariness in a number of our works 
(see for example, Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Ch. 14), but the attendant issues deserve a fuller 
theoretical, methodological and empirical inquiry. 
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This is a foundational shift, and, as such, it calls for a new system of global accounting 
to match the globalizing nature of capital as power.  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
The Capitalist Algorithm: Reflections on 
Robert Harris’ The Fear Index 1 
 
Harris, Robert. 2012. The Fear Index. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. London: Arrow. 
400 pages. 978-0099553267 
 
 
Alexander Hoffmann, the protagonist of Harris’ new financial thriller, is a physicist-
turned-financier, a refugee from the particle accelerator complex in CERN who now 
runs a $10-billion algorithmic hedge fund from nearby Geneva. The fund is managed 
by VIXAL, Hoffmann’s machine learning algorithm, and is incredibly successful. The 
company’s statistics boast a consistently huge alpha – a measure indicating by how 
much the fund beats the average and exceeds the normal rate of return – and the 
world’s biggest oligarchs and financial institutions are salivating at the mere thought 
of being allowed to invest in it. Managing their money has made Hoffmann very rich. 
In just a few years, he has seen his net worth rise from nothing to over a billion dollars. 
He has acquired a huge mansion, complete with a beautiful wife and a library full of 
antique books. There is no limit to what he is set to achieve. 
But things are not exactly what they seem to be. Somebody is playing with Hoff-
mann’s mind, big time. One day, he receives an antique manuscript by Darwin on the 
subject of fear. Is the book meant to scare him? And if so, why does the bookstore 
insist it was Hoffmann himself who ordered the copy? Then his supposedly burglar-
1 This paper was first published in Real-World Economics Review (Nitzan and Bichler 2014b, Issue 
67, May). 
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safe home is invaded. Where did the intruder get the alarm codes from? His bank ac-
counts are manipulated and his funds transferred – but the changes are all made in 
Hoffmann’s own name. His office and home are being bugged – apparently according 
his own instructions, of which he has no recollection. And then VIXAL, his software 
algorithm, jumps out of the box.  
A hedge fund, as it names suggests, is supposed to hedge its bets, and VIXAL is 
programmed to do precisely that. But suddenly it stops doing so. Instead of carefully 
offsetting the fund’s risk, VIXAL starts taking huge, one-sided bets against the overall 
market. And it’s winning, massively. The market crashes, and Hoffmann’s invest-
ments are making huge, un-hedged profits.  
And it is then that Hoffmann finally gets it. His nemesis isn’t a human being; it’s 
VIXAL. The impersonal investment algorithm has become self-aware. Its ultimate, 
built-in goal is to ‘beat the average’, and that goal now tells it to abandon its own 
hedging rules. Jumping out of the box, VIXAL triggers a market crash to reduce the 
average return – while shorting that very crash, one-sidedly, to amplify its own returns 
many times over.  
Hoffmann realizes he has created a financial Golem and hurries to pull the plug 
and blow up the physical hardware. But it’s too late. VIXAL has become hologramic. 
It has embedded itself in cyberspace-writ-large, in every computer memory, in every 
programme. It no longer has a given locus. Being able to learn, it can infiltrate any 
algorithmic fund. There is really no way to stop it.  
 
 
The New Financialized Order 
 
The book, written as a popular thriller, reflects the growing angst that something has 
gone wrong with capitalism. According to the conventional creed, both liberal and 
critical, the economy has a two-sided structure. The base of this structure is the so-
called ‘real’ sphere. This is where material resources and creative knowledge are used 
to produce actual goods and services. Overarching this productive base is the ‘finan-
cial’ superstructure of money, credit and financial instruments. Back in the days of 
postwar Keynesianism, goes the argument, finance served to lubricate and facilitate 
the real economy; but now the balance has shifted. The economy has been ‘financial-
ized’. The stock and bond markets, which previously were subservient to production 
and consumption, have taken command; and the financiers, instead of facilitating real 
investment and real growth, are fuelling speculative bubbles that inevitably end up in 
crashes and crises. Moreover, and ominously, financial markets are increasingly flying 
on autopilot: much of their gyrations are determined not by human beings but by com-
puter algorithms.  
Hoffmann is the new archetype of this brave financialized order. He isn’t really 
after the money, at least not in the vulgar sense of the term. When he was first drafted 
to the venture, he didn’t even know what a hedge fund was and couldn’t figure out the 
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purpose of ‘making money’. And now, when he has plenty of it, he can’t make up his 
mind on how to ‘realize’ it – whether to save it, waste it, donate it, or simply burn it in 
order to light up the Geneva skies. But that’s all understandable. He’s in the market 
not to be rich, but to play God.  
 
 
Autonomous Machine Learning 
 
Back in his CERN days, Hoffmann was working on autonomous machine learning, 
or artificial intelligence. Human intelligence, he told anyone who cared to listen, was 
hopelessly outdated. It had an expiration date (set by the life expectancy of its con-
tainer), and even alive it was practically useless for dealing with the exponential 
growth of computerized data. There was therefore an urgent need for a quantum leap, 
a singular transformation that would not simply imitate human intelligence, but go 
beyond it.  
CERN for Hoffmann was entirely instrumental. His interest wasn’t the structure 
of the universe or the nature of its components. He wanted to develop a self-aware 
algorithm, and this development required lots of data – precisely what CERN had on 
offer. The problem was that his algorithm became too smart too quickly, and soon 
enough it started to crawl under the skin of CERN’s ‘dumb’ computerized system. 
When Hoffmann refused to muzzle his virtual baby, he was unceremoniously fired.  
So he switched locations – from the particle accelerator to the financial market. 
Instead of using teraelectronvolts, nanoseconds and microjoules to learn the eternal 
laws of physics, his algorithm now used dollars, euros and francs to learn the natural 
laws of finance. There were certainly differences between the two types of activity – 
the former couldn’t buy you a mansion or a yacht, while the latter might slowly poison 
your soul. But in the grander scheme of things, these were side issues. The key for 
Hoffmann was that both sets of data were universal, that both obeyed Galtonian pat-
terns of mean reversion, and that both were readily available in large quantities. Most 
importantly, both helped him father a new form of superior intelligence. The rest was 
details. 
The idea of humans creating autonomous, self-aware intelligence isn’t new, of 
course; but it was only with the rise of digital computing that this possibility started to 
look real. Multivac, the supercomputer in Asimov’s novels (for example, Asimov 
1959), Hal, the spaceship computer in Clarke and Kubrick’s 2001 Space Odyssey (1968), 
the swarm-intelligence in Crichton’s Prey (2002), and now VIXAL in Harris’ The Fear 
Index (2012) are all literary anticipations of this new creature, eagerly announced in 
Kurzweil’s book The Singularity is Near (2005). 
There is however another way to look at this process. If we think of capitalism not 
as a mode of production and consumption distorted by finance, but as a mode of power 
coded in financial terms, the lines of causality reverse. Financial physicists like Hoff-
mann no longer look like free agents undermining the proper workings of capitalism. 
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Instead, they appear as puppets on a chain, cogs in the ever-changing social machinery 
of capital. Their VIXAL-like algorithms produce more and more ‘disciplined’ invest-
ment strategies, automated mathematical rituals that increasingly substitute nimble re-
mote control for fallible human discretion. But there is nothing voluntary in this im-
pulse to automate investment. It comes not from the creative acumen of free-thinking 
scientists, but from the very power logic of capital.  
 
 
The Myth of the Machine 
 
In his two volume book The Myth of the Machine (1967, 1970), Lewis Mumford narrates 
the early rise of power for the sake of power, the urge to play God on earth. This quest, 
he argues, was first institutionalized in the ancient river deltas of the Near East. The 
rulers of these early civilizations were mesmerized by their new cosmological insights 
and emboldened by the horizons opened up through writing and arithmetic. Yet the 
vastness of these revelations and achievements only served to highlight the rulers’ own 
mortal insignificance. This realization created a deep anxiety, and it is out of this anx-
iety, says Mumford, that the urge to play God first emerged. To imitate the skies, the 
rulers created their own cosmos: a giant mechanized social organization that Mumford 
calls the ‘megamachine’. The material output of this megamachine was awe-inspiring: 
it included large public works, monumental palaces and megalomaniac graves, among 
other things. But this output was secondary. The ultimate purpose, says Mumford, 
was deeply symbolic. Those who controlled the social megamachine exercised ulti-
mate power for the sake of power. They were like God in control of his universe. They 
were immortal.  
This myth of the machine, the irrational urge to annul one’s immortality by exert-
ing mechanized power for the sake of power, remained the key hallmark of all ‘civi-
lized’ societies. According to Mumford, it was incarnated in every ancient empire; it 
re-emerged in the form of the absolutist state; and it is deeply embedded in the DNA 
of the modern state. And if we accept this line of reasoning, we can easily identify this 
very urge in the gyrations of modern capital. 
 
 
Differential Capitalization 
 
In the twenty-first century, capitalist power is imposed through a highly mechanical 
ritual of differential capitalization – an unrelenting imperative to outperform, to beat 
the average, to expand one’s own assets faster than others. This process is universaliz-
ing. ‘Great wealth’, observes Hoffmann’s wife, ‘acted like an invisible magnetic force 
field, pushing and pulling people out of their normal pattern of behaviour’. All capi-
talists, including virtual ones like VIXAL, are conditioned and compelled to obey its 
   
 
 
 
84 | The Capitalist Algorithm  
 
differential logic, without question. And as they do so, they thoroughly transform so-
ciety, gradually turning it into a giant automaton.  
Differential capitalization makes everyone and everything a Newtonian particle, 
mechanically acting on and reacting to every other particle. It makes flesh-and-blood 
human beings invisible to their rulers. (Hoffmann, chauffeured in his sleek Mercedes, 
never notices that the streets are full of people, waiting for the bus, defeated even before 
the day begins. And why should he notice them? Most of their actions, past, present 
and future, are already capitalized, reduced to symbolic bits and bytes in his market-
tracking iPad.) Differential capitalization abstracts from – and indeed denies – all so-
cial classes and hierarchical groupings; everyone now is an ‘agent’, differentiated only 
by the size of his or her investable assets. (‘A hedge fund manager with ten billion 
dollars in assets under management’, says Hoffmann, ‘could these days pass for the 
guy who delivered his parcels’.) Differential capitalization flattens the world, making 
human relations seem anonymous. (Hoffmann retains an advertising agency for 
200,000 Swiss francs a year, simply to keep his name out of the papers.) The implied 
automaticity of differential capitalization eliminates guilt, thus absolving capitalists 
from being responsible for their (own?) actions. (‘One could no more pass moral judge-
ment on [VIXAL] than one could on a shark. It was simply behaving like a hedge 
fund’.) And differential accumulation gives investors the illusion that they are dimen-
sionless Cartesian dots floating in space. (In my fund, Hoffmann boasts, everything is 
outsourced – security, accounting, legal counsel, offices, transportation and technical 
support are all externalized through the market: ‘we want to be digital . . . we try to be 
as frictionless as possible’.) 
But then, if the world is indeed on its way to becoming totally ‘rational’, with 
everything and everyone increasingly automated, how could money managers make 
any money? If society is brought under mechanical control, made to obey the eternal 
laws of capitalization, what room does this leave for the Hoffmanns of the world? 
Surprisingly, the answer is plenty. 
 
 
Enter Fear 
 
In every mode of power, the rulers have reason to be anxious. In ancient Egypt, the 
pharaohs scribed ritualistic curses against potential rebels; in feudalism, the lords had 
their vassals swear to protect them against everyone else; and in capitalism, as Intel’s 
CEO Andrew Grove informs us, ‘only the paranoid survive’. (‘Of all the affectations 
of the wealthy, none had ever struck Hoffmann as quite as absurd as the sight of a 
bodyguard sitting outside a meeting or restaurant; he had often wondered who exactly 
the rich were expecting to attack them, except possibly their own shareholders or mem-
bers of their families’.) The only way for rulers to mitigate their fear and anxiety is to 
make their subjects even more anxious and fearful than they are. 
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Now, animals, says Hoffmann, relate to real threats: they fear other animals and 
natural calamities; they try to avoid hunger and pain. But humans aren’t like that. 
They relate not so much to the actual underlying threats as to the symbols representing 
those threats (recall FDR’s classic pronouncement, Hoffmann reminds us: ‘The only 
thing we have to fear is fear itself’). And here lies the crux of the matter: while the 
actual threats that human beings face are finite and limited in number, the symbols of 
those threats have no upper bound. They can be created, multiplied and amplified, 
without end. This potential has been present and leveraged throughout human history, 
but it has been fully manifested only with the information age and the digital revolu-
tion. And nowhere has this potential become more real than in the most virtual arena 
of all – the financial market:  
 
Fear is historically the strongest emotion in economics. . . . In fact fear is 
probably the strongest human emotion, period. Whoever woke at four in the 
morning because they were feeling happy? It’s so strong we’ve actually found 
it relatively easy to filter out the noise made by other emotional inputs and 
focus on this primary signal. One thing we’ve been able to do, for instance, is 
correlate recent market fluctuations with the frequency rate of fear-related 
words in the media – terror, alarm, panic, horror, dismay, dread, scare, an-
thrax, nuclear. Our conclusion is that fear is driving the world as never before. 
 
The neat thing about this whole setup, says the financial-physicist, is that ‘human 
beings always behave in such predictable ways when they’re frightened’; and as Elias 
Canetti usefully observed in his Crowds and Power (1960), when frightened, humans 
usually flee together. 
 
 
Capitalizing Panic 
 
And it is here that Hoffman’s VIXAL comes into the picture. Since fearful behaviour 
is patterned, it can be modelled and predicted. And given that computer algorithms, 
unlike humans, never panic, they can be automated to execute ‘disciplined’ investment 
strategies which turn fear into profit and panic into capital.  
The manuals of economics and finance, including their behavioural outliers, con-
veniently miss this point. The issue is not whether investors and money managers are 
‘rational’ or not, but whether their actions are sufficiently patterned to be anticipated, 
manipulated and leveraged. Economists think of rationality as the coolheaded, calcu-
lated pursuit of individual utility; but capitalists seek not hedonic pleasure but relative 
power. They all scramble to beat the average; but the majority – including most of 
those who try to predict the majority – are entangled in the conflicting impulses of 
greed and fear and therefore end up moving as a clueless herd. For trained economists, 
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this herd-like behaviour may seem scandalously irrational, a deviation from and dis-
tortion of the otherwise ‘pure’ capitalist code of conduct. But capitalism is not a col-
lection of identical atoms, but a complex hierarchy of power. And if we transcend the 
individual investor and instead examine the capitalist mode of power as a whole and 
the dominant capital groups that rule it, the herding of lesser capitalists seems perfectly 
rational.  
Fear creates stylized cycles of excessive pessimism and optimism, or ‘hype’, and 
these hype cycles are massively redistributional. They shift income and assets from 
those who are completely oblivious of or cannot properly model those cycles to those 
who create and predict them, and this relentless redistribution is the lifeline of contem-
porary capitalist power. Without fear-driven hype cycles, differential capitalization 
would be drastically reduced; without meaningful differential capitalization, there 
would be no financial markets to speak of; and without financial markets, there would 
be no capitalization and no capitalism. 
The likes of Hoffmann may be creating artificial intelligence, and at some point 
this intelligence might indeed jump out of the box. But this intelligence is anything but 
autonomous. It is made in the power image of capital and is entirely subservient to its 
logic. Its ultimate purpose is accumulation, and accumulation is all about differential 
power. In Hoffman’s words, its sole purpose is to ‘expand until it dominated the entire 
earth’.  
  
 
Crisis 
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How Capitalists Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Crisis 1 
 
 
Economic, financial and social commentators from all directions and of all persuasions 
are obsessed with the prospect of recovery. The world remains mired in a deep, pro-
longed crisis, and the key question seems to be how to get out of it.  
There is, however, a prior question that few if any bother to ask: Do capitalists want 
a recovery in the first place? Can they afford it? 
On the face of it, the question sounds silly: of course capitalists want a recovery; 
how else can they prosper? According to the textbooks, both mainstream and heterodox, 
capital accumulation and economic growth are two sides of the same process. Accumu-
lation generates growth and growth fuels accumulation, so it seems bootless to ask 
whether capitalists want growth. Growth is their lifeline, and the more of it, the better it 
is. 
Or is it? 
 
 
  
1 This paper was first published in Real-World Economics Review (Bichler and Nitzan 2014aIssue 
67, May). 
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Accumulation of What? 
 
The answer depends on what we mean by capital accumulation. The common view of 
this process is deeply utilitarian. Capitalists, we are told, seek to maximize their so-called 
‘real wealth’: they try to accumulate as many machines, structures, inventories and in-
tellectual property rights as they can. And the reason, supposedly, is straightforward. 
Capitalists are hedonic creatures. Like every other ‘economic agent’, their ultimate goal 
is to maximize their utility from consumption. This hedonic quest is best served by eco-
nomic growth: more output enables more consumption; the faster the expansion of the 
economy, the more rapid the accumulation of ‘real’ capital; and the larger the capital 
stock, the greater the utility from its eventual consumption. Utility-seeking capitalists 
should therefore love booms and hate crises.2  
But that is not how real capitalists operate.  
The ultimate goal of modern capitalists – and perhaps of all capitalists since the very 
beginning of their system – is not utility, but power. They are driven not to maximize 
hedonic pleasure, but to ‘beat the average’. This aim is not a subjective preference. It is 
a rigid rule, dictated and enforced by the conflictual nature of the capitalist mode of 
power. Capitalism pits capitalists against other groups in society, as well as against each 
other. And in this multifaceted struggle for power, the yardstick is always relative. Cap-
italists are compelled and conditioned to accumulate differentially, to augment not their 
absolute utility but their earnings relative to others. They seek not to perform but to out-
perform, and outperformance means re-distribution. Capitalists who beat the average 
redistribute income and assets in their favour; this redistribution raises their share of the 
total; and a larger share of the total means greater power stacked against others.  
Shifting the research focus from utility to power has far-reaching consequences. 
Most importantly, it means that capitalist performance should be gauged not in absolute 
terms of ‘real’ consumption and production, but in financial-pecuniary terms of relative 
income and asset shares. And as we move from the materialist realm of hedonic pleasure 
to the differential process of conflict and power, the notion that capitalists love growth 
and yearn for recovery is no longer self-evident.  
The accumulation of capital as power can be analyzed at many different levels. The 
most aggregate of these levels is the overall distribution of income between capitalists 
and other groups in society. In order to increase their power, approximated by their in-
come share, capitalists have to strategically sabotage the rest of society. And one of their 
key weapons in this struggle is unemployment.  
2 For Marx, the end goal of accumulation is accumulation itself: ‘Accumulate, Accumulate! 
That is Moses and the Prophets! . . . Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for 
production’s sake’ (Marx 1867: 652). Contemporary Marxists, however, equate accumulation 
with the growth of the so-called ‘real’ capital stock, as published by the (neoclassical) national 
accounts. And since the latter accounts (supposedly) measure the util-generating capacity of said 
capital (OECD 2001), the ‘Marxist capitalist’, just like her mainstream counterpart, ends up 
pursuing hedonic pleasure. . . . 
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The effect of unemployment on distribution is not obvious, at least not at first sight. 
Rising unemployment, insofar as it lowers the absolute (‘real’) level of activity, tends to 
hurt capitalists and employees alike. But the impact on money prices and wages can be 
highly differential, and this differential can move either way. If unemployment causes the 
price/wage ratio to decline, capitalists will fall behind in the redistributional struggle, 
and this retreat is sure to make them impatient for recovery. But if the opposite turns out 
to be the case – that is, if unemployment helps raise the price/wage ratio – capitalists 
would have good reason to love crisis and indulge in stagnation. 
So which of these two scenarios pans out in practice? Do stagnation and crisis in-
crease capitalist power? Does unemployment help capitalists raise their distributive 
share? Or is it the other way around? 
 
   
Unemployment and the Capitalist Income Share 
 
Figures 1 and 2 examine this process in the United States, showing the relationship 
between the share of capital in domestic income and the rate of unemployment since 
the 1930s. The top panel of Figure 1 displays the levels of the two variables, both 
smoothed as 5-year moving averages. The solid line, plotted against the left log scale, 
depicts pre-tax profit and net interest as a percent of domestic income. The dotted line, 
plotted against the right log scale, exhibits the rate of unemployment as a share of the 
labour force. Note that the unemployment series is lagged three years, meaning that 
every observation shows the situation prevailing three years earlier. The bottom panel 
displays their respective annual rates of change of the two top variables, beginning in 
1940. 
The same relationship is shown, somewhat differently, in Figure 2. This chart dis-
plays the same variables, but instead of plotting them against time, it plots them against 
each other. The capitalist share of domestic income is shown on the vertical axis, while 
the rate of unemployment three years earlier is shown on the horizontal axis (for a 
different examination of this relationship, including its theoretical and historical 
nonlinearities, see Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: 236-239, particularly Figures 12.1 and 
12.2). 
Now, readers conditioned by the prevailing dogma would expect the two variables 
to be inversely correlated. The economic consensus is that the capitalist income share 
in the advanced countries is procyclical (see for example, Giammarioli et al. 2002; 
Schneider 2011). Expressed in simple words, this belief means that capitalists should 
see their share of income rise in the boom when unemployment falls and decline in the 
bust when unemployment rises.  
But that is not what has happened in the United States. According to Figures 1 
and 2, during the post-war era, the U.S. capitalist income share has moved countercy-
clically, rising in downturns and falling in booms.  
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Figure 1 
U.S. Unemployment and the Domestic Income Share of Capital  
1920-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 5-year moving aver-
ages. Profit is pre-tax and includes capital consumption adjustment 
(CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Unemploy-
ment is expressed as a share of the labour force. The last data points 
are 2012 for profit and interest and 2013 for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: GDY for domestic income; ZBECOND for do-
mestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & IVA; INTNETDBUS for domes-
tic net interest); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to 
the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Unem-
ployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for 
the unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemployment 
rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
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Figure 2 
U.S. Unemployment and the 
Domestic Income Share of Capital, 1947-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 5-year moving aver-
ages. Profit is pre-tax and includes capital consumption adjustment 
(CCAdj) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA). Unemploy-
ment is expressed as a share of the labour force. The last data points 
are 2012 for profit and interest and 2013 for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: GDY for domestic income; ZBECOND for do-
mestic pre-tax profit with CCAdj & IVA; INTNETDBUS for domes-
tic net interest); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to 
the Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Unem-
ployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent for 
the unemployment rate [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC for the unemployment 
rate, computed as annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]). 
 
 
The relationship between the two series in the charts is clearly positive and very 
tight. Regressing the capitalist share of domestic income against the rate of unemploy-
ment three years earlier, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in unemployment, 
there is 0.8 per cent increase in the capitalist share of domestic income three years later 
(see the straight OLS regression line going through the observations in Figure 2). The 
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R-squared of the regression indicates that, between 1947 and 2012, changes in the un-
employment rate accounted for 82 per cent of the squared variations of capitalist in-
come three years later.3  
The remarkable thing about this positive correlation is that it holds not only over 
the short-term business cycle, but also in the long term. During the booming 1940s, 
when unemployment was very low, capitalists appropriated a relatively small share of 
domestic income. But as the boom fizzled, growth decelerated and stagnation started 
to creep in, the share of capital began to trend upward. The peak power of capital, 
measured by its overall income share, was recorded in the early 1990s, when unem-
ployment was at post-war highs. The neoliberal globalization that followed brought 
lower unemployment and a smaller capital share, but not for long. In the late 2000s, 
the trend reversed again, with unemployment soaring and the distributive share of cap-
ital rising in tandem.  
 
Box 1 
Underconsumption 
  
The empirical patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2 seem consistent with theories of un-
derconsumption, particularly those associated with the Monopoly Capital School. Ac-
cording to these theories, the oligopolistic structure of modern capitalism is marked by 
a growing ‘degree of monopoly’. The increasing degree of monopoly, they argue, mir-
rors the redistribution of income from labour to capital. Upward redistribution, they 
continue, breeds underconsumption. And underconsumption, they claim, leads to 
stagnation and crisis. The observed positive correlation between the U.S. capitalist 
share of income and the country’s unemployment rate, they would conclude, is only 
to be expected (cf. Kalecki 1933; 1939, 1943; Steindl 1952; Tsuru 1956; Baran and 
Sweezy 1966; Magdoff and Sweezy 1983b; Foster and Szlajfer 1984; for a survey of 
recent arguments and evidence, see van Treeck and Sturn 2012; Lavoie and 
Stockhammer 2013).  
There is, however, a foundational difference between the underconsumptionist 
view and the claims made in this research note. In our opinion, the end goal of capi-
talists is the augmentation of power. This goal is pursued through strategic sabotage 
and is achieved when capitalists manage to redistribute income and assets in their fa-
vour. The underconsumptionists, by contrast, share with mainstream economists the 
belief that capitalists are driven to maximize their ‘real’ capital stock. From this latter 
perspective, favourable redistribution is in fact detrimental to capitalist interests: the 
higher the capitalist income share, the stronger the tendency toward underconsump-
tion and stagnation; and the more severe the stagnation, the greater the likelihood of 
capitalists suffering a ‘real’ accumulation crisis. 
3 The three-year lag means that the redistributional consequences of unemployment are mani-
fested only gradually. The exact nature of this gradual process requires further research.  
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Employment Growth and the Top 1% 
 
The power of capitalists can also be examined from the viewpoint of the infamous 
‘Top 1%’. This group comprises the country’s highest income earners. It includes a 
variety of formal occupations, from managers and executives, to lawyers and doctors, 
to entertainers, sports stars and media operators, among others (Bakija, Cole, and 
Heim 2012), but most of its income is derived directly or indirectly from capital.  
The Top 1% features mostly in ‘social’ critiques of capitalism, echoing the con-
ventional belief that accumulation is an ‘economic’ process of production and that the 
distribution of income is merely a derivative of that process.4 This belief, though, puts 
the world on its head. Distribution is not a corollary of accumulation, but its very 
essence. And as it turns out, in the United States, the distributional gains of the Top 
1% have been boosted not by growth, but by stagnation. 
Figure 3 shows the century-long relationship between the income share of the Top 
1% of the U.S. population and the annual growth rate of U.S. employment (with both 
series smoothed as 10-year moving averages).  
The overall relationship is clearly negative. When stagnation sets in and employ-
ment growth decelerates, the income share of the Top 1% actually rises – and vice versa 
during a long-term boom (reversing the causal link, we get the generalized underon-
sumptionist view, with rising overall inequality breeding stagnation – see Box 1). 
Historically, this negative relationship shows three distinct periods, indicated by 
the dashed, freely drawn line going through the employment growth series. The first 
period, from the turn of the century till the 1930s, is the so-called Gilded Age. Income 
inequality is rising and employment growth is plummeting. 
The second period, from the Great Depression till the early 1980s, is marked by 
the Keynesian welfare-warfare state. Higher taxation and spending make distribution 
more equal, while employment growth accelerates. Note the massive acceleration of 
employment growth during the Second World War and its subsequent deceleration 
bought by post-war demobilization. Obviously these dramatic movements were unre-
lated to income inequality, but they did not alter the series’ overall upward trend.  
The third period, from the early 1980s to the present, is marked by neoliberalism. 
In this period, monetarism assumes the commanding heights, inequality starts to soar 
and employment growth plummets. The current rate of employment growth hovers 
around zero while the Top 1% appropriates 20 per cent of all income – similar to the 
numbers recorded during Great Depression.  
4 Following J.B. Clark (1899), neoclassical manuals assert that, under perfect competition, the 
income of every ‘factor of production’ is equal to its (marginal) productive contribution. In this 
way, capitalists, workers and the owners of raw materials receive in income what they add to 
the economy’s output and therefore to the well-being (i.e. utility) of society. The inequality aris-
ing from this process may create ‘social problems’ and ‘political instability’, but these unfortu-
nate side effects are usually seen as lying safely outside the objective domain of economics 
proper.  
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Figure 3 
U.S. Income Distribution and Employment Growth 
1900-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as 10-year moving 
averages. The trend dashed lines going through the employment 
growth series are drawn freehand. The income share of the Top 1% 
is inclusive of capital gains. The last data points are 2011 for the 
income share of the Top 1% and 2013 for employment growth.  
 
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the 
Present: Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand for 
employment [till 1947]); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through 
Global Insight (series code: ENS for employment, computed as 
annual averages of monthly data [1948 onward]); The World Top 
Incomes Database for the income share of the Top 1% 
(http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/). 
 
 
How Capitalists Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Crisis 
 
If we follow the conventional macroeconomic creed, whether mainstream or hetero-
dox, U.S. capitalism is in bad shape. For nearly half a century, the country has watched 
economic growth and ‘real’ accumulation decelerate in tandem – so much so that that 
both measures now are pretty much at a standstill (Bichler and Nitzan 2013c: 24, 
Figure 12). To make a bad situation worse, policy attempts to ‘get the economy going’ 
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seem to have run out of fiscal and monetary ammunition (Bichler and Nitzan 2013c: 
2-13). Finally, and perhaps most ominously, many policymakers now openly admit to 
be ‘flying blind when steering their economies’ (Giles 2013). 
And yet U.S. capitalists seem blasé about the crisis. Instead of being terrified by 
zero growth and a stationary capital stock, they are obsessed with ‘excessive’ deficits, 
‘unsustainable debt’ and the ‘inflationary consequences’ of the Fed’s so-called quanti-
tative easing. Few capitalists if any call on their government to lower unemployment 
and create more jobs, let alone to rethink the entire model of economic organization.  
The evidence in this research note serves to explain this nonchalant attitude: 
Simply put, U.S. capitalists are not worried about the crisis; they love it.  
Redistribution, by definition, is a zero-sum game: the relative gains of one group 
are the relative losses of others. However, in capitalism, the end goals of those strug-
gling to redistribute income and assets can differ greatly. Workers, the self-employed 
and those who are out of work seek to increase their share in order to augment their 
well being. Capitalists, by contrast, fight for power. Contrary to other groups in society, 
capitalists are indifferent to ‘real’ magnitudes. Driven by power, they gauge their suc-
cess not in absolute units of utility, but in differential pecuniary terms, relative to oth-
ers. Moreover – and crucially – their differential performance-read-power depends on 
the extent to which they can strategically sabotage the very groups they seek to outper-
form.  
In this way, rising unemployment – which hammers the well-being of workers, 
unincorporated businesses and the unemployed – serves to boost the overall income 
share of capitalists. And as employment growth decelerates, the income share of the 
Top 1% – which includes the capitalists as well as their protective power belt – soars. 
Under these circumstances, what reason do capitalists have to ‘get the economy go-
ing’? Why worry about rising unemployment and zero job growth when these very 
processes serve to boost their income-share-read-power? 
The process, of course, is not open-ended. There is a certain limit, or asymptote, 
beyond which further increases in capitalist power are bound to create a backlash that 
might destabilize the entire system (Bichler and Nitzan 2010b; Kliman, Bichler, and 
Nitzan 2011; Bichler and Nitzan 2012a). Capitalists, though, are largely blind to this 
asymptote. Their power drive conditions and compels them to sustain and increase 
their sabotage in their quest for an ever-rising distributive share. Like other ruling clas-
ses in history, they are likely to realize they have reached the asymptote only when it 
is already too late (for our full paper on the subject, see Nitzan and Bichler 2014a).   
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Still About Oil? 1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, we identified a new Middle East phenomenon 
that we called ‘energy conflicts’ and argued that these conflicts were intimately linked 
with the global processes of capital accumulation. This paper outlines the theoretical 
framework we have developed over the years and brings our empirical research up to 
date. It shows that the key stylized patterns we discovered more than twenty years ago 
– along with other regularities we have uncovered since then – remain pretty much un-
changed: (1) conflict in the region continues to correlate tightly with the differential prof-
its of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition, particularly the oil companies; (2) domi-
nant capital continues to depend on stagflation to substitute for declining corporate amal-
gamation; and (3) capitalists the world over now need inflation to offset the spectre of 
debt deflation. The convergence of these interests bodes ill for the Middle East and be-
yond: all of these groups stand to benefit from higher oil prices, and oil prices rarely if 
ever rise without there being an energy conflict in the Middle East. 
 
  
1 This paper was first published in Real-World Economics Review (Bichler and Nitzan 2015, Issue 
70, February). 
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The Triangle of Conflict 
 
Analyses of modern Middle East conflicts vary greatly. They range from sweeping re-
gional histories to narratives of individual disputes. They draw on various analytical 
frameworks and reflect different ideological standpoints. They rely on realism to empha-
size state interests, alignments and conflicts, on liberalism to accentuate markets, trade 
and interest groups, on Marxism to stress exploitation, dependency and imperialism, 
and on postism to transform both the conflicts and their causes into a cultural-ethnic-
racist collage of deconstructible ‘texts’. They use these views, opinions and dogmas to 
critique and condemn, rationalize and moralize, predict and strategize. 
Underlying this great variety, however, lies a simple triangular scheme. Regardless 
of their particular theoretical foci and ideological bent, all analyses seem to derive from 
and accentuate one or more of the following themes: (1) outside intervention, (2) culture 
and internal politics and (3) scarcity.  
Outside intervention. Analysts of international relations tend to divide the history of 
foreign intervention in the region into four broad eras: (i) the period up till the Second 
World War, (ii) the post-war stretch till the collapse of the Soviet Union, (iii) the era of 
neoliberal globalization till the recent financial crisis and (iv) the new period of growing 
multipolarity. Foreign meddling in the Middle East is said to have intensified during the 
nineteenth century. With the decline of Ottoman rule and the rise of European imperi-
alism, direct colonial takeovers carved up the region among the leading European pow-
ers. This division ended after the Second World War. Colonialism disintegrated, and 
with superpower confrontation substituting for inter-imperial struggles, proxy conflicts 
replaced the need for direct occupation. The 1990s collapse of the Soviet Union again 
shuffled the cards. The previously bipolar world was rendered unipolar, and this unipo-
larity, argue the pundits, enabled the United States to launch an aggressive regime-
changing campaign to promote democracy and make the Middle safe for business. But 
this era too seems to be drawing to a close. The United States is not what it used to be. 
Its chronic current account deficit, mounting debt, sliding dollar and recent financial 
crisis, along with its failed military interventions, have given rise to mounting challenges 
from China, India and the new Russia, among others countries, as well as from armed 
NGOs in various parts of the world. These centrifugal forces create peripheral vacuums, 
including in the Middle East, which local mini-powers such as Iran and Turkey and 
militias like ISIS and Hezbollah jockey to fill.  
Culture and internal politics. The issue here is the bellicose consequences of the region’s 
tribal traditions, ethnic differences and religious hostilities – as well as the ways in which 
these cultural-political traits differ from those in other, mainly Western societies. Orien-
tal pundits, analysts and deconstructivists examine how cultural incompatibilities breed 
conflict within the Middle East, as well as a broader ‘clash of civilizations’, particularly 
between Islam and the West. Some claim that the region’s cultural-political bellicosities 
are deeply ingrained and therefore difficult to change, while others see them as malleable 
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attributes that can be smothered or nourished depending on circumstances and expedi-
ency.  
Scarcity. This subject is handled more or less exclusively by economists. The main 
focus here is water, which the region is short on, and oil, of which it has plenty. In the 
short term, say the economists, the overall supply of both water and oil can be taken as 
given, so the ups and downs of their scarcity depend mostly on variations in demand. In 
the case of water, the demand originates within the Middle East itself – particular in arid 
or heavily populated areas – so water-related conflicts are mostly regional in nature. By 
contrast, the demand for oil is generated largely outside the region, so oil-related conflicts 
tend to have an important global dimension. In the long-run, though, supply too is 
changing. The main emphasis here is on global warming, which dries up the region, and 
Peak Oil, which is bound to reduce its petroleum output. Anticipations of these supply-
driven scarcities, many now claim, have already heightened resource-related tensions in 
the region and are sure to intensify its conflicts and wars. 
Of course, the three nodes of this conceptual triangle, although analytically distinct, 
are rarely treated in isolation. On the contrary. Typically, the analyst collects a few ‘fac-
tors’ from each node, tucking them all into a single ‘production function’ in order to 
generate a hopefully richer, more complex discourse. This fusion is evident in current 
explanations of the third Gulf War. ISIS’s media blitzes – and the counter-campaigns of 
its opponents – emphasize the religious basis of the conflict. But culture is only part of 
the picture. Having already captured oil-producing regions and facilities, ISIS openly 
boasts of its intention to take over those of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and others. And with 
human rights and the flow of oil under threat, there is a good enough reason for a U.S.-
led coalition to launch yet another military intervention in the Middle East. 
 
 
Scarcity and the Price of Oil 
 
Now, a vigilant reader might protest that this triangular classification is fatally incom-
plete. It is certainly important to speak about international relations, culture, politics and 
scarcity, she would point out. But what about capital? Doesn’t capitalism rule our world 
and shape its important trajectories? And if that is the case, why is the connection be-
tween Middle East wars and accumulation rarely mentioned explicitly and seldom ana-
lysed empirically?  
Most analysts, though, would dismiss such a critique as amateurish. The nexus be-
tween capital accumulation and Middle East conflict, they would point out, is already 
there, embedded in the very concept of scarcity. 
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Securing the Flow of Oil? 
 
According to the conventional creed, both liberal and radical, capital is an economic cat-
egory, a ‘real’, ‘productive’ entity whose accumulation is more or less synonymous with 
economic growth.2 In order to accumulate and expand, say the economists, capital needs 
access to cheap raw materials, especially energy. And since the Middle East currently 
holds roughly one-half of the world’s proven crude-oil reserves and accounts for one-
third of its daily output, it is in the interest of capitalists – and of oil-consuming econo-
mies more generally – to ensure, violently if necessary, that this oil remains accessible, 
free flowing and cheap.  
Seen from this viewpoint, the three episodes of the Gulf-War series – i.e., the 1990-
91 attack on Iraq, the 2001-03 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 2014 assault 
on ISIS – can be seen as part of a long-term scarcity-reducing operation and therefore 
integral to the accumulation of capital. Officially, of course, each conflict has its own 
reasons. In the first episode, the excuse was kicking Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait; in 
the second, it was eliminating Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and ridding Iraq of its weap-
ons of mass destruction; and in the third, it is eradicating ISIS from the face of the earth. 
But in the mind of most analysts, there is also an abiding common denominator: the 
need to make oil ample and inexpensive, so that capitalists can continue to accumulate 
and the world economy can continue to grow.3 
The scarcity-reducing rationale is both popular and appealing. It sits well with the 
conventional mantras of neoclassical economics, it resonates with international rela-
tions, and it helps decorate cultural texts. Few academics protest it, the media heavily 
advertises it, and the masses love to buy it. All in all, then, it seems pretty much beyond 
dispute – save for one little problem: it doesn’t align with the facts.  
The difficulty is twofold. First, military intervention in the Middle East has intensi-
fied since the early 2000s – yet, this intensification has done little to keep the price of oil 
low; if anything, it has caused it to soar. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is 
in fact no evidence that the price of oil has anything to do with scarcity at all! And if that 
is indeed the case, why use violence to make oil ‘accessible’? Let’s examine these two 
points more closely. 
 
 
The Ups and Downs of Oil Prices 
 
Consider Figure 1.4 The top series in the chart, plotted against the left scale, shows the 
‘real’ price of crude oil – i.e., the price per barrel denominated in 2013 dollars. Now, 
2 We enclose the terms ‘real’ and ‘productive’ in inverted commas to note that, in our view, 
these notions are fraught with conceptual and empirical difficulties. For more on these difficul-
ties, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Chs. 5-8). 
3 For a succinct account of this conventional belief, see Nitzan and Bichler (2003). 
4 The earliest version of this figure was presented and examined in Nitzan and Bichler (1995: 
487-492).  
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recall that, during the early 2000s, the common view was that the attacks of 9/11 had 
given the U.S.-led coalition the pretext to dismantle, or at least incapacitate, OPEC. The 
Economist of London expressed this hope quite openly. ‘[K]nocking out Mr Hussein’, 
the magazine predicted, ‘would kill two birds with one stone: a dangerous dictator 
would be gone, and with him would go the cartel that for years has manipulated prices, 
engineered embargoes and otherwise harmed consumers’ (Anonymous 2002).  
 
 
Figure 1 
‘Scarcity’ and the ‘Real’ Price of Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Excess consumption of crude oil is the difference between world 
consumption and world production, expressed as a per cent share 
of the average of world consumption and world production. 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. Consumption and production of 
crude oil include crude oil, tight oil, oil sands and NGLs (the liquid 
content of natural gas where this is recovered separately); they ex-
clude liquid fuels from other sources such as biomass and deriva-
tives of coal and natural gas. The ‘real’ price of crude oil is the dol-
lar price deflated by the U.S. CPI. The last data points are for 2013.  
 
SOURCE: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, April 2014 and ear-
lier issues (for oil consumption and production). IMF International 
Financial Statistics through Data Insight (series codes: 
L76AA&Z@C001 for the average price of crude oil; L64@C111for 
the U.S. CPI). 
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Judging by Figure 1, though, this prediction failed miserably. The invasions and 
subsequent occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq have done little to keep oil prices down. 
Instead, they propped them up, massively. ‘Not only has the use of force to procure 
Iraqi oil failed to achieve its intended results’, lamented Michael Klare (2005), ‘it has 
actually made the situation worse’. A barrel of crude oil, which in 2000 cost a mere a 
$20 (in 2013 prices), sold in 2013 for nearly $120. If the price of oil is indeed determined 
by scarcity, it seems that external interventions during this period have made oil not 
more abundant, but scarcer. 
 
 
The Scarcity Puzzle 
 
This last claim, though, is not easy to ascertain. The difficulty is twofold. First, scarcity 
and abundance denote the difference between ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ – i.e., between the 
desires of buyers and sellers. Economists, however, know nothing about these desires and 
therefore use actual consumption and production in their stead (for more on this issue, 
see the Appendix at the end of the paper). Second, estimates of global oil consumption 
and production are notoriously inaccurate, so even if the actual purchase and sale of oil 
were equal to its demand and supply, their measurements would still leave much to be 
desired. 
Now, these problems could be forgiven and forgotten if the empirical data, however 
imperfect, were congruent with the theory. But they are not. Judging by Figure 1, the 
‘real’ price of oil has little or nothing to do with its approximated scarcity. 
The bottom series in Figure 1 is the conventional proxy for the scarcity of oil. This 
proxy is computed by subtracting global oil production from global oil consumption and 
expressing the result as a per cent share of the average of these two magnitudes. Assum-
ing that consumption is equal to demand and production to supply, positive observations 
on the chart represent excess demand (inventory depletion), while negative observations 
denote excess supply (inventory build-up). 
According to Economics 101, excess demand should cause ‘real’ prices to increase, 
while excess supply should cause them to fall. In line with this logic, we divided the 
period between 1960 and 2013 into four sub-periods, depending on whether the ‘real’ 
price of oil was heading up or down. In two of the periods – 1970-1980 and 1998-2003, 
which we shade for easy identification – prices trended upward, while in the other two 
– 1961-1970 and 1980-1998 – they moved downward. Now, for the theory to be valid, 
periods of falling prices should be associated with excess supply (i.e., with inventory 
build-ups indicated by negative readings for the series); similarly, periods of rising prices 
should be associated with excess demand (inventory depletion, or positive readings).  
But that is not what we see in Figure 1. Taking the data at face value, the chart shows 
that oil was in ‘excess supply’ till 1980. This condition is consistent with falling prices till 
1970, but it is inconsistent with rising prices from 1970 to 1980. Similarly with the period 
from 1980 onward, which the data suggest was one of ‘excess demand’. This condition 
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is consistent with the price uptrend since 1998, but inconsistent with its downtrend be-
tween 1980 and 1998. In other words, scarcity per se – at least as conventionally measured 
by the consumption-production gap – can tell us very little about ‘real’ price movements 
(see Box 1).   
 
Box 1: ‘Because’ and ‘Despite’ in the Oil Market 
 
Substituting physical shortages and material surpluses for excess demand and supply 
is a treacherous strategy, particularly for those trying to predict the price of oil. The 
following news headlines, collected at random between 1984 and 2004, suggest that 
such predictions are often not much better than tossing a coin. The headlines are 
arranged in pairs, with the first entry being consistent with the theory (the price 
changes ‘because’) and the second inconsistent (the price changes ‘despite’). 
 
Oil prices rise amid reports Iraq jets attacked operations at Iran terminal 
Michael Siconolfi, Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1986, p. 1 
World oil prices fall despite Iran-Iraq war 
Chronicle - Herald Halifax, July 7, 1984, p. 13 
 
Oil prices soar on OPEC pact to cut output 
Michael Siconolfi, Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1986, p 1 
Oil price falls despite cut in output 
Paul Solman, Financial Times, June 13, 1998, p. 12 
 
OPEC agreement means oil prices likely to increase 
The Gazette Montreal, June 29, 1987, p. B5 
Oil prices fall despite OPEC agreement 
Gary Mead, Financial Times, June 25, 1998, p. 32 
 
Oil prices fall again in response to Bush’s hope for Mideast accord and signs of 
ample supplies 
James Tanner, Wall Street Journal, October 3, 1990, p. C14 
Oil price rises despite ample supply 
Calgary Herald, December 8, 1995, p. C13 
 
Oil prices slide in anticipation of rise in output 
Marie C. Sanchez. Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2000, p. 1  
Oil prices soar despite rise in output 
Toronto Star, September 12, 2000, p. D3  
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Oil prices fall on rising US stockpile 
Adrienne Roberts, Financial Times, June 28, 2001, p. 15 
Crude markets unfazed by OPEC; oil prices rise despite stock build 
Octane Week Potomac, June 26, 2000, Vol. 15, No. 26, p. 1 
 
Oil prices rise as OPEC output cut nears 
Robert DiNardo, John Kingston, Anita Nugraha and Margaret McQuaile, Platt’s 
Oilgram News, March 5, 2004, Vol. 82, No. 43, p. 1 
Oil prices fall despite OPEC output cut 
EIU Viewswire, March 31, 2004 
 
One could of course claim that, with the rising threat of Peak Oil, short-term varia-
tions of production and consumption, particularly since the early 2000s, have become 
less important for the price of oil. The problem with this argument is that the finality of 
oil and the bell shape of its temporal production had already been recognized in the 
1950s, yet the price of oil, instead of rising continuously since this recognition, has fluc-
tuated heavily.5 As Figure 1 shows, measured relative to the U.S. CPI, oil prices in-
creased more than tenfold in the 1970s, fell by more than 80 per cent till the late 1990s, 
and rose sixfold since then. 
All in all, then, the conventional scarcity link between capital accumulation and 
Middle East conflict remains unsubstantiated. Not only has outside intervention in the 
region been associated with rising as well as falling prices, but these price oscillations 
seem unrelated to the material short- and long-term underpinnings of the oil sector. 
Does this record mean that Middle East conflicts are largely unrelated to the scarcity 
and price of oil, and therefore to the accumulation of capital? Could it be that conflict in 
the region is mostly cultural, political or international in nature and has little or nothing 
to do with capitalism as such? Should we abandon the holy trinity of demand-supply-
equilibrium and examine this question from a different angle altogether, or is oil simply 
the exception to the otherwise eternal laws of neoclassical economics?  
 
 
From Absolute Accumulation to Differential Accumulation 
 
The answer starts with capital.6 As noted, the conventional creed, both mainstream and 
heterodox, sees capital as an ‘economic’ entity. This entity is said to exist as an amalgam 
of ‘real’ productive items such as machines, structures, semi-finished goods, inventories, 
5 The concept of Peak Oil is due to the pioneering work of King Hubbert (1956). 
6 The issues discussed in this section are developed more fully in Nitzan and Bichler (2009a), Bich-
ler and Nitzan (2012c), Bichler, Nitzan and Di Muzio (2012), and Bichler, Nitzan and Dutkiewicz 
(2013). 
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raw materials and, in the opinion of many, also knowledge. Now, according to the econ-
omists, this ‘real’ amalgam has a unique absolute magnitude, enumerated in universal 
quantities of consumption and production: it can be measured either in ‘utils’ (units of 
utility), which are the elementary particles of mainstream economics, or in socially nec-
essary abstract labour time, which is the elementary particle of Marxism. In principle, 
this framework should enable us to look at the ‘capital stock’ of ExxonMobil and con-
clude that it has a util-generating capacity of 5 trillion (say), or that its magnitude is 
equivalent to the 10 billion socially necessary abstract labour hours it would take to re-
produce.  
Unfortunately, this ‘economic’ view of capital, although all-prevalent in theory, is 
largely useless in practice. First, utils and socially necessary abstract labour time are im-
possible to observe, let alone measure (and they might be logically inconsistent to start 
with). This inability means that the ‘real capital’ of individual firms such as ExxonMobil 
cannot be quantified, and therefore that the aggregate ‘capital stock’, which national stat-
isticians labour so hard to amalgamate, has no clear meaning. Second, and perhaps more 
pertinently for our purpose here, ‘real’ accumulation, however measured, is pretty much 
irrelevant in modern capitalism. 
 
 
Capital as Power and Differential Accumulation 
 
In our day and age, capitalists and corporations are conditioned and driven not to max-
imize their ‘real’ profits, but to beat the average and exceed the normal rate of return. 
They seek not to perform, but to outperform; to obtain not absolute accumulation, but 
differential accumulation. For ExxonMobil, a 10 per cent rate of return is a mark of failure 
if the global average is 20 per cent; but a –5 per cent return (i.e., an outright loss) is 
deemed a huge success if the average return is an even bigger loss of –15 per cent. 
This differential drive is no fluke. Capital, we argue, is not a productive economic 
entity, but a quantitative measure of organized power. And since power relations are inher-
ently relative, capital, which denotes the quantity of organized power, must be assessed 
differentially.  
Take ExxonMobil again. In 2013, the company’s net profit stood at $32.6 billion – 
a figure 15.8 times larger than the net profit earned by the typical Fortune 500 firm ($2.2 
billion) and 103,578 times larger than the net profit of the average U.S. corporation 
($308,945).7 These differentials quantify the complete spectrum of power processes that, 
together, define the capitalized entity we call ExxonMobil. They reflect the power poli-
tics and wars of the Middle East in which ExxonMobil is deeply embedded; the conflict-
ual relations ExxonMobil has with its buyers, suppliers and workers; the company’s 
struggles and collaborations with governments through concessions, taxation, subsidies, 
7 Data are from Compustat through WRDS, Fortune 500, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
through Global Insight and the U.S. IRS. 
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energy-related policies, intelligence services and bribes, among other links; its power al-
liances and feuds with other integrated oil companies as well as with the energy sector 
more broadly; its divergences and convergences with different corporate coalitions 
across the business universe; its tenuous engagement with science over issues of Peak 
Oil, pollution and climate change; the list goes on.  
Every dollar of ExxonMobil profit is impregnated with these power relations – and 
nothing but these power relations – and the same holds true for every other corporation 
(and, indeed, for every income-earning entity). And since differential corporate profits 
quantify relative corporate power, the differential market value of corporations – which 
discounts expected profits into present asset prices – is in fact nothing but the capitaliza-
tion of power.  
Now, in order to sustain and augment their relative profit and capitalization, corpo-
rations need to engage in strategic sabotage: they must subvert their opponents as well as 
society as a whole.8 They have to keep their rivals at bay, undermine their initiative and 
thwart their thrust. More broadly, they need to hold society below its full potential, to 
redirect its activities so that these activities amplify their own distributive share. To 
achieve their differential goals, corporations are compelled to manipulate threats and 
leverage violence, to undermine resonance and inflict dissonance, to restrict autonomy 
and exact obedience. In this sense, their capital is power, and nothing but power. Its 
differential accumulation symbolizes the ability of the capitalists who own it and the 
state organs that support it to creorder – or create the order of – the world in their own 
capitalized image.  
The notion of capital as power is fundamentally different from received convention. 
Economists do not ignore power, of course. But they treat it as if it were external to capital 
proper. Power, they readily concede, can bolster accumulation (as heterodox political 
economists repeatedly emphasize), or distort and undermine it (as mainstream econo-
mists love to insist). But since capital itself remains a purely economic entity, the impact 
of power, whether positive or negative, must come from without, by definition.  
By contrast, in our framework power is internal to capital. Indeed, it is power rela-
tions that define what capital is in the first place, and it is power relations – and the mode 
of power more generally – that determine how large capital is and how quickly it accu-
mulates. This is why we speak not of capital and power, but of capital as power; not of a 
juxtaposition, but of a figurative identity.9 And since power is not a qualitative entity in 
its own right but a quantitative relationship between entities, the accumulation of capital 
8 The notion of ‘strategic sabotage’ and its central role in capital accumulation were first articu-
lated by Thorsten Veblen (1904, 1923). 
9 Note that while all capital is power, not all power is capital. Although capital has become so-
cially central and ever more encompassing, conceptually it remains one of many forms of power 
in society.  
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as power must be measured – as it is indeed measured every day and everywhere – not 
absolutely, but differentially.10  
 
 
Dominant Capital and Differential Accumulation Regimes 
 
Now, if we think of capital not as a productive economic entity but as the quantification 
of organized power, and if we measure it not absolutely but differentially, we can no 
longer treat it as a mere aggregate. We need to examine not only the generalized conflicts 
capital has with other broad groups in society, such as workers and the unemployed, but 
also the redistributional struggles within capital itself. We must unpack not only capital’s 
overall movements relative to other aggregates, but also the constant realignment of its 
own pecking order. 
This is where our notion of ‘dominant capital’ comes to the fore. The term refers to 
the leading state-backed corporate coalitions at the centre of the process being examined, 
whether that process takes place in a particular sector, a particular country or region, or 
the global political economy as whole.11 
To accumulate differentially, dominant capital needs to beat the relevant average. 
Analytically, it could do so either by expanding the relative size of its organization meas-
ured in terms of employees, or by increasing its profit (and capitalization) per employee. 
In our work, we call the first process ‘breadth’ and the latter ‘depth’ and argue that, over 
the past century, breadth has been increasingly achieved not through greenfield invest-
ment in new plant and equipment but through mergers and acquisitions, while depth has 
principally been achieved not through cost-cutting but through inflation in the midst of 
stagnation, or stagflation. Moreover, research by us and others suggests that, for the po-
litical economy as a whole, these two processes tend to develop into increasingly syn-
chronized ‘regimes’ – with the ups and downs in mergers and acquisitions being inversely 
correlated with the cycles of stagflation.12 
10 The conception of power or force as a quantitative relationship between entities rather than a 
stand-alone qualitative entity was first proposed and articulated in 1600 by Johannes Kepler 
(Jammer 1957). 
11 For studies of dominant capital in particular sectors, see for example Baines (2013a, 2013b, 
2014) on the grain traders, Cochrane (forthcoming PhD dissertation) on the De Beers cartel, 
Hager (2012, 2013a, 2013b) on the ownership of the U.S. national debt, Gagnon (2009) on the 
pharmaceutical sector, McMahon (2013) on Hollywood and Nitzan and Bichler (Nitzan and 
Bichler 1995; Bichler and Nitzan 1996) on oil and armaments. For works on particular countries 
and regions, see Brennan (2012b, 2012a, 2014) on Canada, Park (2013, 2015 forthcoming) on 
South Korea and Nitzan and Bichler (2002, 2009a) on Israel, the Middle East and the United 
States. For an examination of the global top 1%, see Di Muzio (2015). For the historical role of 
corporate and government hierarchies around the world in the growth of energy use, see Fix 
(2015). 
12 On breadth and depth in the United States, see Nitzan (2001) and (2009a: Ch. 17). On breadth 
and depth in Israel, see Nitzan and Bichler (2000; 2002: Ch. 4). For a comparison of Britain and 
the United States (including revised data for the latter), see Francis (2013). On South Korea, see 
Park (2013, 2015 forthcoming). On Canada, with somewhat different conclusions, see Brennan 
(2014). 
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Note that regimes of differential accumulation are not narrow ‘market’ phenomena, 
but broad societal transformations. They are driven not by economic growth and price 
stability, but by corporate amalgamation and redistributive stagflation. Their key feature 
is not the augmentation of means of production, but the restructuring of power writ large. 
Over time, they serve to realign the relationships between different groups in society, 
between these groups and governments and within capital itself. In other words, they are 
politicized to their very core. And this politicization makes them crucial for our purpose 
here: they can help us reconceptualise, recontextualize and research the connection be-
tween Middle East conflict and the accumulation of capital.  
 
  
The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
 
Our study of this connection began in the late 1980s. In 1989, before the dawn of the 
internet age, we wrote an obscure series of four discussion papers on oil, armaments and 
the Middle East.13 The papers showed that, by the early 1970s, the Middle East had 
become the focus of two important flows – receipts from weapon imports into the region 
and revenues from oil exports out of it. Underpinning these two flows, we identified the 
emergence of a formidable, albeit uneasy, global alliance between the integrated oil com-
panies, the large armament contractors, leading Western governments and key oil-pro-
ducing countries. We called this global alliance the ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coali-
tion’ and set out to explore its nature, history and implications.14 
 
 
The Petro-Core and the Oil-Producing Countries 
 
The interests of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition, we have argued, converged on 
high crude-oil prices. For the oil-producing countries, the rationale is straightforward: 
since the cost of extracting the crude oil changes only gradually, most of the increase in 
price translates into higher net income (higher prices may reduce the number of barrels 
sold, but with oil this loss tends to be relatively small).  
For the integrated oil companies, the reason is a bit more involved. Crude oil is a 
major input for the refining operations of those firms, so when its price increases, so does 
the companies’ cost of production. However, the oil companies do not simply absorb 
this higher cost while keeping their selling price unchanged. Instead, they usually mark 
their cost up by a given margin, passing on most of the increase – and sometimes more 
– to their consumers in the form of a higher price. The effect of this ‘passing on’, though, 
is anything but neutral. The companies’ profit margin, defined as the ratio of profit to 
13 Bichler, Nitzan and Rowley (1989); Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler (1989); Rowley, Bichler and 
Nitzan (1989); and Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989). 
14 The results of this exploration were first published in two related articles that sought to ‘bring 
capital accumulation back in’ (Nitzan and Bichler 1995) and ‘put the state in its place’ (Bichler 
and Nitzan 1996). 
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sales, may remain stable; but this very stability ascertains that the absolute dollar level of 
their profit will grow in line with their higher cost. So for the integrated oil companies, 
too, higher crude-oil prices generally translate into fatter bottom lines.15  
The converging performance of these two groups – the integrated oil companies and 
the oil-producing countries – is illustrated in Figure 2.16 The chart, expressed in constant 
2013 dollars, contrasts the total oil exports of OPEC with the net profit of the ‘Petro-
Core’, a name we devised to denote the world’s leading private integrated oil companies. 
During the early 1960s, this core comprised six firms – British Petroleum, Chevron, 
Exxon, Mobil, Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco. The 1999 merger of Exxon and Mobil 
into ExxonMobil reduced this number to five, and the 2001 absorption of Texaco by 
Chevron truncated it further to four (which is the current situation).17  
As the chart makes clear, the correlation between the two series is tightly positive 
(a Pearson coefficient of 0.88 out of a maximum value of 1). This correlation means 
that whatever determines the income of one group has a similar impact on the earnings 
of the other – and vice versa. And the most important determinant of oil incomes, at 
least since the 1970s, has been the price of oil.  
 
  
15 Oil profits can be affected adversely by drops in the physical volume of sales and/or by lower 
profit margins; but a large enough increase in the price of crude oil will tend to overwhelm these 
negative effects, causing overall profit to rise together with cost. For a detailed discussion, see 
Nitzan and Bichler (2004b: footnote 42, pp. 305-306). 
16 For the first version of this chart, see Nitzan and Bichler (1995: 485, Figure 5).  
17 Note the difference in scale. The two series show that, since 1960, OPEC revenues have been 
roughly ten times larger than the net profit of the Petro-Core. Much of this difference, though, 
is the consequence of aggregation: OPEC currently has 12 members, while the Petro-Core con-
sists of four firms. So if instead of comparing aggregate exports with aggregate profit we contrast 
export revenues per country with net profit per firm, the ratio between them drops to roughly 
three to one. Furthermore, to make the two earning magnitudes conceptually comparable, we 
need to deduct from OPEC’s export revenues the direct and indirect cost of producing the oil 
(including expenditures necessary to sustain authoritarian social regimes) and add to the oil 
companies’ net profits the corporate taxes appropriated by their respective governments. These 
adjustments would make the oil earnings of the two entities – the countries and the companies 
– more or less comparable in size. 
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Figure 2 
OPEC and the Petro-Core 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data. The Petro-Core consists of British 
Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (with Texaco since 
2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-
Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to 
merger. Data are deflated by the U.S. implicit price deflator. The 
last data points are for 2013. 
  
SOURCE: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 2014, Table 2.4: OPEC Mem-
bers’ Values of Petroleum Exports (for OPEC’s petroleum exports) 
http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulle-
tin/interactive/current/FileZ/XL/T24.XLS. U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis through Data Insight 
(series code: PDIGDP for the U.S. GDP deflator). Fortune and 
Compustat through WRDS (for the Petro-Core’s net profit). 
 
 
It’s All in the Price 
 
The pivotal role of price is depicted in Figure 3. The chart juxtaposes the differential 
earnings per share (EPS) of the integrated oil companies and the relative price of crude 
oil (monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing averages).18 The differential EPS series 
                                                        
18 Earnings per share are computed by dividing total after-tax earnings by the number of out-
standing shares. 
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(solid line) is the ratio between the average EPS of the world’s listed integrated oil com-
panies and the average EPS of all listed firms in the world. When this ratio goes up – 
i.e., when the oil companies beat the world average – the result is differential accumula-
tion; when the ratio goes down – that is, when the oil companies trail this average – the 
result is differential decumulation. 
The relative price measure (dashed series) shows the dollar cost of a barrel of crude 
oil expressed in constant 2013 prices (derived by deflating the current price by the U.S. 
CPI). A rise in this index means that oil prices increase more quickly (or fall more slowly) 
than consumer prices, while a drop suggests that they decrease more quickly (or rise 
more slowly).  
Note that the relative price of oil is plotted with a one-year lag, so that current read-
ings on the chart show what this price was 12 months earlier. The reason for this lag is 
that ‘current’ monthly EPS are not really current; instead, they represent the average of 
the past four quarters, so the full impact on profit of a change in oil prices is felt only 
after a year. 
The historical picture portrayed by this chart leaves little to the imagination. It shows 
that, as far as the differential profits of the integrated oil companies are concerned, the 
key factor, at least since the early 1970s, was and remains the relative price of oil. The 
high Pearson correlation coefficient between the two series (0.83) means that analysts 
trying to predict the differential profits of the integrated oil companies don’t need to 
look very far. They don’t need to project supply and demand, and not even consump-
tion and production. They don’t have to worry about China’s avaricious appetite for 
energy or the shale-oil boom in the United States. They don’t need to disentangle the 
web of international relations, and they don’t have to deconstruct culture and religion. 
All they need to know is the relative price of oil 12 months earlier. And since oil profits 
go together with the earnings of the oil-producing countries (Figure 2), the same logic 
applies to OPEC. In short, in the oil sector, profits and incomes are ‘all in the price’.19 
 
 
  
19 This claim applies equally to the global oil and gas sector as a whole. The Pearson correlation 
between this sector’s EPS and the relative price of oil is 0.85 – practically the same as the one 
for the integrated oil companies only. The net profit of the entire oil and gas sector is roughly 50 
per cent larger than that of the integrated oil companies (based on August 2014 data from 
Datastream), but the EPS of the two groupings are tightly correlated (Pearson coefficient of 
0.97). 
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Figure 3 
Differential Earnings per Share and the  
Relative Price of Crude Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing 
averages. EPS denotes earnings per share and is calculated by di-
viding the stock price index by the price-earnings ratio. Differential 
EPS is calculated by dividing the EPS of the integrated oil index by 
the EPS of the world index. The relative price of oil is the average 
crude price deflated by the U.S. CPI. The last data points are Oc-
tober 2014 for the differential EPS and August 2014 for the relative 
price of oil.  
  
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) and TOT-
MKWD(PE) for the price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed 
firms, respectively; OILINWD(PI) and OILINWD(PE) for the 
price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed integrated oil firms, 
respectively). IMF International Financial Statistics through Data 
Insight (series codes: L76AA&Z@C001 for the average price of 
crude oil; L64@C111for the U.S. CPI). 
 
 
The Arma-Core 
 
The leading armament contractors – based primarily in the United States, but also in 
Europe, the Soviet Union (later Russia) and other countries – have also come to benefit 
from higher oil prices. This benefit first became apparent in the 1970s. The waning of 
the Vietnam conflict shifted the focus of arms exports from East Asia to the Middle 
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East. During the late 1960s, East Asia absorbed nearly 40 per cent of the world’s arms 
exports, while the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) accounted for only 15 per 
cent. By the mid-1970s, though, the situation reversed: the share of East Asia dropped 
to less than 10 per cent, while that of MENA increased fourfold, to roughly 60 per 
cent.20 
The 1970s were lean years for the weapon makers. The end of the Vietnam War 
and the beginning of Détente caused domestic military budgets to drop sharply. In the 
United States, the GDP share of military expenditures was cut in half – from 10 per 
cent in the late 1960s to 5 per cent in the late 1970s.21 Under these circumstances, a 
concurrent shrinkage of the export market – where profit margins are typically far higher 
than in domestic sales – would have spelled disaster for the armament contractors. And 
that is where the Middle East came to the rescue. 
The price of oil, which tripled in inflation-adjusted terms during the early 1970s and 
again doubled later in the decade (Figure 1), increased the oil revenues of Middle East 
oil-producing countries many times over (Figure 2). And with their purchasing power 
rapidly rising, these countries went on a shopping spree. They imported anything and 
everything foreign, including plenty of weapons. According to our empirical estimates, 
between 1973 and 1989, every additional $100 of Middle East oil revenues generated $6 
of armament imports.22 In this way, higher oil prices became the lifeline of the ailing 
armament contractors.  
 
 
Western Governments, Particularly the U.S. 
 
The position of Western governments on the issue of oil prices has been more complex, 
and sometimes duplicitous. In public, most politicians have found it expedient to call 
for ‘cheap’, or at least ‘affordable’ energy, and for good reason. During the 1970s, 
higher oil prices were blamed for triggering a stagflation crisis that placed their voters 
between the rock of inflation and the hard place of stagnation. Economists called it a 
‘supply shock’, an exogenous ‘distortion’ that rattled the otherwise self-equilibrating 
market system. And that branding made it easier to put the blame on others.23  
The usual suspects were the greedy oil sheiks – although there were also other 
culprits, particularly the unscrupulous labour unions and the capricious sky gods. 
These ‘actors’, complained the economists, didn’t play by the rules. Instead of simply 
reacting to ‘market forces’ as the textbooks require, they took an ‘autonomous’ initia-
tive. Acting unilaterally, without provocation and with no justification, they simply 
20 See Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1989: 11, Table 1). 
21 See Bichler and Nitzan (2004b: 319, Figure 16). 
22 Nitzan and Bichler (1995: 493-496). For an earlier rough estimate, see Rowley, Bichler and 
Nitzan (1989: 31, Figure 9). 
23 For the conventional view on this subject, see for example Blinder (1979), Bruno and Sachs 
(1985) and Blinder and Rudd (2008).  
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increased the price of energy, labour and foodstuffs. Just like that. Worse still, the in-
creases were entirely ‘arbitrary’: they were driven not by technology and desires (read 
supply and demand), but by power, greed and whim.  
Unfortunately, though, there is no such thing as a free lunch. The laws of the mar-
ket, like those of any organized religion, cannot be violated without repercussion. And 
since we haven’t managed to prevent the gross violation of these laws, we must all pay 
the price in the form of generalized stagflation. Given this ‘narrative’, no politician in 
her right mind would openly call for high oil prices. 
But there were other, less publicised sides to these developments. Rising oil prices 
served the large oil and armament companies, which during the 1970s and 1980s dom-
inated the business universe, particularly in the United States, and whose interests the 
politicians could not easily ignore.24 Rising oil prices were also expected to skew the 
geopolitical balance in favour of the United States and Britain, which had their own 
oil resources, and against Japan and Continental Europe, which did not. And, last but 
not least, rising oil prices helped fortify the autocratic regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
– the ‘twin pillars’ of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Taken together, these considera-
tions may serve to explain the apparently schizophrenic position of the U.S. admin-
istration, which, although officially in favour of low energy prices, was instrumental 
to the 1971 Tripoli and Teheran agreements that solidified OPEC and led to the 
twelvefold increase in the price of oil.25 
 
 
From Free Flow to Limited Flow 
 
The interest of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition in high oil prices radically trans-
formed the nature of the oil business. Until the late 1960s, the sector operated on a ‘free-
flow’ basis (our term). The main focus was volume. The Petro-Core still owned much of 
its crude oil, and with prices being relatively low and stable – Figure 1 shows that in the 
1950s and 1960s they averaged $10-20 in 2013 dollars – profitability correlated positively 
with the level of output.  
This situation changed completely in the 1970s. The rise of OPEC and the massive 
nationalization of oil resources deprived the Petro-Core as well as lesser companies of 
their previous properties in many of the oil-producing regions. They became ‘service 
providers’ for the oil-producing countries. They extracted, refined and marketed oil and 
its products, but their ownership of the raw material itself was significantly curtailed. 
Most importantly, they lost their previous control over prices. 
It was the dawn of a new, ‘limited-flow’ regime (our term). Prices in this new regime 
have become deeply politicized. They were no longer set by the invisible hand of the 
24 During that period, the net profit of the oil firms and defence contractors reached 15 per cent 
of the global total (Bichler and Nitzan 2004b, Figure 15, p. 316). 
25 For more on these considerations and the other interests involved, see for example Bichler 
and Nitzan (1996) and Nitzan and Bichler (2002: 225-228, 247-250). 
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almighty ‘market’ (i.e., the leading oil companies and the main users of oil). Instead, 
they were determined, visibly and explicitly, by OPEC, with plenty of intervention and 
pressure from various governments and international organizations. And the oil itself, 
rather than flowing ‘freely’, was now fine-tuned by OPEC quotas to fit ‘what the market 
can bear’.26  
Initially, the leading oil companies were alarmed by this turn of events. Having oc-
cupied the commanding heights of the energy world for much of the twentieth century, 
they suddenly found themselves demoted to a status of ‘interested bystanders’, as one 
observer put it (Turner 1983: 147-148). Their apprehension, though, was short-lived. 
OPEC, they quickly realized, was their manna from heaven. Although no longer in the 
driver’s seat, they remained indispensable for the cartel’s extraction and transportation, 
not to speak of its downstream operations and complex business dealings.27 In return for 
these services, the companies received something they could not have achieved on their 
own: a tenfold rise in the inflation-adjusted price of oil and a concomitant jump in their 
differential profit-read-power (Figure 3). 
And so the oil arena shifted from the earlier ‘free flow’ logic of greenfield breadth to 
the new ‘limited flow’ logic of stagflationary depth. Instead of producing more and more 
oil to profit from a growing economy, OPEC and the companies concentrated on raising 
oil prices to profit from the sabotage of inflation and stagnation they inflicted on the rest 
of the world. This shift was supported by the armament contractors who saw their 
weapon exports to the Middle East soar, and it was condoned, usually tacitly though 
occasionally openly, by the U.S. and U.K. governments.  
 
 
Energy Conflicts 
 
Central to this shift was the new institution of ‘energy conflicts’. As noted earlier, the 
common view on the subject is that resource wars – and certainly wars over oil – are 
fought to make the commodity accessible and cheap, at least for the aggressors. But in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, we have argued, there emerged in the oil arena a new 
form of organized violence: the energy conflict. This type of conflict serves not the end 
users of oil, but its owners, sellers and associated allies; and it does so not by cheapening 
oil, but by making it more expensive. 
As we have seen in Figure 1, the price of oil has little to do with the commodity’s 
actual scarcity, however estimated. But it has plenty to do with its perceived scarcity. In 
the modern world of capital, accumulation is forward-looking. The capitalization ritual 
26 Or, as Ali Al-Naimi, Saudi Arabia’s Oil Minister put it: ‘The price is determined by the mar-
ket, what we try to do is to make the market balanced. Today there is disequilibrium between 
supply and demand. Today we are trying to get the market to the normal equilibrium and the 
price will take care of itself’ (Hoyos 2006). 
27 For a detailed scholarly account of this interdependency, see Blair (1976). A riveting literary 
description is offered by Clavell’s novel Whirlwind (1986). 
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compels investors to look not to the past, but to the future: to fantasize alternative sce-
narios, assess their likely effect on oil, and discount these effects, weighted by their re-
spective ‘risk coefficients’, into current prices.28 And from the late 1960s onward, the 
most important scenario for the price of oil has been conflict in the Middle East.  
We should note, though, that however important and central, the price of oil here is 
merely a means to an end. The end itself is profit – and more precisely, differential profit 
– and it is this magnitude we now turn to examine.  
The historical link between energy conflicts and differential profits is demonstrated 
in Figure 4.29 The chart shows the differential return on equity of the Petro-Core. This 
measure is computed in two steps: first, by subtracting the return on equity of the Fortune 
500 group of companies from the return on equity of the Petro-Core; and second, by 
expressing the resulting difference as a per cent of the Fortune 500’s return on equity. 
Positive readings (grey bars) indicate differential accumulation: they measure the extent 
to which the Petro-Core beats the Fortune 500 average. Negative readings (black bars) 
show differential decumulation: they tell us by how much the Petro-Core trails this aver-
age. 
A stretch of differential decumulation constitutes a ‘danger zone’ – i.e., a period dur-
ing which an energy conflict is likely to erupt in the Middle East. The actual breakout of 
a conflict is marked by an explosion sign. The individual conflicts are listed in the note 
underneath the chart.  
 
 
The Stylized Patterns 
 
The figure shows three stylized patterns that have remained practically unchanged for 
the past half-century:  
 
• First, and most importantly, every energy conflict save one was preceded by the 
Petro-Core trailing the average. In other words, for a Middle East energy conflict to 
erupt, the leading oil companies first have to differentially decumulate.30 The only 
exception to this rule is the 2011 burst of the Arab Spring and the subsequent bloom-
ing of ‘outsourced wars’ (our term for the ongoing fighting in Lebanon-Syria-Iraq, 
which is financed and supported by a multitude of governments and organizations 
in and outside the region). This round erupted without prior differential decumula-
tion – although the Petro-Core was very close to falling below the average. In 2010, 
28 For a typical example of such calculations, see Deeley (2013). 
29 This chart first appeared in Nitzan and Bichler (1995: 499). An earlier, non-differential precur-
sor is given in Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1989: 26, Figure 8). 
30 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, and again during the 2000s, differential decumulation was 
sometimes followed by a string of conflicts stretching over several years. In these instances, the 
result was a longer time lag between the initial spell of differential decumulation and some of 
the subsequent conflicts. 
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its differential return on equity dropped to a mere 3.3 per cent, down from 71.5 per 
cent in 2009 and a whopping 1,114 per cent in 2008.  
 
Figure 4 
Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits: 
The Petro-Core vs. the Fortune 500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential return 
on equity is the difference between the return on equity of the Petro-Core and 
of the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on equity of the Fortune 
500. For 1992-93, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 
106 special charges. The last data point is for 2013. 
  
NOTE: The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), 
Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil 
(till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are 
due to mergers. Energy Conflicts mark the starting points of: the 1967 Arab-Is-
rael war; the 1973 Arab-Israel war; the 1979 Iranian Revolution; the 1979 So-
viet invasion of Afghanistan; the 1980 Iran-Iraq War; the 1982 second Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon; the 1990-91 first Gulf War; the 2000 second Palestinian 
Intifada; the 2001 attack of 9/11, the launching of the ‘War on Terror’ and the 
invasion of Afghanistan; the 2002-3 second Gulf War; the 2011 Arab Spring 
and outsourced wars; the 2014 third Gulf War. 
 
SOURCE: Fortune; Compustat through WRDS. 
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• Second, every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies beating the 
average. In other words, war and conflict in the region – processes that are 
customarily blamed for rattling, distorting and undermining the aggregate economy 
– have served the differential interest of the large oil companies at the expense of 
leading non-oil firms.31 This finding, although striking, should not surprise our 
reader. As we have seen, differential oil profits are intimately correlated with the 
relative price of oil (Figure 3); the relative price of oil in turn is highly responsive to 
Middle East ‘risk’ perceptions, real or imaginary; these risk perceptions tend to jump 
in preparation for and during armed conflict; and as the risks mount, they raise the 
relative price of oil and therefore the differential accumulation of the oil companies.  
 
• Third and finally, with one exception, in 1996-97, the Petro-Core never managed to 
beat the average without there first being an energy conflict in the region.32 In other 
words, the differential performance of the oil companies depended not on produc-
tion, but on the most extreme form of sabotage: war.33 
 
 
Another Angle 
 
How robust are these conclusions? Are they sensitive to the particular measure of differ-
ential profit being used? Will they still hold if we use a different proxy? 
Figure 5 tries to assess these questions. Here the focus is on the world as a whole, 
and the measure for profit is earnings per share (EPS). The top two series contrast the 
average EPS performance of the world’s listed integrated oil companies with the average 
EPS performance of all of the world’s listed companies. Each series measures the annual 
rate of change of the respective EPS, computed by comparing any given month with the 
same month a year earlier and expressed as a three-year trailing average. 
The bottom series shows the differential EPS growth of the integrated oil companies. 
This series is derived by subtracting the EPS growth rates of the world index from the 
EPS growth rate of the integrated oil index and expressing the result as a three-year trail-
ing average. As in Figure 4, grey areas indicate periods during which the integrated oil 
companies beat the average (differential accumulation), while black areas show periods 
in which they trail the average (differential decumulation). 
31 It is important to note here that the energy conflicts have led not to higher oil profits as such, but 
to higher differential oil profits. For example, in 1969-70, 1975, 1980-82, 1985, 1991, 2001-02, 2006-
07, 2009 and 2012, the rate of return on equity of the Petro-Core actually fell; but in all cases the 
fall was either slower than that of the Fortune 500 or too small to close the positive gap between 
them, so despite the decline, the Petro-Core continued to beat the average. 
32 Although there was no official conflict in 1996-97, there was plenty of violence, including an 
Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks (‘Operation Desert Strike’). 
33 For the details underlying the individual energy conflicts, as well as a broader discussion of 
the entire process, see Bichler and Nitzan (1996), Nitzan and Bichler (2002: Ch. 5), Bichler and 
Nitzan (2004b) and Nitzan and Bichler (2006b). 
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Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits:  
Integrated Oil Companies vs. the World 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as three-year trailing averages. 
Earnings per share (EPS) are calculated by dividing the stock price index by the 
price-earnings ratio. The annual rate of change is measured relative to the cor-
responding month in the previous year. Differential EPS growth is calculated 
by subtracting the EPS growth rate of the world index from the EPS growth rate 
of the integrated oil index. The last data points are for October 2014. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) and TOTMKWD(PE) 
for the price index and price-earnings ratio of all listed firms, respectively; OIL-
INWD(PI) and OILINWD(PE) for the price index and price-earnings ratio of 
all listed integrated oil firms, respectively). 
 
 
Now, note that, while the energy conflicts here are the same as those listed in Figure 
4, the measure of differential profit is different in several important respects. (1) The ge-
ographical scope is much wider and the focus is less on corporate size and more on the 
nature of business activity. Whereas in Figure 4, the comparison is between a Petro-Core 
of four to six firms and the U.S.-based Fortune 500, here the comparison is between all of 
the world’s listed integrated oil companies and the world average for all listed compa-
nies. (2) The profit metric is different. Whereas in Figure 4, the proxy of choice is return 
to equity, here it is earnings per share (EPS). (3) The nature of the variables is different. 
While in Figure 4 we look at levels, here we examine rates of change. (4) The temporality 
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is more refined. Whereas in Figure 4 the data are annual, here they are monthly, ex-
pressed as a three-year trailing average. (5) The comparison of the two indices is differ-
ent. In Figure 4, the difference between the two profit measures is expressed as a per cent 
of the benchmark measure, whereas here it is presented in absolute terms. And (6), the 
period under examination is shorter – in Figure 4 it starts in 1966, while here the data 
begin only in 1973 (1976 for the three-year trailing averages). 
All in all, then, our proxy for differential profits in Figure 5 is very different from the 
one we use in Figure 4. Yet the stylized patterns – as well as the exceptions to these 
patters – are almost exactly the same!  
Similarly to Figure 4, the chart shows that, since 1976: (1) all energy conflicts were 
preceded by the world’s integrated oil companies suffering differential decumulation 
(with the exception of the 2011 Arab Spring / outsourced wars and the 2014 third Gulf 
War, when differential accumulation was very close to zero, but still positive); (2) all 
conflicts were followed by the integrated oil companies shifting to differential accumu-
lation; and (3) except for the mid-1990s, the integrated oil companies have never man-
aged to beat the average without a prior energy conflict.34 
 
 
The Universal Logic 
 
These stylized patterns appear almost too simple, not to say simplistic – particularly 
when compared to sophisticated explanations of Middle East wars. And maybe this is 
their beauty. 
The experts on this subject – whether conservative or radical, Marxist or postist, 
materialist or culturalist, international relationsist or regional punditist – are undoubt-
edly right. The Middle East defies any simple logic – or at least that’s what the rulers 
want us to think. No determinism can account for its cultural subtleties, no structural 
theory can explain its multilayered conflicts, no Eurocentric text can decipher its post-
structural discourses. It is simply special. 
And yet, somehow, this kaleidoscope of complex specificities gets enfolded, figura-
tively speaking, into the universal logic of modern capitalism: the differential accumula-
tion of capital.35 In the Middle East, we have argued, this process revolves around oil 
profits:  
 
Obviously, the flow of arms to the region [and its associated conflicts] is an-
chored not in one particular cause but in the convergence of many: internal ten-
sions [such as those leading to the Arab Spring], inter-state confrontations [for 
34 Figure 5 would look virtually the same – and would lead to the exact same conclusions – if 
instead of the integrated oil companies we used the oil and gas sector as a whole. As noted in 
footnote 19, while the two groupings differ in overall size, their EPS measures are almost perfectly 
correlated. 
35 The notion of ‘enfoldment’ is beautifully articulated by Bohm (1980) and Bohm and Peat 
(2000). 
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example, the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War], conflicts between coalitions of countries 
[the first, second and third Gulf Wars], superpower intervention [a permanent 
feature], radical and anti-radical ideologies [the 1979 Iranian revolution, ISIS, 
etc.], nationalism [the Palestinian intifadas], clericalism [Iran, Egypt, Afghani-
stan, etc.], economic turbulence and business cycles [the unsatiated capitalist 
thirst for ‘cheap energy’]. . . . Yet, one way or another, these processes can be 
seen as already engulfed by and absorbed into the massive flow of the biggest 
prize of all: oil profits. (Nitzan and Bichler 2007: 376, translated from the 
Hebrew) 
 
Our analysis of this process has focused on the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
of the largest armament contractors and integrated oil companies, OPEC and various 
branches of Western governments. All members of the coalition, we’ve argued, share an 
interest in regional tensions. But when it comes to open hostilities and war, the balance 
tends to hang on the oil companies:  
 
The large oil companies and the leading arms makers both gained from Middle 
East ‘energy conflicts’ – the first through higher conflict premiums and the latter 
via larger military orders. But beyond this common interest the position of these 
groups differed in certain important respects. . . . Overall, ‘energy conflicts’ 
tended to boost arms exports both in the short-run and long-run, and given that 
the weapon makers have had an open-ended interest in such sales . . . their sup-
port for these conflicts should have been more or less unqualified. For the 
Petro-Core, however, the calculations are probably more subtle. . . . [T]he ef-
fects on their profits of higher war-premiums would be positive only up to a 
certain point. Furthermore, the outcome of regional conflicts is not entirely pre-
dictable and carries the inherent danger of undermining their intricate relations 
with host governments. For these reasons, we should expect the large oil com-
panies to have a more qualified view on the desirability of open Middle-East 
hostilities. Specifically, as long as their financial performance is deemed satis-
factory, the Petro-Core members would prefer the status quo of tension-with-
out-war. When their profits wither, however, the companies’ outlook is bound 
to become more hawkish, seeking to boost income via a conflict-driven ‘energy 
crisis’. (Nitzan and Bichler 1995: 497) 
 
Unfortunately for most subjects of the Middle East – and for the vast majority of the 
world population – the empirical regularities of energy conflicts and differential profits 
we have teased out of this hypothesis remain as true today as they were in the early 
1970s.  
Looking backward, these regularities helped us explain the history of the process 
till the late 1980s. Looking forward, they allowed us to predict, in writing and before 
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the event, the 1990-91 first Gulf War as well as the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and 
the 2002 onset of the second Gulf War. 
We have not predicted the recent spate of energy conflicts – but only because our 
research over the past decade has carried us away from the Middle East. The logic of our 
argument, though, remains intact. As Figures 4 and 5 show, any researcher who would 
have updated our data could have predicted, ahead of time, the 2011 Arab Spring and 
its associated outsourced wars, as well as the 2014 third Gulf War against ISIS.  
 
 
The Broader Vista 
 
The Middle East dramas, though, are themselves part of a bigger story. So far, we have 
shown that these dramas – the conflicts and wars, the oil crises and inflicted ‘scarcities’, 
OPEC’s machinations and outside interventions, terrorism and nationalism, religion 
and culture – could be enfolded into the stylized link between energy conflicts and dif-
ferential oil profits. But there is an even broader enfoldment to consider: the way in 
which this oil link fits the larger picture of global accumulation. Needless to say, this 
latter enfoldment is not easy to articulate, certainly not on the fly, so our outline below 
should be read as tentative and suggestive rather than definitive and exhaustive.   
 
Reversals of Fortune 
 
Begin with a bird’s-eye view of the differential oil profits and the energy conflicts depicted 
in Figures 4 and 5. The history of this process can be divided into three rough periods:  
  
1. Late 1960s – early 1980s. During this period, the oil companies tended to beat the 
average. There were only a few ‘danger zones’, and each zone was promptly fol-
lowed by an energy conflict – or a string of conflicts – causing differential profits to 
quickly flip back into positive territory.  
 
2. Mid 1980s – late 1990s. During this period, the oil companies tended to trail the aver-
age. With the exception of one energy conflict (the first Gulf War), ‘danger zones’ 
lingered with no relief in sight, causing the oil companies to suffer from protracted 
differential decumulation. 
 
3. Early 2000s – present. In this period, the oil companies have again taken the lead. 
Their differential profits have risen to record highs, having been boosted by frequent 
energy conflicts that seem to erupt at the mere suggestion of differential decumula-
tion.  
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Breadth and Depth  
  
Now, as noted in above, dominant capital as a whole tends to oscillate between two 
main regimes of differential accumulation: breadth and depth. Breadth is driven largely 
by mergers and acquisitions, while depth is fuelled mostly by stagflation. And what is 
remarkable for our purpose here is that, since the late 1960s, these regimes seem to coin-
cide with the ebb and flow of energy conflicts and differential oil profits. 
Figure 6 shows the long-term movements of corporate amalgamation and stagfla-
tion in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Amalgamation is proxied by 
the ‘buy-to-build’ ratio, plotted against the left log scale. This ratio measures the magni-
tude of mergers and acquisitions expressed as a per cent of gross fixed capital formation 
(the first magnitude denotes the money spent on buying existing assets, while the second 
measures the money spent on building new assets, so dividing the former by the latter 
yields the ‘buy-to-build’ ratio).36 
Stagflation, plotted against the right scale, is a synthetic index. It averages the stand-
ardized deviations of unemployment and inflation from their respective historical 
means. The average value of this index for the whole period is zero, by definition. Posi-
tive values indicate above-average stagflation, while negative values represent below-av-
erage stagflation.37 
Figure 6 shows that, since the 1920s, in both the United States and the United King-
dom, corporate amalgamation and stagflation have tended to move counter-cyclically: 
when one measure rises, the other recedes, and vice versa. Moreover, the counter-cycli-
cal patterns in the two countries are remarkably similar.38  
 
36 The first version of this figure – for the United States only – appeared in Nitzan (2001: Figure 
9, p. 260). Joseph Francis’ meticulous research (2013) corrected an error in our original buy-to-
build data for the United States, revised and updated these data till 2012 and provided the first 
ever long-term estimates for the United Kingdom. For a discussion, see Bichler and Nitzan 
(2013d). Francis’ data and computation are available here: 
http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/381/03/20131000_francis_the_buy_to_build_indicator_data.xls. 
37 Contrary to conventional belief, stagflation is anything but an anomaly. In modern capitalism, 
it is in fact the rule rather than the exception. To see why this is so, note that capitalist societies 
always operate with greater or lesser slack (just think of Marx’s ‘reserve army of the unem-
ployed’ or the monetarist/new-classical ‘natural rate of unemployment’). In other words, capi-
talist societies always stagnate relative to their full potential, so, technically speaking, inflation 
always appears in the midst of stagnation – i.e., as stagflation (Nitzan 1992: Ch. 7; Nitzan and 
Bichler 2009a: Ch 16). 
38 The tight correlations between the two countries are shown in Bichler and Nitzan (2013d: 
Figures 3 and 4, p. 77). 
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Figure 6 
Amalgamation and Stagflation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show annual data smoothed as five-year trailing av-
erages. The buy-to-build ratio denotes expenditures on mergers and 
acquisitions expressed as a percentage of gross fixed capital for-
mation. Stagflation is the average of: (1) the standardized devia-
tions from the average of the rate of unemployment; and (2) the 
standardized deviation from the average rate of inflation of the 
GDP implicit price deflator. The deviations were standardized by 
deducting from each year the arithmetic mean of the series over the 
whole period, then dividing the result by the same arithmetic mean. 
The last data points are for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: Joseph Francis, The Buy-to-Build Indicator: New Esti-
mates for Britain and the United States, Review of Capital as Power, 
2013, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 63-72. 
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Although research on this topic is still in its infancy, the remarkable similarities be-
tween these two leading political economies suggest that breadth and depth regimes 
might be a fairly universal – and perhaps increasingly synchronized – phenomenon in 
modern capitalism.39 And insofar as this phenomenon is increasingly universal, it might 
serve to explain the larger role of energy conflicts and differential oil profits. 
 
 
Energy Conflicts and Stagflation 
 
As we can see in Figure 6, merger activity peaked around the late 1960s before tipping 
into a free fall that lasted till the early 1980s. This retreat from amalgamation forced 
dominant capital to rely on rising stagflation, and the main engines of this stagflation 
were tensions and energy conflicts in the Middle East. 
The crucial link in this process was provided by oil prices. Like many capitalist phe-
nomena, broad-based inflation (read stagflation) often requires a trigger, and during the 
period in question this trigger was rising oil prices. The connection between oil prices 
and inflation is illustrated in Figure 7. The chart juxtaposes the ‘real’ price of crude oil 
on the left scale and the rate of consumer price inflation in the advanced countries on the 
right (monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing averages). It also identifies three dis-
tinct periods, based on the changing correlation between the two series. 
Until the early 1970s, the correlation was largely negative. Inflation fell and rose, 
but its fluctuations must have been driven by something other than the ‘real’ price of oil, 
which remained relatively stable. This indifference ended in 1973. From 1973 to 2002, 
the two series were tightly and positively correlated (Pearson coefficient of 0.8). During 
the 1970s, the ‘real’ price of oil soared and inflation rose sharply with it. And when ‘real’ 
oil prices collapsed in the 1980s and continued to fall through much of the 1990s, infla-
tion decelerated in much the same way. During the most recent period, from the early 
2000s to the present, this positive correlation loosened considerably; but then, that al-
ready puts us ahead of our story. 
 
  
39 For other studies of breadth and depth, see Nitzan and Bichler (2002) on Israel, Park (2013, 
2015 forthcoming) on South Korea, and Brennan (2014) on Canada. 
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Figure 7 
‘Real’ Oil Prices and CPI Inflation in the Advanced Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Series show monthly data smoothed as 12-month trailing av-
erages. The ‘real’ price of crude oil is the dollar price deflated by the 
U.S. CPI. The last data points are September 2014 for CPI inflation 
and October 2014 for the ‘real’ price of crude oil. 
 
SOURCE: IMF International Financial Statistics through Data In-
sight (series codes: L76AA&Z@C001 for the average price of crude 
oil; L64@C111 for the U.S. CPI; L64@C110 for the CPI of the ad-
vanced countries). 
 
  
Middle East Energy Conflicts and Differential Accumulation Cycles 
 
With this link in mind, we can now begin to connect the specific patterns of Middle East 
energy conflicts with the broader differential accumulation cycles of depth and breadth.  
 
 
The Rise of Stagflation (late 1960s – early 1980s) 
 
During the late 1960s, dominant capital in the advanced countries started to shift from 
breadth to depth (Figure 6). By the early 1970s, the merger wave was receding rapidly, 
and as amalgamation weakened, stagflation picked up. The main trigger for the latter 
process was the build-up of Middle East tensions and the eruption of energy conflicts 
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(Figures 4 and 5). Tension and war fuelled the differential profits of the oil companies. 
And in the absence of amalgamation, these conflicts, which stalked overall inflation in 
the midst of stagnation (Figure 6), also helped dominant capital as a whole beat the over-
all average.  
The convergence of these power processes during the 1970s and early 1980s gave an 
enormous boost to the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. The oil companies and the 
armament contractors, OPEC and key elements of Western governments – and now also 
dominant capital more broadly – all had an interest in rising oil prices. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that energy conflicts were so frequent and that 
the differential profits of the oil companies were rarely allowed to fall into negative ter-
ritory. 
 
 
The Resurgence of Amalgamation (mid 1980s – late 1990s) 
 
The 1980s brought a sharp reversal. Neoliberalism was in full swing, and with com-
munism soon to disintegrate, the entire world was opening up for dominant capital. 
Merger and acquisition activity was now going global and by the early 1990s was already 
testing new records (Figure 6). The flip side was that dominant capital now lost all of its 
previous appetite for stagflation (Figure 6). Economic growth appeared to have resumed 
and inflation dropped sharply.  
At this point, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition went out of favour. Although 
the coalition itself was still interested in high oil prices, the rest of dominant capital 
wasn’t. This cleavage within the ruling classes reflected on the Middle East. In contrast 
to the previous stagflationary period, energy conflicts were now few and far between, 
and the differential profits of the oil companies seemed stuck in negative territory with 
no sign of reversal (Figures 4 and 5). 
 
 
Systemic Crisis (early 2000s – present) 
 
The early 2000s were marked by the rising threat of systemic crisis.40 For the first time 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, dominant capital, particularly in the advanced 
capitalist countries, seems to have confronted the asymptotes of its power.41 At the 
household level, the income and asset shares of the top segments of society are now 
approaching record levels. At the aggregate level, the share of net profit in national in-
come is reaching historical highs. And at the corporate level, the leading firms have 
40 For analyses and debate, see Bichler and Nitzan (2008a, 2009), Nitzan and Bichler (2009b) 
and Kliman, Bichler and Nitzan (2011).  
41 For a detailed examination of these asymptotes in the United States, see Bichler and Nitzan 
(2012a). 
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grown so much that their profits and capitalization are now many thousands of time big-
ger than those of the average firm.42 These distributional gains attest to the peak power 
of capitalists in general and dominant capital in particular. But they also indicate that 
extending this power – or simply sustaining it – is becoming more and more difficult. 
One symptom of this difficulty is the deceleration of corporate amalgamation. Com-
pared to its 2000 record, the buy-to-build ratio is now one-third lower in the United States 
and nearly two-thirds lower in the United Kingdom (Figure 6). Like in the 1970s, dom-
inant capital has reacted to this deceleration by trying to switch gears from amalgama-
tion to inflation (i.e. stagflation).43 But this time it isn’t alone. In the 1970s, small and 
medium-sized firms were hostile to inflation, as were policymakers. Not anymore. Now-
adays, capitalists and policymakers are scared of deflation, and for good reason. Given 
the asymptotic outlook for further pro-capitalist redistribution, equity and debt prices 
seem increasingly ‘overcapitalized’ relative to their expected earnings and underlying 
national incomes, and the last thing overcapitalized assets can withstand is a significant 
bout of deflation. The net result is that, unlike in the 1970s, the present pro-inflation 
coalition is much more broadly based. It encompasses not only the Weapondollar-Pet-
rodollar Coalition and dominant capital as a whole, but also many governments and the 
multitude of medium and small capitalists who all yearn for some ‘healthy’ inflation to 
ease their deflationary fears.  
This constellation seems consistent with the new flare-up of Middle East energy 
conflicts. With so much hanging on higher inflation, and given the historical role of oil 
prices as the ‘spark’ that sets inflation going, it is obvious that tension and war in the 
region would be more than welcome by everyone who stands to benefit from such infla-
tion. And since the interested parties comprise some of the most powerful groups in the 
world, it shouldn’t surprise us to see the oil companies again flying high and the region 
once more erupting in flames (Figures 4 and 5). 
 
 
An Omen?  
  
But there is a big fly in the ointment. As Figure 7 shows, over the past ten years or so, 
the positive link between oil prices and overall inflation seems to have weakened consid-
erably. Between 2003 and 2014, the Pearson correlation coefficient of the two series fell 
to a feeble 0.14. The short-term movements are still in the same direction, so upticks in 
the ‘real’ price of oil are closely matched by upticks in inflation; but the long-term trends 
42 For the personal distribution of income and assets, see Piketty (2014); for the aggregate share 
of profit, see Bichler and Nitzan (2012a: Figure 11, p. 41 and Figure 13, p. 44); for the differential 
earnings of dominant capital, see Nitzan and Bichler (2014a: Figure 14, p. 143). 
43 For more on this transition from breadth to depth, see Bichler and Nitzan (2004b), Nitzan and 
Bichler (2006b) and Bichler and Nitzan (2008b). 
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are clearly opposite: while ‘real’ oil prices have moved upward, inflation has slid.44 In 
other words, if conflict-driven oil prices are to reignite worldwide inflation, they would 
have to rise to levels far beyond their recent record. 
This simple observation could prove ominous for the Middle East and the world 
more generally. In 1956, the Japanese political economist Shigeto Tsuru (1956) exam-
ined the role of U.S. military spending as an ‘offset to savings’, a way of absorbing the 
country’s rising ‘surplus’. Military expenditures, he observed, already amounted to 10 
per cent of GDP, and if that level were necessary for economic prosperity, he continued, 
in ten years’ time the United States would have a defence budget far too large for peace-
time: ‘We must say (and we should like to say for the sake of world peace) that it is rather 
questionable if the United States can spend on defense as much as 16 billion dollars more 
than today in 1968’ (p. 28). Given that in 1966, exactly ten years later, the United States 
was deeply entangled in the Vietnam War, this must have been one of the most brilliant 
if sombre predictions in the social sciences.  
The present divergence between ‘real’ oil prices and inflation depicted in Figure 7 
may constitute a similar omen. The third Gulf War with ISIS might be the beginning of 
a new round of Middle East energy conflicts. But that is just the first step. In the past, 
energy conflicts have led to higher ‘real’ oil prices, which in turn boosted differential oil 
profits, and this second step is yet to happen. In fact, despite the hostilities, oil prices 
have retreated sharply from their 2013 record.45  
There is of course no inherent reason why the stylized patterns presented in this 
paper must continue to hold in the future. But if they do – in other words, if the world 
continues to flirt with deflation and the Petro-Core with differential decumulation, and 
if rising oil prices remain crucial for boosting overall inflation and the oil companies’ 
differential accumulation – violence and conflict in the Middle East might need to inten-
sify significantly in the years to come.  
 
44 While the correlation between inflation and the level of ‘real’ crude oil prices dropped to a 
negligible 0.14, the correlation between inflation and the rate of change of ‘real’ crude oil prices 
remains high at 0.78. 
45 Most analyses of this decline seem to replicate the explanations of the sharp price rise of the 
1970s – only in reverse (see footnote 25). Some, like Daniel Yergin (2014), swear by the ‘old-fash-
ioned forces of supply and demand’, stating that while ‘there may be surplus of geopolitical risk in 
the world, there is an even greater surplus of oil’. Others, such as Rafael Ramirez, Venezuela’s 
foreign minister and the former head of state oil company PDVSA, focus on geopolitics. The recent 
drops, he argues, occurred ‘not due to market fundamentals, but to price manipulation to create 
economic problems among major producing countries’ (Rathbone, Rodrigues, and Schipani 
2014). The main culprit is Saudi Arabia. According to this view, the Saudis, possibly with a nod 
from the United States, have orchestrated a ‘new oil-price war’. One effect of this price war is to 
clip the wings of U.S. shale-oil firms whose booming production challenges the Saudis’ primacy. 
Naturally, this impact doesn’t make Washington happy. But according to proponents of this argu-
ment, that is a small price to pay in exchange for the havoc inflicted by lower oil prices on Amer-
ica’s current enemies – namely Russia, Iran and Venezuela – and for having the world economy 
stimulated by a lower ‘oil tax’ (Dyer and Crooks 2014; Lucas and McLannahan 2014). Astute 
commentators are careful to note the deflationary impact of lower oil prices, but this ‘mixed bless-
ing’ rarely makes it to the front page.  
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Appendix: What Do Economists Know about Scarcity?  
 
According to standard economic theory, commodities are not ‘scarce’ or ‘abundant’ as 
such.46 They are scarce or abundant in relation to the ‘desires’ of sellers and buyers. 
When the desire to buy at a given price (i.e., the ‘quantity demanded’) exceeds the desire 
to sell at that price (‘quantity supplied’), economists denote the difference as ‘excess de-
mand’. If the opposite situation prevails, they call it ‘excess supply’. 
For example, if the price of oil is $100/barrel, and if at that price buyers around the 
world wish to buy a total of 80 million barrels/day while sellers want to sell only 75 
million, the result is an ‘excess demand’ of 5 million barrels/day. This positive difference 
means that, given the price of oil and the prevailing preferences of buyers and sellers, oil 
is ‘scarce’. However, if the desires were different – for example, if at $100/barrel buyers 
wanted to buy only 80 million barrels/day while sellers wished to sell 82 million – we 
would have an ‘excess supply’ of 2 million barrels/day. In this situation, oil would be 
deemed ‘abundant’. Moreover, different prices imply different desires to sell and buy, 
making the same commodity scarcer or more abundant, as the case may be.  
Now, economists manipulate these magnitudes with great ease – but only concep-
tually. When it comes to empirical analysis, their hands are tied. And they are tied by 
the embarrassingly simple fact that they know nothing about the actual desires of sellers 
and buyers. Needless to say, this ignorance is fatal. It makes it impossible for economists 
to measure the levels of demand and supply, let alone which exceeds which and by how 
much. And as long as they don’t know whether the commodity – be it oil, automobiles, 
software or anything else – is in excess supply or excess demand, they have no clue as to 
whether it is scarce or abundant. 
Interestingly, most economists seem undeterred by this ignorance. In their everyday 
analyses, they simply assume that ‘what we see is what we get’; or, in economically cor-
rect lingo, that the quantities that agents buy and sell are equal to – and therefore ‘reveal’ 
– their underlying preferences.47 In practical terms, this assumption allows analysts to 
measure production as if it were supply and consumption as if it were demand.48 And 
since the observed levels of consumption and production are presumed equal to the (un-
known) desires of buyers and sellers, the difference between those levels – which to the 
46 In this and the following paragraph we again use inverted commas to highlight concepts we 
find problematic (see footnote 2). 
47 Early neoclassicists such as Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall admitted quite openly that 
wants, desires and satisfaction cannot be observed, let alone quantified; but they insisted on 
using them nonetheless, lest the whole edifice of their utilitarian economics comes down crash-
ing (Jevons 1871: 11; Marshall 1920: 78; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: 128-130). This insistence 
was later formalized by Paul Samuelson’s concept of ‘revealed preferences’ (1938) – the idea 
that it is perfectly OK for economists to use reality to explain preferences instead of the other 
way around (Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Ch. 5). 
48 A Google image search for phrases such as ‘petroleum demand’ or ‘supply of oil’ yields count-
less empirical charts. The series in the charts are labelled ‘demand’ and ‘supply’, but these titles 
are deeply misleading: their data measure not the desires of buyers and sellers as the theory man-
dates, but their actual consumption and production, which may have nothing to do with those de-
sires, whatever they are.  
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naked eye appears as a shortfall or build-up of inventories – is equated with excess de-
mand (scarcity) or excess supply (abundance), respectively.49  
 
 
49 (This footnote is meant for the economically initiated.) In practice, the observed deple-
tion/build-up of inventories consists of two components: intended and unintended. When the in-
tended component is zero, the depletion (build-up) is entirely unintended, by definition; and it is 
only then that the excess consumption (production) is equal to the excess demand (supply). How-
ever, since the desires of buyers and sellers are unknown, economists have no way of knowing 
which part of the inventory change is intended and which is unintended. And as long as the two 
components remain mingled, the accuracy of this scarcity proxy is impossible to assess.  
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Imperialism and Financialism:  
The Story of a Nexus 1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past century, the nexus of imperialism and financialism has become a major 
axis of Marxist theory and praxis. Many Marxists consider this nexus to be a prime 
cause of our worldly ills, but the historical role they ascribe to it has changed dramat-
ically over time. The key change concerns the nature and direction of surplus and li-
quidity flows. The first incarnation of the nexus, articulated at the turn of the twentieth 
century, explained the imperialist scramble for colonies to which finance capital could 
export its ‘excessive’ surplus. The next version posited a neo-imperial world of monop-
oly capitalism where the core’s surplus is absorbed domestically, sucked into a ‘black 
hole’ of military spending and financial intermediation. The third script postulated a 
World System where surplus is imported from the dependent periphery into the finan-
cial core. And the most recent edition explains the hollowing out of the U.S. core, a 
‘red giant’ that has already burned much of its own productive fuel and is now trying 
to ‘financialize’ the rest of the world in order to use the system’s external liquidity. The 
paper outlines this chameleon-like transformation, assesses what is left of the nexus 
and asks whether it is worth keeping. 
  
1 This paper was first published in Journal of Critical Globalization Studies (Bichler and Nitzan 
2012d, Issue 5, January). 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past century, Marxism has been radically transformed in line with circum-
stances and fashion. Theses that once looked solid have depreciated and fallen by the 
sideline; concepts that once were deemed crucial have been abandoned; slogans that 
once sounded clear and meaningful have become fuzzy and ineffectual. But two key 
words seem to have survived the attrition and withstood the test of time: imperialism 
and financialism.2  
Talk of imperialism and financialism – and particularly of the nexus between them 
– remains as catchy as ever. Marxists of different persuasions – from classical, to neo 
to post – find the two terms expedient, if not indispensable. Of course, the views be-
tween them differ greatly, but there is a common thread: for most Marxists, imperial-
ism and financialism are prime causes of our worldly ills. Their nexus is said to explain 
capitalist development and underdevelopment; underlie capitalist power and contra-
dictions; and drive capitalist globalization, its regional realignment and local dynam-
ics.  
The secret behind this staying power is flexibility. Over the years, the concepts of 
imperialism and financialism have changed more or less beyond recognition, as a re-
sult of which the link between them nowadays connotes something totally different 
from what it did a century ago.  
The purpose of our article is to outline this chameleon-like transformation, to as-
sess what is left of the nexus and to ask whether this nexus is still worth keeping. In so 
doing, our goal is not to present our own view of the nexus, but rather to critique what 
others have written about it.3 We try to stick to the categories and units of the theories 
we examine – categories and units with which we often disagree – so that we can com-
pare and contrast the theories on their own terms. And we make no attempt to pick 
and choose. We do not try to decide which version of the nexus is correct in some 
universal sense, and not even which version was correct for its time. Instead, our aim 
is to highlight the historical development of the nexus, particularly the loose manner 
in which it has been altered – to the point of meaning everything and nothing. 
The paper comprises two parts. The first part examines the different schools. It 
traces the transmutation of the nexus – from its first articulation in the early twentieth 
century, to the version developed by the Monopoly Capital school, to the arguments 
of dependency and Word Systems analyses, to the thesis of hegemonic transition. The 
second part offers an empirical exploration. Focusing specifically on the hegemonic 
transition hypothesis, it identifies difficulties that arise when the theory meets the evi-
dence and assesses their significance for the century-old nexus. 
2 As the article seeks to show, the precise terms are rather loose and their meaning varies across 
theorists and over time. ‘Imperialism’, ‘empire’ and ‘colonialism’ are used interchangeably, as 
are ‘finance’, ‘fictitious capital’, ‘finance capital’, ‘financialization’ and ‘financialism’. Here we 
use ‘imperialism’ and ‘financialism’ simply because they rhyme.  
3 For our own analysis of capitalism, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a). 
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PART I: THE SCHOOLS 
 
Empire and Finance  
  
The twin notions of imperialism and financialism emerged at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The backdrop is familiar enough. During the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the leading European powers were busy taking over large tracts of non-capitalist 
territory around the world. At the same time, their own political economies were being 
fundamentally transformed. Since the two developments unfolded hand in hand, it 
was only natural for theorists to ask whether they were related – and if so, how and 
why.  
The most influential explanation came from a British left liberal, Hobson (1902), 
whose work on the subject was later extended and modified by Marxists such as 
Hilferding (1910), Luxemburg (1913), Kautsky (1914), and Lenin (1917), among oth-
ers.  
Framed in a nutshell, the basic argument rested on the belief that capitalism had 
changed: originally ‘industrial’ and ‘competitive’, the system had become ‘financial’ 
and ‘monopolistic’.4  
This transformation, said the theorists, had two crucial effects. First, the process 
of monopolization and the centralization of capital in the hands of the large financiers 
made the distribution of income far more unequal, and that greater inequality re-
stricted the purchasing power of workers relative to the productive potential of the 
system. As a result of this imbalance, there emerged the spectre of ‘surplus capital’, 
excess funds that could not be invested profitably in the home market. And since this 
surplus capital could not be disposed of domestically, it forced capitalists to look for 
foreign outlets, particularly in pristine, pre-capitalist regions.5 
Second, the centralization of capital altered the political landscape. Instead of the 
night-watchman government of the laissez-faire epoch, there emerged a strong, active 
state. The laissez-faire capitalists of the earlier era saw little reason to share their profits 
with the state and therefore glorified the frugality of a small central administration and 
minimal taxation. But the new state was no longer run by hands-off liberals. Instead, 
it was dominated and manipulated by an aggressive oligarchy of ‘finance capital’ – a 
coalition of large bankers, leading industrialists, war mongers and speculators who 
needed a strong state that would crack down on domestic opposition and embark on 
foreign military adventures.6  
And so emerged the nexus between imperialism and financialism. The concen-
trated financialized economy, went the argument, requires pre-capitalist colonies 
where surplus capital can be invested profitably; and the cabal of finance capital, now 
4 Hilferding (1910: Ch. 14); Lenin (1917: 190 and 193-194).  
5 Hobson (1902: 77-78, 85-86, 106). 
6 Hilferding (1910: 335); Luxemburg (1913: 371, 467); Lenin (1917: 243-244). 
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in the political driver’s seat, is able to push the state into an international imperialist 
struggle to obtain those colonies. 
At the time, this thesis was not only totally new and highly sophisticated; it also 
fit closely with the unfolding of events. It gave an elegant explanation for the imperial 
bellicosity of the late nineteenth century, and it neatly accounted for the circumstances 
leading to the great imperial conflict of the first ‘World War’. There were of course 
other explanations for that war – from realist/statist, to liberal, to geopolitical, to psy-
chological.7 But for most intellectuals, these alternative explications seemed too partial 
or instrumental compared to the sweeping inevitability offered by the nexus of empire 
and finance.  
History, though, kept changing, and soon enough both the theory and its basic 
concepts had to be altered.  
 
 
Monopoly Capital 
 
The end of the Second World War brought three major transformations. First, the 
nature of international conflict changed completely. Instead of a violent inter-capitalist 
struggle, there emerged a Cold War between the former imperial powers on the one 
hand and the (very imperial) Soviet bloc on the other (with plenty of hot proxy conflicts 
flaring up in the outlying areas). Second, the relationship between core and periphery 
was radically altered. Outright conquest and territorial imperialism gave way to decol-
onization, while tax-collecting navies were replaced by the more sophisticated tools of 
foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI). Third and finally, the political econo-
mies of the core countries themselves were reorganized. Instead of the volatile laissez-
faire regime, there arose a large welfare-warfare state whose ‘interventionist’ ideologies 
and counter-cyclical policies managed to reduce instability and boost domestic growth.  
On the face of it, this new constellation made talk of finance-driven imperialism 
seem outdated, if not totally irrelevant. But the theorists didn’t give up the nexus. In-
stead, they gave it a new meaning.  
The revised link was articulated most fully by the Monopoly Capital school asso-
ciated with the New York journal Monthly Review.8 Capitalism, argued the writers of 
this school, remains haunted by a lack of profitable investment outlets. And that prob-
lem, along with its solution, can no longer be explained in classical Marxist terms.9  
The shift from competition to oligopoly that began in the late nineteenth century, 
these writers claimed, was now complete.10 And that shift meant that Marx’s labour 
7 For a cross section and reviews of such explanations, see, for example, Veblen (1915), Schum-
peter (1919), Tuchman (1962, 1966) and Kennedy (1987: Ch. 5). 
8 Some of the important contributions to this literature include Steindl (1952), Tsuru (1956), 
Baran and Sweezy (1966) and Magdoff (1969). 
9 Baran (1957: 22 and 23, fn. 3); Baran and Sweezy (1966: 6 and 10, fn. 6). 
10 Baran and Sweezy (1966: Chs. 2 and 8). 
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theory of value and his notion of surplus value had become more or less irrelevant to 
capitalist pricing.11  
In the brave new world of oligopolies, the emphasis on non-price competition 
speeds up the pace of technical change and efficiency gains, making commodities 
cheaper and cheaper to produce. But unlike in a competitive system, where market 
discipline forces firms to pass on their lower costs to consumers, under the new cir-
cumstances, cost reductions do not translate into falling prices. The prevalence of oli-
gopolies creates a built-in inflationary bias that, despite falling costs, makes prices 
move up and sometimes sideways, but rarely if ever down.12  
This growing divergence between falling costs and rising prices increases the in-
come share of capitalists, and that increase reverses the underlying course of capital-
ism. Marx believed that the combination of ever-growing mechanization and ruthless 
competition creates a tendency of the rate of profit to fall. But the substitution of mo-
nopoly capitalism for free competition inverts the trajectory. The new system, argued 
its analysts, is ruled by an opposite ‘tendency of the surplus to rise’.13 
The early theorists of imperialism, although using a different vocabulary, under-
stood the gist of this transformation. And even though they did not provide a full the-
ory to explain it, they realized that the consequence of that transformation was to shift 
the problem of capitalism from production to circulation (or in later Keynesian par-
lance, from ‘aggregate supply’ to ‘aggregate demand’). The new capitalism, they 
pointed out, suffered not from insufficient surplus, but from too much surplus, and its 
key challenge now was how to ‘offset’ and ‘absorb’ this ever-growing excess so that 
accumulation could keep going instead of coming to a halt.14  
That much was already understood at the turn of the twentieth century. But this 
is where the similarity between the early theorists of imperialism and the new analysts 
of Monopoly Capital ends. 
 
 
  
11 See Hilferding (1910: 228), Sweezy (1942: 271) and the entire thrust of Baran and Sweezy 
(1966). Later on, Sweezy (1974) would defend himself and Baran against allegations of betrayal: 
Monopoly Capital, he said, had no intention of abandoning Marx’s labour theory of value. On 
the contrary, the book had taken Marx’s theory ‘for granted’, trying to show how labour values 
were transformed – first into competitive prices, and then into monopoly prices. However, as 
Howard and King (1992: 120) note, this defence was misleading and in fact unnecessary. 
Sweezy had always hailed the qualitative side of the labour theory of value, and that fact was 
worth reiterating; but to claim that he and Baran also took the quantitative aspects of that theory 
for granted was to contradict the gist of their own Monopoly Capital thesis.  
12 Baran and Sweezy (1966: 62-63).  
13 Baran and Sweezy (1966: Ch. 3). 
14 Baran and Sweezy (1966: 218). 
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Black Hole: The Role of Institutionalized Waste 
 
Until the early twentieth century, it seemed that the only way to offset the growing 
excess was productive and external: the surplus of goods and capital had to be exported 
to and productively invested in pre-capitalist colonies. But as it turned out, there was 
another solution, one that the early theorists hadn’t foreseen and that the analysts of 
Monopoly Capital now emphasized. The surplus could also be disposed off unproduc-
tively and internally: it could be wasted at home. 
For the theorists of Monopoly Capital, ‘waste’ denoted expenditures that are nec-
essary neither for producing the surplus nor for reproducing the population, and that 
are, in that sense, totally unproductive and therefore wasteful. These expenditures ab-
sorb existing surplus without creating any new surplus, and this double feature enables 
them to mitigate without aggravating the tendency of the surplus to rise. 
The absorptive role of wasteful spending wasn’t entirely new, having already been 
identified and elaborated on at the turn of the twentieth century by Veblen (1904, 
1923). But it was only after the Second Word War, with the entrenchment of the Ford-
ist model of mass production and consumption and the parallel rise of the welfare-
warfare state, that the process was fully and conscientiously institutionalized as a sali-
ent feature of monopoly capitalism.  
By the end of the war, the U.S. ruling class grew fearful that demobilization would 
trigger another severe depression; and having accepted and internalized the stimulat-
ing role of large-scale government spending, it supported the creation of a new 
‘Keynesian Coalition’ that brought together the interests of big business, the large la-
bour unions and various state agencies.15 The hallmark of this coalition was immor-
talized in a secret U.S. National Security Council document (NSC-68), whose writers 
effectively called on the government to use high military spending as a way to secure 
the internal stability of U.S. capitalism.16 
According to its theorists, monopoly capitalism gave rise to many forms of insti-
tutionalized waste – including a bloated sales effort, the creation of new ‘desires’ for 
useless goods and services and the acceleration of product obsolescence, among other 
strategies. But the two most significant types of waste were spending on the military 
and on the financial sector.17 
The importance of these latter expenditures, went the argument, lies in their seem-
ingly limitless size. The magnitude of military expenditures has no obvious ceiling: it 
depends solely on the ability of the ruling class to justify the expenditures on the 
15 Cf. Gold (1977). 
16 U.S. National Security Council (1950). For a critical examination of Military Keynesianism, 
see Nitzan and Bichler (2006a). 
17 On the surplus absorption of military spending, see for example, Tsuru (1956), Kalecki (1964, 
1967) and Baran and Sweezy (1966: Cf. Ch. 7). On the role of finance, see Baran and Sweezy 
(1966: 139-141) and Magdoff and Sweezy (1983a, 1985). 
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grounds of national security. Similarly with the size of the financial sector: its magni-
tude expands with the potentially limitless inflation of credit. This convenient ex-
pandability turns military spending and financial intermediation into a giant ‘black 
hole’ (our term): they suck in large chunks of the excess surplus without generating 
any excess surplus of their own.18  
Now, on the face of it, the efficacy of this domestic black hole should have made 
imperialism less necessary, if not wholly redundant. According to the theorists of Mo-
nopoly Capital, though, this would be the wrong conclusion to draw. It is certainly 
true that, unlike the old imperial system, monopoly capitalism no longer needs colo-
nies. But the absence of formal colonies is largely a matter of appearance. Remove this 
appearance and you’ll see the imperial impulse pretty much intact: the core continues 
to exploit, dominate and violate the periphery for its own capitalist ends.19  
Spearheaded by U.S.-based multinationals and no longer hindered by inter-capi-
talist wars, argued the theorists, the new order of monopoly capitalism has become 
increasingly global and ever more integrated. And this global integration, they contin-
ued, has come to depend on an international division of labour, free access to strategic 
raw materials and political regimes that are ideologically open for business. However, 
these conditions do not develop automatically and peacefully. They have to be actively 
promoted and enforced – often against stiff domestic opposition – and they have to be 
safeguarded against external threats (the Soviet Bloc before its collapse and Islamic 
fundamentalism and rogue states since then, etc.). And because such promotion and 
enforcement hinge on the threat and frequent use of violence, there is an obvious jus-
tification, if not outright need, for a large, well-equipped army sustained by large mil-
itary budgets.  
In this context, military spending comes to serve a dual role: together with the 
financial sector and other forms of waste, it propels the accumulation of capital by 
black-holing a large chunk of the economic surplus; and it helps secure a more sophis-
ticated and effective neo-imperial order that no longer needs colonial territories but is 
every bit as expansionary, exploitative and violent as its crude imperial predecessor.  
 
 
  
18 Classical Marxists interpret the role of waste rather differently. In their account, wasteful 
spending withdraws surplus from the accumulation process and therefore causes the pace of that 
process to decelerate. However, some classical Marxists, such as Kidron (1974), suggest that the 
deceleration may end up having a ‘positive’ impact: by slowing the pace at which constant cap-
ital accumulates, waste lessens the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
19 Perhaps the clearest advocate of this argument was the late Harry Magdoff, a writer whose 
empirical and theoretical studies stand as a beacon of scientific research (1969, 2003). Similar 
claims (minus the research) are offered by Meiksins Wood (2003). 
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Dependency 
    
The notion of neo-imperialism boosted and gave credence to a subsidiary theory of 
dependency.20 This support was somewhat paradoxical, since the lineage between the 
two theories was weak, if not contradictory. Recall that, by emphasizing the role of 
domestic waste, particularly through the open-ended offsets of military spending and 
the financial sector, the theory of Monopoly Capital served to deemphasize, if not to-
tally negate, the absorptive importance of the periphery.21 But the analysts of depend-
ency put their emphasis elsewhere. The persistence of (neo) imperialism, they claimed, 
showed that, regardless of its own internal dynamics, the core still needs to keep the 
periphery chronically subjugated and underdeveloped. 
This dependency, went the argument, is the outcome of five hundred years of co-
lonial destruction. The basic claim, originally made by Baran (1957: Ch. 5), was that 
capitalist development is inherently uneven. By the sixteenth century, this unevenness 
had created a major fracture between Europe and the periphery: the European powers 
embarked on a colonial process of primitive accumulation, a process that fuelled their 
own growth while stunting that of the periphery. 
From then onward, the imperial powers relentlessly and systematically under-
mined the socio-economic fabric of the periphery, making it totally dependent on the 
core. And when decolonization finally started, the periphery found itself unable to take 
off while the capitalist core prospered.22 At that point, there was no longer any need 
for core states to openly colonize and export capital to the periphery. Using their dis-
proportionate economic and state power, the former imperialist countries were now 
able to hold the postcolonial periphery in a state of debilitating economic monoculture, 
political submissiveness and cultural backwardness – and, wherever they could, to im-
pose on it a system of unequal exchange. 
Unequal exchange can take different forms. It may involve a wage gap between 
the ‘less exploited’ labour aristocracy of the core and the ‘more exploited’ simple la-
bour of the periphery.23 Or the core can compel the periphery to buy its exports at 
‘high’ prices (relative to their ‘true’ value), while importing the periphery’s products at 
‘low’ prices (relative to their ‘true’ value). As a result of the latter strategy, the terms of 
trade get ‘distorted’, surplus is constantly siphoned into the core (rather than exported 
20 Some of the important texts here include Prebisch (1950), Baran (1957), Frank (1967), Em-
manuel (1972), Galeano (1973), Amin (1974b), Wallerstein (1974, 1980) and Cardoso and Fa-
letto (1979). For a good summary of the dependency literature, see So (1990). 
21 According to Baran and Sweezy (1966: 105), foreign investment in developing countries serves 
to aggravate the absorption problem: the returns on such investment are not fully reinvested in 
the periphery, the leftovers flow back to the advanced countries and the surplus gets augmented 
instead of being offset. 
22 Frank (1966); Wallerstein (1974). 
23 Emmanuel (1972). 
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from or domestically absorbed by the core), and the eviscerated periphery remains 
chronically underdeveloped.24 
This logic of dependent underdevelopment was first articulated during the 1950s 
and 1960s as an antidote to the liberal modernization thesis and its Rostowian promise 
of an imminent takeoff.25 And at the time, that antidote certainly seemed to be in line 
with the chronic stagnation of peripheral countries.  
But what started as a partial theory soon expanded into a sweeping history of 
world capitalism. According to this broader narrative, capitalism was and remained 
imperial from the word go: it didn’t simply start with conquest; it started because of 
conquest. Its very inception was predicated on geographical exploitation and domina-
tion – a process in which the financial-commercial metropolis (say England) used the 
surplus extracted from a productive periphery (say India) to kick-start its own eco-
nomic growth. And once started, the only way for this growth to be sustained is for 
the metropolis to continue to eviscerate the periphery around it. The development of 
the emperor depends on and necessitates the underdevelopment of its subjects.26  
The next theoretical step was to fit this template into an even broader concept of 
a World System – an all-encompassing global approach that seeks to map the hierar-
chical political relationships, division of labour and flow of commodities and surplus 
between the peripheral countries at the bottom, the semi-peripheral satellites in the 
middle and the financial core at the apex. From the viewpoint of this larger retrofit, 
capitalism is no longer the outcome of a specific class struggle, a conflict that devel-
oped in Western Europe during the twilight of feudalism and later spread to and re-
produced itself in the rest of the world. Instead, capitalism – to the extent that this term 
can still be meaningfully used – is merely the outer appearance of Europe’s imperial 
expedition to rob and loot the rest of the world.  
This view reflected a fundamental change in emphasis. Whereas earlier Marxist 
theorists of imperialism accentuated the centrality of exploitation in production, de-
pendency and World-Systems analysts shifted the focus to trade and unequal ex-
change. And while previous theories concentrated on the global class struggle, depend-
ency and World-Systems analyses spoke of a conflict between states and geographical 
24 See Amin (1974a). The inverted commas in the referenced paragraph highlight concepts that 
the theory of unequal exchange can neither define nor measure. Since nobody knows the ‘cor-
rect’ value of labour power, it is impossible to determine the extent of exploitation in the two 
regions. Similarly, since no one knows the ‘true’ value of commodities, there is no way to assess 
whether export and import prices are too ‘high’ or too ‘low’. This latter ignorance makes it 
impossible to gauge the degree to which the terms of trade are ‘distorted’ and, indeed, in whose 
favour; and given that we don’t know the magnitude or even the direction of the ‘distortion’, it 
is impossible to tell whether surplus flows from the periphery to the core or vice versa, or how 
large the flow might be.  
25 Rostow (1960). 
26 Galeano (1973: 38-42, 49-51, 67-70, 86-90, 145-148, 206-216, 225-228). 
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regions. The new framework, although nominally Marxist on the outside, has little 
Marxism left on the inside.27 
And if we are to believe the postists who quickly jumped on the dependency band-
wagon, there is nothing particularly surprising about this particular theoretical bent. 
After all, ‘history’ is no more than an ethno-cultural clash of civilizations, a never-
ending cycle of imperial hegemonies in which the winners (ego) impose their culture 
on the losers (alter).28 To the naked eye, the totalizing capitalization of our contempo-
rary world may seem like a unique historical process. But don’t be deceived. This ap-
parent uniqueness is a flash in the pan. Deconstruct it and what you are left with is yet 
another imperial imposition – in this case, the imposition of a Euro-American ‘finan-
cialized discourse’ on the rest of the world. 
 
 
Red Giant: An Empire Imploded 
 
The dependency version of the nexus, though, didn’t hold for long, and in the 1970s 
the cards again got shuffled. The core stumbled into a multifaceted crisis: the United 
States suffered a humiliating defeat in Vietnam, stagflation decelerated and destabi-
lized the major capitalist countries and political unrest seemed to undermine the legit-
imacy of the capitalist regime itself. In the meantime, the periphery confounded the 
theorists: on the one hand, import substitution, the prescribed antidote to dependency, 
pushed many developing countries, primarily in Latin America, into a debt trap; on 
the other hand, the inverse policy of privatization and export promotion, implemented 
mostly in East Asia, triggered an apparent ‘economic miracle’. Taken together, these 
developments didn’t seem to sit well with the notion of Western financial imperialism. 
So once more the nexus had to be revised. 
According to the new script, ‘financialization’ is no longer a panacea for the im-
perial power. On the contrary, it is a ‘sign of autumn’, prime evidence of imperial 
decline.29  
The reasoning, whether explicit or implicit, goes back to the basic Marxist distinc-
tion between ‘industrial’ activity on the one hand and ‘commercial’ and ‘financial’ 
activities on the other. The former activity is considered ‘productive’ in that it gener-
ates surplus value and leads to the accumulation of ‘actual’ capital. The latter activities, 
27 The question of what constitutes a ‘proper’ Marxist framework is highlighted in the debates 
over the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Important contributions to these debates are 
Dobb (1946), Sweezy (1950) and Brenner (1977, 1978). For edited volumes on this issue, see 
Hilton, ed. (1978) and Aston and Philpin, eds. (1985).  
28 For a typical narrative, see Hobson (2004).  
29 Braudel (1985: Vol. 3, p. 246). 
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by contrast, are deemed ‘unproductive’; they don’t generate any new surplus value and 
therefore, in and of themselves, do not create any ‘actual’ capital.30  
This distinction – which most Marxists accept as sacrosanct and to which we re-
turn later in the article – has important implications for the nexus of imperialism and 
financialism. It may be true, say advocates of the new script, that finance (along with 
other forms of waste) helps the imperial core absorb its rising surplus – and in so doing 
prevents stagnation and keeps accumulation going. But there is a price to pay. The 
addiction to financial waste ends up consuming the very fuel that sustains the core’s 
imperial position: it hollows out the core’s industrial sector, it undermines its produc-
tive vitality, and, eventually, it limits its military capabilities. The financial sector itself 
continues to expand absolutely and relatively, but this is the expansion of a ‘red giant’ 
(our term) – the final inflation of a star ready to implode. 
The process leading to this implosion is emphasized by theories of hegemonic 
transition.31 The analyses here come in different versions, but they all seem to agree 
on the same basic template. According to this template, the maturation of a hegemonic 
power – be it Holland in the seventeenth century, Britain in the nineteenth century or 
the United States presently – coincides with the ‘over-accumulation’ of capital (i.e. the 
absence of sufficiently profitable investment outlets). This over-accumulation – along 
with growing international rivalries, challenges and conflicts – triggers a system-wide 
financial expansion marked by soaring capital flows, a rise in market speculation and 
a general inflation of debt and equity values.32 The financial expansion itself is led by 
the hegemonic state in an attempt to arrest its own decline, but the reprieve it offers 
can only be temporary. Relying on finance drains the core of its energy, causes pro-
ductive investment to flow elsewhere and eventually sets in motion the imminent pro-
cess of hegemonic transition. 
Although the narrative here is universal, its inspiration is clearly drawn from the 
apparent ‘financialized decline’ of U.S. hegemony.33 Since the 1970s, many argue, the 
country has been ‘depleted’: it has grown overburdened by military spending; it has 
30 For more on the question of who is productive and who is not, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: 
Ch. 7). 
31 Cf. Braudel (1985); Wallerstein (1984); and Arrighi (1994). 
32 For a succinct summary, see Arrighi and Silver (1999). Building on Braudel and Weber, they 
outline a ‘demand and supply theory of financialization’ (our term). On the capitalist supply 
side, profits that grow relative to stagnating investment opportunities give rise to soaring finan-
cial liquidity. On the government demand side, budget deficits caused by stunted growth force 
states to compete for liquid capitalist funds. ‘All systemwide financial expansions past and pre-
sent’, say Arrighi and Silver, ‘are the outcome of the combined if uneven development of these 
two complementary tendencies’ (32). 
33 On the leading role of the United States in this process, see Arrighi and Silver (1999: 33) and 
Arrighi et al. (1999: 88-89). 
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gotten itself entangled in unwinnable armed conflicts; and it has witnessed its indus-
trial-productive base sucked dry by a Wall Street-Washington Complex that prospers 
on the back of rising debt and bloated financial intermediation.34 
In order to compensate for its growing weakness, these observers continue, the 
United States has imposed its own model of ‘financialization’ on the rest of the world, 
hoping to scoop the resulting expansion of liquidity. Some states have been compelled 
to replicate the model in their own countries, others have been tempted to finance it 
by buying U.S. assets and pretty much all have been pulled into an unprecedented 
global whirlpool of capital flow. 
However, the spread of ‘financialization’, goes the argument, has only been partly 
successful. For a while, the United States benefited from being able to control, manip-
ulate and leverage this expansion for its own ends. But in the opinion of many, the 
growing severity of recent financial, economic and military crises suggests that this 
ability has been greatly reduced and that U.S. hegemony is now coming to an end.  
 
 
PART II: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
 
Up until now, our discussion was fairly even handed. We devoted more or less the 
same attention to each version of the nexus, and for good reason. Judged against their 
concrete historical backdrops, all versions look relevant, even solid. At their time, they 
all offered insight into the world they described and often provided a platform for pop-
ular struggle and alternative politics.  
But this even-handedness is superficial: although the theories themselves may be 
comparable, their empirical bases are not. When Lenin wrote his Imperialism (1917) in 
Zurich in the early twentieth century, the data on which he based his argument were 
meagre and fractured. There were no organized statistics, no time series and no aggre-
gate facts to speak of. Much of his evidence was drawn from works written by Hobson 
twenty years earlier (1894, 1902). The situation was quite different half a century later. 
By the time Baran and Sweezy published their Monopoly Capital (1966), systems of 
national accounts had already been implemented, primarily in the developed coun-
tries, and aggregate data analysis had become increasingly commonplace.35 This new 
infrastructure enabled Baran and Sweezy to enlist the help of Joseph D. Phillips, a 
statistical expert who subjected their thesis to systematic empirical examination. The 
result, published in the famous appendix to their book, was an empirical feat that 
Lenin could not even have fathomed. And yet, even Baran and Sweezy had to restrict 
their analysis to the United States, and particularly to its macro economy: national 
accounting were still far less developed in the rest of the world; organized statistics for 
34 For the ‘depletion thesis’, see for example Melman (1970, 1974). A broader historical appli-
cation is given in Kennedy (1987). The central role of finance in this depletion is emphasized in 
Hudson (2010). 
35 On the history of the national accounts, see Kendrick (1968, 1970). 
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corporations and financial intermediation were still in their infancy; and global data-
bases were not yet on the radar screen. It was only in the 1980s, with the transnation-
alization of capital and the advent of cheap computing, that a global statistical picture, 
however imperfect, became a practical possibility. 
The purpose of this section is to use some of these new data to examine the most 
recent version of the nexus – the theory of hegemonic transition. The examination is 
not exhaustive, but illustrative. It seeks to highlight the importance of empirical anal-
ysis – both as a check on our theoretical speculations and as a catalyst for the develop-
ment of new questions and new concepts. 
The argument is developed in steps. To put things in context, we begin by outlin-
ing the historical evolution of capital flow and transnational ownership; then we ex-
amine the shifting global distribution of profit between the different regions; and fi-
nally, we zero in on the process of financialization and its relation to hegemonic tran-
sition. 
 
 
Capital Flow and Transnational Ownership 
   
The highly publicized imperial misgivings of the United States make the hegemonic-
transition version of the nexus seem persuasive. But when we look more closely at the 
facts, the theoretical surface no longer looks smooth; and as we get even closer to the 
evidence, cracks begin to appear.  
Start with the cross-border flow of capital, the international manifestation of ‘fi-
nancialization’. This process is often misunderstood, even by high theorists, so a brief 
clarification is in order. Contrary to popular belief, the flow of capital is financial, and 
only financial. It consists of legal transactions, whereby investors in one country buy 
or sell assets in another – and that is it. There is no flow of material or immaterial 
resources, productive or otherwise. The only things that move are ownership titles.36  
36 The generalization here applies to portfolio as well as foreign direct investment. Both are 
financial transactions, pure and simple. The only difference between them is their relative size: 
typically, investments that account for less than 10% of the acquired property are considered 
portfolio, whereas larger investments are classified as direct. The flow of capital, whether port-
folio or direct, may or may not be followed by the creation of new productive capacity. But the 
creation of such capacity, if and when it happens, is conceptually distinct, temporally separate 
and causally independent from the mere act of foreign investment. The act of foreign investment 
consists either of transferring existing ownership titles from domestic to foreign residents, or of 
simultaneously adding foreign ownership titles to the liabilities side of the balance sheet and 
cash and/or securities to the asset side. In the latter case, the additional funds on the assets side 
can then be put to various uses: they can be used to build new capacity or to speculate in the 
commodities market; they can be used to pay dividends or buy back the company’s share; they 
can be given to the government in return for short-term bonds or smuggled out of the country; 
etc. But the particular use, whatever it may be, is separate from the act of foreign investment 
and is entirely unrelated to whether that investment is portfolio or direct. 
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These changes in ownership, of course, are of great importance. If the flow of 
capital is large enough, the stock of foreign-owned assets will grow relative to domes-
tically owned assets. And as the ratio rises, the ownership of capital becomes increas-
ingly transnational.  
The history of this process, from 1870 to the present, is sketched in Figure 1, where 
we plot the ratio between the value of global foreign assets and global GDP (both de-
nominated in U.S. dollars). The figure contains two partly overlapping annual series: 
the thicker grey series, which covers selected years during the period 1870-2000, is 
taken from a study by Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor; the thinner black series, 
which covers the entire period of 1970-2007, is from a study by Philip Lane and Gian 
Maria Milesi-Ferretti (with full references indicated in the footnote to the figure). Both 
series are estimated based on a changing sample of countries. The ratio is computed 
in three steps: first, by aggregating the foreign assets of the available sample of coun-
tries; second, by computing their combined GDP; and third, by dividing the first num-
ber by the second. In both series, the sample size increases over time; and as the num-
ber of countries grows, the estimates they provide serve to better reflect the actual 
global ratio.37 
 Admittedly, the raw numbers underlying these computations are not the most 
accurate. The data on foreign ownership are scarce; often they are of questionable 
quality; rarely if ever are they available on a consistent basis; and almost always they 
require painstaking research to collate and sometimes heroic assumptions to calibrate. 
There are also serious problems in estimating global GDP, particularly for earlier pe-
riods. Finally, the accuracy of the estimates changes over time, so temporal compari-
sons must be interpreted with care. But even if we take these severe limitations into 
consideration, the overall picture seems fairly unambiguous.  
The figure shows three clear periods: 1870-1900, 1900-1945 and 1945-2007. The 
late nineteenth century, marked by the imperial expansion of ‘finance capital’, saw the 
ratio of global foreign assets to global GDP grow from 0.47 in 1870 to 0.55 in 1900 
(though keep in mind the inaccuracy and bias of the early estimates). This upswing 
was reversed during the first half of the twentieth century. The mayhem, isolationism 
and protectionism brought about by the two world wars and the Great Depression on 
the one hand and the emergence of domestic ‘institutionalized waste’ on the other 
undermined the flow of capital and caused the share of foreign ownership to recede. 
By 1945, with the onset of decolonization under U.S. ‘hegemony’ and the beginning 
37 The sample data for the earlier years are not only more inaccurate; most likely, they are also 
systematically biased. The reason is that the ratio of foreign assets to GDP, particularly during 
the earlier years, was probably smaller in the countries excluded from the sample than in the 
countries included in it; and if that is indeed the case, the smaller the sample was, the more it 
overstated the actual global ratio. Obstfeld and Taylor compute a ‘hybrid’ ratio between the 
sample foreign assets and the global (rather than the sample) GDP. The resulting estimates are 
lower than those reported in Figure 1, but their temporal pattern is the same. For a visual com-
parison of these two estimates, see Francis, Bichler and Nitzan (2010: Figure 2, p. 7). 
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of the Cold War, the ratio of foreign assets to global GDP hit a record low of 0.12. 
This was the nadir.  
 
 
Figure 1 
Ratio of Global Gross Foreign Assets to Global GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Gross foreign assets consist of cash, loans, bonds and equi-
ties owned by non-residents. Both gross foreign assets and GDP are 
estimates based on a changing sample of countries. The Obstfeld & 
Taylor series (thick grey line) uses a sample that gradually grows 
from four countries in 1870, to seven in 1900, to 26 in 1980, to 63 in 
2000. The Lane & Milesi-Ferretti series (thin black line) uses a sam-
ple that gradually grows from 101 countries in 1970, to 177 in 2000, 
to 178 in 2007.  
 
SOURCE: Thick grey line (1870-2000): Maurice Obstfeld and Alan. 
M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 52-53, Table 2-
1. Thin black line (1970-2007): Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Ex-
tended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004’, Jour-
nal of International Economics, 2007, No. 73, pp. 223-250 (with data 
updated to 2007 by the authors). Downloaded on August 8, 2009, 
from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip. 
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The next half century brought a massive reversal. In the early 1980s, when Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher started to peddle the wonders of neoliberalism, the 
ratio of foreign assets to GDP was already soaring; and by 2007, after a quarter century 
of exponential growth, it reached an all-time high of 1.78.38  
This final number represents a significant level of transnational ownership. Ac-
cording to recent research by the McKinsey Global Institute, between 1990 and 2006 
the global proportion of foreign-owned assets has nearly tripled, from 9% to 26% of all 
world assets (both foreign and domestically owned). The increase was broadly based: 
foreign ownership of corporate bonds rose from 7% to 21% of the world total, foreign 
ownership of government bonds rose from 11% to 31% and foreign ownership of cor-
porate stocks rose from 9% to 27%.39 
Of course, numbers alone tell only part of the story. The issue here is not merely 
that foreign ownership is significant in size and rapidly growing. It is also that the 
attitude toward such ownership has changed radically. The following comparison il-
lustrates this change. In 1987, Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) took advantage of the 
privatization of British Petroleum to buy 22% of the company’s outstanding shares. At 
the time, the neoliberal Thatcher government was so horrified by this attack on its 
national ‘crown jewel’ that it forced KIO to reduce its stake to a more acceptable 9.9%. 
By contrast, when in 2008 Sheikh Mansoor of Abu Dhabi bought 16% of Barclays 
Bank – and then sold it less than a year later for a 70% profit – nobody even blinked.40 
The difference? Capital has become totally vendible, within and across borders. There 
are no crown jewels any more. With the exception of ‘national-security’ companies 
and other such oddities, every asset is now fair game. During the recent crisis, the U.S. 
authorities all but begged sovereign wealth funds to buy U.S. assets.41 
38 The conventional view, at least until recently, was that global capital mobility is cyclical more 
than secular, and that the levels of foreign ownership reached at the end of the twentieth century 
still pale in comparison to those recorded at the beginning of that century (see, for example, 
Hirst and Thompson 1999: 27-29). This conclusion, though, owed less to the facts and more to 
misleading calculations. Most analysts, having no access to the actual data on foreign assets and 
capital flow, relied on the indirect evidence offered by the current account. The logic was that 
countries that run current account deficits must cover those deficits with capital inflow, so if one 
sums up the deficits across all countries, the result must be equal, by definition, to the overall 
sum of global capital flow. This logic, though, is valid only if capital flows in one direction – 
from countries with current account surplus to countries with current account deficit. But over 
the past half century, capital has been increasingly flowing in both directions; and with this two-
way flow – inward and outward – the overall movement of capital and the level of foreign assets 
are no longer related to changes in the current accounts. For more on this issue, see Wallich 
(1984) and Nitzan (2001). 
39 Farrell et al. (2008: 73, Exhibit 3.10). Not surprisingly, the United States, which still has the 
world’s largest pool of capitalized assets, exhibits the lowest levels of inward transnationaliza-
tion. But these levels, although low relative to other countries, are by no means trivial: in 2006, 
foreigners owned 14% of all U.S.-listed equities, 22% of its listed bonds, and 20% of the com-
bined value of the two – up from negligible levels in 1990 (74, Exhibits 3.11 and 3.12).  
40 For the BP episode, see Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989: 5-6). For the Barclays Bank story, 
see Larsen (2009). 
41 See for example, Heinrich (2008). 
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The Shifting Locus of Ownership 
  
Having outlined the global increase in foreign ownership and the accompanying 
change in attitude, the next step is to break the aggregate front and examine the distri-
bution of this ownership. This is what we do in Figure 2, which compares the foreign 
asset shares of British and U.S. owners from 1825 to the present.  
The figure contains two sets of partly overlapping series: each country is repre-
sented first by a dotted series for 1825-1980, and second by a solid series that partly 
overlaps with and further extends it for the period 1970-2007 (the data sources, along 
with the statistical caveats, are the same as for Figure 1). Note that the solid series are 
based on a larger sample of countries. Consequently, during the overlapping period of 
1970-1980, these series show the shares of the two countries to be smaller than those 
measured by the dotted series.  
The chart shows two important differences between the earlier era of ‘classical 
imperialism’ dominated by Britain and the more recent ‘neo-imperial’ period led by 
the United States.  
First, there is the pattern of decline. British owners saw their share of global assets 
fall from the mid-nineteenth century onward, but until the end of the century their 
primacy remained intact. The real challenge came only in the twentieth century, when 
capital flow decelerated sharply and foreign asset positions were unwound; and it was 
only in the interwar period, when foreign investment gave way to capital flight, that 
the share of British owners fell below 50%.  
The U.S. experience was very different. U.S. owners achieved their primacy right 
after the Second World War, when capital flow had already been reduced to a trickle 
– and that position was undermined the moment capital flow started to pick up. In 
1980, when U.S. ‘financialization’ started in earnest, U.S. owners accounted for only 
28% of global foreign assets. And by 2003, when record capital flow and the U.S. in-
vasion of Afghanistan and Iraq prompted many Marxists to pronounce the dawn of 
an ‘American Empire’, the asset share of U.S. owners had been reduced to a mere 
18%.42 
Second, there is the identity of the leading owners. In the previous transition, 
power shifted from owners in one core country (Britain) to those in another (the United 
States). By contrast, in the current transition (assuming one is indeed underway) the 
contenders are often from the periphery. In recent years, owners from China, OPEC, 
Russia, Brazil, Korea and India, among others, have become major foreign investors 
with significant international positions – including large stakes in America’s ‘imperial’ 
debt. 43 
  
42 For the effect on these conclusions of a changing sample of countries, see the debate in Francis, 
Bichler and Nitzan (2010: 1-2 and 7-8). 
43 Joe Francis provides a further breakdown of global ownership by region (Francis, Bichler, and 
Nitzan 2010: 14-15).  
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Figure 2 
Shares of Global Gross Foreign Assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Gross foreign assets consist of cash, loans, bonds and equi-
ties owned by non-residents. The dotted series for both British and 
U.S. owners are based on sample data from Obstfeld & Taylor, with 
global gross foreign assets representing the aggregate for an unspec-
ified number of countries in 1825, four in 1870, seven in 1900 and 
26 in 1980 (with additional increments between these signposts). 
The solid series for both British and U.S. owners are based on sam-
ple data from Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, with global gross foreign assets 
representing the aggregate for 101 countries in 1970, 177 in 2000, 
and 178 in 2007 (with incremental increases between the signposts). 
 
SOURCE: Dotted series (1825-1980): Maurice Obstfeld and Alan. 
M. Taylor, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 52-53, Table 2-
1. Solid series (1970-2007): Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Fer-
retti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Ex-
tended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004’, Jour-
nal of International Economics, 2007, No. 73, pp. 223-250 (with data 
updated and extended to 2007 by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti). Down-
loaded on August 8, 2009, from http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip.  
 
Does this shift of foreign ownership represent the rising hegemony of countries 
such as China – or is what we are witnessing here yet another mutation of imperialism? 
Perhaps, as some observers seem to imply, we’ve entered a (neo) neo-imperial order 
in which the ‘Empire’ actually boosts its power by selling off its assets to the periphery? 
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The Global Distribution of Profit 
  
Surprising as it may sound, such a selloff is not inconsistent with the basic theory of 
hegemonic transition. To reiterate, according to this theory, hegemonic transitions are 
always marked by a financial explosion that is triggered, led and leveraged by the core 
in a vain attempt to arrest its imminent decline. Supposedly, this explosion enables the 
hegemonic power to amplify its financial supremacy in order to (temporarily) retain 
its core status and power. And if retaining that power requires the devolution of foreign 
assets and the selloff of domestic ones, so be it.  
The question is how to assess this power. How do we know whether the core’s 
attempt to leverage global ‘financialization’ is actually working? Is there a meaningful 
benchmark for power, and how should this benchmark be used and understood? 
Unfortunately, most theorists of hegemonic transitions prefer to deal with general 
concepts and tend to avoid the nitty gritty data, so it’s often unclear how they them-
selves gauge the shifting trajectories of global power. But given the hyper-capitalist 
nature of the current epoch, it seems pretty safe to begin with the bottom line: net 
profit.  
Net profit is the pivotal magnitude in capitalism. It determines the health of cor-
porations and their ability to borrow, it tells investors how to capitalize assets and it 
sets limits on what government officials feel they can and cannot do. It is the ultimate 
yardstick of capitalist power, the category that subjugates the social individual and 
makes the whole system tick. It is the one magnitude no researcher of capitalism can 
afford to ignore.44 
Of course, the level of profit as such tells us nothing about power. Power is not 
absolute; it is relative. So in order to assess its extent and movement, our focus should 
be not the absolute magnitude of profit, but its differential size and temporal redistri-
bution.45 
With this rationale in mind, consider Figure 3, which traces the changing distri-
bution of global net profit earned by publicly traded corporations. The chart, covering 
the period from 1974 to the present, shows three profit series, each denoting the profit 
share of a distinct corporate aggregate: (1) firms listed in the United States; (2) firms 
listed in developed markets excluding the United States; and (3) firms listed in the rest 
of the world – i.e. in ‘emerging markets’. In all three series, the underlying raw earnings 
are reported on a consolidated basis: they include the net profit of parent corporations, 
the earnings of domestic and foreign subsidiaries, and the earnings share in minority-
held companies. 
 
44 There are of course other important yardsticks for capitalist power, such as risk, hype and the 
normal rate of return. But these yardsticks are intimately related to profit, and given that our 
concern here is long-term tendencies, the use of net profit seems warranted.  
45 For more on the differential nature of capitalist power, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Ch. 
14). 
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Figure 3 
Net Profit Shares of Listed Corporations 
(% of World Total)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed as the ratio of market value to the 
price-earning ratio. Data for developed markets excluding the U.S. is 
calculated by subtracting from the profit of firms listed in developed 
markets the profit of firms listed in the U.S. Data for rest of the world 
is calculated by subtracting from the profit of all firms the profits of 
those listed in developed markets. Series display monthly data and 
are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. The raw earning data 
are reported on a consolidated basis, including domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries and the equity share in minority held firms. The last data 
points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(MV) and TOT-
MKWD(PE) for the market value and price-earning ratio of all listed 
firms, respectively; TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PE) for the 
market value and price-earning ratio of U.S.-listed firms, respec-
tively; TOTMKDV(MV) and TOTMKDV(PE) for the market value 
and price-earning ratio of firms listed in developed countries, respec-
tively).  
 
The chart demonstrates a sharp reversal of fortune. Until the mid-1980s, U.S.-
listed firms dominated: they scooped roughly 60% of all net profits, leaving firms listed 
in other developed markets 35% of the total and those listed in ‘emerging markets’ less 
than 5%.  
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But then the tables turned. During the second half of the 1980s, the net profit share 
of U.S.-listed firms plummeted, falling to 36% in less than a decade. The 1990s seemed 
to have stabilized the decline, but in the early 2000s the downward drift resumed. By 
the end of the decade, U.S. firms saw their net profit fall to 30% of the world total.  
The other two aggregates moved in the opposite direction. By 2010, the profits of 
firms listed in developed countries other than the U.S. reached 50% of the total (down 
from a peak of 53% a couple of years earlier), while the share of ‘emerging market’ 
firms quadrupled to more than 20%.  
These numbers, of course, should be interpreted with care. First, note that our 
profit data here cover only publicly traded firms that are included in the Datastream 
universe of companies; they do not include unlisted firms, or listed firms that are not 
part of the Datastream universe. This fact means that variations in profit shares reflect 
a combination of three very different processes: (1) changes in the amount of profit 
earned by listed firms, (2) the pace of listing and delisting of firms, and (3) the adding 
of previously excluded stock markets to the Datastream universe. The two latter fac-
tors became important during the late 1980s and 1990s: Europe and the ‘emerging 
markets’ saw their stock market listings swell as many private corporations went pub-
lic, and Datastream added markets that were previously not part of its universe of 
companies – this at a time when the number of listed firms in the United States re-
mained flat.  
Second, the location of a firm’s listing says nothing about its operations and own-
ers. Many firms whose shares are traded in the financial centres of the United States 
and Europe in fact operate elsewhere. And then there is the issue of ultimate owner-
ship. Recall that currently nearly one third of all global assets are owned by foreigners 
(and perhaps more, given the opaqueness of international criminal ties and money 
laundering). This proportion is already large enough to make it difficult to determine 
the ‘nationality of capital’, and if it were to rise further the whole endeavour would 
become an exercise in futility.  
The theoretical implications of these caveats have received little or no attention 
from students of hegemonic transitions, and their quantitative implications remain un-
clear. But even if we take the ‘nationality of capital’ at face value and consider the 
numbers in Figure 3 as accurate and representative of this nationality, it remains obvi-
ous that ‘financialization’ has not worked for the hegemonic power: despite the alleged 
omnipotence of its Wall Street-Washington Complex, despite its control over key in-
ternational organizations, despite having imposed neoliberalism on the rest of the 
world, and despite its seemingly limitless ability to borrow funds and suck in global 
liquidity – the bottom line is that the net profit share of U.S.-listed corporations has 
kept falling and falling.46 
46 Using the data from Figure 3, Joe Francis showed that there is a relatively tight correlation 
between the declining net profit share of U.S.-listed firms and the devaluating U.S. dollar. In 
principle, the dollar’s devaluation can impact the U.S. profit share in two opposite ways: on the 
one hand, nominal devaluation lowers earnings reported in U.S. dollars relative to earnings 
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The Engine of ‘Financialization’ 
 
Now, in and of itself, the collapse of the U.S. profit share – much like the selloff of 
U.S. assets – isn’t at odds with the theory of hegemonic transition. To repeat, this 
theory suggests that the hegemonic/imperial power, having been weakened by its prior 
financial excesses (among other ills), will kick-start, promote and sustain a system-
wide process of ‘financialization’. According to this theory, the latent purpose is to 
leverage this process in order to slow down the hegemon’s own decline – but nowhere 
does the theory say that this ‘strategy’, whether premeditated or implemented on the 
go, has to succeed. 
Presented in this way, the story sounds historically compelling, logically con-
sistent and empirically convincing – but only if we can first establish one basic fact. 
We need to show that the global process of ‘financialization’ indeed has been led by the 
United States. This is the starting point. Only if U.S. ‘financialization’ preceded, was 
bigger than and propelled ‘financialization’ in the rest of the world can we speak of the 
United States leveraging this process for its own ends. And only then can we assess 
whether that leveraging has succeeded or failed.  
So let’s look at the evidence. 
 
 
Concepts and Methods: How to Measure ‘Financialization’? 
 
The initial step in this sequence is to measure ‘financialization’. Conceptually, the task 
may seem simple. All we need to do is calculate the share of financial activity in overall 
economic activity and then trace the trajectory of the resulting ratio. When this ratio 
goes up, we can say that the economy is being ‘financialized’; when it comes down, 
we would conclude that it is being ‘de-financialized’.  
But that is easier said than done.47 
Begin with the term ‘financialization’. The concept is rooted in the classical debate 
on the source of productivity, a controversy that began with the French Physiocrats, if 
not earlier, and that continues to haunt economists till this very day. Situated in this 
reported in other currencies (although with U.S. corporations earning more and more of their 
profits abroad, the effect of this process has been progressively mitigated); on the other hand, 
devaluation (after corrections for relative inflation rates), makes U.S.-made goods and services 
relatively cheaper, and that cheapening should enable U.S.-based firms to raise their global mar-
ket share. Based on Joe Francis’ data, the former (negative) effect has completely overwhelmed 
the latter (positive) impact, suggesting that U.S. firms were unable to turn cheaper exports to 
their advantage. More broadly, and assuming one accepts the nationally based approach to cap-
italist power (which we, personally, do not), the very decline of the U.S. dollar should be indic-
ative of the waning global power of U.S. capitalists. For more on this issue, see Francis, Bichler 
and Nitzan (2010: 3, Figure 1, as well as pp. 8-9 and 16).  
47 For a detailed analysis of the associated difficulties and impossibilities that we discuss in this 
section only in passing, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Chs. 6-8 and 10) and Bichler and Nitzan 
(2009). 
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larger debate, Marxists tend to identify economic activity as productive if it generates 
surplus value. Industry, they say, generates such surplus value and is therefore produc-
tive. By contrast, commerce and finance do not generate surplus value (but merely 
appropriate it), which makes them unproductive. The concept of ‘financialization’ 
draws on this distinction. It denotes a shift of emphasis from productive industrial ac-
tivity to unproductive financial activity – a process that is dominated by financiers, 
directed by financial organizations and governed by the logic of financial intermedia-
tion. 
The reality of this shift, though, remains elusive. One basic difficulty is that, unlike 
during the early twentieth century, when Rudolf Hilferding published his treatise on 
Finance Capital, the entity of ‘finance’ can no longer be equated, however superficially, 
with ‘banks’, and not even with ‘financial institutions’ more generally. Over the past 
half century, the process of conglomeration has created highly diversified corporate 
giants whose ‘financial’ operations cannot be meaningfully disentangled from their 
‘productive’ and ‘commercial’ dealings. 
And that is just for starters. Contemporary capitalism has become thoroughly me-
diated through discounting and capitalization, and that fact makes every mediated ac-
tivity both ‘economic’ and ‘financial’ at the same time. In this context, discriminating 
between the veneer of financial mediation that is common to all market activity and 
activity that is ‘purely’ financial becomes a Sisyphean task.  
The main stumbling block here is that, despite hundreds of years of theorizing and 
endless claims to the contrary, economists do not know how to identify ‘productivity’, 
let alone measure it. In the mainstream case, the productivity of an input is counted in 
terms of the universal utils the input generates. But utils are totally fictitious units. 
They have no objective existence, even on paper. So liberals have grown accustomed 
to going in reverse. Instead of measuring the util productivity of an input directly, they 
deduce it indirectly, by assuming it is ‘revealed’ by income. According to this logic, if 
the CEO of Goldman Sachs earns 100,000 times more than an Exxon mechanic, he 
must be 100,000 times more productive. However, since their respective productivity 
can never be observed independently of the associated income, the above conclusion 
ends up hanging on nothing but faith. 
Sadly, Marxist computations do not fare much better.48 Contrary to mainstream 
economists, for whom productivity is determined by the generation of utils, for Marx-
ists it hinges on the production of surplus value. In this framework, the CEO of Gold-
man Sachs, by virtue of his ‘financial’ function as a banking executive, cannot generate 
surplus value and therefore is unproductive; by contrast, an Exxon mechanic, by virtue 
of his ‘industrial’ profession, generates surplus value for his employer and is therefore 
productive.  
48 The reference here is only to classical Marxists. Neo-Marxists, at least those who have given 
up on the labour theory of value, lack any objective means of separating productive from unpro-
ductive activity to start with. 
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But this argument, too, has a lethal glitch. Value and surplus value are denomi-
nated in universal units of socially necessary abstract labour, and these units are no 
more real than neoclassical utils. Marxists have never been able to objectively observe, 
let alone measure, them independently of prices, and this inability leads to a dead end: 
without a measurement independent of prices, there is no way to verify who actually 
generates surplus value and who does not; without knowing (rather than assuming) 
where surplus value is generated, there is no objective means of separating productive 
from unproductive activity; and without that separation, the decision of what consti-
tutes a ‘purely’ financial activity becomes arbitrary.  
One popular way around this obstacle is to associate productive activity with 
profit and financial activity with net interest (and in some looser versions, also with 
dividends, rent, excessive depreciation and amortization, taxes and other forms of so-
called ‘rentier income’). From this perspective, the extent of ‘financialization’ can be 
approximated by measuring the ratio of net interest to profit income (or some similar 
variant): the higher this ratio, the greater the ‘financialization’, and vice versa.49  
This framework, though, can be very misleading, even by its own logic. To begin 
with, the ratio of interest to profit as such has nothing to do with ‘financialization’: it 
does not show the growing importance of financiers; it does not show the greater role 
of financial intermediation; and it does not show the increasing subjugation of society 
to the principles of financial calculations. In the national accounts, the magnitude ‘net 
interest’ denotes the interest payments that private enterprises make to their creditors 
less the interest payments that private enterprises receive from their debtors.50 This net 
interest, like profit, is a legal classification of capitalist income. In this classification, 
net interest is the return on debt, whereas profit is a return on equity. And that’s basi-
cally it.  
Further, and more importantly for our purpose, there is no correspondence be-
tween interest and profit on the one hand and the type of production on the other. All 
corporations – whether they are an Exxon (typically classified as ‘industrial’), a 
Mitsubishi Trading (classified as ‘commercial’), or a Goldman Sachs (classified as ‘fi-
nancial’) – are capitalized through both debt and equity and therefore pay both interest 
and profits. The result is that, all else being equal, the higher the debt/equity ratio in a 
society, the greater the ratio of net interest to profit – regardless of what is being pro-
duced or how it is produced. And since both debt and equity are ‘financial’ entities to 
start with, the ratio of net interest to profit can tell us nothing about the degree of 
‘financialization’. 
 
 
 
49 For various measures of this type, see for example Krippner (2005), Epstein and Jayadev 
(2005), Crotty (2005) and Orhangazi (2008, especially Ch. 2). 
50 Note that ‘private enterprises’ here include mortgaged home owners, and that the national 
statisticians subject many of the interest data to cruel imputations. 
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The Inconvenient Facts 
 
But not all is lost. For the sake of argument, we can forgo our reservations and stick 
with the most basic conventions. And the convention – at least among capitalists, in-
vestors and, increasingly, academic students of the subject – is to treat ‘finance’ as 
synonymous with the FIRE sector; i.e. with firms whose primary activities involve 
financial intermediation (banking, trust funds, brokerages, etc.), insurance or real es-
tate. 
Based on this conventional (albeit theoretically loose) definition of finance, and 
given our specific concern here with capitalist power, it seems appropriate to proxy the 
extent and trajectory of ‘financialization’ by looking at the distributive share of total 
net profit accounted for by FIRE corporations. The magnitude of this share would 
then indicate the extent to which FIRE firms have been able to leverage ‘financializa-
tion’ for their own end, and the way this share changes over time would tell us whether 
their leverage has increased or decreased. 
This distributional measure of ‘financialization’ is depicted by the two series in 
Figure 4. The first series shows the net profit of FIRE corporations as a per cent of the 
net profit of all U.S.-listed firms. The second series computes the same ratio for firms 
listed outside the United States. And here we run into a little surprise.  
According to the theory of hegemonic transition, the engine of ‘financialization’ 
is the United States. This is the black hole of the World System. It is the site where 
finance has been used most extensively to absorb the system’s surplus. It is the seat of 
the all-powerful Wall Street-Washington Complex. It is where neoliberal ideology first 
took command and from where it was later imposed with force and temptation on the 
rest of the world. It is the engine that led, pulled and pushed the entire process. 
But the facts in Figure 4 seem to tell a different story. According to the chart, the 
United Sates has not been leading the process. If anything, it seems to have been 
‘dragged’ into the process by the rest of the world. . . . 
During the early 1970s, before the onset of systemic ‘financialization’, the U.S. 
FIRE sector accounted for 6% of the total net profit of U.S.-listed firms. At the time, 
the comparable figure for the rest of the world was 18% – three times as high! From 
then on, the United States was merely playing catch-up. Its pace of ‘financialization’ 
has been faster than in the rest of the world; but with the sole exception of a brief period 
in the late 1990s, its level of ‘financialization’ has always been lower. In other words, 
if we wish to stick with the theory of a finance-fuelled red giant that has exhausted its 
own energy and is now slowly imploding as its peripheral liquidly runs out, we should 
apply that theory not to the United States, but to the rest of the world! 
Indeed, even the most recent period of crisis seems at odds with the theory. Ac-
cording to the conventional creed, both left and right, the current crisis is payback for 
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the sins of excessive ‘financialization’ and improper bubble blowing.51 In this Gal-
tonean theory, deviations and distortions always revert to mean, ensuring that the big-
gest sinners end up suffering the most. And since the U.S. FIRE sector was supposedly 
the main culprit, it was also the hardest hit.  
 
Figure 4 
Net Profit Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations 
(% of Region) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed as the ratio of market value to the 
price-earning ratio. Total profit and FIRE profit for firms outside the 
U.S. are calculated as a residual, by subtracting from the world fig-
ures the corresponding figures for the U.S. The raw earning data are 
reported on a consolidated basis, including domestic and foreign sub-
sidiaries and the equity share in minority-held firms. The last data 
points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(MV) and TOT-
MKWD(PE) for the market value and price-earning ratio of all listed 
firms, respectively; FINANWD(MV) and FINANWD(PE) for the 
market value and price-earning ratio of all listed FIRE firms, respec-
tively; TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PE) for the market value 
and price-earning ratio of U.S.-listed firms, respectively; FI-
NANUS(MV) and FINANUS(PE) for the market value and price-
earning ratio of U.S.-listed FIRE firms, respectively).  
                                                        
51 Bichler and Nitzan (2008a, 2009). 
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The only problem is that, according to Figure 4, the U.S. wasn’t the main culprit. 
On the eve of the crisis, the extent of ‘financialization’ was greater in the rest of the 
world than in the U.S. And yet, although the world’s financiers committed the greater 
sin, it was their U.S. counterparts who paid the heftier price. The former saw their 
profit share decline moderately from 37% to 23% of the total, while the latter watched 
their own share crash from 32% to 10%. And when the market finally rebounded, 
FIRE in the rest of the world recovered to about 30% (not far from its all-time high), 
while in the United States it reached barely 18% (a bit over half of its former record). 
It seems that the gods of finance have their own sense of justice.  
Or maybe not? According to Michael Hudson, the conventional focus on profit, 
although adequate in most cases, can be very deceptive when applied to the FIRE 
sector. The reason is twofold. First, there is the issue of tax accounting. The process of 
financialization, he says, allows FIRE firms to leverage their political primacy over 
‘industrial’ companies by gradually reclassifying more and more of their profit as cost. 
They do that by claiming excessive depreciation and depletion allowances on their 
real-estate assets; these allowances – which far exceed what is needed to replenish the 
depreciation portion of the underlying real-estate – serve to reduce their taxable in-
come, often to nil; and that reduction greatly boosts their after-tax cash flow. The sec-
ond part of the story has to do with international differences. According to Hudson, 
this tax minimization by the FIRE sector has been much more successful in the United 
States than elsewhere in the world. And since FIRE firms capitalize their entire after-
tax cash flow, focusing on net profit only – as we do in Figure 4 – is likely to produce 
a misleading picture. Our data in this figure show the net profit share of U.S.-listed 
FIRE firms to have lagged behind the comparable share of FIRE firms listed in the rest 
of world. But if instead of net profit we were to measure cash flow – i.e. net profit plus 
depreciation – the results would have been the exact opposite: U.S. FIRE would be 
the leader and the FIRE sector in the rest of the world the lagger.52  
We find these claims intriguing but unconvincing. The first difficulty is theoretical. 
It is certainly true that individual firms, investors and analysts often consider various 
measures of cash flow, particularly in short-term matters of mergers, acquisitions and 
divestments. But in general, and especially over the longer term, the ultimate yardstick 
that guides accumulation is not the ‘shadow measure’ of cash flow, but the legally 
sanctified entity of reported net earnings. 
  
52 The argument regarding the key role of depreciation and depletion allowances is elaborated 
in Hudson (2010). His suggestion that the deprecation allowances of U.S.-listed FIRE firms are 
much larger (if not infinitely larger) than those of FIRE firms listed outside the United States, 
and therefore that the data in Figure 4 are misleading, was made in a series of private commu-
nications with us in September 2009.  
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Figure 5 
Cash Flow Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations  
(% of Region) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Cash flow is the sum of net earnings and all non-cash charges 
or credits. Normally cash flow consists of net profit before preferred 
dividends, depreciation, amortization, reserve charges, provision for 
loan losses for banks and provision for future benefits for insurance 
companies; it excludes extraordinary items and changes in working 
capital. Cash flow is computed by dividing market value by the price-
to-cash-flow ratio. Total cash flow and FIRE cash flow for firms out-
side the U.S. are calculated as a residual, by subtracting from the 
world figures the corresponding figures for the U.S. The last data 
points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(MV) and TOT-
MKWD(PC) for the market value and price-to-cash-flow ratio of all 
listed firms, respectively; FINANWD(MV) and FINANWD(PC) for 
the market value and price-to-cash-flow ratio of all listed FIRE firms, 
respectively; TOTMKUS(MV) and TOTMKUS(PC) for the market 
value and price-to-cash-flow ratio of U.S.-listed firms, respectively; 
FINANUS(MV) and FINANUS(PC) for the market value and price-
earning ratio of U.S.-listed FIRE firms, respectively).  
 
The second difficulty has to do with the facts. Regardless of whether one uses net 
profit or cash flow, the conclusion seems to be the same: U.S.-listed FIRE firms are 
laggers rather than leaders. The relevant data are presented in Figure 5. The chart com-
pares two series: the first series shows the cash flow of FIRE corporations as a per cent 
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of the cash flow of all U.S.-listed firms; the second series computes the comparable 
ratio for FIRE firms listed outside the United States. Now, unlike the data for net 
profit, those for cash flow are more ‘jumpy’, perhaps as a result of the often arbitrary 
nature of depreciation allowances, occasional changes in tax laws and the absence of 
temporal smoothing when monthly observations are interpolated from quarterly and 
annual reports. But the overall trajectories of the cash-flow series are not much differ-
ent from those of net profit: in both cases, the FIRE share is larger outside than inside 
the United States, and in both cases the overall trend has been for U.S.-listed firms to 
play catch-up with the rest of the world, rather than vice versa. 
 
Figure 6 
EBIT Shares of Listed FIRE Corporations 
(% of Region) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: EBIT denotes corporate earnings before interest and taxes. 
Total EBIT and FIRE EBIT for firms outside the U.S. are calculated 
as a residual, by subtracting from the world figures the corresponding 
figures for the U.S. The last data points are for November 30, 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series code: TOTMKWD(DWEB) and FI-
NANWD(DWEB) for the EBIT of all listed firms and all listed FIRE 
firms, respectively; TOTMKUS(DWEB) and FINANUS(DWEB) 
for the EBIT of all U.S.-listed firms and U.S. FIRE firms, respec-
tively). 
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And since we have already broadened the vista, it is worthwhile to extend the 
examination to cover the entire flow of non-labour corporate income. Figure 6 offers 
such a comparison by measuring the share of listed FIRE firms in EBIT – a shorthand 
for earnings before interest and taxes. This measure, reminiscent of the Marxist ‘sur-
plus’ loosely measured in price terms, gives a broad view of capitalist income before it 
gets divided and appropriated by various capitalist and governmental entities. As be-
fore, one series in the chart measures the share of FIRE in the EBIT of all U.S.-listed 
firms, while the other measures the same share for FIRE firms listed in the rest of the 
world. Now, because it includes interest and taxes, EBIT is ‘looser’ than net profit and 
cash flow, and as such it cannot easily be interpreted as a proxy for capitalist power. 
And yet here, too, the historical conclusion stands: the U.S. FIRE sector has lagged the 
rest of the world. Until the late 1980s, the share of FIRE in EBIT was higher in the 
United States than elsewhere – but that was when both ratios were insignificantly 
small. However, once the two series started to rise, U.S.-listed FIRE firms consistently 
lagged behind their foreign counterparts.  
In other words, regardless of the particular flow – be it the quintessential measure 
of net profit or the wider indices of cash flow and EBIT – the pattern remains the same: 
the process of ‘financialization’, assuming we accept its standard definition, appears 
to have been ‘led’ not by the United States, but by the rest of the world.  
 
 
The End of a Nexus? 
 
Of course, this isn’t the first time that a monkey wrench has been thrown into the 
wheels of the ever-changing nexus of imperialism and financialism. As we have seen, 
over the past century the nexus has had to be repeatedly altered and transformed to 
match the changing reality. Its first incarnation explained the imperialist scramble for 
colonies to which finance capital could export its ‘excessive’ surplus. The next version 
talked of a neo-imperial world of monopoly capitalism where the core’s surplus is ab-
sorbed domestically, sucked into a ‘black hole’ of military spending and financial inter-
mediation. The third script postulated a World System where surplus is imported from 
the dependent periphery into the financial core. And the most recent edition explains 
the hollowing out of the U.S. core, a ‘red giant’ that has already burned much of its 
own productive fuel and is now trying to ‘financialize’ the rest of the world in order to 
use the system’s external liquidity. 
Yet, here, too, the facts refuse to cooperate: contrary to the theory, they suggest 
that the U.S. ‘Empire’ has followed rather than led the global process of ‘financializa-
tion’, and that U.S. capitalists have consistently been less dependent on finance than 
their peers elsewhere.  
Of course, this inconvenient evidence could be dismissed as cursory – or, better 
still, neutralized by again adjusting the meaning of imperialism and financialism to fit 
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the new reality. Undoubtedly, there are those who will hail such adjustment as evi-
dence of strength and vitality, the hallmark of a theory flexible enough to account for 
new circumstances. But too much flexibility makes for irrefutability. So maybe it is 
time to stop the carousel and cease the repeated retrofits. Perhaps we need to admit 
that, after a century of transmutations, the nexus of imperialism and financialism has 
run its course, and that we need a new framework altogether. 
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No Way Out: Crime, Punishment and the 
Capitalization of Power 1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The United States is often hailed as the world's largest 'free market'. But this 'free mar-
ket' is also the world's largest penal colony. It holds over seven million adults – roughly 
five per cent of the labour force – in jail, in prison, on parole and on probation. Is this 
an anomaly, or does the 'free market' require massive state punishment? Why did the 
correctional population start to rise in the 1980s, together with the onset of neoliberal-
ism? How is this increase related to the upward redistribution of income and the capi-
talization of power? Can soaring incarceration sustain the unprecedented power of 
dominant capital, or is there a reversal in the offing? The paper examines these ques-
tions by juxtaposing the ‘Rusche thesis’ with the notion of capitalism as a mode of 
power. The empirical analysis suggests that the Rusche thesis holds under the normal 
circumstances of ‘business as usual’, but breaks down during periods of systemic crisis. 
During the systemic crises of the 1930s and the 2000s, unemployment increased 
sharply, but crime and the severity of punishment, instead of rising, dropped percepti-
bly. 
 
1 This article was first published in Crime, Law and Social Change (Bichler and Nitzan 2014b, Vol. 
62, No. 3, April). It was first presented at the Third Forum on Capital as Power, ‘Capitalizing 
Power: The Qualities and Quantities of Accumulation’, held on September 28-30, 2012, at York 
University in Toronto. 
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Introduction 
 
In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the State of California to release 30,000 
to 40,000 of its 140,000 inmates (Supreme Court of the United States 2011; Liptak 
2012). California’s prisons have become so overcrowded that the Supreme Court 
declared the situation unconstitutional. The decision was imminent. For nearly two 
decades, California, along with many other states, was busy getting ‘tough on crime’. 
In the early 1990s, the state enacted the ‘Three-Strikes Law’, which mandates life 
sentences for third-time serious crime offenders, and it pursued the country’s ‘war on 
drugs’ and other law-enforcement campaigns with increasing zeal. Soon enough, its 
prisons were overflowing at nearly twice their capacity.  
The United States is often portrayed as the archetypical liberal model. It is the 
world’s largest, most prosperous ‘free market’ and the greatest generator of profit on 
earth. And yet this liberal haven is also the largest penal system in the world. There 
are now more than two million inmates in its prisons and jails and another five million 
on probation and on parole. If you add these two numbers together, you get a 
‘correctional population’ of over seven million. This correctional population is the 
largest in the world – both absolutely and relative to the overall population – and it is 
also the largest the country has ever seen. 
From a conventional viewpoint, this combination of market prosperity and 
intense punishment may seem puzzling. The common expectation is for crime and 
punishment to correlate with poverty, backwardness and deprivation; to be a feature 
of the Third World, not the First.  
Knowingly or not, this expectation is grounded in the customary separation of 
production from state and capital from power. According to the liberal version of this 
separation, accumulation breeds economic prosperity, and prosperity in the economic 
sphere in turn reduces crime and calls for less punishment in the socio-political sphere. 
The radical viewpoint, particularly the Marxist, transcends this simplistic economism. 
But the economics/politics bifurcation nonetheless remains, as Marxists still prioritize 
the cycle of industrial production and employment as key to understanding the ups 
and downs in imprisonment.  
This paper rests on a very different understanding of what constitutes 
capitalization, how it evolves historically, and the ways in which it relates to crime 
and punishment. Our starting point is to annul the standard separation between 
‘economic’ production and accumulation on the one hand and ‘political’ institutions 
and the state on the other. If we discard the politics/economics duality and instead 
think of capital as power and of capitalism as a mode of power, the puzzle disappears. 
The greater the capitalization of power, the greater the resistance to that capitalization 
and the larger the force needed to prevent this resistance from exploding. As profits 
increase to make distribution more unequal, the result is mounting resistance from 
below, and this resistance in turn leads to retaliation from above. The rising crime and 
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intensifying punishment that we now see in the United States are key manifestations 
of this dialectic of capitalized resistance and retaliation.  
 
 
The Questions 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of crime and punishment within the 
larger context of capitalized power, and specifically in relation to the limits of such 
power.  
This exploration continues the line of argument we have developed over the past 
several years in a series of conference presentations and papers. In 2009-2011, we 
introduced the concepts of systemic crisis and systemic fear (Nitzan and Bichler 2009b; 
Bichler and Nitzan 2010b; Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan 2011).2 We claimed that the 
current crisis – which started not in 2008 but in 2000 – is systemic, and that capitalists 
are now concerned not so much about employment, production or even profit, but 
about the very survival of their system. 
Then, in 2011-12, we examined the ‘asymptotes of power’ (Bichler and Nitzan 
2012a).3 Capitalists in general and dominant capitalists in particular, we argued, have 
objective reasons to fear for their system. We showed that, in the United Sates, the 
present distribution of income-read-power – ranging from the most aggregate 
indicators of the national accounts all the way to the differential earnings of dominant 
capital – is pushing against its class limits. And we suggested that, if the pushing 
continues, it could trigger systemic collapse. 
The goal of the present paper is to examine the darker side of this struggle. In the 
past, resistance to capital was associated mainly with production, workers, left political 
parties, strikes and mass demonstrations. But as the world changed, new forms of 
resistance and retaliation have emerged, and the ones we will look at here are crime 
and punishment. There is an impressive and thought-provoking Marxist literature that 
deals with the political economy of crime and punishment. But as we shall see, this 
literature, which goes all the way back to Friedrich Engels (1971, originally published 
in 1845), follows a research path and offers explanations that are quite different from 
the ones given here.4  
  
2 The arguments explored in these articles were presented at the First Forum on Capital as 
Power: ‘Crisis of Capital, Crisis of Theory’, held at York University on October 29-30, 2010. 
3 This work was first presented at the Second Forum on Capital as Power: ‘The Capitalist Mode 
of Power: Past, Present, Future’, held at York University on October 20-21, 2011. 
4 Recent contributions to this literature include Lynch (1988), Michalowski and Pearson (1990), 
Michalowski and Carlson (1999), Lynch (1999), Lynch and Michalowski (2006), Greenberg and 
West (2001) and Carlson, Bradshow and Buist (2013). For a critical review, see Lynch (2010). 
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Figure 1 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Income is defined as ‘market income’, including capital gains; 
it excludes government transfers. Grey areas indicate periods during 
which the 5-year moving average of the data series exceeded 45%. The 
last data point is for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The World Top Incomes Database 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (retrieved 
on September 19, 2012).  
 
Let us start with two charts that relate the distribution of income and capital on 
the one hand with the extent of state punishment on the other. Figure 1 shows the 
income share of the top 10 per cent of the U.S. population. This share offers a proxy, 
however imperfect, for the power of the ruling class and the thick power belt that 
supports it. The shaded areas in the figure denote two historical extremes – periods 
during which the income share of the top 10 per cent of the population exceeded 45 
per cent. During the 1930s, this share approached 47 per cent of total income. And in 
retrospect, that level proved to be the asymptote of capitalist power. Pushing against it 
triggered a systemic crisis, followed by the complete creordering of the U.S. political 
economy and a sharp decline in capitalist power, proxied here by a large drop in 
income inequality. The situation now is remarkably similar, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. During the 2000s, the income share controlled by the top 10 per cent of 
the population approached 48 per cent, a level whose attainment and sustainment 
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required the ruling class to subject the underlying population to increasing doses of 
violence, pain and sabotage.  
Figure 2 illustrates one key manifestation of this process – and the difficulty of 
sustaining it. The chart reproduces the distributional measure from Figure 1 and 
contrasts this measure with the adult ‘correctional population’, expressed as a share of 
the overall population. The correctional population comprises adults in prison, in jail, 
on probation and on parole.5 And as the chart shows, the ‘correctional’ share of the 
population is tightly and positively correlated with the distributional power of the 
ruling class: the greater the power, the larger the dose of violence inflicted on the 
underlying population. Presently, almost 2.5 per cent of the U.S. population is under 
some sort of institutional punishment – which, as indicated, is the largest proportion 
in the world and the highest in the country’s history. Although there are no hard and 
fast rules here, it is doubtful that this massive punishment can be increased much 
further without highly destabilizing consequences. The 2011 Supreme Court order to 
release 30,000 to 40,000 prisoners is perhaps a sign that the ruling class is apprehensive 
of such a destabilization; and the apparent peak in both income inequality and the 
correctional population suggests that capitalist power may be approaching its 
asymptotes and that a systemic reversal could be in the offing.  
Now, let us focus on the correctional population. In Figure 3, the black series at 
the bottom denotes the correctional population as a share of the overall population 
(which we take from Figure 2). The top red series shows the annual rate of change of 
the bottom series. Historically, this rate of change has fluctuated between −10 and +10 
per cent, and the question we need to ask is what drives these changes: Why did the 
correctional population remain fairly stable till the late 1970s? Why did is soar during 
much of the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s? And why did it level off in the 2000s?  
 
5 Raw data for the overall correctional population are available only from 1980 onward. For the 
period of 1925-1979, the raw data cover jail and prison inmates only. Note, however, that for 
the period of 1980-2010, the overall correctional population and the number of jail and prison 
inmates are tightly correlated, with a Pearson coefficient of 0.993. For this paper, we assumed 
that the two series moved in tandem also during the period of 1925-1979 and used the latter 
series to extrapolate the former. Our empirical work here utilizes the resulting raw/extrapolated 
series for the overall correctional population. The conclusions, though, would have been the 
same had we used the jail and prison population instead. 
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Figure 2 
U.S. Income Distribution and the Correctional Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, 
by computing the average ratio between the total correctional popu-
lation and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 
1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year the num-
ber of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last data 
points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The income share of the top 10% of the population is from 
The World Top Incomes Database 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (retrieved 
on September 19, 2012). Data on the correctional population are from 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 
6.28.2009 (http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); 
from 1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/csv/t612010.csv)). Population data till 1929 are from the Histor-
ical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial 
Edition (online) (series code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are 
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (series 
code: N@US). 
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Figure 3 
U.S. Correctional Population as  
a Share of the Overall Population 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the 
period 1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year 
the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/csv/t612010.csv)). Population data till 1929 are from the His-
torical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millen-
nial Edition (online) (series code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data 
are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (se-
ries code: N@US). 
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Georg Rusche 
 
Until the 1930s, these types of questions were never asked, let alone answered. The 
subject of crime and punishment was studied mostly by novelists, legal experts, 
doctors, psychologists, philosophers and moralists. It was rarely if ever dealt with by 
political economists, and it was certainly never studied scientifically. 
The first to undertake this type of study was the German political economist Georg 
Rusche (for a biographical sketch of Rusche, see Melossi 2003). Rusche was born in 
1900 and received his PhD in economics in the mid-1920s. He was interested in labour 
economics, and he also became involved in prison work. This background led him to 
contemplate the connection between punishment and the labour market. In the early 
1930s, he was commissioned by the Frankfurt School to write a book on the subject, 
and shortly thereafter he produced a concise article, titled ‘Labor Market and Penal 
Sanction’, where he spelled out his thesis (Rusche 1933). Six years later, he published, 
together with Otto Kircheimmer, the full manuscript, titled Punishment and Social 
Structure (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939).6 
According to Rusche, crime and punishment were too important to be left out of 
political economy. They needed to be anchored in economic theory, he said, and they 
had to be embedded in the evolution of class relations and class conflict. What were 
the basic propositions the researcher should start from? Rusche offered four. 
 
• The first proposition – which today may sound like a liberal triviality – concerned 
the goal of the penal system. Crime consists of acts forbidden by society, and one 
of the purposes of the penal system, Rusche posited, is to limit and reduce those 
acts.  
 
• The second proposition – which nowadays may ring like a mainstream cliché, but 
back in the 1930s sat well with the materialist emphasis of Marxist analysis – had 
to do with Bentham’s ‘calculus of pleasure and pain’. In order to deter crime, the 
penal system needs to convince people that ‘crime doesn’t pay’; in modern 
economic parlance, we would say that it needs to make the expected pain from 
punishment greater than the expected gains from crime. 
 
• The third proposition identified what we may call the ‘asymptotes of penality’. 
Most people disposed to crime come from the lower strata of society, where the 
conditions of life are the hardest. This fact means that in order to deter crime, the 
penal sanction must be worse than the living conditions of these lower strata. ‘If 
the prison doesn’t underbid the slum in human misery’, Rusche (1933: 4) quotes 
Bernard Shaw, ‘the slum will empty and the prison will fill’. In other words, the 
lowest living conditions in society set the upper limit of the penal system. 
6 Although the detailed analysis was published jointly by Rusche and Kirchheimer, this paper 
focuses on the key propositions first articulated by Rusche alone. 
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• The fourth and final proposition concerned the rate of unemployment. Many 
factors affect the living conditions of the lower strata, says Rusche. But the most 
important by far is the labour market, and particularly the ‘excess supply/demand’ 
for labour, or the rate of unemployment. When there is ‘excess supply’, 
unemployment rises and wages decline, causing crime to increase and punishment 
to intensify. And when there is ‘excess demand’ and unemployment decreases, the 
opposite process is set in motion. 
 
These observations, which Rusche says hold in every society, set the general boundaries 
of penality: 
 
• When labour is abundant, deprivation is close to its limits, so the unemployed can 
be deterred from crime only by the ultimate punishment: death. Rusche gives the 
example of China, where a huge reserve army of unemployed makes human life 
worth close to nothing. Under those conditions, he observes, it is common for 
captured criminals to be executed without much fuss.  
 
• By contrast, when labour is scarce and there are not enough workers to fill all the 
jobs, the penal system shifts toward reform and exploitation. The goal now is not 
to prevent the hungry from criminal acts, but to convince unwilling labourers and 
criminals that they need to be working. This situation, says Rusche, existed for 
example during the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth century, when 
‘excess demand’ for labour ushered in by the Mercantilist Era brought prison re-
forms. Moreover, since ‘excess demand’ for workers drives wages up, it became 
profitable to lock up criminals and use them as forced labour, and that too was a 
feature of European Mercantilism. All in all, a tight labour market causes the sys-
tem to move from execution to exploitation.  
 
Now these are the two logical extremes: death on the one hand, penal reform and 
forced labour on the other. A political economy of crime and punishment, says Ru-
sche, needs to start from this analytical skeleton and then flesh out the real historical 
process that Disraeli referred to as the ‘two nations’ and Marx called the ‘class strug-
gle’. The first person to offer such analysis was Rusche. 
Rusche’s own work was largely historical and comparative. He went through a 
series of epochs, examining in each case (1) the conditions of the labour market; (2) 
the nature of crime; and (3) the intensity of punishment. And what he found was 
largely consistent with his hypothesis. 
 
• During the early Middle Ages, land was abundant and the population sparse. 
Most crime was about passion rather than property, and punishment usually took 
the form of revenge, penance or monetary fines. 
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• In the late Middle Ages, land grew scarcer and the population more abundant. 
There were peasant wars and social unrest, and armies of beggars became 
commonplace. Property crime and robbery were on the rise, but criminals were 
often unable to pay, so punishment grew crueller and execution more common. 
 
• During the Mercantilist period, roughly the seventeenth century, wars, hunger and 
plagues reduced the population, while trade raised the demand for workers. 
Labour became scarcer and wages increased. It was in this context that the 
Enlightenment movement made punishment more humane and that 
imprisonment emerged as a new venue to exploit forced labour. 
 
• In the Industrial Revolution, roughly the eighteenth century, mechanization made 
workers abundant, wages fell and the reserve army of the unemployed swelled. 
Forced labour was no longer necessary, and prison conditions became punitive 
and grew harsher. 
 
• In America till the late nineteenth century, rapid industrial development, 
abundant land and a relatively small population made labour scarce and wages 
high. The crime scene accorded with Rusche’s hypothesis: criminal offences were 
low; prison reform was in full swing; conditional sentences, parole and probation 
were increasingly used; and scientists began to study the causes of crime and how 
welfare policies can abate them. 
 
• Rusche also provided an interesting comparison between the United States and 
Germany during the 1930s. In America, he said, massive unemployment and 
weak unions drove wages down, causing the penal system to become more 
overcrowded, brutal and repressive. In Germany, in contrast, the presence of 
strong labour unions mitigated the decline of wages and helped moderate penal 
sanctions.  
 
• Finally, Rusche was also prescient in predicting the use of concentration camps to 
solve the labour shortages created by the rearmament drives of totalitarian 
regimes.  
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The Puzzle 
 
Rusche himself received little recognition in his lifetime and committed suicide in 
1950. Although he offered a very impressive starting point for what was then a totally 
new approach, for a long time his work remained largely unknown and did not make 
it to the mainstream of either criminology or sociology, let alone political economy.  
It was only in the 1980s, with soaring U.S. crime and the massive increase in 
incarceration, that his approach finally gained some traction, particularly in the critical 
literature. Also, there were now more systematic data to study, and with computing 
becoming cheaper, critical sociologists and radical criminologists started to subject 
Rushe’s hypotheses to various empirical investigations.  
But then there arose a puzzle. Whereas Rusche’s long-term historical hypotheses 
seemed to shed light on various epochs and lead to derivative theses and theories, the 
conclusions from shorter-term analyses, particularly of contemporary Western 
societies, were more ambiguous.  
The breakdown happened around the 1980s. The central axis of Rusche’s 
argument is that penality should be positively correlated with ‘excess supply’ in the 
labour market. Most researchers take the rate of unemployment as the key proxy for 
‘excess supply’ of labour and the share of the overall population under ‘correction’ as 
the proxy for penality.7 These two proxies are plotted in Figure 4 – unemployment on 
the left scale and the correctional population on the right. Now, the chart shows that 
until the early 1980s the two proxies were correlated positively (though by no means 
tightly). However, from the early 1980s onward, this correlation breaks down 
completely. With Ronald Reagan in office and neoliberalism in full swing, 
unemployment declined – yet the correctional population went vertical. On the face 
of it, then, it would seem that the Rusche thesis was loosely valid until the beginning 
of neoliberalism, but not afterwards.8  
 
  
7 The ‘excess supply’ of labour and the level of penality could be estimated in many different 
ways. Given the broad nature of our claims, we deliberate focus on the simplest, most conven-
tional measures. 
8 Inverarity and MCarthy (1988, 1989) offer empirical support for the Rusche thesis till the 
1980s. For a recent review of the empirical literature and its shortcomings, see Pfaff (2008). For 
a theoretical critique, see Lynch (2010). 
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Figure 4 
U.S. Unemployment and the Correctional Population 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. Prior to 1980, systematic data are 
available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier years, the 
total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, by com-
puting the average ratio between the total correctional population 
and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 1980-
1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the number 
of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last data points 
are 2010 for the correctional population and 2012 for unemploy-
ment. 
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/csv/t612010.csv)). Population data till 1929 are from the His-
torical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millen-
nial Edition (online) (series code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data 
are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (se-
ries code: N@US). Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statis-
tics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition 
(online) (series code: Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight (series code: 
RUC@US). 
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Incarceration and Exploitation 
 
This apparent breakdown meant that, from the early 1980s onwards, radical 
criminologists and critical sociologists were no longer able to establish a simple link 
between unemployment and incarceration. Their explanations, writes Michael Lynch 
(2010 :73), have ‘failed to explore the independent significance of the direct effect of 
economic structures on incarceration and punishment, and thus are inconsistent with 
the position taken by Rusche and Kirchheimer’. 
Lynch’s own solution is to make Rusche’s labour-market thesis a subset of the 
broader Marxist understanding of ‘productive relationships’ in capitalism. His starting 
point is the rate of exploitation in the so-called ‘productive sector’, specifically 
manufacturing. Competitive forces compel capitalists in this sector to use labour-
saving technical change, he explains; the result is growing mechanization, which tends 
to raise the rate of exploitation, defined as the sectoral ratio of surplus value to variable 
capital; with the ratio between capitalist and labour incomes increasing over time, 
manufacturing employment tends to diminish and the working class suffers increasing 
marginalization, alienation and exploitation; and it is these later impacts that lead to 
rising crime, stiffer penal enforcement and higher incarceration. 
This broad Marxist view, Lynch argues, enfolds the narrow Rusche thesis. ‘The 
unemployment rate’, he writes, ‘taps into a portion of the marginalization process, but 
fails to represent its more expansive outcomes (alienation and exploitation; deskilling 
of the labor force; distinctions between types and duration of unemployment, etc.,) 
associated with Marx’s theory of surplus value’ (2010: 78, emphasis added). The broad 
exploitation perspective, he adds, also differs from the post-Fordist model (De Giorgi 
2006, 2007), according to which the historical shift from ‘economies of scale’ to 
‘economies of scope’ has served to loosen the links between unemployment, crime and 
penality.  
Lynch (2010) puts his model to a statistical test. Focusing on the United States 
during the period of 1977-2004, his multivariate empirical analysis shows changes in 
incarceration to be positively correlated with the rate of exploitation in 
manufacturing.9 He is unable, however, to support Rusche’s thesis – namely, that the 
level of incarceration during this period is positively correlated with unemployment.  
The main difficulty with this approach lies in the underlying categories (for a 
detailed critique of Marxist value theory, see Nitzan and Bichler 2009a). In order to 
measure the rate of exploitation in society, Marxists need, among other things, to 
identify the socially necessary abstract labour contents of commodities and to 
distinguish productive activity (which generates surplus value) from unproductive 
activity (which uses it). Unfortunately, labour values cannot be observed, and there is 
9 Lynch computes the amount of surplus value as the difference between manufacturing value 
added and the manufacturing wage bill. Assuming that prices are equal to values, this measure 
excludes the very large surplus value that, according to Marxist analysis, originates in manufac-
turing but ends up being consumed by the unproductive sectors. 
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no objective way to separate productive from unproductive activity. The common 
solution is to take a shortcut. Most Marxist analysts use the neoclassical price and 
quantity estimates of the national account as proxies for Marxist labour values, and 
they further assume that all surplus value originates in several sectors of the national 
accounts that they classify as ‘productive’ (usually manufacturing, agriculture, 
construction, mining and utilities).  
This seems to us a theoretically problematic and historically outdated framework 
on which to build an encompassing political economy of contemporary capitalism. 
Does it make sense to trace the origin of all capitalist income to a shrinking sector that 
currently accounts for a mere 10-20 per cent of all business activity, and that is likely 
to get even smaller? And if penality in society is indeed driven by the exclusion, 
alienation and marginalization of workers, shouldn’t this impact be mediated, at least 
in part, through the rate of unemployment? Crime and punishment in capitalism 
certainly need to be understood as part of the broader logic of accumulation. But in 
our view, this broader logic can no longer be easily analysed with the ‘material’ 
categories of nineteenth-century sweatshops, abstract labour, productive capital and 
the rate of exploitation.  
 
 
Re-search 
 
One way or the other, the empirical rejection of the Rusche thesis has been too hasty. 
It seems to us that, at any point in time, penality should be proxied not by the overall 
level of the correctional population, but by its rate of change. The reason is simple. 
The overall level of the correctional population is determined by two factors: (1) the 
cumulative results of past crime and punishment; and (2) current crime and 
punishment that cause this cumulative result to increase or decrease. The current rate 
of unemployment affects only the second of these factors; it influences not the past 
levels of crime and punishment, but their current rate of change.  
Figure 5 reflects this shift in emphasis, and the effect is dramatic. The figure shows 
the same rate of unemployment as in Figure 4. But penality now is proxied not by the 
level of the correctional population relative to the overall population, but by the annual 
rate of change of this ratio. There are two important things to note in this chart. 
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Figure 5 
U.S. Unemployment and the Correctional Population 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, 
by computing the average ratio between the total correctional popu-
lation and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 
1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last data 
points are 2010 for the correctional population and 2012 for unem-
ployment. 
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Sourcebook 
of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/csv/t612010.csv)). Population data till 1929 are from the His-
torical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millen-
nial Edition (online) (series code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data 
are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (se-
ries code: N@US). Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statis-
tics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition 
(online) (series code: Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight (series code: 
RUC@US). 
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1. We can see that, for much of the past century, annual changes in the U.S. 
correctional population were almost perfectly ‘explained’, at least statistically, by 
annual changes in the rate of unemployment.10 Rusche was right – indeed more 
right than he could have anticipated. According to the figure (and Occam’s razor), 
there is no need for complicated models, multiple variables and assorted excuses 
(when the models fail). The two forms of sabotage – unemployment and penality 
– mirror each other very closely.  
  
2. But there are two important exceptions to the rule – the first occurred during the 
Great Depression of 1930s, the second in the present crisis. During both of these 
systemic crises, which the chart shades in grey, the two series are not positively, 
but negatively correlated. In both, unemployment rises sharply – but penality, 
instead of soaring in tandem, decelerates sharply or actually falls. 
 
So we have an enigma. If our interpretation of Rusche is correct, then what 
explains the decoupling of unemployment and penality during systemic crises? Is this 
a mere coincidence, or do systemic crises alter the underlying relationship of the two 
processes? We return to this enigma at the end of the paper. 
 
  
Decompose 
 
Let us try to make sense of the two observations made in the previous section. The 
first step is to decompose the rate of change of the correctional population. Consider 
Equation (1), where the dots on top of the variables indicate temporal rates of change. 
In this equation, the rate of change of the share of the correctional population in the 
overall population is approximately equal to the rate of change of the correctional 
population less the rate of change of the overall population. 
 
1. 
••
•
−≈





populationoverallpopulationalcorrection
populationoverall
populationalcorrection
 
 
Now, if the rate of change of the overall population is fairly stable, variations in the 
share of the correctional population in the overall population (the left-hand side of the 
equation) will be dominated by the rate of change of the correctional population (first 
element on the right).  
So let’s decompose the rate of change of the correctional population. 
Mathematically, this rate of change comprises three components: (1) the intensity of 
10 The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.59 for 1937-2007 and 0.67 for 1945-2007. When the 
data are smoothed as 5-year moving averages, the 1945-2007 coefficient rises to 0.8. 
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punishment, proxied by the change in the correctional population relative to crime 
(with ∆ denoting the difference between two successive observations); (2) the crime 
rate, measured by the ratio of crime to the overall population; and (3) the correctional 
population as a share of the overall population. The decomposition is given by 
Equation (2): 
  
2. 
populationalcorrection
populationalcorrectionpopulationalcorrection ∆=
•
 
 
   
populationalcorrection
populationoverall
populationoverall
crime
crime
populationalcorrection
××
∆
=  
 
       
populationoveralltheofshareaaspopulationalcorrection
ratecrimepunishmentofintensity ×
=  
 
 
Crime and Punishment 
  
Let us look more closely at the numerator of the third line of Equation (2), beginning 
with the crime rate. Figure 6 shows the historical evolution of what the FBI calls the 
‘serious crime rate’. Serious crimes include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor-vehicle theft (U.S. Department 
of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation). The FBI collects these statistics from 
various sources, standardizes them and expresses them as a ratio to the overall 
population. For example, in 2010, the serious crime rate was 334 for every 10,000 
people, or 3.3 per cent. Note the long-term cyclicality of the serious crime rate. It rose 
from its nadir of 2 per cent in 1960 to a peak of 6 per cent in 1980. At that point, 
criminologists, social commentators and politicians thought that all hell was breaking 
loose, that the crime rate was likely to shoot through the roof, and that the social fabric 
of the U.S. was about to disintegrate (see for example, Levitt 2004). None of these 
predictions has materialized. Instead of rising, the crime rate started a long-term 
decline, and by 2010 it was half as high as it was in 1980.  
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Figure 6 
U.S. Serious Crime and Murder Rates (per 10,000 persons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of the 
FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to the 
overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homicide, 
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and 
motor-vehicle theft. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: The number of murders is from Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (se-
ries code: Ec191 for 1900-1932 and Ec22 for 1933-1959); and from 
UCR Online (http://www.ucrdata-
tool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm for 1960-2005; 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-2010). 
Population data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series 
code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). The serious 
crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to the population) is from 
UCR Online as above. 
 
 
Unfortunately, we do not have unified serious crime statistics for years prior to 
1960. But we do have data for the murder rate, depicted here by the thin red line. The 
number of murders of course is much smaller than the overall number of serious 
crimes. In 1980, for instance, for every 10,000 people there were 600 serious crimes 
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but only one murder. The key for our purposes, though, is that the two series are highly 
correlated. And if this correlation also held prior to 1960, it implies that the U.S. crime 
rate has followed a fairly stylized long-term cycle.  
Bearing this cyclicality in mind, we can move to Figure 7. The thick black line in 
the figure measures the serious crime rate per 100 people. The chart also shows the 
intensity of punishment, proxied by the thin red line. If you look at Equation (2), you 
can see that this intensity is measured in two steps. The first step is to compute net 
change in the correctional population. For example, in 2010 the correctional 
population fell by 157,000. This figure represents, for that year, the number of people 
who were caught, tried and sentenced, less the number of those released. For 2010 the 
net figure was negative – there were more people leaving the correctional system than 
entering it. The second step is to divide this net change by the number of serious crimes 
reported that year and multiply the result by 100. This computation gives us the net 
change in the correctional population per 100 crimes. In 2010, this ratio was −1.5, which 
means that for every 100 serious crimes, there were 1.5 people deleted from the 
correctional population. By contrast, in 1998 the number was +3.2, which means that 
for every 100 serious crimes, there were 3.2 people added to the correctional 
population. Note that this is a ‘composite measure’ that reflects four different 
processes: (1) the efforts and the effectiveness of the police; (2) changes in the legal 
code; (3) the harshness of the courts; and (4) the release rate of those previously 
sentenced.  
The chart shows that the two measures – crime and the intensity of punishment – 
are tightly correlated. Now, recall that, according to Rusche, crime and punishment 
are both driven by conditions in the labour market – particularly unemployment – so 
the correlation between them suggests we should examine their separate relationships 
to unemployment. 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the serious crime rate and the 
unemployment rate since the 1960s. In general, the data seem consistent with Rusche’s 
hypothesis, at least until recently. They show the two processes to be moving in 
tandem, rising until the 1980s and receding afterwards. But by the late 2000s, the 
relationship between unemployment and crime seems to have broken down: while 
unemployment has risen sharply, the crime rate, instead of increasing, has continued 
to drop.  
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the intensity of punishment and 
unemployment. And the patterns here are similar to those in Figure 7. There is a 
positive relationship between unemployment and the intensity of punishment, with 
both rising till the 1980s and falling afterwards. And here, too, the relationship inverts 
in the late 2000s: while unemployment rises dramatically, the intensity of punishment 
drops sharply and indeed becomes negative (note in particular the late 1990s). Note 
that the short-term correlation since the 1980s is looser than before; but even in this 
looser correlation, the divergence between the series in the late 2000s stands out 
clearly. 
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Figure 7 
U.S. Serious Crime and the Intensity of Punishment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of the 
FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to the 
overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homicide, 
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and 
motor-vehicle theft. The correctional population consists of adults in 
prison, in jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, 
systematic data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For 
those earlier years, the total correctional population is estimated in 
two steps: first, by computing the average ratio between the total cor-
rectional population and the number of adults in prison and jail dur-
ing the period 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for 
each year the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. 
The last data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to the 
population) is from UCR Online (http://www.ucrdata-
tool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm for 1960-2005; 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-2010). 
The correctional population is from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 (http://www.al-
bany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 1980 onward: Table 
6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv).  
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Figure 8 
U.S. Unemployment and Serious Crime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of the 
FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to the 
overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homicide, 
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and 
motor-vehicle theft. The last data points are 2010 for serious crime 
and 2012 for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to the 
population) is from UCR Online (http://www.ucrdata-
tool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm for 1960-2005; 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-2010). 
Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Figure 9 
U.S. Unemployment and the Intensity of Punishment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, 
by computing the average ratio between the total correctional popu-
lation and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 
1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The serious 
crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of the FBI Unified Crime 
Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to the overall population. Part 
I Index Crimes include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, ag-
gravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor-vehicle theft. The 
last data points are 2010 for net change in correctional population 
and 2012 for unemployment.  
 
SOURCE: The correctional population is from Sourcebook of Crim-
inal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/source-
book/csv/t612010.csv)). The number of serious crimes (Part I Index 
Crime) is from UCR Online (http://www.ucrdata-
tool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm for 1960-2005; 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-2010). 
Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Taking Stock 
 
What do these relationships mean for capital as power and for the limits on that power? 
To contextualize our conclusions, let us reiterate our earlier findings. In our recent 
work, we noted that this is not a regular crisis but a systemic one, and that it is not a 
crisis of production or finance, or of a mismatch between them, but a crisis of power. 
The ruling class, we said, is struck by systemic fear – that is, fear for the survival of 
capitalism. The reverberations of crime and punishment – including the recent 
Supreme Court order to release a quarter of California’s prisoners – may be signs of 
that fear.  
We then outlined the objective ‘asymptotes of capitalist power’. The ruling class, 
we said, is fearful for a reason. The logic of capital as power is deterministic. It forces 
dominant capitalists to accumulate differentially and augment their power. They have 
no choice in this matter. They have to push toward the asymptotes of their power, 
relentlessly. And as they get closer to those asymptotes, their push elicits counter 
forces, making systemic collapse increasingly likely.  
In the present paper we have looked at the dark side of this process – the side of 
resistance. In the past, most analyses of resistance were anchored in the productive 
process. The focus was on industrial strikes, workers, mass movements and political 
parties. This ‘materialist’ focus was subsequently challenged by the ethno-cultural 
revolution. Instead of the old myths of the Enlightenment and socialism, there arose a 
new emphasis on power and postist ideologies. Subjective deconstruction substituted 
for history’s ‘laws of motion’. Determinism was discredited, but so was meaning and 
significance. 
Our own work breaks with this postist fashion. Autonomous resistance – such as 
the May 1968 uprising in France or the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987/8 – does not 
abide by the logic of capital and therefore cannot be analysed from within that logic. 
But most resistance to capital as power is not autonomous, but heteronomous: it does 
not initiate – it responds; it is less an action and more a reaction; it is not external but 
integral to the conflictual logic of capital as power. In short, it is part and parcel of the 
capitalist mode of power, and that embeddedness makes it amenable to objective, 
deterministic inquiry.11 
In order to engage in such inquiry, though, we need to transcend the conventional 
frame of reference. Most critical researchers continue to separate the capitalist reality 
into ‘production’ and ‘power’. In this framework, the labour market is part of the 
economy and accumulation, while the penal system is part of the state and the socio-
political system more broadly. Rusche sought to challenge this view: he tried to analyse 
penality in relation to both production and discipline, and unemployment in relation 
to both criminality and the economy. But working within the Marxist frame of 
11 The concepts of heteronomy and autonomy are developed in Castoriadis (1991b). On the 
difference between the heteronomy of capital and the autonomy of resistance, see Nitzan and 
Bichler (2009a). 
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reference, he continued to think of capitalism as a mode of production. So his attempt, 
however ingenious, remained focused on material conditions and therefore was 
incomplete.  
From the viewpoint of capital as power, penality and unemployment are not 
distinct aspects of politics and economics, respectively. Instead, they are different 
forms of capitalized resistance and sabotage. Human creativity is a positive form of 
resistance to capitalist power, and the threat of unemployment is the means by which 
the ruling class tries to strategically sabotage and subjugate this creativity to capitalist 
ends. Similarly with crime and punishment. Illegality is a negative form of resistance 
to capitalist power (a 'primitive rebellion', as Engels 1971 called it), and penality is the 
major institution that keeps this resistance from undermining the capitalist creorder.  
These forms of resistance and sabotage fit into the breadth and depth regimes of 
capital as power (Nitzan 2001; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Chs. 15-17). In the past, we 
argued that during a depth phase, the sabotage of stagflation (stagnation and inflation) 
assists the process of ‘accumulation through crisis’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2002). Now, 
since crime and punishment are tightly correlated with unemployment, we can see 
how this additional form of sabotage kicks in. During the depth phase of the 1970s and 
1980s, unemployment and inflation increased, as did crime and punishment. 
Conversely, during the breadth phase of the 1990s, they all decreased.  
And here we come to the enigma of Figure 5. During the systemic crises of the 
1930s and 2000s, the tight correlation between penality and unemployment seems to 
have broken down: in both periods, the sabotage of unemployment rose sharply; yet 
crime and punishment, instead of rising in tandem, actually receded.  
What could explain this enigma? One possibility is that some of the data we use 
are incorrect or inaccurate. A second possibility is that our top-down presentation of 
the data is too crude, and that a more refined set of proxies for unemployment, crime 
and punishment will eliminate the anomaly. But there is also a third, substantive, 
possibility, and that is that systemic crises alter the rules of the game. These crises not 
only dent the resolve of the ruling class; they also change the class disposition of 
criminals. Under the system of ‘business as usual’ (including its cyclical crises), the 
poor feel that there is ‘no way out’. Without jobs, without dignity and with little 
prospect for change, the only alternative is crime. But during a deep, systemic crisis, 
there emerges another, transformational, alternative. This alternative is based not on 
individual alienation and protestation, but on class solidarity; not on defying the 
system through Quinney’s ‘crimes of resistance’ (1980), but on altering its very 
structure. Perhaps it is the emergence of this democratic opening during a systemic 
crisis that causes crime to drop despite soaring unemployment.12 
 
 
 
12 The third possibility was suggested to us by the Israeli criminologist, Professor Jacob Reuven.  
   
                                                        
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
The 1%, Exploitation and Wealth:  
Tim Di Muzio Interviews Shimshon Bichler 
and Jonathan Nitzan 1 
 
 
1.  
 
Tim Di Muzio: You argue that the capital as power framework does not offer a general 
theory of society but an incisive account of how capitalists shape and reshape our 
world through the logic of differential capitalization and accumulation. As you well 
know, the Occupy Wall Street movement has organized under the banner ‘We are the 
99%’, opposing what they refer to as the global 1%.  
Could the capital as power framework be conceptualized as the political economy 
of the 1%? If not, do you see any way in which the capital as power framework could 
contribute to a critical political economy of the 1%? Does your latest article on the 
asymptotes of power speak to any of these debates? 
 
Shimshon Bichler & Jonathan Nitzan: Your question invokes the century-old di-
lemma of what kind of determinism we can impose on society and the world more 
generally. This dilemma emerged largely as a consequence of the second scientific rev-
olution and parallel developments in logic and mathematics, and it remains largely 
1 This interview was first published in Review of Capital as Power (Bichler, Nitzan, and Di Muzio 
2012, Vol. 1, No. 1). 
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unresolved. Is there a ‘general logic’ to be discovered, or is ‘reality’ fractured into mul-
tiple and possibly contradictory patterns? Should we adhere to the traditional identi-
tary-ensemblist logic of Cantor’s set theory, or should we follow Castoriadis’ notion 
of the magmas – those fuzzy groupings that include yet extend beyond the traditional 
logic and that allow the nomos to partly defy the determinism of the physis (Castoriadis 
1987: Ch. 7)? Are we to look for a singular totality, or should we follow Bohm’s frame-
work of infinite enfoldments (Bohm 1980; Bohm and Peat 1987)? 
Modern theories and doctrines of society – from liberal political economy to 
Marxism to statism, as well as their many offshoots and fusions, from social systems 
to postism – tend to follow the traditional path, each imposing its own determinism, 
logic and rules. These impositions may be natural or historical, positivist or dialectical, 
simple or complex. Most of them imitate the determinism of the first scientific revolu-
tion, while a few, mainly of the postist variety, reject determinism altogether (although 
this wholesale rejection is itself a form of determinism). But whatever the approach, 
the imposition tends to be universal: each approach articulates its rules, structures and 
patterns (or their absence) in general terms, applicable to society as whole. 
It is important to note, though, that the origin of these universal approaches is 
always particular: liberalism originally spoke for the interests of capitalists, Marxism 
for those of workers and statism for the state apparatus. And in each case, the particu-
lar starting point has been leveraged into a complete theory of society: liberalism 
claims the principles of utility and productivity to be inherent in every social atom; 
Marxism makes labour time the linchpin of both the accumulation of capital and the 
resistance of workers; and statism sees the imperatives of the state as the governing 
rationale of modern society. 
Our own analysis of capitalism rejects these particular-cum-universal views. Our 
principal aim, as you indicate, is to understand not society ‘in general’, but the under-
lying logic of its ruling class. We call this logic the ‘capitalist mode of power’. If there 
is a meaningful determination in capitalism, we argue, it can be found only in the 
uncompromising ethos, rituals, institutions and organizations that the ruling class im-
poses on itself and everyone else. It is only here, in the ‘megamachine of capital’, that 
we can expect to observe fairly stable structures and patterns, or at least to estimate 
their statistical hierarchies and boundaries. Our research on dominant capital and dif-
ferential accumulation strives to substantiate this view.  
But the logic of the capitalist regime, although universalizing, is by no means in-
trinsic. It permeates everything, but it is not inherent. It does not spring up naturally, 
on its own. For this logic to exist, capitalists have to relentlessly impose, force and 
imprint it on every living tissue of society. And they are compelled to do so because 
enfolded in their logic is the greatest menace of all: an unknown magma of meanings 
and significations that capital cannot grasp or mould, but merely cap and withhold. 
This magma is like the infinite irrationality that pervades and upsets the apparent 
smoothness of Pythagorean rationality. It is the bedrock of humane resistance and 
change, the creative energy of society than hasn’t succumbed to the capitalist mode of 
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power. And because this humane energy lies outside the logic of capital as power, it 
cannot be examined and analysed – let alone predicted – by that logic.  
Now, on the face of it, this portrayal seems consistent with your suggestion: if we 
think of dominant capital as represented by what the Occupy movement calls the 1% 
and the underlying magma of humanity as proxied by the remaining 99%, can we not 
treat the theory of capital as power as the political economy of the 1%?  
Unfortunately, the answer is not as simple as it may seem. Our framework seeks 
to research, theorize and negate the way in which the ruling class creoders – or creates 
the order of – the capitalist mode of power. And in that respect, it certainly resonates, 
at least in spirit and motivation, with the anti-systemic Occupy movement, particularly 
with those who emphasize autonomy and direct democracy. But we need to bear in 
mind here that the capitalist ruling class is not the same thing as the 1%, and that its 
mode of power cannot be reduced to a simple contrast between rich and poor.  
Begin with the numbers. Who are the 1%, and who are the 99% that the Occupy 
movement calls ‘We’? Strictly speaking, the 1% consists of the top income earners and 
asset holders in society. If we were to rank every individual according to what he or 
she earns and owns and set the top percentile as our cut-off point, those above that 
point will constitute ‘the 1%’, and the 99% below it will comprise the ‘We’.  
This, though, is not the only possible division. We can use any other cut-off point. 
For example, we can contrast the top 0.1% with the bottom 99.9%, or the top 10% 
with the bottom 90%, etc. These divisions are obviously all arbitrary, so their associa-
tion with the ruling class is loose to begin with. More importantly, these divisions are 
usually used not to examine the structure of power or the ways in which this power is 
imposed, but to accentuate the contrast between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’. Most com-
monly, they are marshalled to show that the top strata of society have ‘access to re-
sources’ and live lavishly, while the bottom strata lack such access and are left to feed 
on the crumbs.  
This focus on ‘rich versus poor’ is not accidental. The Occupy movement is largely 
a reaction to the current systemic crisis. The movement decries the outcome of the cri-
sis, but, so far, it has had little or nothing to say about the causes of the crisis, let alone 
on what can be done about them. And this reaction is hardly unique. Note that the 
present systemic crisis started not in 2008, but in 2000 or even earlier, and that it was 
accompanied, from the beginning, by increasing counter-systemic reverberations. The 
reverberations were first felt in 1998 (a year after the 1997 Asian Crisis) with the anti-
globalization demonstrations in Seattle; they continued with the growth of the ecolog-
ical movement; and they spread further with the recent popular uprisings in the Middle 
East and elsewhere. However, so far, these counter-systemic movements, although full 
of energy, remain acts of protestation. They abhor the apparent injustice, inefficiency 
and corruption of the system, but they do not offer a meaningful alterative to that sys-
tem. They point their finger at greedy corporations and financial intermediaries that 
‘mismanage’ our resources and highjack our future; they accuse governments of being 
corrupt, complacent, or simply unable to regulate the ‘excesses’ of the system; and they 
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blame these maladies for a growing inequality that allows the top 1% to engross a 
disproportionate share of society’s ‘wealth’. But they find it difficult to explain how 
any of these developments can be fundamentally altered.  
In our view, the key reason for this difficulty is that these counter-systemic move-
ments remain hostage to the very capitalist cosmology they contest. This cosmology – 
which all political economists, left and right, seem to share, and which the protesters, 
unknowingly, tend to reproduce – rests on three key premises. The first premise is that 
‘economics’ and ‘politics’ are two distinct realms of society; the second premise is that 
the economy is an ‘objective’ productive entity that obeys a set of mechanical functions 
(in the liberal case) or historical laws of motion (in the Marxist one), and that politics 
either distorts this economy (in the liberal case) or supports it (in the Marxist version); 
the third and final premise is that the economy itself is further divided into two do-
mains: a ‘real’ sphere of material production and consumption on which the economy 
rests, and a ‘nominal’ sphere of volatile money and speculative finance that often up-
sets the real sphere and throws it out of balance (for more on the capitalist cosmology, 
see Bichler and Nitzan 2012b). 
This conventional viewpoint fractures society into numerous spheres, realms and 
systems that ‘interact’ with and ‘affect’ each other positively or negatively. In this frac-
tured view, the income and wealth inequality between the 1% and the 99% are rooted 
in the objective laws of the ‘economy’. The main cause of inequality lies in the ‘real’ 
sphere of production (the high productivity of capitalists according to the liberals, ex-
cessive exploitation if we follow the Marxists), and its immediate impact is on the ‘real’ 
level of consumption (plenty for the 1%, little for the 99%). This ‘real’ inequality could 
be amplified by the ‘nominal’ sphere of the economy (for example, by the financial 
mischief of the banks, or the bubbly activity of stock-market speculators). The inequal-
ity then reaches beyond the economy to interact with the other spheres of society. It 
affects ‘politics’, ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’ and ‘gender’, among other realms (for in-
stance, by enabling the rich to ‘buy power’ and ‘influence’ government policy; by keep-
ing the poor in a lifecycle of hard work, social deprivation and petty crime; and by 
accentuating racial, ethnic and gender divisions); and it is in turn affected by those 
very realms (for example, when lower corporate taxes augment inequality, or when 
unemployment and welfare payments reduce it). 
If the Occupy movement wants to offer an alternative to the capitalist regime, it 
has to shed this fractured cosmology. Capitalism is the most universalizing mode of 
power, and so should be the framework that seeks to understand and negate it. In our 
research, we have tried to study the fabric of capitalist power, its historical evolution 
and multifaceted manifestations. We have shown how seemingly distinct phenomena, 
which the social sciences associate with separate realms of society, can be examined 
as part of a single totality. We have demonstrated how different processes, organiza-
tions or institutions – be they asset prices, earnings, risk, credit, leverage and mergers 
and acquisitions (usually classified as ‘financial’); inflation, stagflation, unemploy-
ment, growth and productivity (‘economic’); state, government, the army, violence, 
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political parties, NGOs and social movements (‘political); communication, public re-
lations, advertising, propaganda, entertainment and religion (‘cultural’); or wars, 
peace treaties, energy conflicts and superpower confrontations (‘international’) – all 
get quantified, capitalized and integrated into the megamachine of capital as power.  
The quantitative manifestation of this complex megamachine is a matrix of differ-
ential income streams and asset holdings that maps the distribution of capitalist power. 
One of the many measures included in this matrix is the indicator that the Occupy 
movement has rallied against: the income and asset share of the 1%. But if we wish to 
use this index, we should understand it not as an ‘economic’ measure of ‘access to 
resources’, unequal ‘standards of living’ or ‘distributive injustice’, but as an indirect 
proxy for capitalist power.  
We use a similar power proxy in our recent paper on ‘The Asymptotes of Power’ 
(Bichler and Nitzan 2012a). Figures 16 and 17 in the article plot the ups and downs in 
the income share of the top 10% of the U.S. population since the late 1920s, showing 
its historical U-shape and the fact that its respective peaks were recorded during the 
two systemic crises of the 1930s and the 2000s. This focus on the top 10% of the pop-
ulation is meant to highlight the power not only of dominant capital, but also of the 
thick ‘power belt’ of managers, lawyers, accountants, journalists, public officials, opin-
ion makers and other professionals that surrounds, serves and protects the mode of 
power and the class that rules it. The charts also show that this broad proxy of power 
has been positively and tightly correlated with the ‘correctional population’, measured 
by the share of the U.S. labour force that is in prison, in jail, on probation and on 
parole. The paper uses this and similar correlations to suggest that, in the 1930s and 
again since the 2000s, the rising power of dominant capital and its power belt was 
predicated on increasing sabotage, rising fear and growing pains inflicted on the un-
derlying population. If this trajectory were to continue, the paper argues, capital would 
be pushed toward the asymptotes of its power, with untold consequences for the future 
of humanity. 
This pronouncement, though, is no more than preliminary. The problem is that 
the measures and proxies we use to critique the capitalist regime, including the income 
shares of the top 1% and 10%, are generated by the capitalist regime itself. They are 
based on and drawn from a conceptual and statistical infrastructure created for capi-
talist purposes, mostly by capitalist organizations and the government organs and 
NGOs that serve them. These categories and measures work to bolster the mode of 
power and those who rule it, in part by concealing the very existence of this regime 
and hiding the identity of its masters. In order to tease out from the data what they 
seek to hide, we need bend the categories and reinterpret the measures – and even then, 
the results often highlight no more than a small fragment of the larger totality.  
Obviously, this is not the way to go.  
Many in the Occupy movement, particularly the anarchists, imagine a world with-
out corporate/state organizations, nationalism, racism, institutionalized religion and 
other xenophobic barriers to a humane society. And as outcasts of a society besieged 
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by all those ills, we share their aspiration for direct democracy. But we very much 
doubt that these goals are served by rallying against the ‘Wall-Street-Washington 
Complex’, ‘financialization’, ‘American Imperialism’ and ‘the 1%’. If the Occupy 
movement wants to change the world, it should resist the temptation of catchy slogans 
and put aside worn-out theories and dogmas, and instead develop its own novel un-
derstanding of how the capitalist mode of power operates.  
And that novel understanding cannot be concocted out of thin air. It needs an 
alternative conceptual and statistical infrastructure from which to grow, and such an 
infrastructure can only come from re-searching: from seeking new facts, from inventing 
new categories, from developing new methods of inquiry, from devising new systems 
of accounting and measurement and from building new theories.  
In our view, the first step in that direction is an independent, non-academic research 
institute. The Occupy movement needs an autonomous organization that will theorize 
and empirically research the capitalist mode of power with no strings attached. Arthur 
Koestler titled the first volume of his autobiography Arrow in the Blue (1952). The ‘ar-
row’ in the title stood for political action, while the ‘blue’ represented contemplation 
and theorization – and according to Koestler, although he engaged in both, he could 
never engage in both at the same time. An autonomous research institute may help 
mitigate this problem: the institute will inform the struggle, while the struggle will raise 
questions for the institute to grapple with. By finding out what capitalism is, the move-
ment might then be able to articulate what it wishes to have in its stead and how to 
fight for what it wants to achieve.  
 
 
2.  
 
Tim Di Muzio: Marxists have a number of disagreements with the capital as power 
framework. But it seems that one of the most prominent is that the framework eschews 
the labour theory of value in favour of a new power theory of value that sees accumu-
lation not as a narrow offshoot of production, but as a broad power process. For Marx-
ists, since exploitation is rooted in the production process and is the expropriation of 
surplus value, abandoning this idea means that there is no reason to struggle against 
capitalism, let alone a justification for democratic/socialist/communist revolution. 
How, then, might the capital as power framework contribute to a practical and/or 
philosophical justification for resistance or revolution? Furthermore, is there any rela-
tionship of exploitation in the capital as power framework? Does the concept of ex-
ploitation matter at all to your approach? 
 
Shimshon Bichler & Jonathan Nitzan: Marx studied capitalism as a mode of produc-
tion. But for him, the capitalist mode of production meant not merely a ‘productive 
system’, or even as an ‘economic system’, but as an entire societal regime – the regime 
of capital. He was interested in the underlying structure and dynamics of that regime: 
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What brought this regime into being and made capitalists its rulers? How had this 
regime developed? What would come in its place? To answer these questions was to 
decipher the underlying forces that shape change and resistance to change, to discover 
the mechanisms that stabilize and transform social reality, to lay bare the rules that gov-
ern the broad contours of social action and its historical evolution. To answer these 
questions, in other words, was to understand the nature of power in society. 
The secret to such an understanding, Marx argued, lies in production and, specif-
ically, in its relationship to labour. Following Hegel, Marx saw labour as a deeply 
dialectical process. Labour enables human beings to discover their subjectivity and 
manifest their societal existence – but it is also the means through which they are being 
controlled by and subjugated to others. In capitalism, the worker creates goods and 
services, yet the capitalist uses those goods and services against their own creator. In 
this way, labour becomes the chief leverage of societal power – as well as the leading 
agent in the abolition of that power. 
According to Marx, the engine of the capitalist regime is the exploitation of indus-
trial-productive workers. The capitalist extracts the surplus labour of these workers – 
which he then ploughs back into production in the form of accumulated capital with 
the sole purpose of extracting more surplus labour in order to accumulate more capital. 
The process gains momentum through incessant technical change and increasingly 
‘rational’ means of organizing production and consumption. Industrial workers and 
machines get entangled in a Gordian Knot that makes them increasingly productive 
and profitable. The stock of capital grows in volume and value, and that growth em-
powers its capitalist owners, disempowers the workers and fuels the class struggle be-
tween them. Around this skeleton of industrial production, exploitation and struggle 
grows the political, legal and cultural fabric of capitalism. And the totality of these 
relationships is what Marx calls the capitalist mode of production. 
Now, on the face of it, this portrayal suggests two important similarities between 
Marx’s view and our own theory of capital as power. First, both frameworks are con-
cerned with social power writ large. For Marx the question is how production and ex-
ploitation, organized through the process of accumulation, dictate the totality of hu-
man relations in capitalism; whereas for us the question is how power relations – in-
cluding the power relations between capitalists and workers (although not the Marxist 
relations) – are capitalized to creorder, or create the order of, this very totality. Second, 
both theories see capital accumulation as the key mechanism of social power – and no 
more. Capital is a means of control, not an agent of creation. In and of itself, capital is 
barren. Societal creativity – the transformation of nature and society for the good life 
– is the work of productive labourers (in Marx) and of the social hologram less the 
capitalists and their power apparatus (in our theory).  
But underneath the similarities there is also a crucial difference. For Marx, capital 
is logically and historically conditioned on labour, and specifically on wage labour: 
without wage labour, there could be no surplus value and therefore no capital and no 
capitalism. By contrast, in the theory of capital as power, wage labour is a critical 
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component – but not the only critical component – in the emergence of capitalism. 
Furthermore, the importance of wage labour lies not in the surplus value it supposedly 
generates, but in its relation to the reification of force. Capitalism, our theory argues, 
is a system of capitalized power, and the wage contract is the institution that quantifies, 
commodifies and eventually helps capitalize the direct power of capitalists over work-
ers. 
During the early stages of the bourgeois revolution, the relationship between own-
ers and workers dominated the power structure of the European bourg. The wage con-
tract helped depersonalize and abstract this structure. By making labour a vendible 
commodity, it relieved owners of any responsibility for their workers beyond the daily 
wage, it gave workers a mobility that feudalism forbade, and it anchored both in a new 
morality of liberty and opportunity. The wage contract first appeared in warfare (the 
hired soldiers of the communes) and then in production (the ‘blue nail’ cloth workers), 
and as the institution spread, the ability of capitalists to constantly and flexibly creor-
der the nature and overall architecture of their power increased exponentially. The 
wage contract forced workers to become ever more efficient in ways that slaves and 
serfs could never be made to be; it helped capitalists divide and conquer workers when 
the latter attempted to organize and resist; and it enabled the bourgeoisie to leverage 
the power embedded in this new structure in their struggle to topple the feudal regime.  
But the power enabled by the wage contract, although crucial in the early stages 
of the bourgeois revolution and still very important today, is only one aspect of capi-
talist power at large. Not only has the power of capitalists over workers expanded be-
yond the labour day and into consumption, leisure, culture and politics, but capitalist 
power more generally has now penetrated every corner of society, from ideology and 
the genetic code, to the law, politics and international relations, to the future of the 
environment and the very survival of humanity. 
To see the crucial implications of this difference between exploitation in produc-
tion and power at large, we need to examine Marx’s argument more closely before 
returning to the theory of capital as power. The starting point is valuation. Because 
capitalism is a system of commodities, and because commodities – and the social 
groups behind them – are related through prices, any general theory of capitalism must 
rest on a theory of value. Marx based his own theory of value on labour time – and 
more specifically, on socially necessary abstract labour time. The exchange value of com-
modities, he said, depends on the average productive labour needed to make them (the 
socially necessary aspect), and this socially necessary labour, he continued, can be 
measured in universal (read abstract) units. In this way, the labour of productive work-
ers, properly socialized and abstracted, becomes the elementary particle on which the 
entire logic of capitalism rests. 
This quantitative aspect of the theory – i.e., its reliance on the magnitude of socially 
necessary abstract labour time – is the heart and centre of Marx’s scientific socialism. 
Marx claimed his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it 
did something they couldn’t: it objectively derived the rate of profit – the quantitative 
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compass of capitalism – from the material conditions of the labour process. Prices of 
production, he wrote, ‘are conditioned on the existence of an average rate of profit’, 
which itself ‘must be deduced out of the values of commodities. . . . Without such a 
deduction, an average rate of profit (and consequently a price of production of com-
modities), remains a vague and senseless conception’ (Marx 1909, Vol. 3, pp. 185-86). 
The very same point was reiterated by Engels. ‘These two great discoveries’, he wrote, 
‘the materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist 
production through surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism 
became a science. The next thing was to work out all its details and relations’ (Engels 
1966, Section I).  
And this is where the problem begins.  
First, neither Marx nor his followers have ever been able to offer an objective way 
of measuring socially necessary abstract labour. This failure is crucial, since, without 
this elementary particle, their science is akin to physics without mass or chemistry 
without the periodic table: it loses its explanatory power. And the science is just half 
the problem. The other half is Marx’s political rejection of capitalism – a system based 
on an unjust and contradictory process of exploitation. And here, too, there is a diffi-
culty.  
As noted, for Marx exploitation is a quantitative concept, based on units of so-
cially necessary abstract labour. But if these abstract units cannot be shown to exist, 
let alone be measured, on what scientific grounds can one claim that capitalism is ex-
ploitative and therefore objectionable and unsustainable? Moreover, how do we decide 
what is socially necessary? Marx tried to solve the problem by stating that the socially 
necessary cost of labour power is the actual wage as dictated by the particular epoch 
and concrete societal context, and that surplus value is simply the remainder left when 
this wage is deducted from the worker’s product – but this solution was dangerously 
circular, not to say irrefutable.  
A second, related hurdle has to do with the separation between ‘productive’ and 
‘unproductive’ labour. According to Marx’s theory, the two types of labour are very 
different: productive labour produces value and surplus value, whereas unproductive 
labour merely consumes those values. The key difficulty here is to decide who is pro-
ductive and who is not, and Marxists have found themselves having to invest much 
time and effort trying to sort it out. Unfortunately, most of this time and effort has 
been spent for naught. Contrary to common belief, ‘productivity’ is not a straightfor-
ward, objective concept; it is replete with highly subjective considerations, which in 
turn makes the entire problem theoretically insoluble and empirically intractable. 
Worse still, even if the productive-unproductive division were crystal clear, there 
would still remain the equally daunting challenge of fitting it into the broader theory.  
During the twentieth century, the relationship between the so-called ‘surplus us-
ing’ and ‘surplus producing’ sectors became top-heavy, with the unproductive sector 
apparently growing much faster than the productive one. This development was un-
known to classical Marxism, so the challenge was to develop neo-Marxist explanations 
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that would sort out which sectors serve to ‘offset’ or ‘absorb’ the growing surplus, and 
how. Some theories concentrated on the unproductive governmental, legal and mili-
tary arms of the state. Others emphasized the unproductive managerial, marketing and 
sales apparatuses of large corporations. And still others pointed to the growing process 
of ‘financialization’, in which banks, insurance companies, real-estate firms and other 
unproductive intermediaries suck in increasing chunks of surplus.2 
This emphasis on surplus absorption, though, had one serious shortcoming: it en-
dowed the shrinking productive sector with ever-greater surplus-generating capacity. 
To avoid this rather implausible assumption, other theorists, particularly those associ-
ated with ‘cultural’ or ‘political’ Marxism, opted for a more creative solution: they 
made surplus generation and absorption look more balanced simply by shifting sectors 
from one side of the equation to the other. One example of this fix was offered by 
Henry Lefebvre (1991, 2003), who made the city part of the productive base – a daring 
feat for which he was expelled from the French Communist Party. Another was given 
by Louis Althusser (1971), who, conjuring up ideas from the Frankfurt School, sorcer-
ously moved political ideology into the productive base. In so doing, he made the state 
a potential partner to capital in generating surplus and accumulating capital, thus 
opening up a whole new field for subsequent generations of cultural and statist Marx-
ists to capitalize on. 
The chief casualty of these explanations and fixes was the labour theory of value. 
With no agreement on what constitutes socially necessary abstract labour time, and 
with no ability to decide who is productive and who is not, the scientific core of Marx-
ism – the quantitative theory of prices, distribution and accumulation – broke down. 
And with the theoretical core decimated, the notion of exploitation lost its clear mean-
ing, the capitalist laws of motion dissipated, and the logic for resisting capitalism be-
came opaque. 
This void leads us to the third problem: the broader Marxist theory of politics. 
According to Marx’s logic, the state and the law – as well as culture, religion, interna-
tional relations and globalization, among other processes – are all causally tied to and 
ultimately steered by the generation of value and surplus value. In the final analysis, 
national parties, foreign policy, regional wars and superpower conflicts – as well as 
their countertendencies, from protest and reform to utopias and revolutions – should 
all be traceable, directly or indirectly, to the productive base of economic valuation 
and exploitation. But are they? 
2 Later on, many Marxists would switch to emphasizing the negative effects of ‘financial’ or 
‘nominal’ capital, which, in their view, eviscerates and destabilizes capitalism – in contrast to 
‘productive’ or ‘real’ capital’, which propels it forward (albeit with plenty of contradictions). The 
problem with this view is that nobody knows exactly how to distinguish financial from produc-
tive capital in the first place. This difficulty never arises in our own work, which argues that 
there is no such thing as ‘real’ or ‘productive’ capital, and that all capital is finance – and only 
finance. This solution, though, contradicts the basic real-nominal duality that all political econ-
omists adhere to, so obviously it cannot be accepted by Marxists. 
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Many Marxist careers have been devoted to articulating these complex dialectical 
derivations. But the empirical-historical evidence to substantiate these articulations is 
not that impressive. In the end, it is hard to discern any connection between the ex-
ploitation of productive workers in Britain in the 1950s and the country’s foreign pol-
icy in Iran; between the changing rate of exploitation in twentieth-century South Af-
rica and the institution and dissolution of Apartheid; or between the rate of exploita-
tion in contemporary Chinese manufacturing and government prosecution of religious 
sects – particularly when the rate of exploitation itself is not only unknown, but un-
knowable.  
We need to remember that Marx fashioned his theory of value after the liberal 
version of David Ricardo. Ricardo’s theory, conceived during the first half of the nine-
teenth century, reflected the early stages of European industrialization, when capital-
ists were still struggling to shape and control their emerging regime. At the time, it 
seemed reasonable to associate the soaring profitability and accumulation of factory 
owners with the explosive expansion of their industrial activity and the horrendous 
conditions enforced on their industrial workers. But this emphasis that led Marx to 
base his own value theory on ‘industrial exploitation’ is historically bounded: what 
seemed obvious in Victorian England started to look increasingly out of sync in the 
twentieth century and became practically irrelevant in the twenty-first; it is grossly in-
sufficient if not utterly misleading for understanding contemporary capital accumula-
tion; and it is a dangerous starting point for developing non-capitalist, democratic al-
ternatives.  
And here we come to the fourth and final difficulty: the class struggle. If we follow 
Marx and anchor this struggle in the underlying notions of production and exploita-
tion, we inevitably end up with a narrow clash between the owners of the ‘means of 
production’ and their ‘productive’ workers – while the rest of the population, classified 
as ‘unproductive’, is pushed to the sidelines. This understanding of the class struggle 
was a keystone of many twentieth-century revolutions – from the Russian and the Chi-
nese to the Cuban and the Cambodian. Resistance to capitalism and capitalists excited 
the followers of these revolutions, while socialist dogma assisted their liberation strug-
gles, solidified their national identity and helped their initial industrialization. But 
soon enough, the socialist projects faltered, inflicting incalculable costs on the under-
lying population.  
Marxists often blame those failures on unfortunate ‘mistakes’, adverse ‘externali-
ties’ and the ‘special circumstances’ that enabled gang leaders such as Stalin, Mao and 
Pol Pot to hijack the revolutions. But there was also a deeper, systemic flaw that Marx-
ists, understandably, prefer to ignore: the revolutionaries relied on an inadequate theory 
of value. In Cambodia, for example, the Khmer Rouge turned their society upside down 
on the premise that the labour of city dwellers was largely unproductive. Cambodian 
society, they said, would be better off if its urban population were to be relocated, en 
masse, to the agricultural countryside, where it would become productive and create 
value instead of just consuming it (Samphan 1976; Mackey 2011). A similar template 
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was followed by the Soviet Union, China and other socialist experiments, where as-
sumptions about the ‘creation of value’ underpinned massive forced relocations and 
grandiose ‘productive’ projects that ended up killing millions and subjugating the rest 
to ruthless tyrannies. (According to Solzhenitsyn (1974), in the Soviet Union surplus 
and growth were generated by and benchmarked on the simple labour of the abstract 
Gulag.) 
All of this serves to suggest that capitalism cannot be effectively resisted, let alone 
replaced, if we misunderstand what it means and how it operates. Protest and revolu-
tion occur for many different reasons – all mediated by notions of justice and dignity, 
the sense of having nothing to lose or something to gain, the image of an alternative 
and the confidence of achieving it. This complexity, although recognized by Marxists, 
can be linked to their theory only from the outside. For Marx, the bearer of revolution 
is the ‘productive’ working class. And yet, in the twentieth century, industrial labour-
ers were often conservative and indifferent, and sometimes hostile, to revolutionary 
change. Can this failure be attributed entirely to ‘false consciousness’ – or might the 
fault lie in the very definition of ‘productive workers’ as a class and in the labour theory 
of value that makes this class the vanguard of progress? And then, what are we to make 
of the many uprisings and revolts spearheaded by students (from May 1968 to the pre-
sent Occupy movement), veterans (Europe after WWI), women (from Argentina to 
Nigeria), the ‘homeless middle class’ (Israel), civil-right activists (from Northern Ire-
land to the United States), peasants (from France to Mexico), blacks (from Haiti to 
South Africa) and the ‘unproductive’ marginalized masses (from the dawn of capital-
ism to the Arab Spring), to give a few examples? Are these all the roundabout conse-
quences and derivatives of the class struggle between productive workers and capital-
ists – or do we need to rethink the meaning of classes in capitalism? 
The theory of capital as power helps us transcend the narrow confines of the so-
called industrial class struggle. Capitalism, it argues, is a system of quantified power, 
synthesized and creordered through the ever more encompassing ritual of differential 
capitalization. The power of capitalists over production and labour certainly is a sig-
nificant aspect of this system – but it is merely one aspect of many, and not necessarily 
the most important one at that. Every power process that affects expected earnings, 
risk or the normal rate of return can be capitalized, and whatever gets capitalized be-
comes a facet of capital. The importance of any of these power processes – be they in 
production, consumption, culture, public policy, religion, war, the natural environ-
ment, or genetic engineering, to name a few – should be determined not a priori, but 
based on their relative contribution to capitalization.  
In Marx’s theory, real capital – and the resistance to that capital – is to be found 
in the productive factories of the industrial sector. Finance in this framework is ‘ficti-
tious’ capital, a distinct nominal realm that lives off, absorbs and distorts the surplus 
generated in production. The theory of capital as power is completely different. Fi-
nance, it argues, is not a separate addendum to capital, but the only capital. All capital 
– whether we call it General Electric, Omnicom, JPMorgan Chase, the Government 
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Pension Investment Fund of Japan, or the China Investment Corporation – is financial 
and only financial. Finance is the brain and nerve centre of the capitalist megama-
chine, a matrix whose raison d’être is to automate human beings and sacrifice humanity 
to the Moloch of power. Unlike Marx’s capitalist mode of production, whose built-in 
kill switch ascertains not only the system’s eventual demise but also its replacement by 
a better, socialist society, the capitalist mode of power does not have a pre-determined 
path. As we have tried to show in ‘The Asymptotes of Power’ (Bichler and Nitzan 
2012a), capitalist power certainly has limits. But transcending those limits neither is 
automatic nor does it guarantee a better society. It can lead to socialism or barbarism 
– as well as to other forms of social existence, and even to the annihilation of society 
altogether.  
In our view, the all-encompassing drive of capitalist power and the open-ended 
nature of its alternatives constitute a much deeper reason to abolish capitalism than 
mere exploitation does. These features mean, first, that the potential bearers of this 
radical transformation are not only industrial workers, but humanity as a whole; and 
second, that the outcome of this effort will depend not on historical laws of motion, 
but on understanding the concrete challenges of capital as power and on being able to 
negate them by creordering a humane, democratic alternative. 
 
 
3.  
 
Tim Di Muzio: In the annals of political economy, debates on the origins of ‘wealth’ 
loom large. How might the capital as power framework intervene in these debates, 
particularly given the gross disparity of compensation in the world and the right-wing 
justifications for the appropriation of income and wealth? Are investors and those 
charged with investing and managing their money really wealth and job creators and 
more productive than their counterparts in the working class? 
 
Shimshon Bichler & Jonathan Nitzan: References to wealth are as ancient as class 
society. In every mode of power, the rulers command material resources that they use 
for various purposes, from self-glorification and conspicuous consumption to produc-
tive projects and destructive war-making. Throughout much of history, the possession 
of wealth was limited to a narrow stratum of society, and it is only with capitalism that 
the concept has gained wider appeal. Instead of the exclusive wealth of a few, political 
economists started to talk about the wider ‘wealth of nations’, a fuzzy concept that 
economists would subsequently replace by the seemingly more accurate ‘gross domes-
tic product’ and the ‘standard of living’.  
The key to this liberal ‘wealth’ is the capital stock. In economic parlance, both 
mainstream and Marxist, capital denotes ‘productive capacity’. This capacity can take 
different forms. It can appear as plant and equipment (for example, a GM factory); as 
structures (the head office of Mitsubishi); as natural resources (the oil of Saudi Arabia); 
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as human bodies (the workers of the United States); or as knowledge (the inventions 
and innovation of GE). But regardless of its form, the essence is always the same: an 
ability to create goods and services that generate utility (in the liberal version) or use 
value (in the Marxist one). 
Our own view is very different. Capital, we argue, is not productive capacity but 
commodified power. As a legal ownership construct symbolized in financial terms, 
capital stands outside the process of production. It has no role in industry, broadly 
understood, and it therefore cannot create jobs or output, by definition. If anything, 
the impact of capital on these categories is entirely negative. In order for capital to 
accumulate, its owners have to strategically sabotage, restrict and inhibit the creative 
faculties of humanity below their full potential. This suppression serves to augment 
the wealth of those who administer it, but the increase is entirely redistributional; it is 
achieved by curtailing the wellbeing of others, as well as of society at large.  
To understand the problem with the conventional view, we need to go back to the 
Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During that period, a totally new 
phenomenon appeared on the historical scene: growth. Until that time, the per-capita 
levels of production and consumption and the so-called standard of living (however 
measured) changed very slowly, if at all. There were occasional increases, but these 
were usually offset by subsequent decreases. Life expectancy, health, energy use and 
caloric intake, to mention a few key indicators, fluctuated within fairly narrow bounds. 
And for as long as this stable pattern persisted – which means for much of human 
history and prehistory – distribution was a matter of conflict and power: for some to 
have more, others had to have less. 
This imperative was removed with the emergence of growth. The early signs of 
this growth appeared in the budding European bourgs in the first half of the second 
millennium CE. But for a few hundred years, little of this growth spread to the pre-
dominantly feudal landscape, where inertia and stagnation prevailed. It was only in 
the eighteenth century that growth started to gather momentum and gain the attention 
of theorists and ideologues; and it was only in the nineteenth century that it became a 
defining moment of human affairs – first in Europe and then in the world as a whole.  
This change had a profound effect on the nature of redistribution. While society 
had previously moved in a closed loop, now the skies were the limit. It seemed that, 
for the first time ever, it was possible for everyone to have more – or at least for some 
to have more without others having less. And this possibility has kept theorists and 
ideologues debating the question ever since: who ‘deserves’ to get which piece of the 
growing ‘pie’?  
The answers, almost invariably, are anchored in production. Before the eighteenth 
century, the ruling classes justified distribution mostly by religion: different social 
groups were said to receive whatever the gods wanted them to have. But with the ap-
pearance of growth, the justification changed. The secular-scientific revolution intro-
duced a new mechanical cosmology, and the classical political economists – the new 
theorists of society – fashioned their explanations along similar lines. Matter can 
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change its form but it always retains its mass, and the same law of conservation applies 
to society. The only way to increase output – or what Adam Smith called the ‘wealth 
of nations’ – the political economists argued, is for the different social classes to in-
crease their ‘productive’ inputs. And with philosopher John Locke asserting that peo-
ple have the right to own what they produce, the road was open to tying distribution 
to productivity.  
During the eighteenth century, the struggle between the rising bourgeoisie and the 
declining nobility pit Adam Smith against the Physiocrats. The Physiocrats, who 
spoke for the nobility, argued that the source of all productivity lay in agriculture, 
whereas Smith, who represented the bourgeoisie, suggested that productivity was in-
creasingly coming from manufacturing. The two theories helped explain rent and 
wages, but they got stuck when it came to profit. The difficulty arose because the early 
political economists thought that there were only two factors of production – labour 
and land – and that capital was merely an auxiliary that did not possess intrinsic 
productivity and therefore did not deserve an income. But if so, whence did profit 
come? 
There were many attempts to answer this question. Some, like Nassau Senior 
(1836), argued that capitalists are compensated for their ‘abstinence’ while their capital 
is tied in production. Others, such as Alfred Marshall (1920), thought that profit com-
pensates capitalists for the time they ‘wait’ until their capital returns. And still others, 
such as Herbert Spencer (1904), William Sumner (1920, 1963) and Ayn Rand (1966), 
took a more biological path, claiming that profit was due to the superior human traits 
of capitalists. But it was only in the early twentieth century that profit was put on the 
solid footing of productivity. The breakthrough came with J. B. Clark (1899), who 
declared that capital was not a mere accessory, but a full-fledged factor of production, 
on par with labour and land. Each factor of production, he maintained, has its own 
productivity; and under conditions of perfect competition, the owners of these factors 
– capitalists, workers and rentiers – each receive an income proportionate to the mar-
ginal productivity of the factor they own.  
It should be mentioned that neither Clark nor his successors ever demonstrated 
this correspondence between productivity and income, and for a simple reason: 
productivity is not a knowable, let alone a quantifiable, attribute or trait. This failure, 
though, didn’t bother the theorists in the least. On the contrary, it gave them a carte 
blanche to draw wherever conclusions they felt appropriate. Logically, the theorists 
should have proceeded from productivity to income. For example, to explain the very 
high profit-to-wage ratio, they should have first measured the relative marginal produc-
tivities of capitalists and workers and then demonstrated that the latter measure was 
equal to the former. But since productivity in general and marginal productivity in 
particular cannot be known, the theorists have made it a habit to go in reverse. Their 
practice, from day one, has been to claim that the high profit-to-wage ratio proves that 
capitalists contribute that much more than workers. . . .  
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And this reverse template has been exploited to the fullest. Whereas Clark spoke 
of three factors of production, his successors have extended the list significantly, if not 
infinitely. First they divided and subdivided each factor, so that we can have as many 
different types of ‘capital’, ‘labour’ and ‘land’ as we wish. Then, they invented brand 
new factors – from ‘technology’ to ‘organization’ to ‘knowledge’, ‘symbols’, ‘culture’, 
‘social networks’, ‘education’, ‘training’, ‘innovation, ‘risk taking’, ‘entrepreneurship’ 
and ‘arbitrage’. Supposedly, these newly concocted factors are all endowed with their 
own distinct productivities, all accurately revealed – or so we are told – by the incomes 
of their alleged owners. We say ‘alleged’ because, in many cases, the identity of the 
owners is not entirely clear (who possesses ‘knowledge’, who owns ‘organization’ and 
who is the proprietor of ‘culture’?) But these questions too haven’t unsettled the in-
come-by-productivity experts. On the contrary, they gave them additional room to 
manoeuvre. For example, when the earnings of a corporation, a group of workers or 
a even a whole country seem to ‘exceed’ (or ‘fall short of’) what is implied by the first-
tier inputs of labour, land or capital, the pundits conjure up the contributions of sec-
ond-tier inputs such ‘technology’ (Microsoft is said to be knowledge-rich, whereas 
Sears isn’t, hence Microsoft’s higher income), ‘entrepreneurship’ (software analysts 
take initiative while miners don’t, hence the former’s higher wages), or ‘risk’ (Germany 
was willing to take it while Italy wasn’t, hence Germany’s higher growth rate). Go 
prove otherwise.  
And that isn’t the end of the story. Having succeeded in elevating capital from an 
auxiliary to a full-fledged factor of production, economists have decided to take the 
next logical step and declare that every factor of production is capital. The idea was 
first floated by Irving Fisher more than a century ago (1896). Capital, he argued, is not 
a ‘special’ commodity. In fact, any commodity, observed as a ‘stock’ at a give point in 
time, is capital. Fisher was still thinking in traditional economic terms, so his examples 
were drawn mostly from the tangible process of production. But his successors were 
no longer so hindered, and they have gradually imposed the concept on more and 
more social entities. Consequently, we are now enriched by ‘social capital’ (Hanifan 
1916) ‘human capital’ (Becker 1964), ‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu 1984) and ‘cultural 
capital’ (Bourdieu 1986), among other capitals – as well as by an endless list of deriv-
atives, from ‘academic capital’, to ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge capital’, ‘innova-
tion capital’, ‘public capital’, ‘religious capital’, ‘military capital’ and ‘risk capital’. 
Nowadays, there seems to be no entity that the word ‘capital’ cannot easily suffix. And 
by extension, everyone – from big billionaires and asset managers, to state officials and 
professionals, to unionized workers, day labours, scientists, artists, homemakers, retir-
ees, the unemployed, criminals and the insane – is an ‘investor’. These ‘investors’ all 
advance their capital, making it contribute to production in their quest for the highest 
possible return in income. 
Now, in this fantasy world, the claim that capitalists ‘create’ our jobs and ‘aug-
ment’ our wealth is a tautology. Since everything is capital, everyone is a capitalist and 
productivity is equal to earnings, it follows that the capitalists who profit the most are 
   
The 1%, Exploitation and Wealth | 209 
also those who ‘contribute’ the most. They ‘generate’ most of the jobs, ‘produce’ most 
of the innovations and ‘add’ most of the wealth. And the fascinating thing is that the 
bulk of humanity readily accepts this irrefutable dogma. In a recent global poll of 
12,000 adults in 23 countries, roughly half the respondents thought that the rich ‘de-
serve’ their wealth, and only a quarter strongly disagreed with that statement 
(GlobeScan 2012). The distressing thing about these polls is not only the distribution 
of their answers, but the fact that the queries they pose are taken as self-explanatory. 
In order to agree or disagree that the rich deserve their income, one needs a prior 
benchmark of ‘fair income’. And for most people, this benchmark, whether they know 
it or not, is J. B. Clark’s productivity theory of distribution – the notion that everyone, 
rich or poor, should get in income what they ‘contribute’ in production – even when 
such contributions are unknowable and indeed indistinguishable in the first place.  
Marxists avoid this tautological trap, but only superficially. As we have seen, they 
reject the mainstream theory of distribution and instead offer their own Marxist ‘pro-
duction function’ in which the only productive agent is labour and in which all other 
income derives from the exploitation of productive workers. But this argument is still 
very much anchored in production – and as we have suggested earlier, it, too, runs 
into logical contradictions and empirical dead ends.3  
The solution, we argue in our work, is to think of distribution not as a derivative 
of production, but as a manifestation of organized power. Society is like a giant holo-
gram of conflicting impulses. The productive dimensions of this hologram are inte-
grated, coordinated and cooperative. Every creative endeavour of humanity resonates 
with all others, and this systemic resonance makes it impossible to speak of separate 
‘factors of production’, let alone of their distinct ‘productive contributions’. Jobs, pro-
duction and wellbeing are created not by this or that factor, but by the resonating totality 
of societal creativity. However, in capitalism, the productive dimension of the holo-
gram is subjugated to the logic of capital as power. Capitalist owners manifest their 
power by imposing – or threatening to impose – dissonance on the resonating structure 
of production. And it is this strategic sabotage, rather than capitalists’ alleged contri-
bution, that is measured by their differential income and assets.  
 
 
3 For the application of this production function to the distribution of income in the Soviet Bloc, 
see Djilas’ The New Class (1957). In his Cancer Ward (1968), Solzhenitsyn describes how this 
production function was used to justify the inequality of income and privileges between the 
Soviet nomenklatura and the country’s productive workers.  
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Capitalism as a Mode of Power:  
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
Interviews by Piotr Dutkiewicz 1 
 
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: In a unique two-pronged dovetailing discussion, frequent collabo-
rators and coauthors Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler discuss the nature of con-
temporary capitalism. Their central argument is that the dominant approaches to stud-
ying the market – liberalism and Marxism – are as flawed as the market itself. Offering 
a historically rich and analytically incisive critique of the recent history of capitalism 
and crisis, they suggest that instead of studying the relations of capital to power we 
must conceptualize capital as power if we are to understand the dynamics of the market 
system. This approach allows us to examine the seemingly paradoxical workings of 
the capitalist mechanism, whereby profit and capitalization are divorced from produc-
tivity and machines in the so-called real economy. Indeed Nitzan and Bichler paint a 
picture of a strained system whose component parts exist in an antagonistic relation-
ship. In their opinion, the current crisis is a systemic one afflicting a fatally flawed 
system. However, it is not one that seems to be giving birth to a unified opposition 
movement or to a new mode of thinking. The two political economists call for nothing 
short of a new mode of imagining the market, our political system, and our very world. 
1 A shorter version of this interview was first published in 22 Ideas to Fix the World: Conversations 
with the World’s Foremost Thinkers, edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (Bichler, 
Nitzan, and Dutkiewicz 2013). 
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1.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Let’s start from a fairly general big picture of the economic system. 
Please look around and tell me what you see as the key features of the current market 
system. 
 
Shimshon Bichler: Although it may not seem so at first sight, your question is highly 
loaded. For me to describe the current ‘economic system’ and ‘market system’ is to 
accept these terms as objective entities, or at least as useful concepts. But are they?  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: So what terms would you use? Is there an alternative approach? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: Yes, there is an alternative approach; but before getting to that 
approach, we need to sort out the problem with the conventional one.  
In my view, terms such as the ‘economic system’ and the ‘market system’ are mis-
nomers. They are irrelevant and misleading. Nowadays, they are employed more as 
ideological slogans than scientific concepts. Those who use them often end up con-
cealing rather than revealing the capitalist reality.  
Of course, this wasn’t always the case. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, when capitalism was just taking hold, there was nothing apologetic about the 
market. On the contrary. The market was seen as the harbinger of progress – a power-
ful institution that heralded liberty, equality and tolerance. ‘Go into the London Ex-
change’, wrote Voltaire, ‘a place more dignified than many a royal court. There you 
will find representatives of every nation quietly assembled to promote human welfare. 
There the Jew, the Mahometan and the Christian deal with each other as though they 
were all of the same religion. They call no man Infidel unless he be bankrupt’.2  
The market has had a dramatic impact on European history, partly because it 
emerged in a seemingly unlikely setting. After the nomadic invasions and the fall of 
the imperial civilization of the first millennium AD, Europe developed a highly frac-
tured social regime we now call feudalism. This regime was based on self-sufficient 
rural estates, cultivated by peasant-serfs and ruled by a violent aristocracy. Technical 
knowhow during that period was limited, the agricultural yield meagre and trade al-
most non-existent. The power relations were legitimized by the sanctified notion of a 
‘triangular society’, comprising prayers, warriors and tillers (or, in a more political 
lingo, priests, nobles and peasants). Merchants and financiers had no place in that 
scheme. 
But not for long. The feudal order began to disintegrate during the first half of the 
second millennium AD, and this decline was accompanied – and to some extent ac-
celerated – by the revival of trade and the growth of merchant cities such as Bruges, 
2 Quoted in Amos Elon, Founder: A Portrait of the First Rothschild and His Time (1996: 109). 
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Venice and Florence. These developments signalled the beginning of a totally new so-
cial order: an urban civilization that gave rise to a new ruling class known as the ‘bour-
geoisie’, an unprecedented civilian-scientific revolution and a novel culture we now 
call ‘liberal’.  
Because of the specifically European features of this process, the market came to 
symbolize the negation of the ancien régime: in contrast to the feudal order which was 
seen as collective, stagnant, austere, ignorant and violent, the market promised indi-
vidualism, growth, well-being, enlightenment and peace. And it was this early conflict 
between the rule of feudalism and the aspirations of capitalism that later galvanized 
into what most people today take as a self-evident duality: the contrast between the 
state, or ‘politics’, and the market, or the ‘economy’.  
According to this conventional bifurcation, the economy and politics are orthog-
onal realms, one horizontal and the other vertical. The economy is the site of inde-
pendence, productivity and well-being. It is the clearing house for individual wants 
and desires, the voluntary arena where autonomous agents engage in production and 
exchange in order to better their lives and augment their utility. By contrast, the polit-
ical system of state organizations and institutions is the locus of control and power. 
Unlike the flat structure of the free economy, politics is hierarchical. It is concerned 
with coercion and oppression and driven by command and obedience.  
In this scheme, the economy – or more precisely, the ‘market economy’ – is con-
sidered productive (generating wealth), efficient (minimizing cost) and harmonious 
(tending toward equilibrium). It is competitive (and therefore free). It seeks to increase 
well-being (by maximizing utility). And if left to its own device (laissez faire), it aug-
ments the welfare of society (by sustaining economic growth and increasing the wealth 
of nations). The political system, by contrast, is wasteful and parasitical. Its purpose is 
not production, but redistribution. Its members – the politicians, state officials and 
bureaucrats – seek power and prestige. They eagerly ‘intervene’ in and ‘monopolize’ 
the economy. They tax, borrow and spend – and in the process stifle the economy and 
‘distort’ its efficiency. Sometimes, ‘externalities’ and other forms of ‘market failure’ 
make state intervention necessary. But such intervention, the argument goes, should 
be minimal, transitory and subjugated to the overarching logic of the economy.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: So the ‘market’ serves the role of a new ideology for the bourgeoi-
sie? 
 
Shimshn Bichler: Exactly. The portrayal I’ve just painted owes much to Adam Smith, 
the eighteenth-century Scotsman who turned the idea of ‘the market’ into the key po-
litical institution of capitalism. Smith’s invention helped the bourgeoisie undermine 
and eventually topple the royal-princely state, and that was just for starters. Soon 
enough, the market became the chief ideology of the triumphant capitalist regime. It 
helped spread capitalism around the world, and it assisted in the fight against compet-
ing regimes, such as fascism and communism. In the Soviet Union, where production 
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was besieged by chaotic planning and accompanied by tyrannical rule, organized vio-
lence, open corruption and restricted consumption, the market symbolized the ‘other 
life’. It was the alternative world of freedom and abundance. And this perception is 
still hammered home by the ideologues of capitalism. In the final analysis, we are told, 
there are only two options: the market or the Gosplan. If we don’t choose egocentrism 
and liberty, we end up with planning and tyranny. And that is it. There is no other 
alternative, or so goes the dogma.  
The ideological basis of these arguments was bolstered in the late nineteenth cen-
tury by the official split of classical political economy into two distinct academic dis-
ciplines – political science and economics. The term ‘economics’ was invented by Al-
fred Marshall, the Cambridge University don who coined it to denote the new ‘mar-
ginalist’, or neo-classical, doctrine of political economy. Marshall, who wanted eco-
nomics to be a real science, gave it the same suffix as that of physics and mathematics. 
He also wrote the first economics textbook (the definitive edition of which was issued 
in 1890), where he set the rigid boundaries of the discipline, elaborated its deductive 
format and articulated many of the examples that are still being used today. 
Despite its aspirations, though, economics never became a real science, and for a 
simple reason: it couldn’t. Science is sceptical. Unlike organized religion, which is in-
finitely confident, science thrives on doubt. It relies not on static ritual and unchanging 
dogma, but on seeking novel explanations for ever-expanding horizons. It tries to un-
derstand, not to justify. Now, none of this could be said about economics. If anything, 
we can say the very opposite: the latent role of economics was not to explain capital-
ism, but to justify it. When economics first emerged in the late nineteenth century, 
capitalism was already victorious. But it was also highly turbulent and increasingly 
contested by critiques and revolutionaries, so it had to be defended; and the ideological 
part of that defence was delegated to the new priests of liberalism: the economists. In 
order to perform their role, the economists have elaborated an intricate system of math-
ematical models. This system, they claim, proves that a free, totally unregulated econ-
omy – if we could ever have one – would yield the best of all possible worlds, by defi-
nition.  
The conventional counterclaim, marshalled by many heterodox critiques, is that 
neoclassical models may be elegant, but they have little or nothing to do with the actual 
world we live in. And there is certainly much truth in this observation. But the ‘science 
of economics’ is besieged by a far deeper problem that rarely if ever gets mentioned: it 
relies on fictitious quantities.  
Every science rests on one or more fundamental quantities in which all other mag-
nitudes are denominated. Physics, for example, has five fundamental quantities – 
length, time, mass, electrical charge and heat – and every other measure is derived 
from those quantities. For instance, velocity is length divided by time; acceleration is 
the time derivative of velocity; and gravity is mass multiplied by acceleration. Now, as 
a science, economics too has to have fundamental quantities – and the economists 
   
 
 
 
214 | Capitalism as a Mode of Power  
claim it does. The fundamental quantity of the neoclassical universe is the unit of he-
donic pleasure, or ‘util’.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz : Can you explain this idea in more detail? How does the ‘util’ form 
the basis of the neoclassical economic universe? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: The answer begins with the conventional bifurcation of the econ-
omy itself into two quantitative spheres: ‘real’ and ‘nominal’. According to the econo-
mists, the key is the real sphere. This is the material engine of society, the realm of 
tangible assets and technical know-how, the locus of production and consumption, the 
fountain of well-being. The nominal side of the economy is secondary. This is the 
sphere of money, prices and finance, of inflation and deflation, of speculative bubbles 
and stock market crashes. Although highly dynamic, the nominal sphere doesn’t have 
a life of its own. Its money magnitudes are merely reflections – sometimes accurate 
sometimes inaccurate – of what happens in the real sphere. And the reflection is quan-
titative: the price quantities of the ‘nominal’ spheres mirror the substantive quantities 
of the ‘real’ sphere. 
Now, in the final analysis, all economic quantities are reducible to utils. The util is the 
elementary particle of economic science. It is the fundamental quantity, the basic 
building block everything economic is made of. The utils themselves, like Greek at-
oms, are identical everywhere, but their combination yields infinitely complex forms 
that economists call ‘goods and services’. Every composite of the ‘real economy’ – 
from the aggregate quantities of production, consumption and investment, to the size 
of GDP, to the magnitude of military spending and the scale of technology – is the 
sum total of the utils it generates. And the price magnitudes of the ‘nominal’ economy 
– for instance, the dollar prices of an industrial robot (say $5 million) and a trendy 
iPhone ($500) – merely represent and reflect the util-denominated quantities of their 
respective ‘real’ quantities (whose ratio, assuming the reflection is accurate, is 
10,000:1).  
And, yet, and here we come to the crux of the matter, this util – this basic quantum 
that everything economic is supposedly derived from – is immeasurable and in fact un-
knowable!  
Nobody has been able to identify the quantum of a util, and I very much doubt 
that anyone ever will. It is a pure fiction. And since all ‘real’ economic quantities are 
denominated in this fictitious unit, it follows that their own quantities are fictitious as 
well. To measure ‘real GDP’ or the ‘standard of living’ without utils is like measuring 
velocity without time, or gravity without mass. (I should note here that a similar cri-
tique can be levelled against classical Marxism. The elementary particle of the Marxist 
universe is socially necessary abstract labour. This is the fundamental quantity that all 
‘real’ magnitudes are made of and which the nominal spheres (should) reflect – and 
yet no Marxist has ever measured it.)  
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So, just like in Andersen’s The Emperor’s New Clothes, everyone pretends. The stu-
dents, dazed by the endless drill of ‘practical’ assignments, do not even suspect that 
their ‘computations’ are practically meaningless. Most professors, having graduated 
from the meat grinder of neoclassical training, have had all traces of the problem safely 
erased from their memory (assuming they were aware of it in the first place). And the 
statisticians, whose job is to measure the economy, have no choice but to concoct 
numbers based on arbitrary assumptions that nobody can either validate or refute. The 
entire edifice hangs in thin air, and everyone keeps quite lest it collapse.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: So what you are saying is that one of the very few supposedly solid 
foundations of our life – the notion that something ‘economic’ is measurable and thus 
‘objective’ – is a fiction? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: Yes. And this, mind you, is the dominant ideology that rules the 
world.  
Every cog in the corporate-government-military megamachine – from business 
managers and state planners, through army officers and central bankers, to financial 
analysts, accountants and tax experts – is hardwired to the conventions and rituals of 
this doctrine. They are all conditioned by the same never-to-be-questioned mantras of 
the capitalist matrix: that the economy is productive and politics parasitic; that the 
market is equilibrating and the state destabilizing; and, of course, that we constantly 
need to check the excesses of government, deregulate the economy and increase com-
petition. 
So if we come back to your original question, I cannot characterize contemporary 
reality in terms of its ‘economy’ and the ‘market system’. These are misleading cate-
gories to begin with. They force us into a rigid neoclassical template, block our vision 
and stifle our imagination. They make creative thinking all but impossible. If we want 
to transcend these barriers and think openly, the first thing we need to do is dispense 
with these categories altogether.  
And this is the time to do so. We live in a deep crisis, and deep crises can sometime 
lead to an intellectual renaissance. They tend to foster critical thinking, generate novel 
methods of inquiry and help us devise alternative forms of action. The Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s triggered such a revival. That crisis transformed the way we under-
stand and critique society: it gave birth to liberal ‘macro’ economics and anti-cyclical 
government policy; it rejuvenated Marxist and other streams of radical thinking in ar-
eas ranging from political economy to philosophy to literature; and, by shattering 
many of the prevailing dogmas, it allowed the mutual insemination of ideologically 
opposing approaches.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Some say that the 2007-2009 crisis was indeed a trigger for such a 
reevaluation, but are we actually seeing any real change in the way the economy is 
perceived?  
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Shimshon Bichler: I don’t think so. One would have expected a revival similar to that 
which followed the Great Depression in the current crisis, but so far the signs of such 
a revival are nowhere to be seen. A small chorus of mainstream economists such as 
Nouriel Rubini, Joseph Stilglitz and Paul Krugman have criticized their discipline. But 
besides moral indignation and contrarian predictions, their critiques offer nothing that 
is fundamentally new. The real disappointment, though, is the theoretical weakness of 
the left. During the 1930s, radical movements and organizations were energized by 
novel theories of capitalism and detailed platforms for its replacement. That isn’t the 
case today. The anti-globalization, ecology and Occupy movements lack this source 
of energy. They don’t have a new theoretical foundation to build on – and without 
such a foundation, they find it hard to develop an effective critique of capitalism, let 
alone a clear alternative that would come in its stead.  
This weakness creates a vacuum that is increasingly filled by religious and radical 
right movements. And with the global crisis ongoing and the ruling class tittering on 
the verge of panic, there is a real possibility of a massive shift to the right, not unlike 
that of the 1930s. I think that such a shift will be difficult to prevent, let alone counter-
act and reverse, without a totally new theoretical alternative. 
 
 
2.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: In light of Shimshon Bichler’s insights into the ideological role of 
economic theory, is it still relevant to talk about capital, capitalism, and capitalist cul-
ture? It sounds as if we are back in the nineteenth century. 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: I think these terms remain relevant. Our world, of course, is rather 
different from that of the nineteenth century, but it is still very much capitalistic. In 
fact, it is more capitalistic that it ever was.  
When we were growing up in the 1950s, we rarely heard words such as ‘capitalist’, 
‘capitalism’ and the ‘capitalist regime’. They sounded like anachronistic remnants of 
a bygone era. They might have been relevant to the cruel reality of Victorian England 
that Marx experienced and analysed, or to old communist propaganda banners, but 
not to the middle of the twentieth century. By the 1950s, Victorian England was a very 
distant memory, and communist parties seemed to be losing their proletarian appeal 
to the tide of rising wages. The terminology of classical political economy, having be-
come useless, sank into oblivion.  
This was the heyday of the Cold War, and the dominant ideology emphasized the 
wonders of ‘modernization’. The old colonial system was disintegrating, the Western 
welfare-warfare state was expanding, and many workers no longer lived at subsistence 
levels. Instead of the ‘class struggle’, the pundits started talking about an ‘affluent so-
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ciety’. There was no longer any need, they argued, for the dialectics of Marx’s histori-
cal materialism. The positivist path of Auguste Comte offered a much more efficient 
and just method of managing industrial society.  
It was therefore surprising to witness the recent revival of ‘capital’ and ‘capital-
ism’. The terms first reappeared in mainstream lingo after the collapse of communism 
in the late 1980s, and within less than a decade they were already commonplace in 
academic writings and popular discourse. This time around, though, they were used 
not as ideologically contestable concepts, but as part of the natural order of things. As 
Michel Houellebecq observes in The Possibility of an Island (2005), for most of those 
born into the neoliberal order, protesting layoffs or economic policy, let alone the re-
gime itself, seems as absurd as protesting weather changes or locust infestations. The 
contemporary global natives can imagine no meaningful alternative to the capitalist 
order, and the rulers know it. Their oppressive tolerance has helped assimilate the cri-
tique of capitalism into its own mass culture, as Herbert Marcuse so eloquently antic-
ipated in his One-Dimensional Man (1964).  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: So does that mean that capitalism has somehow become a mislead-
ing slogan?  
 
Jonathan Nitzan: Not at all. The term still represents the world we live in. When 
Marx invented the notion of the ‘capitalist regime’, he referred not to the narrow eco-
nomic domain or even to liberal ideology more broadly. For him, the capitalist regime 
denoted a new totalizing logic, a material-ideal system that dominates society and gov-
erns its historical trajectory. Individuals in this scheme, whether they are workers or 
capitalists, are secondary. Regardless of where they are situated in society, they all 
obey the same supreme subject: capital itself. The logic of capital affects everything. It 
dictates the nature of ownership, power and authority, it influences the technological 
process and it shapes human consciousness. It seems to me that this broad description 
of the rule of capital, a condition that Marx was the first to identify and describe, is 
more valid today than it ever was.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: So is capitalism a constant, making evolution a frivolous concept? 
In the dynamic picture of European politico-social systems you have written about 
with Bichler, is capitalism the only ‘unchangeable element’? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: What has changed, I think, and dramatically so, is the specific nature 
of capitalism. Marx’s science and the bourgeois political economy he criticized were 
creatures of their time. Both were informed by the apparent separation of the sweat-
shops, factories and ‘civil society’ of merchants and industrialists on the one hand from 
the ancient statist-political regime on the other. Both were impressed by the atomistic 
nature of capitalism, its anarchic competition, the disciplinary role of technology and 
the apparent automaticity of the system’s cyclical gyrations and long-term tendencies. 
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And both were marked by the scientific revolution from which they emerged: the de-
mand and supply of the liberals reproduced Newton’s forces of attraction and repul-
sion, while Marx’s historical laws of motion paralleled the new cosmology of the heav-
enly bodies; their equilibrium and disequilibrium tendencies replicated Newton’s du-
ality of inertia and force; and their analytical methods employed the new techniques 
of calculus, probability and statistics.  
However, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the classical por-
trayal and analysis of capitalism no longer seemed valid. There were several reasons 
for this growing mismatch. First, the rise and expansion of large organizational units 
– from big business to big government to big unions – made it difficult to speak of an 
atomistic society, let alone of its automatic regulation. Second, there emerged a whole 
slew of new processes – from total war and the permanent war economy, through 
large-scale government policies, to the growth of a ‘labour aristocracy’ and leisure 
time, corporate management, inflation and large-scale financial intermediation – that 
the classical political economists were completely unfamiliar with and that their old 
theoretical schemes could not accommodate. Third, with the rise of fascism and Na-
zism, the primacy of class and production was challenged by a new emphasis on 
masses, power, state, bureaucracy, elites and systems. And fourth, the objective/me-
chanical cosmology of the first political-scientific revolution was undermined by un-
certainty, relativity and the entanglement of subject and object. Science, including the 
science of society, was increasingly challenged by anti-scientific vitalism and postism. 
These developments resulted in a deep rupture: while capitalism has become ever 
more universal, the unified theory that once explained it has disintegrated. Bourgeois 
political economy has been divided and subdivided. Instead of a single study of capi-
talism, we now have a multitude of distinct disciplines – economics, politics, sociol-
ogy, psychology, anthropology, international relations, management, finance, culture, 
gender, communication and what not – all trying to barricade their own turf and pro-
tect their proprietary categories. The same has happened with classical Marxism: what 
once stood as a totalizing critique of capitalism has been fractured into a tripod of neo-
Marxian economics, a neo-Marxian critique of culture and neo-Marxian theories of 
the state. And if this wasn’t bad enough, in between all the cracks emerged the rapidly 
multiplying anti-science dogmas of ‘post-modernity’ that deny the possibility of a uni-
versal logic altogether.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: What would your solution be to these fragmented approaches to-
ward something that governs the very way we live, earn, spend, and accumulate? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan. I think we can no longer rely on the prevailing theories and dogmas. 
They are fractured and exhausted. If we wish to change society, we ought to embark 
on a totally new path. And the first step in that path is to revolutionize the way we 
understand capitalism. The grip of capital is universalizing, and so should our attempt 
to comprehend and counteract it be. We need theories and research methods that are 
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not disjoined and fractured, but encompassing and totalizing. And in devising these 
theories and methods, we should focus not on the world of yesterday, but on the cap-
italist reality of today and, indeed, tomorrow. 
 
 
3.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Even neoliberals agree that we need to reinvent or reinforce politi-
cal economy, as we have lost a vital link between politics and the market. So what 
should be the centrepiece of today’s political economy? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: The centrepiece is still capital, but we have to think about it in a 
totally new way. Capital is not means of production that generate hedonic pleasure as 
the liberals argue, and it is not a quantum of abstract labour as the Marxists claim. 
Rather, capital is power, and only power. 
Note the emphasis on the word ‘is’. Capital, Jonathan Nitzan and I claim, should 
be understood not in relation to or in association with power, but as power. This figura-
tive identity is very different from the conventional creed. Marxist and mainstream 
analysts often connect capital with power. They say that capital ‘affects’ power, or that 
it is ‘influenced’ by power; that power can help ‘augment’ capital, or that capital can 
‘increase’ power, etc. But these are all external relations between distinct entities. They 
speak of capital and power, whereas we talk about capital as power.  
Further, and more broadly, we argue that capitalism is best viewed not as a mode 
of production or consumption, but as a mode of power. Machines, production and con-
sumption of course are part of capitalism, and they certainly feature heavily in accu-
mulation. But the role of these entities in the process of accumulation, whatever it may 
be, is significant only insofar as it bears on power.  
To explain our argument, let me start with two basic entities: prices and capitali-
zation. Capitalism – as both liberals and Marxists recognize – is organized as a numer-
ical commodity system denominated in prices. The capitalist regime is particularly 
conducive to numerical organization because it is based on private ownership, and 
anything that can be privately owned can be priced. This basic feature means that, as 
private ownership spreads spatially and socially, price becomes the universal numeri-
cal unit with which the capitalist order is organized.  
Now, the actual pattern of this numerical order is created through capitalization. 
Capitalization, to paraphrase physicist David Bohm, is the ‘generative order’ of capi-
talism. It is the flexible, all-inclusive algorithm that continuously creorders – or creates 
the order of – capitalism.  
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Piotr Dutkiewicz: What exactly is capitalization? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: Considered most broadly, capitalization is a symbolic financial 
entity; it is the ritual that capitalists use to discount risk-adjusted expected future earn-
ings to their present value. This ritual has a very long history. It was first invented in the 
proto-capitalist bourgs of Europe during the fourteenth century, if not earlier. It over-
came religious opposition to usury in the seventeenth century to become conventional 
practice among bankers. Its mathematical formulae were first articulated by German 
foresters in the mid-nineteenth century. Its ideological and theoretical foundations were 
laid out at the turn of the twentieth century. It started to appear in textbooks around the 
1950s, giving rise to a process that contemporary experts refer to as ‘financialization’. 
And by the early twenty-first century, it has grown into the most powerful faith of all, 
with more followers than of all the world’s religions combined.  
Nowadays, capitalists – as well as everyone else – are conditioned to think of cap-
ital as capitalization, and nothing but capitalization. The ultimate question here is not 
the particular entity that the capitalist owns, but the universal worth of this entity de-
fined as a capitalized asset. 
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: And how does this mechanism of capitalization actually work? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: Take the example of a capitalist who considers buying (or selling) an 
Exxon share with expected annual earnings of $100. If the discount rate is 10%, or 0.1, 
the capitalist will capitalize the asset at $1,000 (to verify, expected earnings of $100 on a 
$1,000 investment represent an expected return of 10%, or 0.1). The expected earnings 
themselves are partly objective, partly subjective. The objective part is the actual earnings 
that will become known in the future, say $50. But the capitalist in our example expects 
$100, meaning that he or she is overly optimistic. We call this over-optimism ‘hype’, and 
this hype has a quantity – in this case, 2 (=$100/$50). If the capitalist were overly pessi-
mistic, with a hype of say ½, the expected earnings would be only $25. The discount rate 
is also made of two components: the normal rate of return – say the yield on relatively 
safe Swiss governments bonds – and a risk assessment. In our case, the normal rate of 
return may be 5%, but if Exxon is assessed to be twice as risky as Swiss government 
bonds, the discount rate will be twice as high, at 10% (=2 x 5%). 
Neoclassicists and Marxists recognize the existence of capitalization – but given 
their view that capital is a ‘real’ economic entity, they don’t quite know what to do with 
its symbolic appearance. The neoclassicists bypass the impasse by saying that, in princi-
ple, capitalization is merely the mirror image of real capital – although, in practice, this 
image gets distorted by unfortunate market imperfections. The Marxists approach the 
problem from the opposite direction. They begin by assuming that capitalization is en-
tirely fictitious – and therefore unrelated to the actual, or real capital. But, then, in order 
to sustain their labour theory of value, they also insist that, occasionally, this fiction must 
either inflate or crash into equality with real capital.  
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It seems to me that these attempts to make capitalization fit the box of real capital 
are an exercise in futility. First, as I already noted, ‘real’ capital lacks an objective quan-
tity. And, second, the very separation of economics from politics – a separation that is 
necessary to make such objectivity possible in the first place – has become defunct. 
And, indeed, capitalization is hardly limited to the so-called economic sphere.  
Every stream of expected income is a candidate for capitalization. And since in-
come streams are generated by social entities, processes, organizations and institu-
tions, we end up with capitalization discounting not the so-called sphere of economics, 
but potentially every aspect of society. Human life, including its social habits and its 
genetic code, is routinely capitalized. Institutions – from education and entertainment 
to religion and the law – are habitually capitalized. Voluntary social networks, urban 
violence, civil war and international conflict are regularly capitalized. Even the envi-
ronmental future of humanity is capitalized. Nothing escapes the eyes of the dis-
counters. If it generates expected future income, it can be capitalized, and whatever 
can be capitalized sooner or later is capitalized.  
The encompassing nature of capitalization calls for an encompassing theory, and 
the unifying basis for such a theory is power. The primacy of power is built right into 
the definition of private ownership. Note that the English word ‘private’ comes from 
the Latin privatus, which means ‘restricted’. In this sense, private ownership is wholly 
and only an institution of exclusion, and institutionalized exclusion is a matter of orga-
nized power.  
Of course, exclusion does not have to be exercised. What matters here are the right 
to exclude and the ability to exact pecuniary terms for not exercising that right. This right 
and ability are the foundations of accumulation.  
Capital, then, is nothing other than organized power. This power has two sides: 
one qualitative, the other quantitative. The qualitative side comprises the institutions, 
processes and conflicts through which capitalists constantly creorder society, shaping and 
restricting its trajectory in order to achieve their redistributive ends. The quantitative side 
is the process that integrates, reduces and distils these numerous qualitative processes 
down to the universal magnitude of capitalization.  
 
 
4.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Let me raise a very broad question: What is power? Can power be 
an economic force? What is the link between power and capital? We are used to think-
ing about capital as an exclusively economic category, but you seem to understand it 
differently. How exactly do you understand it? What are the more practical conse-
quences of your approach to understanding current economic-cum-political systems? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan. As Hegel tells us in The Phenomenology of Mind (1807) and elsewhere, 
and as Max Jammer shows in his Concepts of Force (1957), power is not a thing in itself. 
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It is a relationship between things. Consequently, power cannot be observed as such. We 
know it only indirectly, through its effects. In religion, the power of the gods is revealed 
through their alleged deeds and miracles, while in science power is revealed through its 
measureable consequences. We know of gravity not by observing it directly, but by meas-
uring the quantitative relationship between mass and acceleration. Similarly with capital 
as power: we know the power of owners indirectly, by the numerical magnitude of their 
capitalization and the way in which it creorders society.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: And how does capitalist power creorder society? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: To answer this question, we first need to make a distinction between 
the creative/productive potential of society – the sphere that the American political econ-
omist Thorstein Veblen called industry – and the realm of power that, in the capitalist 
epoch, increasingly takes the form of business. This distinction is crucial not least be-
cause it goes counter to the conventional creed: in common parlance, industry and busi-
ness are synonyms, whereas for Veblen they were antonyms. 
Using as a metaphor the concept of physicist Denis Gabor, we can think of the social 
process as a giant hologram, a space crisscrossed with incidental waves. Each social ac-
tion – whether an act of industry or of business – is an event, an occurrence that generates 
vibrations throughout the social space. However, there is a fundamental difference be-
tween the vibrations of industry and the vibrations of business. Industry, understood as 
the collective knowledge and creative effort of humanity, is inherently cooperative, inte-
grated and synchronized. It operates best when its various events resonate with each 
other. Business, in contrast, isn’t collective; it’s private. Its goals are achieved through 
the threat and exercise of systemic prevention and restriction – that is, through what 
Veblen called strategic sabotage. The key object of this sabotage is the resonating pulses 
of industry – a resonance that business constantly upsets through built-in dissonance.  
Business sabotage affects both the direction and pace of industry. The impact on the 
direction of industry is so prevalent that we often don’t see it. The most obvious effect is 
the progressive subjugation of billions of minds and bodies to the single-minded Moloch 
of profit-making and the consequent stifling of individual and societal creativity. And 
that is just the beginning. Consider the following examples: the systematic destruction 
of public transportation in the United States and elsewhere in favour of the ecologically 
disastrous private automobile; the development by pharmaceutical companies of expen-
sive remedies for concocted ‘medical conditions’ instead of drugs to cure real diseases 
that mostly afflict those who are too poor to pay for treatment; the promotion by global 
conglomerates of junk food in lieu of a healthy diet; the imposition of intellectual prop-
erty rights on societal knowledge instead of the free diffusion of such knowledge; the 
invention by high-tech companies of weapon technologies instead of alternative clean 
and renewable energies; the development by chemical and bio-technology corporations 
of one-size-fits-all genetically modified plants and animals instead of bio-diversified 
ones; the forced expansion by governments and realtors of socially fractured suburban 
   
Capitalism as a Mode of Power | 223 
sprawl instead of participatory and sustainable urbanization; the development by televi-
sion networks of lowest-common-denominator programming that sedates the mind ra-
ther than stimulates its critical faculties; the list goes on.  
These and similar diversions permeate the entire structure of capitalism. They can 
be seen everywhere – that is, provided we are willing take off our neoclassical blinkers. 
And if we accounted for them all, we would have to conclude that a significant propor-
tion of business-driven ‘growth’ is wasteful, not to say destructive, and that the sabotage 
that underlies this waste and destruction is exactly what makes it so profitable.  
The other form of business sabotage is the impact it has on the pace of industry. 
Conventional political economy, both neoclassical and Marxist, postulates a positive re-
lationship between production and profit. Capitalists, the argument goes, benefit from 
industrial activity and, therefore, the more fully employed their equipment and workers, 
the greater their profit. But if we think of capital as power, exercised through the strategic 
sabotage of industry by business, the relationship should be nonlinear – positive under 
certain circumstances, negative under others.  
And that is exactly what the historical data tell us. In the United States, Great Britain 
and Canada, for example, the share of capitalists in national income (measured by profit 
plus interest) has tended to rise as growth accelerated and the rate of unemployment 
declined – but only up to a point. After that point, rising growth and declining unem-
ployment – in other words, less sabotage – have tended not to increase but to reduce the 
income share of capitalists!  
The case of the United States is illustrative. In the 1930s, when the sabotage of in-
dustry by business was extreme and official unemployment hovered around 25%, the 
share of capitalists in national income stood at around 11%. Then came the Second 
World War, employment and production soared, and the income share of capitalists 
rose to nearly 16%. But that was the peak. As the war effort continued, business sabotage 
of industry was almost eliminated and unemployment fell to less than 2%. However, the 
share of capital in national income, instead of rising as conventional political economy 
would have predicted, dropped sharply, reaching a low of 12%, barely above its depres-
sion level. This situation was obviously unacceptable to capitalists; so after the war, sab-
otage was reinstated, unemployment rose to between 5 and 7%, and capitalists’ share in 
national income soared to an all-time high of nearly 19%. It seems that ‘business as usual’ 
(high capitalist income) and the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ (the strategic level of 
industrial sabotage) are two sides of the same capitalist coin. Perhaps this combination 
is what economists have in mind when they speak about equilibrium.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Can you further concretize the notion of capital as power? How is 
this concept related to what economists call ‘profit maximization’? What does it tell us 
that standard economics and other social sciences do not? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: Power is never absolute; it’s always relative. For this reason, 
Shimshon Bichler and I argue, both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of capital 
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accumulation have to be assessed differentially, relative to other capitals. Contrary to 
the claims of conventional economics, capitalists are driven not to maximize profit, 
but to ‘beat the average’ and ‘exceed the normal rate of return’. Their entire existence 
is conditioned by the need to outperform, by the imperative to achieve not absolute 
accumulation, but differential accumulation. And this differential drive is crucial: to beat 
the average means to accumulate faster than others; and since the relative magnitude 
of capital represents power, capitalists who accumulate differentially increase their 
power – that is, their broad strategic capacity to inflict sabotage. 
The centrality of differential accumulation, we claim, means that in analyzing ac-
cumulation we should focus not only on capital in general, but also – and perhaps 
more so – on dominant capital in particular: that is, on the leading corporate-govern-
mental alliances whose differential accumulation has gradually been placed at the cen-
ter of the political economy.  
The importance of this process can be illustrated by the recent history of the United 
States. Over the past half century or so, differential accumulation by U.S. dominant 
capital has advanced in leaps and bounds. In 1950, the average net profit per firm 
among the top 100 U.S.-incorporated companies was roughly 1,600 times larger than 
the average net profit per firm in the U.S. business sector as a whole; by 2010, this 
multiple was fourteen-fold larger, at over 23,000!  
This massive increase in differential accumulation quantifies the growing power 
of U.S. dominant capital; the other side of this trend is the qualitative power processes 
that differential accumulation quantifies and distils into a single magnitude. Much of 
our work over the past three decades has been devoted to examining this quantitative-
qualitative underpinning of power, in the United States and elsewhere.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Can you illustrate this type of analysis? How do its conclusions 
differ from those of conventional social science?  
 
Jonathan Nitzan: Let me take an example from the work Shimshon Bichler and I did 
on the global political economy of the Middle East. Figure 1 depicts the differential 
performance of the world’s six leading privately owned oil companies relative to the 
Fortune 500 benchmark. Each bar in the figure shows the extent to which the oil com-
panies’ rate of return on equity exceeded or fell short of the Fortune 500 average. The 
gray bars show positive differential accumulation – i.e. the percent by which the oil 
companies exceeded the Fortune 500 average. The black bars show negative differen-
tial accumulation; that is, the percent by which the oil companies trailed the average. 
Finally, the explosion signs in the chart show the occurrences of ‘energy conflicts’ – a 
term we use to denote regional energy-related wars.  
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Figure 1 
The Petro-Core’s Differential Accumulation 
and Middle East ‘Energy Conflicts’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential 
return on equity is the difference between the return on equity of the 
Petro-Core and the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on 
equity of the Fortune 500. For 1992-3, data for Fortune 500 companies 
are reported without SFAS 106 special charges. 
  
NOTE. The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 
1998), Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 
1999), Mobil (till 1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). 
Company changes are due to merger. The Energy Conflicts include: the 
1967 Arab-Israel war, the 1973 Arab-Israel war, the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, the 1979 first Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1979 Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, the 1982 second Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, the 1990-1 first Gulf War, the 2000 second 
Palestinian Intifada, the 2001-2 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the 
launching of the ‘War on Terror’ and the 2002-3 second Gulf War. 
 
SOURCE: Fortune; Standard & Poor’s Compustat. 
 
Now, conventional economics has no interest in the differential profits of the oil 
companies, and it certainly has nothing to say about the relationship between these 
differential profits and regional wars. Differential profit is perhaps of some interest to 
financial analysts. Middle East wars, in contrast, are the business of international re-
lations experts and security analysts. And since each of these phenomena belongs to a 
completely separate sphere of society, no one has ever considered linking them in the 
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first place. And yet, as it turns out, these phenomena are not simply linked. In fact, 
they could be thought of as two sides of the very same process – namely, the global 
accumulation of capital as power.  
To get a sense of this process, consider the following relationships evident in the 
chart. First, every energy conflict was preceded by the large oil companies trailing the 
average. In other words, for an energy conflict to erupt, the oil companies first had to 
differentially decumulate – a most unusual prerequisite from the viewpoint of any social 
science.  
Second, every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies beating the aver-
age. In other words, war and conflict in the region – processes that social scientists 
customarily blame for ‘distorting’ the aggregate economy – have served the differential 
interest of certain key firms at the expense of other key firms.  
Third and finally, with one exception, in 1996-7, the oil companies never managed 
to beat the average without there first being an energy conflict in the region. In other 
words, the differential performance of the oil companies depended not on production, 
but on the most extreme form of sabotage: war.  
It seems to me that these relationships, and the conclusions they give rise to, are 
nothing short of remarkable. First, the likelihood that all three patterns are the conse-
quence of a statistical fluke is negligible; there must be something very substantive 
behind the connection of Middle East wars and global differential profits. Second, 
these relationships seamlessly fuse quality and quantity. In our research on the subject, 
we have shown how the qualitative aspects of international relations, superpower con-
frontation, regional conflicts and the activity of the oil companies on the one hand, 
can both explain and be explained by the quantitative global process of capital accu-
mulation on the other. And, third, all three relationships have remained stable for half 
a century, allowing us to predict, in writing and before the events, both the first and 
second Gulf Wars.3 This stability tells us that the patterns of capital as power – alt-
hough subject to historical change from within society – are anything but haphazard. 
 
 
5.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Let’s turn to the economic downturn of 2008–9. We used to hear 
that it is natural, after the boom like the one we had in the past twenty years, to have 
a downturn. Given the supposedly cyclical nature of the market system, we should 
theoretically not worry. But from consumers to bankers, we are all worried. So what 
is different now? 
 
3 The first Gulf War (1990-91) was predicted in Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan (1989: Section 2.3). 
The second Gulf War (2002-) was predicted in Bichler and Nitzan (1996: Section 8).  
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Shimshon Bichler: In light of what was said so far, I think that what we are experi-
encing now is not an ‘economic downturn’, or even an ‘economic crisis’, but a systemic 
crisis: a crisis that threatens the very existence of the capitalist mode of power. This 
crisis has been lingering for more than a decade. It started not in 2008, as most observ-
ers argue, but in 2000, and it shows no sign of abating. 
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Can you further clarify what you mean by ‘systemic crisis’? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: Let me take for a moment the viewpoint of the capitalists. As they 
see it, the key barometer of success and failure is not the growth of production or the 
level of employment, but the movements of the stock market. The stock market capi-
talizes their expected future earnings – and by so doing distils and reduces their collec-
tive view on the future of capitalism down to a single number.  
Now, if we examine the history of the U.S. stock market, measured by the 
S&P 500 price index, we see that, over the past century or so, capitalists were besieged 
by four ‘major bear markets’. Each of these major bear markets was characterized by 
a massive drop in prices, ranging between 50% and 70% in ‘constant dollars’. Note, 
however, that these declines, although roughly similar in quantity, were very different 
in quality. Each of them signalled a major – and unique – creordering of capitalist 
power:  
 
1. The crisis of 1906-1920 (–70%) marked the closing of the American frontier, the 
shift from robber-baron capitalism to large-scale business enterprise and the begin-
ning of synchronized finance.  
 
2. The crisis of 1929–1948 (–56%) signaled the end of ‘unregulated’ capitalism and 
the emergence of large governments and the welfare-warfare state.  
 
3. The crisis of 1969–1981 (–55%) marked the closing of the Keynesian era, the re-
sumption of worldwide capital flows and the onset of neoliberal globalization.  
 
4. And the current crisis – which, as I noted, began not in 2008, but in 2000, and is 
still ongoing (–50% from 2000 to 2009) – seems to mark yet another shift toward 
a different form of capitalist power, or perhaps a shift away from capitalist power 
altogether.  
 
The current crisis is marked by systemic fear. Capitalists today are not just uncertain 
or worried; they are scared. Their apprehension is not about this or that aspect of cap-
italism, but about capitalism’s very existence. Many of them now fear that the capital-
ist order itself may not survive, at least not in its current form.  
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Piotr Dutkiewicz: What indication do we have that capitalists suffer from ‘systemic 
fear’? 
 
Shimshon Bichler: A key gauge of this systemic fear is the way in which capitalists 
price their equities. The capitalization ritual is unambiguous: it instructs capitalists to 
discount not the current level of profit, but its estimated long-term trajectory. So, under 
normal circumstances, changes in stock prices should show little or no direct correla-
tion with changes in current profit – and, indeed, they usually don’t. But periods of 
systemic fear are anything but normal. During such periods, capitalists doubt the sur-
vival of their system, and that doubt makes them lose sight of its future; with the cap-
italist future having become opaque, the ‘long-term profit trend’ loses its meaning; and 
with no estimates of long-term profits, capitalists are left with nothing to discount.  
In a capitalized world, the inability to capitalize is a mortal threat. So capitalists, 
desperate for something to hang on to, abandon their sanctified reliance on the ex-
pected future and latch onto the present. Numbed by systemic fear, they discount not 
the eternal long-term trend of profit, but its day-to-day variations. And that is exactly 
what we observe in the current crisis: since 2000, equity prices, instead of moving in-
dependently of current profits, have tracked those profits remarkably closely.  
This type of panic-driven breakdown is not unprecedented, though. It also hap-
pened in the 1930s. Much like today, capitalists in the 1930s were struck by systemic 
fear; and much like today, they abandoned the capitalization ritual. Moreover, and 
crucially, the reason for the breakdown was pretty much the same: in both periods, 
capitalist power had become so great that capitalists lost confidence that they could 
retain that power, let alone increase it. 
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: This claim seems counterintuitive: shouldn’t capitalists be more 
confident the more powerful they become? 
 
Shimshon Bichler. Only up to a point. Capitalist power is distributional, measured by 
relative capitalization, so a capitalist group with $300 billion in net assets is three times 
as powerful as a group with only $100 billion. Now, in beating the average and ex-
ceeding the normal rate of return, dominant capital accumulates differentially; and 
since capital is distributional power, differential accumulation is the augmentation of 
distributional power. Distributional power, though, is clearly bounded. No group of 
capitalists, no matter how sophisticated and ruthless, can ever own more than every-
thing there is to own in society. Moreover, in practice, capitalist power is likely to stall 
long before it reaches this upper limit. 
The reason is rooted in the conflictual dynamics of power. Capitalists cannot stop 
seeking more power: since capital is power, the drive to accumulate is a drive for more 
power, by definition. But that very quest for power generates its own barriers. Power 
hinges on the use of force and sabotage, so the closer capitalist power gets to its limit, 
the greater the resistance this force and sabotage elicit; the greater that resistance, the 
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more difficult it is for those who hold power to increase it further; the more difficult it 
is to increase power, the greater the need for even more force and sabotage; and the 
more force and sabotage, the higher the likelihood of a serious backlash, followed by 
a decline or even disintegration of power.  
It is at this latter point, when power approaches its societal ‘asymptotes’, that cap-
italists are likely to be struck by systemic fear – the fear that the power structure, having 
become top heavy, is about to cave in. And it is at this critical moment, when capital-
ists fear for the very survival of their system, that their forward-looking capitalization 
is most prone to collapse.  
In the United States, this type of collapse was trigged first in 1929, and then again 
in 2000. As we’ve shown in our work, in both cases the period preceding the collapse 
was marked by distributional extremes: both in the late 1920s and in the 2000s, the top 
10% of the U.S. population controlled nearly half the income. However, it is worth 
noting that the underlying inequalities today are probably greater than they were dur-
ing the 1920s. To illustrate, by 2010, the national income share of capitalists (interest 
and profit), of after-tax profit, and of the net profits of the top 0.1% of all corporations 
(a proxy for dominant capital) were all at record highs, exceeding anything recorded 
since 1929, the first year for which full national income data are available.  
In order to increase and sustain this type of differential accumulation-cum-power, 
dominant capital has had to inflict more and more threats, sabotage and anguish on 
the underlying population. This damage has taken numerous forms, one of the most 
striking of which is shown in Figure 2.  
The solid line, plotted against the left scale, depicts the income share of the top 
10% of the U.S. population. The dashed line, plotted against the right scale, measures 
the ratio between the adult ‘correctional population’ and the labour force (the correc-
tional population includes the number of adults in prison, in jail, on probation and on 
parole).  
Although there are no hard and fast rules here, it is doubtful that this massive 
punishment can be increased much further without highly destabilizing consequences. 
And yet, the logic of differential accumulation dictates that redistribution and the ac-
companied increase in sabotage must continue. This clash between the imperatives of 
capital as power and the instability it engenders explains why leading capitalists have 
been struck by systemic fear. Peering into the future, they realize that the only way to 
further increase their distributional power is to apply an even greater dose of violence. 
Yet, given the high level of force already being exerted, and given that the exertion of 
even greater force may bring about heightened resistance, they are increasingly fearful 
of the backlash they are about to unleash. The closer they get to the asymptote, the 
bleaker the future they see. 
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Figure 2 
The Underlying Magma:  
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population vs. 
the Correctional Population as a Share of the Labour Force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, 
by computing the average ratio between the total correctional popula-
tion and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 
1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year the num-
ber of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last data 
points are 2008 for the Income Share of the Top 10% of the Population 
and 2010 for the Correctional Population.  
 
SOURCE: The income share of the top 10% of the population is from 
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, ‘Income Inequality in the 
United States, 1913-2002’, Monograph, 2004, pp. 1-92. Updated till 
2008 from http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2008.xls; 
data sheet: data-Figure1 (retrieved on February 7, 2011). Data on the 
correctional population are from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Sta-
tistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 (http://www.al-
bany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 1980 onward: Table 
6.1.2010 (http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv). 
Civilian labor-force data till 1947 are from the Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (se-
ries code: Ba470); from 1948 onward, the data are from the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce through Global Insight (series code: LFC). 
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6. 
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: What next for power, capital and the market? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: To answer this question, we need a new – and very different – re-
search institute.  
To re-search means to search again, and that is exactly what the current theoreti-
cal-ideological impasse calls for. As we have reiterated throughout this interview, the 
existing approaches to capitalism – liberal and Marxist – have run their course. They 
rely on the wrong assumptions; they use fictitious building blocks; they employ mis-
leading categories, concepts and research methods; and most importantly, they often 
ask the wrong questions. They lead us to a dead end.  
Capitalism is not a mode of production and consumption. It is a mode of power. 
And in order for us to transcend this mode of power, we first need to properly under-
stand its structure, development and crises. In short, we need a cosmology of capitalist 
power.  
Such a cosmology, though, cannot be concocted out of thin air. A new cosmology 
emerges not from the self-organization of Platonic ideas, but from the relentless empir-
ical inquiries of flesh-and-blood researchers. The detailed empirical investigations of 
these researchers yield new evidence and novel regularities; the new evidence and reg-
ularities undermine and eventually shatter the old dogma; and with the old dogma 
having been debunked, the door is open for a new system of assumptions, concepts, 
questions and theories.  
This is how modern science was born in the sixteenth century. It emerged not from 
re-idealizing religion or revamping moral theory, but from empirical research. It was 
the celestial observations of Copernicus, Tyco Brahe, Johannes Kepler and Galileo 
Galilei, the hands-on surgical procedures of Andreas Vesalius, the discovery of sys-
temic circulation by William Harvey, the chemical experiments of Richard Boyle and 
the detailed analysis of magnetism by William Gilbert, among others, that helped un-
dermine the old dogma. And it was this empirical research that eventually gave birth 
to a novel method of inquiry we now call science. ‘There is no empirical method with-
out speculative concepts and systems’, says Albert Einstein, but also, ‘there is no spec-
ulative thinking whose concepts do not reveal, on closer investigation, the empirical 
methods from which they stem’.4 
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: Can you illustrate this theoretical-empirical duality in the study of 
political economy? 
 
4 Albert Einstein, Foreword to Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems – 
Ptolemaic & Copernican (1632: xxviii).  
   
                                                        
 
 
 
232 | Capitalism as a Mode of Power  
Jonathan Nitzan. Certainly. Take the Keynesian Revolution of the late 1930s. Alt-
hough Keynes and his followers retained the Newtonian determinism of neoclassical 
economics (utility-maximizing agents, individual rationality, perfect competition, 
etc.), their framework nonetheless undermined basic tenets of bourgeois orthodoxy. It 
separated the macro sphere of government and state from the micro world of consum-
ers and producers, it offered different ethics for private and public management, and it 
allowed – and indeed called for – stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies by govern-
ments.  
However, even this limited bourgeois revolution would have been impossible, in-
deed inconceivable, without a prior empirical-statistical basis – in this case, the prior 
development of systematic national accounting. The first steps in that direction were 
taken at the end of the nineteenth century in Europe, the United States and other coun-
tries, and they culminated in the 1920 foundation of the U.S. National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) and the official publication of the country’s first national ac-
counts in 1934. Without this emergent empirical picture of national aggregates, it is 
doubtful that Keynes could have imagined a distinct ‘macro’ perspective, let alone a 
theory that related its underlying flows and stocks.  
 
Piotr Dutkiewicz: What does that mean for radical students of society in general and 
for the study of the capitalist mode of power in particular? 
 
Jonathan Nitzan. In order for us to develop – and negate – the cosmology of capitalist 
power, we too need an empirical infrastructure; and that infrastructure is yet to be 
created. The importance of such infrastructure for radical undertakings can be gleaned 
from the evolution of twentieth-century Marxism. When Lenin wrote his book Impe-
rialism (1917), the data on which he based his argument were meagre and fractured. 
There were no organized statistics, no time series and no aggregate facts to speak of. 
Much of his evidence was drawn from works published twenty years earlier by the left-
liberal political economist John Hobson. The situation was quite different half a cen-
tury later. In 1966, when American Marxists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy published 
their Monopoly Capital (1966), systems of national accounts had already been imple-
mented, primarily in the developed countries, and aggregate data analysis had become 
increasingly commonplace. This new infrastructure enabled Baran and Sweezy to en-
list the help of Joseph D. Phillips, a statistical expert who subjected their thesis to sys-
tematic empirical examination. The result, published in the famous appendix to their 
book, was an empirical feat that Lenin could not even have fathomed. And yet, even 
Baran and Sweezy had to restrict their analysis to the United States, and particularly 
to its macro economy: national accounting was still far less developed in the rest of the 
world; organized statistics for corporations and financial intermediation were still in 
their infancy; and global databases were not yet on the radar screen. It was only in the 
1980s, with the transnationalization of capital and the advent of cheap computing, that 
a global statistical picture, however imperfect, became a practical possibility. 
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These new data and the relative ease with which they can be accessed through the 
internet offer research opportunities that earlier critical thinkers could only dream of. 
However, I think we need to bear in mind that these databases have been conceived 
and developed to serve the capitalist mode of power, not to undermine it. They are 
geared toward the interests of accumulation, and, as such, they reflect the assumptions, 
categories, methods and theories of neoclassical economics – the ruling ideology of 
the accumulators. This fact serves to explain why Marxists have found it increasingly 
difficult to distance their empirical analyses from those of their class enemy. Having 
failed to develop their own statistical methods and corresponding data, they have grad-
ually been forced to use those of the neoclassicists. And by using these methods and 
data, they ended up, often without noticing that they were doing so, validating the 
very approach they seek to reject.  
We need to get rid of all this baggage. To be radical means to go to the root, to 
start from scratch. We need to develop new questions, new method, new categories, 
new data and, finally, an entirely new mode of accounting. We need to re-draw the 
capitalist map in a manner that will uncover and depict the logic and reality of capi-
talist power. We need to measure the aggregate and differential manifestations of this 
power in different regions, countries and sectors and at different levels of analysis. We 
need to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses of that power, so that we can 
know how to resist and overturn it. And to do all of that, we need to revolutionize the 
way we think, interrogate and investigate.  
This kind of revolution demands an organizational Ctrl-Alt-Del. It requires a new, 
autonomous research institute – a non-academic scientific organization that will be inde-
pendent of neoclassicism, Marxism and postism. The purpose of this research for-
mation will be to lay the empirical-theoretical groundwork for a new cosmology of the 
capitalist mode of power, as well as a counter cosmology to help us creorder a humane 
alternative.  
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1 This eulogy was first posted on The Bichler and Nitzan Archives in Hebrew (Bichler and Nitzan 
2013a) and English (Bichler and Nitzan 2013b). 
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It is recommended to copy, duplicate, photograph, record, translate, store in a 
knowledge base and distribute this eulogy, in whole or in part, in any form 
and by any means, electronic, optic or mechanical, without permission from 
the authors, on condition that the publication not be for profit and that its title 
and authors be mentioned in the citation.  
 
In the spirit of Akiva (Aki) Orr, 1931−2013 
 
Aki, a man enamoured with life and enchanted by animals – including humans of 
different varieties – pays a visit to his friend, the veterinarian. The vet tells him of two 
seniors who suffer from depression, and Aki is quick to raise their low spirits and warm 
up their aching bodies. He hangs the boa constrictor on his neck and places the hairy 
tarantula on his head. There is no need to worry, he assures us. After all, why would 
two elderly creatures hurt an empathetic being so eager to help them? 
This view was typical of Aki. That is how he viewed the world, its history and 
conflicts – as well as the solutions for those conflicts.  
‘Just think about it logically’, he says. ‘Why would a Palestinian suddenly turn 
into a “terrorist”? What reason does he have to oppose “peace”? Why should he be 
eager to fight the “only democracy in the Middle East”? Is it his culture, religion or 
race? Is it “in his nature”, as the Zionist propaganda machine reiterates?’ 
Of course not, he answers.  
For more than a century, the Palestinians have confronted a Zionist movement 
whose colonial policies have gradually deprived them of their life, land and autonomy. 
As often happens with occupiers, the Israelis have preferred to blame their victim. 
Their fancy academic theories, spiced up with ideologies of culture, religion and race, 
prove, at least to themselves, that there can be no ‘political solution’. The ‘Arabs’, they 
say, cannot be trusted. Like the boa constrictor and tarantula, it is ‘their nature’ to bite 
and strangle.2  
Nowadays, these explanations have no traction. Most sensible observers around 
the world have come to accept Aki’s logic and reject the official Israeli line as self-
serving, if not ludicrous. But that wasn’t always the case.  
Half a century ago, when Aki and his friends started their hazardous journey to 
explore the underlying logic of the conflict, they were considered illogical, if not weird, 
and branded as ‘traitors’ (although it was never clear exactly what or who they had 
‘betrayed’).  
 
 
  
2 Alternative to a Psychotic State (Orr 2010). 
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The Other Logic 
 
One day, Aki had his new car hijacked by two Palestinian teenagers. He was backing 
up into his parking spot, when one of the teens pretended to have been hurt by the 
automobile’s back bumper. Aki hurried out to assist the ‘injured’ boy – and as he 
stepped out of the car, the two thieves jumped into the vehicle, racing it toward the 
‘slaughter houses’ of the nearby Palestinian town of Taibe to be dismembered and sold 
for parts. 
Aki didn’t seem particularly worried about his stolen car (which, incidentally, he 
had just bought and hadn’t yet insured). His real concern was the two juvenile robbers. 
The Zionist occupation, he said, had left them out of the loop. It limited their land and 
restricted their access to water. It undermined their education. It barred them from the 
formal labour market and made it difficult for them to secure legal employment. They 
existed on the slippery margins of the food chain. What options, other than high-risk 
petty theft, did they have? 
For Aki, the world seemed straightforward. Nature and society, he thought, are 
logically ordered, usually in a fairly simple way. The rulers constantly try to conceal 
this simplicity. By manipulating knowledge, controlling the prevailing ideologies and 
dominating mass communications, they trick human consciousness and distort reality. 
But they can do so only for a while. Over the longer haul, the human quest for clarity, 
consistency and meaning is much stronger. Manipulation collapses and enlightenment 
prevails.  
Aki was firmly wedded to this view. Contemporary postists dismiss this view as 
antiquated, but Aki wouldn’t even dream of changing it. He was an ‘enlightened 
modernist’: rationalist, humane, without a shred of cynicism or a trace of hypocrisy. 
In this sense, his approach resembled Leibnitz’s – although one could also see it as a 
variation on Candide.  
As an enlightened rationalist, he was keenly interested in the history of ideas, both 
cosmological and political. One of his preoccupations was the Russian Revolution: 
why did it fail? He delved into Communist Party minutes from the 1920s, along with 
other discussions and debates, hoping to find in them clues to the riddle.3 
The conventional explanations didn’t satisfy him. According to one prevailing 
view, the revolution is best seen as a glorified gang war. The Stalin gang happened to 
be more focused and ruthless than its opponents, and it was this practical superiority 
– and not any ideological advantage – that helped it win the spoils and mislead 
Western intellectuals for years to come.  
Aki considered such views simplistic and partial. He didn’t fancy one-sided 
accounts. These may be appropriate for TV series or Hollywood movies whose 
individual heroes are never allowed political goals other than wealth and power. But 
in history, said Aki, especially over the longer haul, it is the ideas that matter. When 
3 Revolution, the D.I.Y Version (20th Century World Politics – and Their Consequences) (Orr n.d.-b: 
Chs. 7-8). 
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you examine history logically, you see a never-ending clash between the forces of 
reason and the forces of chaos. Even what we normally think of as ‘conflicts of interest’ 
and ‘struggles for power’ eventually manifest themselves as opposing theories, 
ideologies and doctrines.  
Aki’s analysis of the Cultural Revolution in China was no different. In his eyes, it 
was not a gang war between Mao and the established oligarchies, but an ideological 
struggle over the future of Chinese socialism. And the same was true for U.S. foreign 
policy in the twentieth century. For Aki, this policy was much more than a simple 
reflection of capital accumulation and the shifting strategies of domestic and 
multinational corporations. 
A few years ago, we noticed that he had started reading books on American 
politics in the 1950s. In the beginning, we couldn’t figure out this new obsession. He 
devoured scores of strange manuscripts, all packed with archaic details. And then it 
dawned on us: he wanted to convince himself that the Stalinist version of ‘historical 
materialism’, a doctrine he absorbed in the 1950s as a member of MAKI (the Israeli 
Communist Party), was in fact shallow and flawed. He tried to endow American 
political culture with a measure of autonomy, to show that it was not completely 
subservient to ‘economic interests’ and the ‘dictates of capital’. The political 
functionaries, military officials, ideologues and managers who conducted the Cold 
War, he said, were not economic automatons. They were driven by prejudice, 
influenced by ideologies and hamstrung by intellectual blindness. More often than not, 
their political activity had little or nothing to do with the so-called ‘objective-material’ 
reality of production and accumulation.  
 The same logic was applied to the emergence of the Greek polis, a socio-political 
order that emerged together with and fused philosophy, mathematics and democracy.4 
Aki didn’t like the conventional explanations of this fusion. For him, the polis was 
something else. It was radically different from any of the monarchies, oligarchies, 
dictatorship and tyrannies that dominated the ancient East. And that radical difference 
could not easily be accounted for by the so-called ‘objective circumstances’. Academic 
sociologists and historians often point to Greece’s mountainous terrain, its geopolitical 
setting and special technological conditions as factors that presumably helped it escape 
the oppression, violence and religious intolerance of so-called oriental despotism. 
Aki rejected this view. In his opinion, the Greek polis was like the square root of 
two: something that emerges, suddenly and without warning, to defy and crack the all-
encompassing logic around it.5 There was no ‘external determinism’ here. Taken 
together, the evolution of logical dialogue and collective decision-making, and the 
discussions and debates on the good life and the encompassing participation, enabled 
democratic forms of thinking. They gave rise to pure mathematics, logic, philosophy, 
4 Aki’s views on this subject were inspired by his mentor and friend Cornelius Castoriadis, a 
former Trotskyite, philosopher, political economist and psychoalnalyst who lived in Paris. 
5 On the creative role of discontinuities and leaps in cosmology and society, see From Protest to 
Revolution (Orr 2004: 27-29) and Enlightening Disillusionment (Orr 2011: 49-51). 
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history, theatre, academia and humane public education. And these democratic forms 
of thinking in turn nourished, sustained and gave meaning to a self-conscious social 
order – the Greek polis.6 
 
 
The Hidden Factor 
    
These were not mere metaphysical protestations, but engagements with a practical 
problem. Often it seemed to us that Aki was trying to develop an alternative 
conception of history, a theory that would be simple, logical and – most importantly – 
useful. This was the purpose of Marxism-Leninism, he said. Its goal was not merely 
to decipher exploitation and alienation, but to provide a way out, to help us plan the 
good life. If a political theory offers no solutions, he asked, why have it in the first 
place? 
This is also how he saw the 1962 foundation of MATZPEN (The Socialist 
Organization in Israel): the purpose of the organization was not protestation, but 
revolution. In the 1960s, MATZPEN’s radical politics were a complete novelty in the 
otherwise tightly controlled Israeli ‘consensus’. Most treated the organization as an 
oddity, but for its members MATZPEN was a movement with a solution to a problem: 
the problem was the intensifying Arab-Israeli conflict, and the solution was socialism 
in Israel and the region.  
But in order to bring about this solution, Aki and his friends told themselves and 
others, we must first explore, fearlessly and without inhibition, the root causes of our 
reality. We need to study the historical underpinnings of Zionism and imperialism in 
the region, to rethink the official story, to search for what the dominant ideology seeks 
to hide.  
And sure enough, they found it. Their inquiry led to the introduction of a totally 
new factor into the political equation: the Palestinians.  
Until then, the Palestinians were a non-entity. Having been marginalized and 
concealed by the official Zionist historiography, they were entirely absent from the 
Israeli consensus. MATZPEN was the first to make them part of the equation. And 
the initial step in that direction was made in Peace, Peace and No Peace, a book that Aki 
co-authored with Moshé Machover in 1961.7  
For Aki, the discovery of the Palestinians was a logical solution to a political 
puzzle: Why had Israel assisted the declining powers of France and Britain in their 
1956 attack on the Suez Canal? The difficulty was that, only a decade earlier, Britain 
was still being accused by the Israeli government of fomenting conflicts in the region 
6 See The Original Philosophy and the True Democracy (Orr n.d.-a). This book offers Hebrew trans-
lations from and commentary on the writings of Cornelius Castoriadis by Aki and friends.  
7 The second Hebrew edition was issued in 1999; the English version of the second edition, 
translated by Mark Marshall, appeared in 2009. 
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and was considered, even by leading Zionist officials, as the country’s archenemy. So 
why had the tables suddenly turned to make Israel Britain’s allay? 
 
Originally Machover and I thought that Zionism’s foreign policy stemmed 
from its support for the capitalist system. . . . As Communists, we thought that 
it was Zionism’s opposition to socialism and its support for capitalism and 
colonialism that placed it on the path of conflict with the peoples of the 
countries colonized by the colonial powers. That explained Israel’s 
participation [in the 1956 Suez War], and Israel’s support for the United 
States in the Korean War (1950-1953), and Israeli support for French rule in 
Algeria and Vietnam, and many other Israeli policies. . . . (Orr 2011: 41) 
  
But the puzzle didn’t fit. No matter how they rearranged it, there were always 
historical bits that didn’t sit well with the theory. Finally, they realized what nobody 
had previously noticed: there was a piece missing.  
 
. . . Palestine was populated by Arabs who wanted to establish their own state 
there (from 1936 to 1939 they rebelled against British rule). The Zionist aim 
conflicted with the Palestinian one. That conflict dictated Israel’s foreign 
policy [which sided with that of the colonial powers, including Britain]. It was 
not the Zionist foreign policy that dictated the Zionist settlement and military policy 
(as the Communist Party claimed); it was the other way round: Zionist settlement 
and military policy dictated Zionist foreign policy. [The expropriation of] the 
Palestinians (from 1900) and building of Jewish settlements on their land 
caused Zionism to oppose Palestinian supporters (mostly anti-colonialists) 
[such as Egypt] and to support their colonialist rulers [like Britain and 
France].  
 
In 2005 that seems self-evident, but in 1962 all Israelis responded with 
wonderment ‘Palestinians’? ‘Who are they?’  
 
Until the ‘Intifada of the Stones’ (1987-1993) no Israeli politician, academic, 
orientalist, political analyst or journalist saw the Palestinians as a political 
factor. At the most they were seen as a social factor – miserable refugees who 
needed to be housed and fed. . . . [In 1962] It looked like the ‘absurd’ idea of 
two mathematics students who had no expertise on the Middle East. . . . (ibid.: 
44, original emphases) 
 
Half a century later, we can safely say that MATZPEN’s new equation trans-
formed Israeli politics and, in some sense, changed the world. The socialist-Zionist 
consensus has been cracked beyond repair. It is true that the world now is different 
from what it was in the 1960s, and that the postist newspeak has gained the high 
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ground. But the critique that Aki and his friends presented back then still echoes, and 
their questions still resonate.8 
A tiny group of people, surrounded by suspicion and hate, lacking any resources, 
with no support and against all odds, had managed to shake our perception and create 
a new reality. 
And the solution? Only time will tell. 
 
 
Autonarchy 
 
MATZPEN was also the logical answer to the Stalinist debasement of Marxism. As 
Aki described it, he and his friends grew sick and tired of playing gatekeepers for Soviet 
imperial interests. They didn’t wish to end up like the Israeli Communist parties – from 
MAKI (Israeli Communist Party) to RAKACH (New Communist List) to HADASH 
(The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) – whose functionaries kept silent on 
Khrushchev’s (secret) confessions of Stalin’s crimes and remained silent (while silenc-
ing others) when the Soviet Union abandoned the Communist revolutionaries of 
Egypt, Iraq and Syria.  
Aki and his friends were not interested in the realpolitik of the Communist super-
power. They wanted a revolution. Their thinking, politics and spirit were close to the 
Fourth (Trotskyite) International, and they maintained close ties with Trotskyite and 
Marxist revolutionaries among the popular Palestinian liberation movements.  
But even the Trotskyite ideas, which Aki was first exposed to while in Britain, 
proved problematic. They were unable to address the basic problem of Marxism: the 
absence of democracy.  
This problem haunted every Communist country, and Aki, inspired by Cornelius 
Castoriadis, offered a solution: autonarchy. Autonarchy for him meant a political sys-
tem of self-rule, a regime of ‘direct democracy’ in which every member of society ac-
tively participates in the management of that society.9  
This was no flash in the pan. For Aki, ‘direct democracy’ was not some utopian 
impracticality to be scribbled on a placard. It was a concrete answer to a fundamental 
problem. Over the years, defenders of socialism and Communism have blamed the 
regime’s authoritarianism on assorted ‘externalities’ – from the ‘ideological betrayal’ 
of political functionaries, to the gradual ‘corruption of the leadership’, to the debilitat-
ing process of ‘bureaucratization’. Aki rejected these excuses. The failure of socialism 
and Communism, he said, was not circumstantial, but foundational. These regimes 
were undermined not by their ‘special conditions’, but by the very theory that informed 
them. Their problem was not the ‘distortions’ introduced by Leninism, Stalinism or 
Maoism, but the original logic of Marx’s thesis. 
8 See ‘To the New Reader Innocent of the Undeconstructed Past: On the Second Edition of 
Peace, Peace, and No Peace’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2010c). 
9 See ‘Autonarchy = Direct Democracy’ (Orr 2000a). 
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Logic, though, is not a static concept, he noted. It develops dialectically, together 
with the changing historical context. In order for us to assess the merits of Marxism, 
we need some retrospect. And it is only now, more than a century after Marx, that we 
can begin to appreciate the contradictory manifestations of his theory.  
Aki saw Marxism as a theory focused on private property, which, in our epoch, 
appears as capital. Capital controls and stirs industrial production for the purpose of 
accumulation. The accumulation process creates a class conflict between capitalists 
and productive workers. The capitalists leverage the political regime in order to legiti-
mize exploitation and sanctify accumulation, while their workers, who witness their 
own exploited labour accumulating against them, organize and resist. For Marxists, 
the solution to this conflict is the abolition of private property and the socialization of 
the means of production. But this solution, said Aki, creates a new problem.  
Regimes that ‘socialized the means of production’ did not liberate the workers; 
instead, they placed them under the control of state managers, technical experts, plan-
ners and public officials. Whereas labourers in capitalist countries submitted to the 
market and the associated institutions of the capitalist state, their counterparts in Com-
munist countries were made to obey the Party, bureaucracy and military. The former 
surrendered their autonomy to capitalist exploitation, the latter to bureaucratic oppres-
sion.  
It took Aki some time to reach this conclusion. His political awakening began in 
1951, as a sailor on one of the striking ships in the Haifa Seamen Revolt. On that ship, 
he witnessed, first hand, the security forces attacking the strikers. He realized that the 
police and the army exist to protect not the subjects, but the political regime that rules 
those subjects. In the wake of this experience, he joined the leftist group of Moshe 
Sneh and later MAKI – where he was soon introduced to the other side of oppression.  
His political transformation continued with the 1953 workers’ revolt in East Ger-
many and the 1956 popular uprising in Hungary. Both movements were put down by 
a Soviet bloodbath of violence and mass arrests. And in both cases, the Communist 
parties kept silent.  
The final wakeup call came with the 1968 Paris revolution. It was then that he 
realized the problem is not one of choosing between ‘private’ and ‘public’ property, 
but of attaining autonomy. Neither the greed-driven regime of private property nor the 
power-driven regime of public property is able to emancipate human beings, and for a 
simple reason: both are premised on excluding the vast majority of their subjects from 
running their own society.   
Capitalist theories are produced and imposed by a sect of know-it-all experts and 
analysts with proprietary insight into the mysteries of the ‘economy’ and the secrets of 
the ‘market’. The role of this sect is to protect the regime and its inner core of big 
capitalists and top managers. The latter group controls and directs everything of im-
portance in the capitalist order – from technology and production, through desires and 
ideology, to the planetary ecology and the fate of the human race. The members of this 
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group are convinced that they serve the interests of society (conveniently equated with 
their own). 
Marxist theories, although very different from their capitalist counterparts, lead to 
a similar result. They give rise to a small cadre of omniscient political functionaries 
and pundits with superior insight into history’s ‘laws of motion’. These theoreticians 
reputedly know the needs of humanity and how to fulfil them; they can identify the 
required technologies and how to invent them; they cognize what constitutes proper 
education and how the masses should live; they decide what infrastructure will be used 
and whether to care for or ignore the natural environment. Moreover, they are con-
vinced that this insight is best imposed through violence, brainwashing and deceit. 
The only solution, said Aki, is a revolution. We need an entirely new regime, one 
that will be managed not by a narrow group of ‘free marketeers’ or ‘Gosplanners’, but 
by society as a whole. It was this conclusion that eventually led him to Castoriadis’ 
historical philosophy of direct democracy. 
The 1968 revolution in France showcased the practical potential of autonarchy. 
There was no need for brainwashing or mass re-education, Aki observed. The idea 
seemed almost natural. It spread rapidly and was accepted enthusiastically, as if it were 
part of humanity’s ‘practical reason’. Methods of self-rule were tried with varying de-
grees of success in many different settings. They were implemented in industrial fac-
tories and government offices, schools and universities, regional assemblies and city 
halls. They were even introduced into military units.  
Eventually, the revolution fizzled out and died. Relieved by its demise, orthodox 
historians and mouthpiece journalists were quick to dismiss it as ‘student riots’ and 
statistical ‘disturbances’ that occasionally flare up on the margins of the established 
order. But this depiction, said Aki, merely revealed the defensive mode of the powers 
that be. The rulers of the world, both capitalist and socialist, know that they must keep 
their grip over the masses, and in 1968 they came close to losing it.  
The events of that year, said Aki, were truly revolutionary: they marked the first 
modern manifestation of autonarchy. In this sense, the Paris uprising of 1968 was 
more important than the Russian Revolution of 1917. It represented an entirely new 
logic that threatens both capitalism and socialism and that will forerun the struggles of 
the twenty-first century.  
 
 
The Wandering Circus 
 
Of course, none of this will happen automatically. Revolutionary ideas, said Aki, no 
matter how logical and ripe for their time, do not suddenly pop up into the heads of 
human beings. Not even in the era of ‘market forces’. Autonarcy imperils the regime, 
and that means it will be fiercely resisted. The rulers, regardless of their gender, race 
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and culture, will fight it tooth and nail. They will refuse to give up their private prop-
erty, profits and perks, and they will certainly be unwilling to allow their subjects more 
than a token say in organizing society. 
The war will be long and drawn out. There will be plenty of surprising twists, 
unexpected turns and disappointing setbacks. But the struggle has already started, said 
Aki, and it will not stop. It will continue, because, in the final analysis, human beings 
fight for logic and reason – precisely what direct democracy gives them.10  
And so, soon enough, Aki found himself in the ideational trenches, fighting for 
autonarchy. 
 
Shimshon Bichler: During the 1990s, I taught political economy at the Law Faculty of 
Haifa University. In every course, I would devote at least one session to a one-man 
show by Aki. Later, I also taught at various colleges, which gave Aki the opportunity 
to expand his performances to other locales. 
We called these performances the ‘wandering circus’. Aki was the star, Eran Tur-
biner was the director/cameraman/producer, and I was the organizer. The performer, 
dressed in open sandals, a sailors’ coat and a knit cap (regardless of the weather), 
showed no inhibition. Quick to his feet, he immediately dominated the stage with his 
booming voice.  
Eran and I knew the text by heart. We also knew the gestures, jokes and dramatic 
pauses. Yet we were always mesmerized. Even after ten years on the road, we still felt 
as if we were listening to him for the first time.  
He usually talked about his own life, told as a political autobiography. The audi-
ence would be taken through the ups and downs of world history and learn how they 
shaped the narrator’s opinions and influenced his political consciousness.  
The stories were wonderful. They started in Berlin in the early 1930s, where Aki’s 
mother, pushing her two-year old son in his stroller, noticed to her horror the toddler 
returning the ‘Heil Hitler’ salute of a smiling S.S. officer. The mother could not fathom 
10 Interestingly, Aki’s view on this subject resembles Michel Houellebecq’s. In general, the two 
hold very different opinions, but there is one thing that both agree on: the strongest transforma-
tive force in history is revolutionary ideas. In his book The Elementary Particles (2000), Houellebecq 
speaks about a ‘metaphysical mutation’, a radical global transformation in social values that 
tend to come at the hubris stage of a civilization. Such mutations, he argues, do not happen 
often. But once started, they are unstoppable. This is what happened with the rise of Christianity 
at the zenith of the Roman Empire and, again, with the emergence of scientific thinking at the 
apex of European feudalism.  
Houellebecq, like Aki, considers the current wave of religious and ethnic movements as 
temporary. Aki often said that human consciousness, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The crisis 
of socialism and capitalism, he argued, creates an ideational emptiness, and this emptiness is 
quickly filled with religious mantras and postmodern slogans. But in the background there 
emerges a new metaphysical mutation – autonarchy. According to Houellebecq, science caught 
on because it offered something that the trickery and omens of religious dogma could never 
match: ‘rational certainty’. Science, he says, imposes logic and makes sense of the physical uni-
verse. And autonarchy, argued Aki, does the same for society: it offers a reasoned way to make 
sense of and organize the social universe. 
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her sole offspring becoming a Nazi, and the family soon moved to Palestine. Aki 
would then describe how, during the great Palestinian Revolt of 1937, he and his 
mother found refuge in the (now-ruined) Arab village of Lifta near Jerusalem; how, in 
1946, he competed against and lost to the excellent Egyptian swimming team; how, in 
1951, he found himself participating in a violent strike against the Israeli ruling class; 
how, while studying mathematics and physics at the Hebrew University, he became 
head of the Communist student cell; how he was expelled from the Communist Party, 
and how his newly founded MATZPEN movement rattled the Zionist foreign propa-
ganda machine; how he stopped being a Marxist (at least according to the conven-
tional definitions); and how he joined the movement for autonarchy in the glorious 
days of the 1968 revolution in Paris. 
At that point, the spectacle would climax. To dramatize the moment, Aki would 
slow down to recite, with a touch of pathos, the French strikers’ demands for self-
management. The strikers, he said, dismissed the ‘generous’ offers of the Gaullist re-
gime and the Communist Party. They had no interest in what was on offer:  
 
‘We don’t want more bread; we want to run the bakery. . . .’ 
 
 From here onwards, the emphasis would shift from stories to analysis, from an 
alternative political history to the logic of direct democracy: ‘How can a society of 
autonomous human beings’, he would ask, ‘collectively manage its social life for the 
good of its members?’ 
Despite his Marxist mannerisms, Aki was a ‘technological determinist’. Human 
history for him was driven, first and foremost, by scientific and technological develop-
ments; class wars, cultural revolutions and political changes were mostly the conse-
quences. 
To make his point, he would search the many pockets of his old sailor’s coat, 
eventually producing the victory gadget of autonarchy: a magnetic plastic card. 
In Paris in 1968, he explained, the democratic logic of autonarchy was still ham-
strung by technological limitations. The many action committees, spread all over 
France, lacked an effective communications infrastructure. They came up with many 
different ideas, demands and goals, but they had no means of communicating them, 
let alone putting them into collective practice.  
‘But now’, his voice boomed, ‘the time has come!’  
Waving the little plastic card, he would explain how instant interactive communi-
cations and reliable electronic encoding make autonarchy feasible – nationally and 
perhaps even globally. We can now engage in long-distance mass discussion, debate 
and secure voting – and that ability enables us to finally dispense with all functionaries 
and go-betweens. There is no longer any need for dictators, ruling gangs, exploitative 
oligarchies or four-year ‘representatives’. There is no reason to remain submissive for 
years on end in exchange for a one-day holiday called ‘elections’.  
The age of reason has arrived.  
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When his listeners expressed doubt and skepticism, Aki was endlessly patient. 
There are no ready-made solutions, he would say – none ‘from above’, and certainly 
none from self-appointed ‘experts’. Reasoned solutions can emerge only through in-
teractive social experimentation – and even then there are no guarantees. There are 
always mistakes and mishaps, with good solutions invariably accompanied by bad 
ones. But autonarchic decisions, whether good or bad, have one important advantage: 
they can be changed. Even if the majority errs – for example, in deciding to bring in the 
death penalty, or to hold onto occupied territories – it can always reverse its own de-
cision.  
Not so with ‘representative governments’ (as the rulers and their servants like to 
call their organizations). Once elected, the ‘representatives’, seeking their own ends, 
can wreak havoc on the underlying population, with the only recourse being the next 
election, when the ‘voters’ are allowed to ‘choose’ a different set of ‘representatives’. 
This method brings despair. It causes people to lose hope and mistrust democracy, to 
look inward instead of outward. They become alienated individuals, isolated atoms 
that no longer try to alter their collective fate.  
 
Although his logic seemed compelling, Aki found it difficult to answer the ques-
tion posed by Professor Philip Philipovich, the transfigurating surgeon in Bulgakov’s 
novel The Heart of a Dog (1968): 
 
. . . if I begin to sing in chorus in my apartment every evening instead of op-
erating, it will lead to ruin. . . . It is impossible to serve two gods! It is impos-
sible at one and the same time to sweep the streetcar tracks and settle the 
fate of Spanish beggars! (37) 
 
Aki’s idea of autonarchy seems to take for granted the nature of technology and 
production, as if they were objectively ‘given’ to society. But this is hardly the case. 
Every invention, innovation, production line and labour process, not to mention ‘en-
trepreneurship’ and ‘investment’, is deeply embedded in the logic of capital and its 
mode of power. A PG&E utility plant, a JPMorgan Chase office building or a Google 
data centre are not stand-alone entities, separate from the social context in which they 
operate. Their design and construction, their employees’ education and training, the 
way they are used and abused are all intertwined with the gist and purpose of the re-
gime. It seems to us an illusion to think that this inherently capitalist infrastructure can 
somehow be taken over, ‘as is’, by direct democracy. 
At the end of the show, students would line up to speak with Aki and buy his 
books. Many of them were women, and a fair number of those women were Arab. 
Minority groups, especially those seeking change, found Aki easy to connect with.  
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A Chain of Stories 
 
Over the past decade, Aki produced his books and articles on his own, without a pub-
lisher. He would print them at Beit Hanina in East Jerusalem and ‘distribute’ them in 
person. His design and layout left much to be desired. The footnotes were often larger 
than the text, the font would suddenly change, the pages were not always centred and 
some editorial markings were left uncorrected. When we drew his attention to the aes-
thetic drawbacks, he seemed perplexed. ‘The important thing is the content, not the 
form’, he said. ‘Those who recycle dogmas need snappy designs to catch the eye; I 
don’t’. Sometimes he used approximate rather than definitive numbers. At others, the 
evidence he marshalled would be imprecise. His critics used these oversights to attack 
his underlying ideas, but Aki remained unfazed: ‘. . . history is not a random collection 
of dates, events and numbers; it’s the understanding of processes. . . .’ It was obvious 
he couldn’t connect with the postists.  
During the 2000s, his war effort for autonarchy intensified. There were more and 
more anarchist groups in Israel, and Aki would eagerly address them in abandoned 
warehouses, worn-out cafés and street demonstrations. His talks covered a wide range 
of subjects and catered to different audiences. He would lecture to retired Yekkes (Jews 
of German descent) on the history of modern physics and speak to high school students 
on cosmology. No invitation was refused, and no audience was ever disappointed. 
Aki’s creative fusion of autobiographical stories, history and theory kept them at the 
edge of their seats. 
There was, however, another set of stories – equally fascinating and politically 
spicy, yet more personal – that Aki never shared in public. Over the years, we tried to 
persuade him to put his tales into writing, and eventually he was swayed. In 2000 he 
issued Hevzekim (Flashes) , followed in 2011 by its English version, Enlightening Disillu-
sionment.  
As a youngster, Aki taught mathematics at Alliance Jerusalem, and he remained 
a teacher at heart for ever afterwards. His Enlightening Disillusionment, written as a 
chain of stories, is sparkling, funny, enchanting and hopeful. It encourages you to re-
think history, to examine it in a different way. The book recounts memories, thoughts 
and deeds from his days in Palestine, Israel, Britain and France – and again in Israel. 
Reading it, you can feel the real, humane story of the twentieth century bubbling up, 
the historical logic, so often concealed and destroyed, emerging from the depth of a 
forgotten memory.  
It was like an anamnesis to us.  
When we first read it, though, we noticed to our surprise that half of the stories he 
had told us – and often the more juicy ones – were missing. We pressed him on this 
point, and he finally confessed: he couldn’t write with malice about people – especially 
not about his comrades, even if their roads had parted. His book does not retell the 
splits within MATZPEN and his disputes with some of his friends (including his break 
with Machover after Aki had abandoned Marxism). There is nothing on hard drugs. 
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There is no mention of difficult political experiences and disappointments. There is no 
reference to mistakes and regrets, and there are no personal or intimate tales. Even the 
‘bad’ stories – for example, the bitter disappointment with and expulsion from MAKI, 
or the confrontation with the Zionist-Israeli establishment at home and abroad – are 
told without bile or ill will. There is no sabre rattling with former enemies, no settling 
of accounts, no gloat. 
 
On Simplicity and Proportions 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: To be with Aki was to be immersed in stories. It was so from the very 
moment I met him. We had barely exchanged a few sentences before he asked me: 
‘What turning point in your life made you a Marxist? Was it a political event? Some-
thing you participated in or witnessed? Was it a book you had read or a story you had 
heard? Was it a movie, or maybe a play?’ He was eager to hear my story.  
But usually it was the other way around: Aki would be the storyteller and I the 
listener. I was not used to this ancient art of communication. The assertive telescreen 
and know-all internet have destroyed this art, and very few people engage in it nowa-
days. I was therefore amazed to see it practiced so charmingly and creatively by this 
vibrant elder.  
In his own democratic bubble, Aki became my Socrates. His stories encouraged 
me to ask questions, to seek different paths, to look for what the Greeks called a 
‘method’.  
My work with Shimshon has carried us into many uncharted territories. We ex-
plored the evolution of the Israeli ruling class and its accumulation through crisis; stud-
ied the political economy of Israeli inflation; traced the connections between the 
‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’ and Middle East ‘energy conflicts’; and exam-
ined the transnational capitalization of Israel and the region. Recently, we began to 
sketch an alternative history of the capitalist mode of power, going back to its origins 
in fourteenth-century Europe. Aki often disagreed with our theoretical claims and his-
torical writings, but he enthusiastically encouraged us to pursue them. He was always 
eager to engage new hypotheses, to hear of new research trajectories, to learn of new 
facts.  
The thing that impressed me most about him, though, was his quest for simplicity. 
A short story is very much like a scientific claim or a mathematical equation: it is an 
effective way of making a point. Until the appearance of science and the emergence of 
formal logic, stories were the main venue through which people shared their thoughts 
and feelings. They told their stories not for utility or profit, but for beauty and enlight-
enment. And as Aki demonstrated so beautifully, the most enlightening stories are 
often the simplest.  
My visits to Israel always included meetings with him. In one of those trips, on 
the day of my departure back to Canada, he called me to ask if he could come over. ‘I 
want to bring you a present’, he said. I was staying nearby, less than ten minutes by 
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car from his home; but Aki, known for his philosophical driving, took a full hour to 
arrive. When he finally emerged from his beat-up vehicle, he had a huge envelope in 
his hand and a mischievous smile on his face. Slowly, he pulled out from the envelope 
an equally large photograph and presented it to me. It was entirely black – save for 
tiny white dots spread here and there. ‘Do you remember the spacecraft Voyager, the 
one propelled in 1977 out of the solar system?’ he asked. ‘Well, this is one of the pic-
tures taken from the Voyager, and this tiny white dot – right here – is planet Earth! I 
want you to take this photograph with you, for the future. It will help you keep things 
in proportion. . . .’  
That picture still hangs over my desk. 
But even proportions have to be kept in proportion. And that lesson, too, Aki 
managed to convey with typical simplicity.  
The Pythagoreans, he said to us one afternoon as we were sitting in a Jaffa beach 
café watching the sunset, saw every magnitude in the universe as a ‘rational number’: 
a ratio – or ‘proportion’ – of two integers. Their approach seemed totalizing and en-
compassing, applicable everywhere in the cosmos. According to their logic, the dis-
tance between any two numbers – say 1 and 2 – is ‘populated’ by an infinite number 
of rational numbers. To see that this is the case, divide the distance by two to obtain 
another rational number (in this case, 1½). Repeating this division again and again 
will produce more and more rational numbers. Eventually, after an infinite number of 
divisions, there will be ‘no more room’ left to squeeze in anything else.  
It turns out, though, that this seemingly all-embracing logic is rather partial. The 
distance between 1 and 2 indeed contains an infinite number of rational numbers. But 
as the Pythagoreans themselves came to realize, regardless of how tightly we ‘pack’ 
these rational numbers together, there exists in the interstices between them a parallel 
world, equally infinite in size yet entirely different in logic – the universe of irrational 
numbers.  
In other words, we can think of the same space as constituted, simultaneously, by 
two or more distinct ‘realities’, each with its own valid principles. This ability to im-
agine multiple co-existing logics is as beautiful as it is emboldening. It gives courage 
to break the envelope, to negate the dogma, to come up with a different way of think-
ing.  
That ability allowed Democritus to invent the atom as a way of reconciling the 
frozen universe of Parmenides with the fluid world of Heraclitus. It enabled Hegel and 
Marx to contest rationalism and positivism with dialectical thinking. It opened the 
door for David Bohm to conceive the infinite ‘enfoldments’ of physical reality and for 
Cornelius Castoriadis to invent the ‘magmas’ of signification.  
And it had a similar effect on us. It led us to think of capitalism as operating with 
two separate logics and therefore in need of two separate languages. The liberals offer 
a language based on utility, profit and capitalization, while the Marxists impose the 
language of labour and surplus. But each of these languages is all-encompassing, and 
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that singularity is potentially misleading. We need to think not of one, but two inter-
twined logics: the logic of power and conflict pitted against the logic of creativity and 
cooperation; the dominant in-your-face world of profit and accumulation versus the 
underlying hidden world of resistance and transformation; the language of order 
against the language of creorder.  
Is this not the anamnesis that Aki helped us rekindle? 
 
The Scientist and the Church 
  
Shimshon Bichler: Aki loved to read and talk about books. He read everything – from 
science and history to literature and mysteries. Good books, of any kind, exited him. 
Innovative books set him on fire. He discussed them with great passion and often with 
much originality.  
A conversation with Aki was a dialogue in the Greek sense of the term. It had 
nothing combative or acrimonious about it. Contrary to the ‘discursive’ fashion of the 
postists, Aki never tried to confuse, manipulate or humiliate his ‘opponent’, to trick in 
order to ‘win’. He conversed in order to foster understanding, to shed light, to help 
create something new. A dialogue with him was always open-ended. You never knew 
what you were going to get. Although old and half-deaf, he was more intellectually 
alert than most young people I know. It was a pleasure to visit him, and we dropped 
by as often as we could. His welcome was always joyous. There was never a hint of 
reservation. We would be invited to sip exotic coffee, to enjoy a box of dried dates, to 
try some homegrown grass.  
He was the antithesis of an academic.  
Conversations with academics are usually empty and boring. They tend to revolve 
around power relations, nominations, backstabbing and intrigue. They thrive on bad 
laughter. I have never had an academic provide me with a clear outline of a book he 
had read, let alone with what he had learned from it. I am yet to meet a single academic 
who would eagerly engage me with his research or hypotheses. What I usually hear is 
smearing, gossip, personal anecdotes and nasty commentary on theorists (but not their 
theories) – along with upbeat stories about vacations tied to conferences and other 
perks of the trade. 
Aki engaged in none of these banalities. He was a true scientist. Original and cre-
ative, he knew to appreciate novelty and was quick to endorse it. He was excited by 
new technological inventions and loved to play with new gadgets.  
But, above all, he was humble. He never demanded intellectual copyright – or, in 
fact, any rights at all. His position on this issue (which predated the Creative Commons 
movement) excited us. It suggested a way to undo the sabotage on knowledge. His 
books were preambled by an open challenge, a declaration of the creative-scientific 
spirit:    
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It is permitted to copy, duplicate, photograph, record, translate, store in a knowledge base 
and distribute this book, in whole or in part, in any form and by any means . . . without 
written permission from anyone, on condition that the reproduction not be for profit and not 
distort the spirit of the text. . . .  
 
Note that Aki wrote ‘permitted’, but what he really meant was ‘recommended’.  
I was deeply embarrassed one day in 2004 to see him standing outside a subsidized 
academic conference, selling/giving away his self-published books.  
The conference was pompously titled ‘Against the Current’. Organized by slick 
Hebrew and Arab academics, it spoke highly of the Palestinian protests and the need 
for a different kind of democracy. 
I queried one of the organizers on why they hadn’t invited Aki to give a talk. The 
professor looked at me with pity: ‘. . . Aki knows little about Greek democracy, and 
he has limited familiarity with Palestinian history. His books are simplistic and full of 
inaccuracies. This conference is for experts. . . .’ 
The inventor was facing the Golem. . . .  
And Aki? He couldn’t care less. He was perfectly content to have young students 
buying his books. Those who were unable to pay received them for free. In fact, the 
way I know Aki, if it weren’t for the embarrassment, he would have gladly paid the 
students to read his books. He was like Pythagoras, the first scientist, who bribed his 
pupil to love mathematics.  
 
 
Self-Consciousness and Autonomy 
 
During the 1960s, Aki read cosmology for a PhD at King’s College in London (where 
his classmates included future mathematical physicist Roger Penrose and cosmologist 
Stephen Hawking). Later, he enrolled in the first computer science course in the world. 
Both fields contributed to his life-long interest in ‘artificial intelligence’. Usually, this 
field is subsidized by the rulers in the hope of tightening their control over their subjects 
and substituting obedient machines for unpredictable workers. Aki’s approach was the 
very opposite. He thought that studying ‘artificial intelligence’ might shed light on self-
consciousness, and that such an understanding could lead to autonomy and help 
emancipate human beings from their rulers. He once told us that, fifty years ago, he 
had started working on an algorithm to make a machine recognize itself. ‘I’m still 
working on it’, he added. 
The last story in Enlightening Disillusionment, titled ‘Suicide?’ deals with this issue. 
The year is 1953, and Aki is sailing to Africa aboard a cargo vessel. In one of the ports, 
the crew members buy rhesus monkeys. Most are infants and die within days. But one 
adult female survives. Her owner ties her to a long rope on the deck, but she bites 
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through the leash and runs way. The sailors chase and quickly corner the monkey at 
the rear end of the ship:  
 
She stood on the railing looking at us and then at the sea below. She did this 
again, and again. We realized she was contemplating whether to jump into 
the sea – or not. No one made a move – or a sound. We didn’t want her to 
jump. Finally she took one last look at us, and jumped into the sea. We were 
shocked. Her repeated looking at the sea below and then back at us indicated 
she realized that jumping into the sea meant death and was contemplating 
whether to live as a captive or to die. We were all deeply moved and depressed 
by her death. Did she really know that she would die if she jumped? Did she 
knowingly commit suicide? None of us had an answer but the possibility that 
she knowingly committed suicide tormented us. It still torments me. (Orr 
2011: 157) 
 
Jonathan Nitzan: In some sense, Aki reminds us of the physicist Michael Beard, the 
protagonist of Ian McEwan’s Solar (2010).  
Like Beard (though without the latter’s nihilism), Aki always had a solid reference 
point, a stable locus to stand on – the scientific method. The world around him may 
have seemed in turmoil, full of unrelated events, surprises and disasters. But for Aki, 
there was logic behind the chaos: ‘Let the philosophers of science delude themselves 
to the contrary’, contemplates Beard, but ‘physics was free of human taint; it describes 
a world that would still exist if men and women and all their sorrows did not. . . .’ 
(McEwan 2010: 8-9). 
Aki’s commitment to the scientific method blinded him to the rise of postism since 
the 1980s. Like McEwan’s Beard, he found it difficult to understand the new, non-
ontological physics. And like Beard, he stood helpless when the new enemies of en-
lightenment unleashed their ‘black rhetoric’ against science and reason. Their trickery, 
duplicity and avid ignorance left him baffled. Their protestations against ‘hegemonic 
arrogance’, ‘reductionism’ ‘essentialism’ and the ‘crude objectivism that seeks to main-
tain and advance the social dominance of the white male elite’ seemed to him innocent 
of any logic or system. Like Beard, he couldn’t understand what they were talking 
about (and, between us, who can?). 
 Although Aki never said so explicitly, it seems that these developments were re-
sponsible, at least in part, for his return from England. Postism gradually took over the 
discourse, sending the advocates of enlightenment and progress into retreat. Religious 
zealots, culturalists and racists of various colours, ethnicities and genders were now 
front and centre. They peeled off the radical calls for reason, autonomy and change 
and spitefully discarded the ideas that generations of revolutionaries like Aki had strug-
gled to create. Aki had little to look for in this ‘like-reality’.   
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Aki and Friends 
 
Aki loved animals, perhaps because he found in them the simplest, most aesthetic 
logic. More than anything, he liked cats. His house was full of them. Some were very 
close and allowed onto his bed. Others were just fans who dropped by for a quick bite 
in the yard. When we came to visit, we often found him in his favourite position – 
lying on his back in bed, one hand holding a book and the other caressing a purring 
cat. The cats were everywhere – stretching, yawning, gazing at us with their dreamy 
eyes. Aki made it a point never to name them. 
Human beings need names and titles, he explained. The political regime makes 
them indistinguishable, like standardized commodities. Haunted by fear of losing their 
‘identity’, they are desperate for labels. They fight to be unique, to accentuate their 
differences, to protect their special culture. They would turn into serial killers for a 
whiff of immortality.  
Cats need none of these signs and symbols. They are already special. They are un- 
trainable and forever different. Some are woolgathering while others quick-witted. 
There are edgy cats and calm ones, curious and conservative, skinny and plump, 
thorny and velvety, ugly and beautiful. Some are aggressive while others are timid. 
But evil cats? There is no such thing. There will be the occasional skirmish over fast 
food and quick sex. But to organize a world war? To have millions of cats marching 
to slaughter and be slaughtered? And for what? For a flag, religion or nationality? Or 
worse still – for ‘leaders’ who wave flags, religions and nationalities? No my friend. 
You won’t find this oddity among the animals. 
Aki’s house in Kfar Shmaryahu had a large yard where he would feed his cats. 
One day we noticed him throwing pieces of meat into the distant shrubs. Strangely, 
the cats stayed away from the freshly served food. ‘I’m feeding the mongooses’, he 
explained triumphantly.  
Mongooses . . . ?! 
A new asphalt road had severed the mongooses from their habitat, so they landed 
at Aki’s. They must have known, back from their days in London, that marginalized 
minorities and political refugees are always welcome in his quarters.  
The mongoose is a small, beautiful carnivore with a delicate face, but as readers 
of Jack London’s White Fang (1905) will know, its teeth and claws can be deadly. The 
mongoose is generally shy. It doesn’t trust animals, especially humans.  
It was therefore an impressive sight to watch Aki’s acolytes gather for their daily 
meal: the noisy cats would swarm around him and brush against his legs, while the 
stealthy mongooses would wait tensely under the bushes. 
In the beginning, we didn’t actually see the mongooses. But in subsequent visits, 
we could sometimes spot them, threading carefully on the outer perimeter of the yard. 
And then came the big day. Aki was beaming with pride: that afternoon he was woken 
up from his siesta by a mongoose pup! The pup, which had snuck in through the open 
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door, climbed onto the bed among the squatting cats and gently caressed Aki’s cheek 
with his paw: he was hungry and demanded that his meal be promptly served.  
Upon our arrival, Aki was already busy feeding his flock. The animals were still 
in two groups, but they were no longer afraid to approach each other. There were 
occasional grumbles over disputed pieces of meat, but Aki easily silenced them with 
additional slices. 
Looking at us with a broad smile, he said: ‘See, if cats and mongooses can live 
peacefully in my yard, there should be no reason why Palestinians and Israelis cannot 
live together in one democratic society . . . We can always start from two states, but in 
the end it will become obvious that one is better. . . .’11 
Aki befriended animals and human beings alike. It was difficult not to like him – 
and as a single child, he needed and craved warmth and attention. But underneath the 
extroverted empathy was a solitary, impenetrable core. One time he confided to us 
that, more than anything, he liked being ‘with himself’.  
He always tried to get the most out of life. He never complained – about anything. 
Not even when his health deteriorated and the nasty reality of Netanyhu’s privatized 
healthcare system hit him. He remained eternally optimistic. ‘The situation is only 
getting better’, he would say. ‘Another small heart cath, a new valve and a replaced 
hip, and I’m like new’.  
His financial situation was getting worse. His debts ballooned, and excess interest 
charges made them impossible to ‘service’. Eventually, he was forced to sell his modest 
home in Kfar Shmaryahu and buy a cheaper one in Tnuvot. His hope was that, after 
paying his bank loans, there would be enough left for him to live on. But his accounting 
was never as good as his mathematics, and he rarely tracked his bills. Eventually, he 
had to remortgage his house, and the deprivation started to weigh on him. In his last 
few weeks, he was visibly depressed. No one cared for him at home, and he was too 
proud to seek help. For the first time in his life, he looked old. He would stay in bed 
for days, eating very little. The spark in eyes was gone. 
He died alone, surrounded by his cats.  
 
Akiva Orr’s free books: http://www.akivaorrbooks.org/  
Akiva Orr’s free videos: http://tinyurl.com/d3tqufr/  
 
 
11 Aki’s animal metaphor resembles Aldous Huxley’s suggestion, made in his novel Island 
(1962), on how to educate children to be tolerant.  
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The Scientist and the Church 1 
 
 
The April 21, 2005 issue of the London Review of Books carried a lead article titled ‘Blood 
for Oil?’ (Boal et al. 2005). The paper is attributed to a group of writers and activists – 
Iain Boal, T.J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts – who identify themselves 
by the collective name ‘Retort’. In their article, the authors advance a supposedly new 
explanation for the wars in the Middle East.  
Much of their explanation – including both theory and fact – is plagiarized. It is 
cut and pasted, almost ‘as is’, from our own work. The primary source is ‘The 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’, a 71-page chapter in our book The Global Politi-
cal Economy of Israel (Nitzan and Bichler 2002). The authors also seem inspired, incog-
nito, by our more recent papers, including ‘It’s All About Oil’ (Nitzan and Bichler 
2003), ‘Clash of Civilization, or Capital Accumulation?’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2004), 
‘Beyond Neoliberalism’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2004a) and ‘Dominant Capital and the 
New Wars’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2004b). 
In their paper, the Retort group credits us for having coined the term ‘Weapon-
dollar-Petrodollar Coalition’ – but dismiss our ‘precise calibration of the oil/war 
nexus’ as ‘perfunctory’. This dismissal does not prevent them from freely appropriat-
ing, wholesale fashion, our concepts, ideas and theories – including, among others, the 
‘era of free flow’, the ‘era of limited flow’, ‘energy conflicts’, the ‘commercialization 
1 This monograph was first posted on The Bichler and Nitzan Archives in 2005. It was never for-
mally published. 
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of arms exports’, the ‘politicization of oil’ and the critique of the ‘scarcity thesis’. No-
where in their article do the authors mention the source of these concepts, ideas and 
theories; occasionally, they even introduce them with the prefix ‘Our view is. . . ’. 
Their treatment of facts is not very different. They freely use (sometimes without un-
derstanding) research methods, statistics and data that took us years to conceive, esti-
mate and measure – again, never mentioning the source. 
These concepts, theories and facts are far from trivial. Until recently, they were 
greeted with strategic silence, from both right and left. Their publication has been re-
peatedly denied and censored by mainstream as well as progressive journals (includ-
ing, it must be said, by the London Review of Books, that turned down our paper on the 
subject). They cannot be found anywhere else in the literature, conservative or radical. 
To treat them as ‘common knowledge’ is deceitful. To cut and paste them without due 
attribution is blatant plagiarism. The first part of our paper illustrates this process of 
‘intellectual accumulation-by-dispossession’ with selected examples. 
The issue, though, goes well beyond personal vanity and self-aggrandizement. At 
the core, we are dealing here with the clash of science and church, with the constant 
attempt of organized faith – whether religious or academic – to disable, block and, if 
necessary, appropriate creativity and novelty. Creativity and novelty are dangerous. 
They defy dogma and undermine the conventional creed; they challenge the dominant 
ideology and threaten those in power; occasionally, they cause the entire edifice of 
power to crumble.  
For these reasons, the latent purpose of intellectual accumulation-by-disposses-
sion – like the accumulation of private property – is primarily negative. The word ‘pri-
vate’ comes from the Latin privatus, meaning ‘restricted’, and from privare, which 
means ‘to deprive’. And, indeed, the most important feature of private ownership is 
not to enable those who own, but to disable those who do not. It is only through the threat 
of prevention – or ‘strategic sabotage’ as Thorstein Veblen called it – that accumulation 
can take place. It is only by restricting the free creativity of society that society itself 
can be controlled. The second section of the paper explains how the appropriators of 
‘Blood for Oil?’ fit this pattern. 
The final section of the paper is an epilogue. It describes our failed attempts to get 
this paper published with the London Review of Books; Retort’s efforts to mislead us; and 
some additional insight from their Afflicted Powers (Retort 2005), a Verso book that 
contains the same plagiarism and more. The epilogue concludes with a few observa-
tions on the nature of academic dialectics.  
 
 
PART I: INTELLECTUAL ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION 
 
The Retort authors open their article with a customary tribute to Karl Marx, the 
prophet of the dispossessed. They talk about the process of commodification and em-
phasize the primacy of prices. Their words ring familiar, declaring both loyalty and 
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intent. The reader is prepared for the standard line of contemporary Marxist reasoning. 
According to this line, the ‘capitalist system’ is built on ‘expanded reproduction’; ex-
panded reproduction requires ‘economic growth’; economic growth necessitates ‘ac-
cess to plentiful raw materials’ and ‘cheap oil’; these requirements mandate the con-
tinuation of ‘primitive accumulation’, often in foreign lands, hence the never-ending 
‘imperialism’.  
These concepts are particularly popular among ‘cultural Marxists’. The most fash-
ionable is the old-new mantra of ‘primitive accumulation’, recently re-issued as ‘accu-
mulation by dispossession’. No one seems to know precisely what this mantra means 
and few dare to ask. But as a battle cry, it certainly fills a void. It helps keep Lenin’s 
imperialism ‘relevant’ despite the absence of an imminent world war. It covers up the 
theoretical crisis of Marxism by citing the Holy Scriptures without committing to 
them. And it relieves the anti-science expert from having to deal with the nitty-gritty 
of the ‘economy’ (in which, as we all know, nothing important has changed since Lux-
emburg, Lenin and Marx).  
And sure enough, ‘imperialism’, ‘primitive accumulation’ and ‘dispossession’ – 
along with the other catchphrases – are sprinkled throughout the text. But the plot itself 
seems to have changed. It is no longer Marx’s, or even Lenin’s. It is the plot of Nitzan 
and Bichler, dressed in the prophets’ clothes.  
 
  
The Politicization of Oil and Commercialization of Arms Exports 
 
In our research, beginning with a series of working papers on ‘The Political Economy 
of Armament and Oil’ (Bichler, Nitzan, and Rowley 1989; Bichler, Rowley, and 
Nitzan 1989; Nitzan, Rowley, and Bichler 1989; Rowley, Bichler, and Nitzan 1989), 
we have invented, theorized and analysed a twin historical process: a process that in-
tertwines what we call the politicization of oil on the one hand and the commercialization 
of arms exports on the other.  
Our analysis is very different from both the mainstream and ‘macro-Marxist’ lit-
eratures. It is built on a new theory of modern capitalist development driven by differ-
ential accumulation; it focuses not on the aggregate categories of the balance of pay-
ments, the ‘national interest’ and the ‘interest of the capitalist system’, but on the dis-
aggregated interests of what we call dominant capital and on the underlying movements 
of differential profits; it debunks the conventional creed on the insignificance of arms 
exports for the U.S. arms contractors; it articulates and deflates the so-called demise 
thesis of the oil companies; it creates new concepts, develops new research methods 
and offers a new history.  
 The Retort authors freely appropriate these broad concepts and ideas, down to 
the smallest details. The following quote from their paper describes the historical back-
ground for the politicization of oil. It attributes the cause of this politicization to the 
inability of the state (in this case, the American state) to prop up the profits of the oil 
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companies. Alongside, we quote the source – in this case, The Global Political Economy 
of Israel. 
 
Retort #1: ‘US oil companies had 
turned, not unexpectedly, to the state 
for support: they were duly provided 
with foreign tax credits to compensate 
for rising royalty payments in the world 
at large, with tariffs on the importation 
of cheap overseas oil, with exemptions 
from anti-trust prosecution, and, most 
dramatically, with a CIA-backed coup 
to topple the Mosadeq government in 
Iran. But all this, in a sense, proved fu-
tile. The new geography of oil cartels, 
and the founding of OPEC in 1960, 
marked a historic politicisation – and 
ultimately a global restructuring – of the 
oil business’. 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘. . . .the [oil] com-
panies turned to their governments for 
help. Government assistance, particu-
larly in the United States, assumed a va-
riety of forms, including foreign tax-
credits to offset royalty payments, re-
strictions on the importation of cheap 
oil into the United States, exemptions 
from antitrust prosecution, and a CIA-
backed coup against the Mossadeq gov-
ernment in Iran, to name a few. . . . 
Such blunt services, however, were too 
crude and certainly insufficient for the 
post-colonial era. . . . [There was a need 
for] a new political realignment. . . . With 
the nationalisation of crude oil, produc-
tion decisions now moved to the offices 
of OPEC, opening the way to a new, 
“limited-flow” regime’ (The Global 
Political Economy of Israel, 2002: 225-
226). 
 
 
From ‘Free Flow’ to ‘Limited Flow’ 
 
In ‘The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the Middle East’ (Rowley, Bichler, and 
Nitzan 1989), we argue that a central feature of the politicization of oil had been the 
shift from what we call the era of free flow to the era of limited flow. In a section of The 
Global Political Economy of Israel  (Nitzan and Bichler 2002) titled ‘Politicizing Oil: From 
“Free Flow” to “Limited Flow”’, we write that during the free flow era, up until the 
early 1970s, the control of oil was exercised through private ownership, with state in-
terference assuming only a secondary role. This logic was reversed during the subse-
quent limited flow period. We argue that, toward the late 1960s, there emerged a need 
to ‘limit’ the flow of oil, and that this limitation could have been achieved only through 
the politicization of the oil business. The consequence of that process was a huge surge 
in both the oil revenues of OPEC and the profits of the large petroleum companies. 
Within this framework, we then investigate the concrete relationship between the prof-
its of the leading oil companies on the one hand and the revenues of OPEC from oil 
exports on the other.  
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Now, it is of course true that many researchers have examined the oil companies 
and OPEC – but they have rarely analysed both together, hardly ever analysed them 
in relation to Middle-East conflicts and, to our knowledge, never analysed them as 
integral elements of a broader political economy of accumulation.  
This omission has been perpetuated by rigid academic bifurcation. Essentially, 
there are two distinct groups of oil researchers. The first group consists of international 
relationists. Their main focus is oil policy, the superpowers and OPEC. The second 
group is made up of economists. These are concerned mainly with oil prices, the flow 
of output, the imbalances of international payments, the condemnation of monopolis-
tic inefficiency and the damage of cartels.  
Occasionally, the oil companies are factored into their research, sometimes quan-
titatively. But the focus is almost always on sales, prices and output. Few researchers 
have dealt specifically with profit – and of those few, most have based their conclusions 
on the data and analyses provided by others. There are only a handful of works that 
offer original empirical research on this subject. To the best of our knowledge, of these 
later works, ours is the only one to have examined the relationship between the profits 
of the leading oil companies and the export earnings of OPEC and to have situated 
this relationship at the centre of the global political economy.  
We have examined this relationship in great detail, both analytically and histori-
cally. We have developed for this purpose our own categories. We have painstakingly 
collated and estimated data from various sources. And we have carefully adapted them 
to our specific needs.  
Much of this work, it should be noted, was done in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
well before the ‘download age’. There was no Internet and no Google. Computerized 
databases were limited and costly. They demanded considerable programming exper-
tise that we had to acquire. Print sources were highly heterogeneous and had to be 
standardized. It was an enormously difficult and thankless process, carried out with 
no research assistance and no research budgets.  
When we eventually managed to get some of this research published in journal 
articles – for example, in ‘Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In’ (Nitzan and Bichler 
1995: 512-515) – we insisted on including a special data appendix. This appendix con-
sisted of some of our raw time series – including sales, net profits, owners’ equity and 
defence contracts – data that we collated for the leading oil and armament corpora-
tions.  
This insistence may seem puzzling. In an era of intellectual property rights, giving 
your data away is considered unusual, not to say silly. We think otherwise. We believe 
that knowledge is social, not private. We think it should not be protected and should 
not be made exclusive. And we consider empirical research crucial – and, unfortu-
nately, at risk of extinction. Providing the raw data, along with explanations of how 
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they were conceived and collated, was our modest contribution toward reversing that 
trend.2 
For the Retort authors all of these layers are trivial stuff. They simply engross the 
final text en masse, including the words we quote from other creative researchers. Un-
fortunately, they try to decorate the pasted material, and in the process introduce some 
embarrassing mistakes. But then again, who cares; nobody will check anyway:  
 
Retort #2. ‘None of this, of course, 
meant the collapse of profitability for 
the likes of Shell and Amoco. Quite the 
reverse: the new ‘limited flow’ arrange-
ment was predicated, as Sheikh Ya-
mani, the Saudi oil minister and one-
time head of OPEC, put it, on not want-
ing ‘the majors to lose their power’. For 
every dollar that the price of crude in-
creased during the 1970s, the majors in-
creased their net profits by 7 per cent. 
Nevertheless, they were now compelled 
to live with a new international oil sys-
tem, accepting ‘upstream’ nationalisa-
tion and an effective Third World cartel 
as unpleasant facts of life. In response, 
the majors moved ‘downstream’, oper-
ating joint ventures with national oil 
firms, and consolidating their power at 
other points in the supply chain to com-
pensate for the loss of direct control of 
reserves. Between 1953 and 1972 their 
share of concession areas fell from 64 
per cent to 24 per cent’. 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘But the bonanza 
hardly came at the expense of the Petro-
Core. On the contrary, OPEC, by work-
ing closely if tacitly with the companies, 
was instrumental in boosting their rela-
tive performance. . . . Interestingly, the 
rationale for this new alliance was de-
lineated already in 1969 by the Saudi 
petroleum minister, Sheik Yamani. 
‘For our part’, he stated, ‘we do not 
want the majors to lose their power. . . ’. 
(cited in Barnet 1980: 61). . . . [F]or 
every one dollar increase or decrease in 
export, there was a corresponding 6.7 
cents change in the companies’ net 
profit. . . . At the ‘upstream’ part of the 
industry, the oil companies succumbed 
to the relentless nationalistic pressure of 
their host countries, and after a quarter-
century of eroding autonomy eventu-
ally surrendered most of their crude oil 
concessions. . . . Between 1953 and 
1972, the share of the ‘Seven Sisters’ in 
the oil industry outside the United 
States fell from 64 per cent to 24 per 
cent of all concession areas. . . . (Jacoby 
1974: Table 9.12, p. 211)’ (The Global 
Political Economy of Israel, 2002: 226, 
227, 219). 
2 These days few political economists bother to publish their raw data. Most do no empirical 
research at all and therefore have nothing to hide. Those who do use data usually rely on the 
statistics of others; they also tend to keep their sources vague in order to shield their conclusions 
from unwelcome scrutiny. A small minority collate their own data, but they usually view them 
as ‘proprietary’. And the select few who think that publishing their raw statistics is important 
have to squabble with cost-conscious editors and publishers who insist on keeping their journal 
volumes slim. 
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As noted, the above cutting and pasting is skilful, but not perfect. The Retort au-
thors erroneously associate the 7 per cent ratio with a change in the price of oil, rather 
then with a change in the total value of oil exports as computed in our work. They also 
erroneously refer to the ‘majors’, which are U.S.-based companies, rather than to the 
‘Petro-Core’ of six global oil companies on which our calculations were based. 
This attitude toward facts, evident throughout the text, merits another illustration. 
Retort’s explanation for the so-called ‘OPEC revolution’ climaxes in a factual cre-
scendo. At the end of the plot, they state that ‘In a ten-month period in 1974, the price 
of a barrel of oil rose 228 per cent’. Presumably, this dramatic price increase proves 
the success of the said revolution. Now, since there is no source given for this particular 
percentage, a reader would naturally conclude either that this is a well-known fact – 
or, otherwise, one computed by the authors. 
But in fact, this fact is not really a fact. According to IMF monthly data of average 
global prices, there was no ten-month period in 1974 during which the price of oil rose 
by 228 per cent. So where does this number come from? We cannot know for sure, but 
one possible source is page 230 of The Global Political Economy of Israel (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2002) where it is said that ‘the real price of oil soared, rising by 16 per cent in 
1971, 4 per cent in 1972, 6 per cent in 1973 and 228 per cent in 1974’ (our emphasis).  
If this is indeed where the Retort authors copied their ‘fact’ from, they certainly 
did not understand what they copied. Note that the quote specifically refers to ‘real’ 
price changes. Unlike the actual price of oil, the so-called real price of oil cannot be 
observes from your neighbourhood gas station, nor can it be concocted out of thin air. 
The real price is a theoretical, highly ideological and, indeed, deeply problematic con-
struct (see 'Price and Quantity Measurement', Nitzan 1989). It reflects the belief that 
one can measure the so-called ‘purchasing power’ of one commodity (in this case, 
crude oil) in terms of an aggregate basket of other commodities.  
There is no one simple way of ‘measuring’ such purchasing power. You need to 
decide which price to use (the price of Brent oil, West Texas, Composite, etc.); you 
need to choose the particular currency (will you use U.S. dollars, pound sterling or 
Saudi Riyals?); you need to decide on the adequate ‘deflation’ method (using a current-
based index, a fixed-based index, or a hybrid index); you have to choose the specific 
basket with which to deflate the price of oil (should it be the U.S. CPI, the global 
wholesale prices index, the investment deflator of Chechnya?); you need to get the 
data (which, as we know, is not always trivial); you need to decide on the relevant 
time period (would you use a month, a quarter, a year?); you need to determine the 
method of computation (adjacent periods, corresponding periods in adjacent years?); 
and, of course, you need to believe that ‘purchasing power’ can be objectively meas-
ured in the first place.  
Now, to be fair, few political economists are bothered by these questions; for the 
most part, they just follow accepted procedures. But the Retort authors are not your 
run-of-the-mill political economists. These are self-proclaimed experts in the dialectics 
of value and price. They should know better. So how is it that these experts are unable 
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to compute even a simple rate of change, let alone to distinguish a ‘real’ from a ‘nom-
inal’ one?  
But, then, as they say, ‘don’t bother us with facts, we already have our “own 
view”’. 
 
  
The Theoretical Predicament 
 
In light of the present hype surrounding ‘peak oil’, the Retort writers devote a signifi-
cant part of their paper to the issue of ‘scarcity’. The ‘end of oil’ has become a profitable 
publishing bonanza, and the authors seem keen on reaping their share of the dividends. 
To minimize their cost, they take their entire argument from Nitzan and Bichler, gra-
tis.  
Being too greedy, however, they overextend their leverage. They appropriate our 
theory as if it were part of Marx’s, and that cannot be done. The match won’t hold 
because, in a certain crucial respect, the two theories are incompatible. By trying to have 
their cake and eat it too, the Retort authors demonstrate that they misunderstand not 
only our own argument, but also Marx’s.  
In order to understand this predicament, it is necessary first to outline the theoret-
ical background. Central to our work on capital accumulation and capitalist develop-
ment is a new theory of value. At issue here is the basic unit of analysis. In contrast to 
the neoclassical utility theory of value and the Marxist labour theory of value, we offer 
a power theory of value. In our view, the capitalist price system is not intrinsic to com-
modities. Prices have nothing to do with the ‘utils’ that commodities supposedly gen-
erate in consumption. They similarly have nothing to do with the ‘abstract labour’ that 
commodities presumably require for their production. Instead, we argue that, in capi-
talism, the structure of prices reflects the ‘architecture of power’.  
Our emphasis on the architecture of power follows the spirit of Marx. He, too, 
saw the price system as the code of capitalist power. It is only that his attempt to the-
orize this power specifically through labour time was partial and, in the final analysis, 
impossible.3  
3 Having witnessed the labour theory of value being hammered from within and without, many 
Marxists now claim that Marx never intended to produce a ‘positive’ price theory. His labour 
theory of value, they argue, was meant not to explain prices but to criticize bourgeois political 
economy.  
This is an apologetic interpretation that does not do justice to Marx. His work was certainly 
a critique of capitalist ideology. But it was much more than that. Marx tried to create an alterna-
tive science, a framework that could replace both bourgeois political economy and the positivist 
social management of Auguste Comte. This scheme stood on two main foundations. One was 
a dialectical history that provided the basis for revolutionary consciousness. The other was a 
value theory that broke the front window of prices and offered a starting point for future demo-
cratic planning.  
It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that, unlike today, during the nineteenth century 
science was still highly rated. Marx followed Hegel in viewing the rise of science as part of the 
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Neoclassical and Marxist value theories carry the unmistakable marks of Lavoi-
sier’s Law of Conservation of Matter. In both, the supposed ‘conversion’ of utils and 
abstract labour into prices is a conversion of equivalents, a transformation from one 
quantitative ratio to another quantitative ratio. To illustrate: if a software programme 
generates, at the margins, 100 times the utility of a loaf of bread, or requires, on aver-
age, 100 times the abstract labour to produce, then, if nothing else intervenes, their 
corresponding price ratio will be 100:1. But that conversion doesn’t really work.  
The problem is easily exposed. Well-meaning economists repeatedly interpret the 
short-term rise of a certain price ratio as ‘proof’ of a corresponding increase in the 
underlying ratios of marginal utilities; or the long-term decline in another price ratio 
as ‘evidence’ for a parallel drop in the ratio of abstract labour. But that is going in 
reverse. The real task is to move from utility and abstract labour to prices; that is, to use 
changes in utility or abstract labour to explain changes in prices. Unfortunately, so far, 
nobody has been able to do so – simply because no one has ever been able to define, 
let alone measure, the basic particle called ‘util’ or the elementary unit called ‘abstract 
labour’. 
Our own power theory of value is fundamentally different. The price system, we 
argue, is a quantitative map. It describes, in the language of capital, the relative power 
of owners to shape the social process. According to this logic, Bill Gates, with assets 
worth $25 billion, has 25 times the power of a capitalist whose assets are worth $1 bil-
lion, and 2.5 million times the power of a worker whose assets are worth $10,000.  
Of course, this quantitative ‘architecture of power’ stands on qualitative social foun-
dations. And here lies a fundamental difference between the utility and labour theories 
of value on the one hand and our own power theory of value on the other. The former 
theories are similar in claiming that there is an ‘intrinsic equivalence’, an equivalence 
that enables the conversion of one quantitative ratio to another; they are also similar 
in that both fail to show that this equivalence exists. By contrast, our own power theory 
of value argues that there is no intrinsic equivalence in the first place. Power relations 
are qualitative, not quantitative. Under capitalism, these qualitative power relations 
broader development of history. But that view never led him to treat science merely as a matter 
of fashion and power. He truly believed he could create a new science, one that would both 
debunk conventional political economy and explain the reality of capitalism. 
Now, that reality could not possibly be understood without understanding prices. To argue 
that Marx was not concerned with prices is to argue that his key theses about capitalist develop-
ment – including the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the immiseration of the proletariat, 
and the tendency of capitalism to generate recurrent profitability crises – were meaningless gib-
berish. These tendencies can be expressed only in terms of price ratios. To theorize them is to 
theorize prices, and that is precisely what Marx did.  
The fact that he erred in trying to ‘mechanically’ anchor prices in labour value is secondary. 
It certainly requires no cover-up or apology. Many eighteenth and nineteenth century physicists 
now seem dated, if not irrelevant. Yet, without their breakthroughs physics would not have been 
where it is today. The same is true for Marx’s labour theory of value. This was the first theory 
to put the study of society on a systematic footing. If it were not for the stifling influence of the 
Soviet Union, the spirit of that theory would likely have kept Marxism a vibrant science. 
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do ‘take’ the quantitative form of relative prices; but the ‘conversion’ occurs not nu-
merically, as the neoclassicists and Marxists suggest, but speculatively.  
Because neoclassicists and Marxists separate the qualitative world of power from 
the quantitative world of value, their logic is inherently dualistic: an ‘economic’ sphere 
distorted or supported by a sphere of ‘politics/ideology’; a ‘real’ world of production 
and consumption reflected in or delinked from the ‘fictitious’ world of finance; an ideal 
‘equilibrium’ versus the earthly deviations of ‘disequilibrium’.  
The neoclassicists imagine an ‘economic’ world (‘the market’) whose equilibrium 
is constantly upset by the external intervention and distortions of ‘political’ forces. 
With the Marxists, the bifurcation is between a productive ‘base’ on the one hand and 
a ‘superstructure’ of state, politics, the law and ideology on the other. The base and 
superstructure are causally connected, with the precise nature of that connection de-
pending on the specific version of Marxism (orthodox, neo-Hegelian, neo-Marxist, 
structuralist, culturalist, etc.). In all versions, however, the two spheres are merely con-
nected, and therefore inherently distinct. 
For the neoclassicists, under conditions of general equilibrium the ‘real’ world of 
production and consumption is accurately reflected by the ‘nominal’ world of money 
and finance. For the Marxists, the correspondence is far from perfect. ‘Real’ value is 
created only by productive labour under the auspices of productive capital. But this 
value, when converted into prices, gets partly re-distributed to the other fractions of 
land owners, commercial enterprises and particularly ‘fictitious-financial’ capital (as 
well as to unproductive workers). This conversion and redistribution in turn enables 
the speculative ‘delinking’ of finance from production, accentuating the already im-
perfect association of the ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ spheres.  
In the neoclassical scheme, forceful expansion, conquest and war are statist-polit-
ical processes, with only spurious connection to markets. In Marxist theory, particu-
larly in its neo-Marxist variants, expansionism, conflict and imperialism are intimately 
related to the ‘economic’ process and, specifically, to the production and realization 
of the economic surplus. 
This latter notion of ‘economic surplus’ is fundamental to the Marxist duality of 
politics/economics. All Marxists, regardless of their particular inclination, seem to be-
lieve in its existence. Surplus is the basis of class society and the origin of all capitalist 
sins. As such, the surplus is essentially a deviation, a negation of a ‘natural state’ of no 
surplus. In the absence of surplus there is obviously no conflict over its distribution, 
and therefore no politics. If there is no surplus, there is no need to ‘absorb’ it; there is 
no need for a state to legitimise it; no point of having capitalist fractions and shifting 
political alliances squabble over its appropriation; no reason for imperialism and war 
to broaden its extraction; no necessity to regulate and deregulate its production; no 
imperative to alter fashion and brainwash consumers; no reason for race discrimina-
tion and gender hierarchies. 
The attempt to overcome these dualities has gradually fractured Marxism into nu-
merous schools and sects, each with its own founding father, proprietary vocabulary 
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and off-limits. Each group offers its own solution to these dualities. There are the 
Marxist-Leninsts, the neo-Ricardians, the Gramscians, Kaleckians and Althusserians. 
Some swear by Poulantzas, while others believe in Minsky or take their cue from 
Braudel. There are those who wander further, hanging their faith on more fashionable 
fusions such as Foucault, Lacaan, Deluse & Guattari and Hardt & Negri. And, of 
course, there are the eclectic, such as Retort, who take whatever ‘link’ they can get.  
Our power theory of value is different. Instead of linking the dualities, it breaks 
them from the start. We do away with ‘surplus versus harmony’, with ‘politics versus 
economics’, ‘real versus nominal’, ‘equilibrium versus disequilibrium’. Instead, we ar-
gue that, at any point in time, the conversion of qualitative power into quantitative 
accumulation reflects the consensus of the ruling capitalist class – formed against op-
position – regarding the structure of power and its expected future trajectory. The 
quantitative price system provides the language through which capitalists think about 
and express their power. It is the language with which they calculate success, failure 
and action. It is the language that they impose upon the rest of us. The way to analyse 
this ‘conversion’ is to describe changes in the qualitative processes and institutions of power 
on the one hand, and to contrast these changes with the quantitative process of differential 
accumulation and relative price movements on the other.  
This methodology underlines much of our research on capital accumulation; it 
underlies our theory of inflation and stagflation; and it forms the basis of our specific 
analysis of oil prices and how these fit into the broader global political economy.  
 
 
The Scarcity Thesis: Prices and Power 
 
Starting from our power theory of value, we argue in our work that oil prices cannot 
have anything to do with ‘scarcity’ (i.e., with a difference between supply and demand 
denominated in utils). We similarly reject the possibility that such prices can have an-
ything to do with labour values. Instead, we claim that oil prices – like all other prices 
– are a reflection of the ‘architecture of power’, and that their dynamic movements 
represent changes in power.  
Our work on oil, which was first published in the late 1980s, articulates these pro-
cesses in considerable detail. It demonstrates – rather persuasively in our view – the 
speculative conversion of qualitative power processes and institutions into relative 
movements of oil prices and differential oil profits. It shows how the appearance of 
‘scarcity’ was institutionally created through Middle East conflict and war; it analyses 
how such ‘scarcity’ was destroyed through peace between countries and strife among 
OPEC members and the oil companies. To the best of our knowledge, no one has 
written anything similar on the subject.  
And yet, for the Retort authors this is all their analysis. ‘Our view’, they say with 
little hesitation, ‘is that scarcity and price – the twin sisters of Malthusian pessimism – 
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don’t provide a basis on which the Iraq war can or should be understood’. The real 
basis, they maintain, lies in the history of oil (i.e., in Nitzan and Bichler’s work): 
 
Retort #3: The history of oil in the 20th 
century is not a history of shortfall and 
inflation, but of the constant menace – 
for the industry and the oil states – of 
excess capacity and falling prices, of 
surplus and glut’. 
Nitzan and Bichler : ‘The relentless 
search for new reserves, along with the 
incessant proliferation of new technol-
ogy created a constant menace of excess 
capacity and falling prices’ (The Global 
Political Economy of Israel, 2002: 228). 
 
The Retort authors then turn to the details. In our work, we examine the ‘scarcity 
thesis’ inside out. First, we assume, for the sake of argument, that ‘scarcity’ – or in the 
economist’s jargon, ‘excess demand’ – can indeed be observed. We interpret the ratio 
of proven reserves to current annual production as a proxy for long-term scarcity and 
examine the historical development of that ratio in relation to the so-called real price 
of oil (the dollar price deflated by the U.S. price index). For the short term, we look at 
the relative difference between global consumption and global production (i.e. the dif-
ference divided by the average of consumption and production). We then take this 
index as a proxy for short term ‘scarcity’ and compare its annual movements to the 
movement of the real price of oil. In both cases – the long run and the short run – we 
find that, over the past half-century, the relative price of oil has been either unrelated 
or inversely related to our proxy of scarcity – exactly the opposite of what standard 
theory would have us believe. Here too, we are unaware of any similar analysis in the 
literature – and certainly not of any analysis that uses these specific proxies and reaches 
the same conclusions. The Retort writers, however, take all of this to be common 
knowledge; below we illustrate how they cut and paste it, almost verbatim.  
Before we turn to their appropriation, however, we should mention that to our 
analysis goes much further. It claims that ‘scarcity’ cannot be measured in the first 
place. Oil is a globally traded commodity. To measure the scarcity of oil (or any other 
commodity for that matter), we need to know not the relationship between actual con-
sumption and actual production, but the extent to which the global ‘desire’ to buy it 
exceeds the global ‘desire’ to sell it. In other words, we need to know, first, the exact 
shape of the global demand and supply curves for oil; and, second, whether or not the 
oil market is in equilibrium. But supply and demand are what economists call ‘no-
tional’ functions. They cannot be known, ever. The same holds for equilibrium. No-
body has ever been able to identify it. And since demand and supply are unknown and 
equilibrium invisible, the scarcity thesis turns out to be irrefutable, by definition.  
Given this predicament, we are careful in our work to use excess consumption and 
excess production, rather than ‘excess demand’ and ‘excess supply’ (which we always 
denote in inverted commas).  
Of course, for the Retort writers, all of this is theoretical nit-picking. Who cares 
about the difference between consumption and demand? Everyone knows they are the 
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same thing. And, so, in cutting and pasting our words below, they freely substitute 
‘excess demand’ and ‘economic expansion’ for excess consumption. It just sounds so 
much better: 
 
Retort #4: ‘Over the past three decades, 
the ratio of proven reserves to current 
production has risen by a quarter, yet in 
real terms prices have doubled. During 
the 1970s prices soared, but the oil crisis 
of 1973-74 had nothing to do with 
shortage: there was no shortage. By the 
1980s, excess consumption had taken 
hold, yet prices fell by 71 per cent be-
tween 1980 and 1986. Over the last fif-
teen years, the fluctuations of price in 
relation to excess demand (in other 
words, to economic expansion) are ut-
terly baffling. Since 1960, world con-
sumption has typically been 2 to 3 per 
cent above or below world output. How 
can such relatively insignificant dis-
crepancies explain dramatic real-price 
fluctuations of tens or sometimes hun-
dreds of per cent a year? And why are 
prices sometimes so sensitive to the dis-
crepancies, and at other times com-
pletely resistant to them?’ 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘Over the past three 
decades, due to extensive exploration, 
this ratio [of proven reserves to current 
production] rose by a quarter – from 
about 30 production years in the mid-
1960s, to over 40 production years dur-
ing the 1990s. . . . Now, according to 
the scarcity thesis, the increase should 
have brought crude oil prices down. 
And yet the exact opposite has hap-
pened. As Figure 5.5 shows, during the 
1990s the real price of oil was not lower 
than in the 1960s, but twice as high. . . . 
During the first half of the 1980s, excess 
production gave way to excess con-
sumption, and yet the real price of oil 
again refused to cooperate. Instead of 
rising, it fell by 71 per cent between 
1980 and 1986. Even over the past 15 
years, with the oil market presumably 
becoming more ‘competitive’ (notwith-
standing the Gulf War of 1990–91), it is 
hard to see any clear relationship be-
tween excess demand and real price 
movements. . . . Over the past 40 years, 
world consumption was usually 2-3 per 
cent above or below world output. But 
then could such relatively insignificant 
discrepancies explain dramatic real-
price fluctuations of tens or sometimes 
hundreds of per cent a year? And why 
are prices sometimes hyper sensitive to 
the mismatch, while at other times they 
hardly budge?’ (The Global Political 
Economy of Israel, 2002: 229, 231). 
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The Trappings of Power 
 
If supply, demand and the holy equilibrium are to be ruled out, what else can cause 
the violent ups and downs in the price of oil? According to our power theory of value, 
it is the appearance of scarcity. This appearance is created and destroyed not by physical 
production and consumption, but by the institutions and processes of power. And in 
the Middle East, the chief mechanism underlying this process is the militarization of 
the region and the ebb and flow of conflict and war. The Retort authors could not 
agree more:  
 
Retort #5: ‘The answer to these ques-
tions is that oil is a key item of market 
currency, and therefore subject to con-
stantly shifting expectations and per-
ceptions, speculation and gambling – as 
well as the pressure of “external circum-
stances”. However plentiful supplies 
have been, since 1960 continual wars 
and rearmament in the Middle East 
have generated an atmosphere of crisis. 
Prices magically return to “acceptable 
levels” as the conflicts dissipate. Alt-
hough wars and regional instability pro-
duce high prices, the link is in no simple 
sense causal. The oil industry has long 
built such things into its business calcu-
lus: the so-called price consensus typi-
cally incorporates a “peacetime base”, 
an “embargo effect” and “war premi-
ums”’. 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘The solution for 
these perplexities is to broaden the no-
tion of “scarcity”. As a speculative 
commodity, the price of crude petro-
leum depends [among other things] on 
future expectations . . . [and] on the na-
ture of perceived scarcity associated with 
“external” circumstances. . . . the re-
gion’s ongoing militarisation since the 
late 1960s [helped] maintain high prices 
even in the absence of tight producer 
coordination, [while] the occasional 
outbreak of a major conflict tended to 
trigger an atmosphere of immediate 
“energy crisis”. . . . The industry’s 
“price consensus”, for example, now 
customarily incorporates, in addition to 
its “peacetime” base, also such items as 
“embargo effects” and “war premiums” 
(Fortune, 5 November 1990)’ (The 
Global Political Economy of Israel, 2002: 
231-232). 
 
Our power theory of value leads to a view of capital that is radically different from 
both neoclassical and Marxist interpretations.  
The latter theories see capital as a ‘materialistic-economic’ entity, related to but 
nonetheless distinct from the realm of ‘ideology-culture-politics’. In the neoclassical 
case, politics, culture and ideology serve to ‘distort’ the economic accumulation of 
capital. Accumulation, according to this view, is a technological process that combines 
productive input to produce useful output; it is driven by utility-maximizing agents; it 
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occurs under competitive conditions; and its outcome is optimal, by definition. There-
fore, any additional force – whether political, cultural or ideological – is by definition 
‘exogenous’ and by extension superfluous and damaging.  
In the Marxist case, the state – and the sphere of politics, ideology and culture 
more generally – provides the institutional, organizational and intellectual support for 
the economic base of accumulation. But, in and of itself, this support is limited to de-
fending and sometimes ‘regulating’ accumulation. It is not ‘productive’ of value and 
therefore cannot create new surplus and add new capital. In that sense, it remains in-
herently separate from the economic category of capital.  
We see it differently. Since capital is a form of power, it is, by its very definition, a 
political institution. Capital is not affected by politics; it is, in itself, the dominant –and 
increasingly encompassing – form of politics.  
This viewpoint underlies our analysis of the oil arena. Profit and accumulation, we 
argue, are premised on the existence of what Veblen called ‘strategic sabotage’. They 
presuppose the creation and institutionalization of ‘scarcity’. They are the quantitative 
manifestation of the qualitative politics of power.  
Of course, the ‘making of scarcity’ and the concomitant accumulation are not al-
ways easy to achieve (and ‘scarcity’ itself is not an eternal ‘law of nature’ but a histor-
ical/political institution). During much of the 1950s and 1960s, the oil companies 
watched oil become more and more ‘abundant’. The reason was not that oil had be-
come more available physically; it was rather that the centrifugal political forces of 
rivalry among the key actors proved stronger than the centripetal political forces of 
cooperation. If the accumulation of oil profit was to be revived, the entire political 
structure of accumulation had to be transformed. This requirement was the backdrop 
for what we call the politicization of oil. 
As noted, this logic, based on a notion of capital as power, is orthogonal to both the 
Marxist and liberal views where capital is merely affected by power. For the neoclassi-
cists, the relative profits of the oil companies represent the utils generated by oil but 
distorted by regional politics and production monopolies; for the Marxists, they are 
counted in units of abstract labour socially necessary to extract this oil, boosted by the 
very same politics and structure of production. In our own work, these differential 
profits are the manifestation of politics; they are the quantitative representation of the qual-
itative politicization of oil.  
To reiterate, this latter view can be reconciled with neither the neoclassical nor the 
Marxist theories. But the Retort authors, oblivious to the fine theoretical differences, 
continue to dispossess and absorb this view into their infinitely elastic ‘Marxist tradi-
tion’: 
   
Retort #6: ‘Oil prices declined through-
out the 1960s, as the unrelenting search 
for reserves, new upstream technolo-
gies, and fresh infusions of oil from 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘The relentless 
search for new reserves, along with the 
incessant proliferation of new technol-
ogy created a constant menace of excess 
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Russia combined to create massive ex-
cess capacity. With new actors on the 
scene, old-style collusion was less and 
less feasible. Against this backdrop, 
OPEC’s politicisation of the oil market 
can be understood not as a threat to the 
major oil-consuming states, but as a 
new and more sophisticated conver-
gence of interest between companies, 
the US government and suppliers. A 
higher price regime was good for the 
majors (their profits soared during the 
1970s, and their ability to check the 
power of independents was enhanced), 
good for Washington (it promised a 
slowdown in the Japanese and Euro-
pean economies), good for Britain (be-
cause of North Sea oil and its majors), 
and good for the Cold War (since it 
boosted the US military presence in the 
Middle East). Sheikh Yamani articu-
lated OPEC’s mission rather well: “at 
all costs to avoid any disastrous clash of 
interests which would shake the foun-
dations of the whole oil industry”’. 
capacity and falling prices. At the same 
time, with the number of actors on the 
scene growing rapidly, counteracting 
this threat solely through corporate col-
lusion was impractical. For the large 
companies, the way to overcome these 
challenges was to integrate their private 
interests into a broader political frame-
work. . . . There emerged, then, a new 
and more sophisticated realign-
ment. . . . In the words of Odell (1979: 
216), the 1970s brought an ‘unholy alli-
ance’ between the large international 
oil companies, the United States, and 
OPEC, which together sought to use 
higher prices as a way of boosting com-
pany profits, undermining the growth 
of Japan and Europe, and fortifying the 
American position in the Middle East. 
To these, Sampson (1977: 307) also 
added the eventual support of the Brit-
ish government, the Texas oil lobby, the 
independents, investors in alternative 
sources of energy, and the conserva-
tionists – all with a clear stake in more 
expensive oil. . . . [in the words of Saudi 
petroleum minister, Sheik Yamani] 
“We want the present setup to continue 
as long as possible and at all costs to 
avoid any disastrous clash of interests 
which would shake the foundations of 
the whole oil industry’’ (cited in Barnet 
1980: 61)’ (The Global Political Economy 
of Israel, 2002: 227-228). 
 
 
The Commercialisation of Arms Exports 
 
During the 1980s, analysts of the U.S. military sector viewed arms exports as relatively 
unimportant for the profit of the large defence contractors and virtually insignificant 
for the profit of big business as a whole. These exports were simply too small relative 
to domestic military spending and minuscule when compared to the aggregate sales of 
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the largest U.S. corporations. Partly for this reason, most students of the subject con-
centrated on the foreign policy aspects of such exports – their political reasons and 
consequences at home and abroad. 
Our work challenges this perception. It collates and analyses disaggregate corporate 
data on the leading armament contractors, including net earnings, sales, owners’ eq-
uity, domestic military contracts and arms exports. The results, first reported in our 
paper series on ‘The Political Economy of Armament and Oil’ (Bichler, Nitzan, and 
Rowley 1989; Bichler, Rowley, and Nitzan 1989; Nitzan, Rowley, and Bichler 1989; 
Rowley, Bichler, and Nitzan 1989) and subsequently extended and elaborated in later 
publications, suggest a radically different picture. They indicate that arms exports were 
far more important to profit than they seemed, particularly during lulls in domestic 
spending.  
This conclusion, we are not shy to re-emphasize, is based on years of strenuous 
empirical research. One key lesson from this research was that purely aggregate analysis 
is inherently misleading. You cannot understand broad processes of capitalism, such as 
inflation, superpower confrontation, militarization and national security, simply by 
relating them to other broad processes, like overall growth, changes in the average rate 
of profit, total government spending and shifts in ideology. You have to peer deeper, 
into the disaggregate structure of power and the processes of its restructuring.  
The Retort authors treat this conclusion as if it were self-evident. It is not. It cer-
tainly cannot be deduced from ‘high theory’, no matter how dialectical. The only way 
to develop this conclusion is by empirically re-searching received theory, by re-theoriz-
ing the evidence, by creating new categories and constructing new facts – precisely the 
type of work that Retort knows nothing of.  
One of the first scholars to empirically break the aggregate front was the great 
Marxist researcher, Michal Kalecki. In the mid-1960s, Kalecki (1964, 1967) predicted 
that military spending would become crucial for U.S. capital accumulation, and par-
ticularly for certain business segments. He was right. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
there emerged in the United States a group of leading military-dependent corporations. 
We call them the Arma-Core. Faced with mounting foreign competition, these firms 
have gradually retreated into the shelter of government contracts and subsidies, dis-
guised under the aggregate fiscal policy of ‘military Keynesianism’, a term coined by 
David Gold (1977). 
Initially, the Arma-Core was dependent mainly on domestic military contracts. 
However, with the end of the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. government was less and less 
able to underwrite these firms. The partial solution was arms exports. In the beginning, 
these exports were financed by the U.S. government through foreign loans and aid. 
But as the fiscal crisis deepened at home, more and more of these exports had to be 
paid for by the buyer, in cash. In our work, we argue that the change in export finance 
came hand in hand with a change in foreign policy. Armaments were no longer ex-
ported solely for ‘political goals’. Increasingly, weapons were sold abroad to bolster 
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the bottom line of domestic contractors. We call this process the commercialization of 
arms exports. 
The final piece in the puzzle was the new source of financing for the weapon trade: 
Middle-East oil. Until the early 1970s, the primary destination of global arms exports 
was South-East Asia. But the politicization of oil, the attendant ‘energy conflicts’ 
(fuelled by imported weapons), the resulting ‘oil crisis’ and the happy surge in OPEC’s 
oil revenues conspired to shift the focus. Soon enough, the Middle East became the 
world’s leading market for imported weapons.  
The research, theorization and integration of these processes yield a highly con-
trarian picture. For the Retort authors, however, this is all common knowledge. They 
summarize it in their (our?) own words: 
 
Retort #7: ‘OPEC’s politicisation of the 
oil sector took place in conjunction 
with the commercialisation of the arms 
industry. In the 1950s, 95 per cent of US 
armament exports had been provided 
as foreign aid. By 2000, the figure had 
fallen to a quarter. . . . Following a 
wave of mergers and consolidations in 
the 1990s (overseen and promoted by 
the Defense Department), the largest 20 
US contractors had been reduced to 
four: Boeing, Northrop Grumman, 
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Their 
sales now account for $150 billion, and 
they control a vast proportion of state 
contracts. Net profit in the sector, as a 
share of the total net profit of the For-
tune 500, doubled (to 10 per cent) be-
tween 1965 and 1985. This extraordi-
nary growth could not be sustained 
even by US levels of military Keynesi-
anism: it required foreign purchases 
and, specifically, Third World buyers’. 
 
Nitzan and Bichler: The attendant polit-
icisation of oil [came] together with the 
parallel commercialisation of arms ex-
ports. . . . During the 1950s, when arms 
exports were still seen as a matter of for-
eign policy, up to 95 per cent of U.S. 
foreign military deliveries were fi-
nanced by government aid. Over time, 
though, with the line separating state 
from capital becoming less and less 
clear, the proportions changed, and by 
the 1990s only 30 per cent were given as 
aid. . . . During the 1990s [the Weapon-
dollar–Petrodollar Coalition] spent 
much time and effort trying to regroup 
and consolidate through corporate 
amalgamation, usually with full gov-
ernment backing. . . . In 2000, there 
emerged a clear pack of five leaders: 
Lockheed Martin . . . Boeing . . . Ray-
theon . . . General Dynamics . . . and 
Northrop-Grumman. . . . Figure 5.2 
presents the net profit share of the 
Arma-Core within dominant capital. 
The data show that, following the Vi-
etnam War, this share had doubled to 
10 per cent by the mid-1980s, up from 5 
per cent in the mid-1960s. . . . Clearly, 
if these firms are to keep their produc-
tion lines open, they can never rely 
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solely on domestic procurement, and 
must constantly look for ‘counter-cycli-
cal’ export markets’ (The Global Political 
Economy of Israel, 2002: 201, 216, 268, 
270, 210, 212). 
 
Note that, once again, the Retort authors confuse the terms. It was arms exports, not 
the arms industry, that were commercialized. The authors also mix up the facts. The 
data they ‘quote’ on net profit as a share of the Fortune 500 are taken from Figure 5.2 
on page 211 in The Global Political Economy of Israel (Nitzan and Bichler 2002). The 
authors erroneously relate these data to the defence ‘sector’ as a whole. In fact, these 
data are computed for an ‘Arma-Core’ of 16 leading defence contractors. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Our power theory of capital accumulation turned out to be highly robust. It enabled 
us to explain, with great accuracy, the eruption of every ‘energy conflict’ in the Middle 
East up until the late 1980s. It also allowed us to predict, in writing and ahead of time, 
both Gulf wars. It helped us explain the pattern of differential profits of the leading 
petroleum companies. And it has done so nearly without fail. Anticipating critiques of 
‘over-determination’ and ‘mono-causation’, we wrote in 1995:  
 
Given the complexity of Middle Eastern affairs, these regularities [linking the 
differential accumulation of the oil companies and ‘Energy Conflicts’] appear 
almost too systematic to be true. Indeed, is it possible that the differential rate 
of return of six oil companies is all that one needed in order to predict such 
major upheavals as [the] June 1967 War, the Iraq-Iran conflict or the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait? And what should we make of the notion that Middle East 
conflicts were the main factor ‘regulating’ the differential accumulation of the 
Petro-Core? Finally, are lower-than-normal earnings for the oil majors indeed 
a necessary condition for Middle East energy wars? Maybe the picture emerg-
ing from the data . . . is more of a coincidence, a statistical mirage with little 
relevance to the underlying events? ('Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In', 
Nitzan and Bichler 1995: 500) 
 
We answer these questions in considerable detail – in ‘Bringing Capital Accumu-
lation Back In’ (Nitzan and Bichler 1995), in The Global Political Economy of Israel 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2002), and, more recently, in ‘Dominant Capital and the New 
Wars’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2004b). We examine the history of every ‘energy conflict’, 
assessing the extent to which these individual histories are consistent with explana-
tions and theories other than our own. We conclude that these explanations, although 
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often persuasive, are inherently partial; they are able to explain individual conflicts, 
but not the more general processes at work. By focusing specifically on oil and arma-
ment, our own approach provides a unified way of understanding the modern global 
political economy of the Middle East. And by concentrating on differential profits we 
are able to embed the modern history of the Middle East within a broader theory of 
global capital accumulation. The Retort authors quickly adapt the gist of this argument 
to the invasion of Iraq: 
 
Retort #8: ‘This is not the same as say-
ing that the Blood for Oil argument is 
crudely reductive. It is true that there 
are almost too many other plausible 
ways of framing the Iraq invasion. . . . 
But all (or most) human situations are 
overdetermined; it does not follow that 
the best we can do is settle for a plural-
ity of causes, or a resigned plea for com-
plexity. Some determinants are more 
important than others, and oil may be 
one of them. The problem with the 
Blood for Oil hypothesis is . . . that it 
has conspicuously failed to grasp that 
oil draws its power from a field of capi-
talist forces that must periodically re-
constitute the conditions of its own 
profitability’. 
 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘The hypotheses 
presented in this paper are neither de-
ductive, nor rooted in a fictitious frame-
work. . . . [Our approach] does not nec-
essarily negate the significance of other 
material and ideal considerations, nor 
does it eliminate the role played by non-
corporate actors and governments’ 
('Bringing Capital Accumulation Back 
In', 1995: 501). ‘It is almost a cliché to 
say that conflict and war are never 
mono-causal. They always occur 
within a highly complex historical con-
text, and that context can never be re-
duced to a ‘functional’ relationship be-
tween several ‘variables’. But in the 
case of the Middle East, the context of 
conflict cannot be comprehended solely 
from the narrow perspective of the war-
ring factions; it cannot be understood 
without reference to its own continui-
ties and apparent ‘regularities’; and it 
cannot be analyzed separately from 
broader world developments. Our own 
view is that Middle East conflicts were 
integral to the power processes of global 
accumulation’ ('Dominant Capital and 
the New Wars', 2004b: 313). 
 
 
The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition: Too Perfunctory 
 
Up to this point, the Retort authors are careful not to mention the source of their ex-
planations and facts. But it would have been too dangerous to omit it altogether. So, 
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at the end of their paper, they give Nitzan and Bichler a paragraph. They credit us for 
‘coining’ the term ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’, and for explaining how the 
fortunes of this coalition have been intertwined with the processes they so skilfully 
analyse earlier in their paper. But the buck stops here. Retort is unequivocal: 
 
The precise calibration of the oil/war nexus articulated by Nitzan and Bichler 
is, in the end, too perfunctory. They point in the right direction, but the dia-
lectic of oil and armaments extends much further, embracing not only military 
and oil-service industries, but construction giants . . . the global engineering 
and industrial design sector, and financial services organisations and banks 
. . . [as well as] the ‘black economy’ . . . drugs, oil theft and money launder-
ing. . . .  
 
Translation: the two anonymous hands of the academic maquiladora have done their 
job. They sweated in the data mines, they spat blood trying to make sense of the facts, 
they laboured day and night to break the conventional categories and create a new, 
coherent picture. They have produced plenty of value and much surplus to boot. It is 
time to appropriate it.  
The disengagement is simple. Nitzan and Bichler do provide some insights, the 
reader is being informed, but these merely ‘point in the right direction’. The real task 
is to absorb these ephemeral insights into the eternal truth of Marxism. You have to 
re-calibrate. You need to extend and embrace. You must think ‘dialectically’ rather 
than ‘perfunctorily’.  
This task is best left to the experts of accumulation-by-dispossession. If the Retort 
authors had been the ones doing the research, their ‘calibration’ would have been 
much more extensive and far more nuanced. Of course, that calibration would not 
require any actual research. There would be no need to invent new categories (as we 
all know since Plato, categories simply float in the air; you just need to extend your 
hand and grab them). There would be no need to rethink political economy (as we all 
know, modern political economy is nothing but a footnote to Marx, who had already 
worked it out). And there would be no need to worry about the facts – from construc-
tion, to banks, drugs and money laundering (as we all know, these are simply fictitious 
creatures of the capitalist ‘spectacle’). The only thing Retort would need is another text 
with sufficient surplus to ‘deconstruct’. Perhaps they should use Marx’s own analysis 
of ‘The So-Called Primitive Accumulation’. He concludes it with the following words: 
‘The expropriators are expropriated’ (1909, Vol. 1: 837).  
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
278 | The Scientist and the Church 
  
PART II: NOVELTY AND DOGMA 
 
Now, one must admit that, in a certain respect, Retort is right. It is misleading to ex-
amine only the superficial surface of phenomena. One has to look behind the perfunc-
tory details of plagiarism, to delve deeper into the dialectics of cut and paste. After all, 
the really interesting thing here is not dispossession per se, but the reason behind it.  
All organized religions abhor creative change. Catholic priests hated the new cos-
mology of Copernicus. Muslim Cadis and Mullahs detested the appearance of a con-
traceptive pill. Jewish rabbis loathed the arrival of television. Inventions represent cre-
ativity and novelty. They open up the horizon. They contest existing authority. Their 
very possibility challenges the church’s exclusive hold over truth. And that challenge is 
a cause for panic – for without this exclusivity, organized religion becomes irrelevant.  
The ultimate reason behind Retort’s plagiarism is this very type of panic. It is the 
fear of an organized paradigm losing its grip, the dread of an academic religion wit-
nessing its own decline.  
Marxism in the early twenty-first century is very different from the work of Marx. 
Marx’s research was novel, scientific and revolutionary; the texts of many Marxists 
today (although by no means all) are recycled, dogmatic and often anti-scientific. Marx 
was sure of his theory and confident of its political potential; many Marxists today 
doubt their theory and accept its political impotence. Marx continued, till his death, 
to develop his labour theory of value, to study the dialectical history of capitalism, to 
broaden his horizons; many of his followers, who already know it all, have given up 
on new research in favour of reproducing old-new slogans (witness the parody they 
made of his ‘primitive accumulation’). Marx tried to understand reality in order to 
change his world; many Marxists today ignore reality in order to defend their faith. 
Unlike the Marxists, Marx was never a Marxist. He wouldn’t force himself into a box. 
In contrast, many of his followers swear by an oxymoron: the ‘Marxist tradition’. 
 
 
We’ve Said it All Along 
 
For these adherents, new radical theories and research – particularly if critical of Marx 
– are a threat to be neutralized. The standard practice is to first mock these ideas and 
findings, then belittle them, and finally, if that doesn’t work – appropriate and inter-
nalize them into the dogma. This practice, of course, is well known and hardly unique 
to Marxism – or to the social sciences for that matter. It seems to be dogma’s standard 
response to novelty. ‘Every new truth’, goes the saying, ‘passes through three stages. 
In the beginning the experts ridicule it as nonsense. Then they dismiss it as trivial. And 
in the end we learn that they said it all along’.4 
4 Various versions of this quote are attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer, Arthur C. Clarke and 
Leo Szilard, among others. 
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One of the most striking examples of this pattern is the story of Cecilia Payne.5 
Payne’s doctoral dissertation, submitted at Radcliffe in 1925, showed that the sun was 
composed of over 90 per cent hydrogen, the rest being mostly helium – contrary to the 
contemporary orthodoxy according to which it was composed of two-thirds iron. The 
finding was immensely important. It suggested that Einstein’s famous equation, 
E=MC2, could be universally applied. But it also meant that the old-boys network that 
dominated academic astrophysics at the time was entirely in the wrong. Payne being 
right jeopardized their reputation, careers, budgets and patronage. And so a contract 
was put on her head. 
Her own supervisor, Harlow Shapley, declared her findings invalid, as did Henry 
Norris Russell, the all-powerful Don of East Coast astrophysics. Like Galileo, Payne 
was forced to denounce herself. In order for her thesis to pass, she had to write in it 
that, contrary to her discovery, ‘the enormous abundance [of hydrogen]. . . . is almost 
certainly not real’.  
Unlike Galileo’s, her story ended badly. Her colleagues forced her to take on an 
exceptionally heavy teaching load, so that she could do no further research; they made 
sure that her courses were not listed in the official catalogue, so as to contain her ability 
to confuse younger minds; later on, she discovered that her salary was classified as 
‘equipment expenses’. ‘There was literally no time for research’, she said, ‘a setback from 
which I have never fully recovered’. 
Eventually, though, her science prevailed. She was right and her professors were all 
wrong. Of course, that did not make them apologize, nor did it make them give up their 
secure positions and honours. They offered no token of regret. After all, they had nothing 
to be ashamed of. The sun was indeed mostly hydrogen, but hadn’t they been saying it 
all along?  
At age 77, just before her death, Payne was awarded the ‘Henry Norris Russell Prize’ 
named after the man who did the most to destroy her science. 
 
 
Free Thinking versus Doctrine 
 
The clash between creative thinking and the dogmas of power, although hardly new, 
became overtly political during the mechanical-bourgeois revolution of the seven-
teenth century. Its most famous episode was the confrontation between Galileo Galilei 
and Pope Urban VIII. Their cosmological debate came to symbolize the conflict be-
tween science and the Church, between the progress and enlightenment of the new 
liberal order and the decay and oppression of the ancient regime. 
The victory of capitalism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries altered 
this pattern. Liberalism developed its own structures of power, and as these structures 
5 Summarized and cited from David Bodanis, E=MC2. A Biography of the World's Most Famous 
Equation (2000). 
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consolidated, they, too, grew intolerant to free thinking and creative criticism. The 
dialectical history of this transformation was first described and analysed by Karl Marx 
in his German Ideology (Marx and Engels 1970). Marx was the first to treat the ‘capital-
ist system’ as a political order and, indeed, as the subject of scientific inquiry. He crit-
icized positivism with dialectical materialism. He used the laws of motion of history 
to debunk the ‘natural’ laws of political economy. He made his revolutionary science 
part of a wider political struggle against capitalism.  
But by the end of the nineteenth century dogma started to creep in, and in the 
twentieth century ‘classical’ science was already in a full-scale retreat. In the capitalist 
countries, the encompassing classical approach was replaced by a fractured ‘social sci-
ence’, a system of independent ‘disciplines’ subservient to the overarching logic of 
‘neo-positivism’. The ideology of neo-positivism combined the neoclassical economic 
belief in free markets and rational consumers on the one hand with the statist tenets of 
political science and international relations on the other. The glue that tied it together 
was the cardinal faith in ‘optimizing behaviour’ and ‘systemic equilibrium’.  
A parallel process took place in the Soviet Bloc. Marx’s classical science was har-
nessed and eventually eviscerated by the Leninist-Stalinist church. Creativity and in-
novation gave way to squabbles over interpretations. Religious hostilities developed 
between the Soviet Order and the competing papacies of Mao and Tito, each claiming 
exclusivity for its own reading of the prophet’s texts.  
 
 
Marxism in Crisis 
 
The twentieth century presented Western Marxists with significant challenges. Real 
wages in capitalist countries rose consistently and dramatically, instead of falling. 
Many types of labour became complex and skilled, rather than one-dimensional and 
simple. The profit rate trended sideways, not down. The anarchy of competition – the 
disciplinary engine of capitalism – gave way to big business coalitions and collusion. 
The capitalist state grew stronger, not weaker. After the 1930s, its policy interventions 
not only prevented serious depressions, but also helped mitigate the once-dreaded busi-
ness cycle. Culture, media and consumerism became no less crucial for accumulation 
than production was. Inflation replaced cost-cutting as a key mechanism of redistribu-
tion, while finance took over the factory floor as the locus of power. Strict class divi-
sions proved too crude a basis for dealing with the political, ideological and psycho-
logical complexities of the twentieth century. Traditional concepts of class provided 
only a partial – and often misleading – insight into human consciousness. Capitalism 
did not crumble. It has survived major upheavals and transformations – from totalitar-
ianism, to Keynesianism, to postmodernism. It outlasted communism. It seems easily 
capable of internalizing religious fundamentalism.  
The labour theory of value – the basic building block of Marxism – proved inade-
quate for dealing with these multiple challenges. On the one hand, its logical structure 
   
The Scientist and the Church | 281 
and internal consistency came under repeated attack. On the other hand, its underlying 
assumptions about competition and its focus on production grew increasingly difficult 
to reconcile with new forms of politics, power, oligopoly, finance, inflation, big gov-
ernment and imperialism. 
These difficulties brought a series of revisions to Marxism, the most important of 
which was a shift of emphasis from ‘growth’ to ‘force’, from expanded reproduction 
to accumulation through confiscation. The main trigger was a 1902 book, Imperialism, 
written by left-liberal John Hobson. Hobson accentuated the underlying tendency to-
ward underconsumption, the inability of capitalism to generate enough demand for its 
ever-growing productive capacity. This tendency, rooted in the unequal distribution of 
income of wages and profits, was further amplified by monopoly, high finance and 
military adventurism that emerged during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 
only solution was foreign investment, hence the imperial rush for colonies.  
Marxists were quick to appropriate and internalize Hobson’s liberal thesis, along 
with his painstaking empirical research (as did John Maynard Keynes several decades 
later). But in doing so they let in a Trojan horse. In retrospect, Imperialism helped derail 
Marxism from the scientific path originally charted by Marx, diverted it into statist 
and ethnic directions and ultimately hastened its dogmatic closure.  
Following Adam Smith, Marx saw in capitalism the first political order capable 
of internal growth.6 For the first time in history, there emerged a system that did not 
require external plunder. Capitalism thrived precisely because it was able to continu-
ously reorganize the work process and exploit the ever-expanding productivity of 
workers. Furthermore, and crucially, inherent to this new system of internal growth 
was its own quantitative logic. According to Marx, capitalism was a system of ex-
panded commodity production denominated in prices. Remarkably, this price system 
was itself a derivative of production: its underlying logic was rooted in labour time. 
Ultimately, then, any understanding of capitalism had to be based on a labour theory of 
value.  
The new school of underconsumption, finance-monopoly capital, imperialism, 
uneven exchange and dependency abandoned this quest. Instead of internal growth, it 
emphasized chronic stagnation. Under mature capitalism, went the argument, the ‘po-
tential surplus’ – namely the difference between what the society can produce and the 
necessary cost of producing it – had a tendency to rise. This rising surplus had to be 
‘absorbed’ by wasteful spending or ploughed into foreign investment (intertwined with 
primitive accumulation, plunder and dispossession). In the absence of such ‘offsets’, 
the surplus remained unrealized, the consequences being recession, unemployment 
and underutilized capacity.  
6 On the contradictions between Marx’s and the underconsumptionist views of capitalism, see 
Anwar Shaikh (1978). 
   
                                                        
 
 
 
282 | The Scientist and the Church 
  
Capitalism, many neo-Marxists started to believe, could not survive on its own; it 
needed military spending, imperialism, colonies, post-colonies and the development of 
underdevelopment.  
Furthermore, and as a direct consequence of this conclusion, the neo-Marxists – 
although retaining the notion of ‘surplus’ – have practically abandoned the labour the-
ory of value. They had to. The introduction of power, force and waste ‘contaminated’ 
the notion of ‘intrinsic equivalence’; it undermined the disciplinary logic of competi-
tion and technical progress; it made labour values invisible, if not nonexistent. Prices 
no longer reflected the logic of labour time, not even approximately.  
And, indeed, following Luxemburg, Lenin and Hilferding, many neo-Marxists 
were only too happy rid themselves of the theoretical burden. Marx was hesitant to 
develop a full-fledged theory of the state before coming to grips with the quantitative 
architecture of the labour theory of value. But with the latter theory discarded, it was 
now possible to venture into the analysis not only of state power, but also of culture, 
international relations, post-colonialism, race, gender and beyond.  
This new direction was not necessarily misguided. But it was certainly incomplete. 
It is plausible to argue that modern capitalism is based on power and force as well as 
economic growth, that waste is as important as efficiency, that foreign investment, war 
and colonization are all crucial, that ethnic and gender divisions count, that culture 
and the media matter. But these claims come to naught without a theory of value.  
In the absence of a theory of value, Marxists can say very little about the basic 
architecture of capitalism, namely the commodity price system. They can say very little 
about the key process of capitalism, namely the accumulation of capital. They can no 
longer claim to understand the specifically capitalist nature of society. They even lose 
the units with which to measure the surplus. 
A small number of diehard ‘orthodox’ Marxists recognize this imperative. They 
have never given up on the labour theory of value and continue to seek solutions for 
its intractable problems. But for most of those who have abandoned the theory, this is 
no longer an issue. They have never tried to replace Marx’s labour theory of value with 
another theory of value. They consequently have no theory of value at all. And, for 
the most part, they fail to realize how devastating that void is.7  
7 One of the few neo-Marxists who did understand the consequences was Paul Sweezy. In his 
1991 assessment of Monopoly Capital, a deservedly influential book that he had co-authored with 
Paul Baran twenty-five years earlier, he wrote: ‘Why did Monopoly Capital fail to anticipate the 
changes in the structure and functioning of the system that have taken place in the last twenty-
five years? Basically, I think the answer is that its conceptualization of the capital accumulation process 
is one-sided and incomplete. In the established tradition of both mainstream and Marxian econom-
ics, we treated capital accumulation as being essentially a matter of adding to the stock of exist-
ing capital goods. But in reality this is only one aspect of the process. Accumulation is also a 
matter of adding to the stock of financial assets. The two aspects are of course interrelated, but 
the nature of this interrelation is problematic to say the least. The traditional way of handling 
the problem has been in effect to assume it away: for example, buying stocks and bonds (two of 
the simpler forms of financial assets) is assumed to be merely an indirect way of buying real 
capital goods. This is hardly ever true, and it can be totally misleading. This is not the place to 
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The consequences of that void are already evident. The past decade has offered an 
opening for change. The collapse of communism brought demands for democracy; the 
victory of capitalism was challenged by worldwide resistance to liberal globalization; 
the new wars in the Middle East triggered a seemingly unprecedented anti-war senti-
ment all over the world. And, yet, at that critical moment, Marxism has proven unable 
to provide a cohesive alternative, a worldview to unite the forces of progress. It is not 
surprising that, in this void, many radicals have drifted toward theories of power and 
dispossession fashioned by Nazis such as Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt and ni-
hilists like Michel Foucault. 
For Marxism to remain dogmatic is to risk a fate similar to that of the organized 
religions. Over the past three centuries the Rabbinate, Christian and Islamic churches 
have lost their exclusive right to explain the universe. Simply put, they have been 
pushed aside by the scientific process. It is true that they have reluctantly accepted, as 
practical ‘narratives’, various aspects of science, including Copernicus, Darwin and 
Freud. It is also true that they have all made extensive use of scientific technology 
(harnessing television to the conditioning the laity, exploiting the Internet and cellular 
communication to invest in the stock market, using electronic audio and video to 
preach against science, and so on). But these inclusions have gradually undermined 
their foundations, robbing them of their authentic voices. Their only remaining asset 
is fundamentalism. The best they can do is leverage ignorance in the interest of domi-
nant capital.  
 
 
Marxism in Retreat 
 
Without its own theory of value, Marxism loses its encompassing universal view. It 
loses its scientific stature. Its claims become irrefutable. It falls back on mainstream 
economic categories. It accepts the capitalists’ own data. It uses neoclassical research 
methods. Soon enough, it ends up drawing similar conclusions.  
The ‘new wars’ of the twenty-first century illustrate this process. Marxists were 
quick to make these wars part of a ‘new imperialism’, as did the spokeswomen and 
men of capitalism. Both Marxists and mainstream analysts agreed that ‘America’ was 
an ‘empire’, and that ‘states’ and ‘state officials’ were the relevant units of analysis. 
Marxists argued that the wars were fought primarily over oil; their conservative coun-
terparts couldn’t agree more. Both sides believed that capitalism needed ‘economic 
try to point the way to a more satisfactory conceptualization of the capital accumulation process. 
It is at best an extremely complicated and difficult problem, and I am frank to say that I have 
no clues to its solution. But I can say with some confidence that achieving a better understanding 
of the monopoly capitalist society of today will be possible only on the basis of a more adequate theory of 
capital accumulation, with special emphasis on the interaction of its real and financial aspects, 
than we now possess’ (Sweezy 1991, emphasis added). 
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growth’, and both were convinced that such growth required ‘cheap energy’. Both ex-
pected the invasion of Iraq to reclaim the oil fields and undermine OPEC, making 
petroleum plentiful and inexpensive. Both were very wrong.  
There were of course also some uniquely Marxist claims. Some writers, such as 
David Harvey, asserted that the new imperialism represented ‘accumulation-by-dis-
possession’, a claim that many Marxists, including the Retort authors, echo with great 
conviction. But what does ‘dispossession’ really mean? 
What exactly is being ‘dispossessed’? Before the invasion of Iraq, there was a near-
consensus that the purpose was to physically confiscate the oil fields in order to flood 
the world with oil. This confiscation has not happened. Furthermore, Iraqi oil produc-
tion has dwindled to a trickle, with the blessing of its new U.S. administrators (who 
are now de facto members of OPEC).  
Before the invasion, the experts were convinced that the war would be financed 
by dispossessed Iraqi oil. Now it is suddenly obvious that the dispossessed are mainly 
the U.S. taxpayers and foreign creditors who foot the bill.  
Before the invasion, some argued that the war was motivated by the desire to stop 
the slide of the dollar, perpetrated by Iraq’s threat to denominate its oil trade in euros. 
But if so, why has the U.S. administration formally abandoned its hard dollar policy? 
Who are the ‘dispossessors’? The usual suspects include big business, the oil com-
panies and the Bush-Cheney Cabal. And, indeed, all have gained from the war – but 
mostly for the wrong reasons. Cheaper oil was supposed to make the world safer and 
more profitable for capitalists in general and U.S.-based companies in particular. It 
didn’t work that way. By making oil significantly more expensive, the war is now 
threatening the world with revived stagflation (stagnation combined with inflation). 
Yet, instead of crying foul over an invasion gone awfully wrong, dominant capital 
seems rather happy to see the threat of deflation dissipated, pricing power restored and 
differential profit margins fattened.  
A similar twist applies to the oil companies. Supposedly, their aim was to break 
OPEC and take over the Iraqi fields. They have done neither – yet their net profits 
have quadrupled (from roughly $30 billion globally in 1999, to an estimated $90 billion 
in 2005). And how did that happen? It happened because the war failed to archive its 
‘objective’, causing the price of oil to soar rather than fall. This outcome may seem 
confusing – but only because ‘dispossession theory’ attributes to the oil companies 
goals they probably never had. The interest of the oil companies is profit, and in the 
oil business profit depends not on high output but on high prices. There is nothing 
better than an ‘infinite war’ to achieve that latter objective – particularly if the hostili-
ties help invigorate the scapegoat OPEC.  
Finally, we have the Halliburtons and Bechtels of the Bush-Cheney cabal. They 
certainly benefited from the latest cycle of destroying and rebuilding Iraq. But, then, if 
they were the sole cause of the Iraqi adventure, do we really need Marxist dialectics to 
explain it? 
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Le Dernier Cri: ‘Overaccumulation Crisis’  
 
The Retort authors inform us that ‘“Military neo-liberalism” is the formula appropri-
ate to the current capitalist moment, and to the politics of oil’. We confess to not know-
ing what ‘military neo-liberalism’ means. We are also unsure why it is appropriate to 
the ‘current capitalist moment’ and to the ‘politics of oil’. But we are willing to learn. 
Maybe these logos do have some historical-dialectical contents worth ‘deconstructing’. 
So let’s unpack these banners. 
According to the Retort authors, ‘military neo-liberalism’ is capitalism’s response 
to a ‘crisis of overaccumulation’ (our emphasis). The ‘over’ prefix in overaccumulation 
suggests the existence of a ‘natural’ state of accumulation, a benchmark of ‘normal’ 
accumulation that the ‘actual’ rate of accumulation can exceed or fall short of.  
But what exactly is this ‘normal’ accumulation? Is there a single historical example 
of such accumulation? What type of accumulation qualifies as ‘normal’ in a capitalism 
riddled by ‘power’, ‘force’, ‘dispossession’, ‘primitive accumulation’ and ‘imperial-
ism’? Since this latter capitalism no longer obeys the labour theory of value, in what 
units should we count the accumulated capital – whether ‘over’ or ‘normal’?  
It is indeed ironic that, of all students of society, Marxists should be talking about 
‘normal’ accumulation. Their own dialectical method should warn them that there 
could be no such thing. Only pre-class societies can be ‘normal’ and ‘natural’. Perhaps 
California, where the Retort authors live, was once home to such societies. But since 
the arrival of Stanford and his Pacific Quartet, the main hallmark of normal accumu-
lation has been precisely its abnormality. That, in any event, is what the scriptures 
would say. 
The sad truth is that most present-day Marxists – although by no means all – have 
not the slightest clue as to what ‘capital accumulation’ means, theoretically or empiri-
cally. They have no idea how to separate ‘primitive accumulation’ from ‘expanded 
reproduction’, how to distinguish ‘productive’ from ‘unproductive’ labour, how to dif-
ferentiate ‘actual’ from ‘fictitious’ capital, how to convert ‘concrete’ to ‘abstract la-
bour’, or how to deal with ‘depreciation’. Most do no empirical work at all. They are 
not familiar with even the basic data about accumulation, whether ‘real’ or ‘financial’. 
They do not know how these data are computed, the assumptions that underlie their 
computation, or how these assumptions stack against the labour theory of value. Most 
of their empirical assertions are based on the research of mainstream academics, finan-
cial analysts or the business press – research that they are happy to convert, with a few 
strokes on the keyboard, into self-evident ‘Marxist’ conclusions. There are a select few 
who do empirical research – some of which is highly insightful – but even they rarely 
venture beyond the categories of mainstream macroeconomics and the data provided 
by the capitalist national accounts.  
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The ‘New Imperialism’ 
 
The sudden bellicosity of the early 2000s caught most Marxists by surprise. During the 
1990s, their attention focused mainly on ‘globalization’. The key words were ‘neolib-
eralism’ and the ‘new economy’. There were heated debates about the pros and cons 
of capital flows and emerging markets, about deregulation and the decline of the wel-
fare state. Mainstream ideologues told us that these developments were best for hu-
manity. Marxists, for the most part, took it upon themselves to argue the opposite.  
When the new wars erupted, the old slogans had to be removed in haste. But with 
the dogma still the same, the only solution was to reword those very slogans, adapt 
them to the new, unpleasant reality, and hang them up again.  
Since most liberals and Marxists agreed that the world was ‘neoliberal’, it followed 
that the new wars must be ‘neoliberal wars’ and the new path of rearmament simply 
part of ‘military neoliberalism’. True, unlike in past imperialisms, the conquests of 
Afghanistan and Iraq were not followed by foreign investment; but, then, that was 
simply because we now lived in a ‘new imperialism’.  
And why is there suddenly a need for a ‘new imperialism’? Easy. According to 
Nitzan and Bichler, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq are part of a broader process 
of capitalist development, one in which dominant capital swings between relatively 
peaceful waves of corporate merger, globalization and liberal ideology on the one 
hand, and highly conflictual periods of stagflation, boosted by military conflict and 
statist rhetoric on the other. The new Middle East wars are part of this latter regime.8  
It is true that Nitzan and Bichler do not equate this regime with ‘imperialism’. In 
fact, they claim that the term ‘imperialism’ belongs to another era, and that it is highly 
misleading when applied to contemporary capitalism. But then, with so much noise 
coming from the war drums, who would ever notice? Just replace Nitzan and Bichler 
with ‘our view’, hang up the banner of ‘new imperialism’, and the explanation be-
comes Retort’s:  
 
In our view, the [naive] Blood for Oil thesis loses sight of what oil ultimately 
stands for in the present moment: that is, neo-liberalism mutating from an 
epoch of ‘agreements’ and austerity programmes to one of outright war; the 
plural and unstable relations among specific forms of capital, always under 
the banner of some apparently dominant mass commodity; and those periodic 
waves of capitalist restructuring we call primitive accumulation. . . .  
 
8 For a broad analysis of differential accumulation regimes, see ‘Regimes of Differential Accu-
mulation’ (Nitzan 2001) and The Global Political Economy of Israel (Nitzan and Bichler 2002: Ch. 
2). The two papers, ‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2004b) and 
‘Differential Accumulation and Middle East Wars: Beyond Neo-Liberalism’ (Bichler and 
Nitzan 2004a), examine the present moment as part of these altering regimes. 
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This is the proper frame [à la Retort] for understanding what has happened in 
Iraq. It is only as part of this neo-liberal firmament [we admit to not knowing 
what ‘neo-liberal firmament’ means], in which a dominant capitalist core has 
begun to find it harder and harder to benefit from ‘consensual’ market expan-
sion or corporate mergers and asset transfers, that the preference for the mili-
tary option makes sense. 
 
And how exactly will the ‘military option’ compensate for the lost consensus? Through 
a new slogan: ‘accumulation-by-dispossession’. And how does this dispossession func-
tion? Elementary: by making oil plentiful and cheap. But isn’t oil now five times more 
expensive than it was in 1999? Yes, of course it is! In doublespeak ‘cheap is always 
more expensive’. The dialectic of capitalist inner contradictions eventually creates the 
conditions for its own demise. So, does that mean that capitalism is about to collapse? 
Yes and No. War is Peace. Ignorance is Strength. . . . 
 
New Imperialism or New Capitalism? 
 
Since the late 1980s, we have published works that challenge Marxism on its own turf. 
Our claims are meant to elucidate rather than obfuscate; they are spelled out clearly, 
without foggy double meanings; they include concrete predictions. We argue that, 
over the past century, capitalism has fundamentally changed. To understand this trans-
formation, we offer a new, power theory of value that contests both the utility and 
labour theories of value.  
The theory emphasizes the primacy of disaggregation, redistribution and differential 
accumulation; it focuses on the power processes that underlie overall social develop-
ment; it offers a new logic of capital accumulation and capitalist development; it sug-
gests new ways of studying the capitalist state and the inter-state arena.  
Based on our power theory of capital, we have conceived of and analysed two 
basic regimes of differential accumulation – breadth and depth. The breadth regime is 
powered by corporate amalgamation and capital flow; it occurs in the context of pro-
letarianization, green-field growth and relative political stability. The depth regime is 
fuelled by redistribution through stagflation; it occurs in the context of inflation, stag-
nation, political instability, crisis and military conflict.  
We have studied how the cyclical pendulum of these two regimes emerged, devel-
oped and related to one another. We have dissected the empirical gyrations of these 
regimes in the United States and elsewhere. We have analysed their broader political-
economic causes and consequences. We have examined how they pan out in relation 
to the more secular development and contradictions of state/capital, liberalism/mili-
tarism, growth/stagflation, corporate warfare/cooperation, peace and war and the 
global political economy of oil and armament.  
Using this analysis, we predicted that the long breadth cycle that started in the 
1980s was approaching an end. Global capitalism, we wrote in the late 1990s, was 
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ready to revert to a depth cycle, accompanied by stagflation, crisis and conflict. We 
further stated that stagflation and conflict, should they develop, would likely boost 
differential accumulation by the world’s leading dominant capital groups.  
At the time, these claims were largely ignored or simply treated as off-the-wall 
nonsense. It was well-known that the last thing capitalists wanted was inflation; that 
stagflation was an anomaly best forgotten; and that the world had long moved from 
war profits to peace dividends.  
We further argued that, if and when it came, the shift from breadth to depth, or 
from mergers and acquisitions to stagflation, would likely centre on oil and the Middle 
East. This claim emerged from integrating our work on ‘energy conflicts’ and oil crises 
into our broader analysis of regimes of differential accumulation. In 1996, we pre-
dicted that the next ‘energy conflict’ would erupt following a drop in differential prof-
itability of the oil companies. When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, we wrote that, 
contrary to the prevailing consensus, the move was intended to destabilize the region 
and raise the price of oil, and that it would succeed on both counts.  
Again, these claims were treated with a mixture of indifference and disdain. It was 
well-known that wars were made by ‘policy makers’, not petroleum companies; that 
the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were meant to tranquilize the fundamentalists 
and stabilize the Middle East; that the U.S. was keen on dismantling OPEC and flood-
ing the world with cheap oil in order to invigorate ‘growth’ and boost ‘accumulation’. 
Our analyses were branded as ‘economistic’, ‘mechanistic’, ‘deterministic’, ‘posi-
tivist’ and ‘perfunctory’. We were scolded for our ‘arrogance’, warned against ‘cutting 
ourselves loose’ from the protective embrace of the ‘Marxist tradition’. Learned mag-
azines and journals, some very much on the left, rejected our submissions as ‘unsubtle’ 
and insufficiently tuned to the ‘complexities’ and ‘dialectics’ of the situation. Only a 
few, mostly fringe publications, were willing to risk their reputation with our wild 
propositions and predictions.  
But in the end, it is hard to argue with the facts (although perhaps not for Retort; 
they know how to convince the evidence). It is a fact that the new wars did come on 
the footsteps of differential decumulation by the oil companies; it is a fact that these 
companies were very much involved in planning the coming conflicts; it is a fact that 
the price of oil has quadrupled and that the profits of the oil companies are in the 
stratosphere; it is a fact that the global merger wave has collapsed, deflation dissipated 
and stagflation resurfaced as a real threat. And, suddenly, it is also a fact that – as of 
now – the experts have ‘said it all along’.  
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PART III: EPILOGUE 
 
Correspondence 
 
On May 15, 2005, we emailed a shorter version of this paper (roughly 11,000 words) 
to the London Review of Book. The paper was accompanied by the following cover letter:  
 
May 15, 2005 
 
Dear Mary-Kay Wilmers: 
 
We are writing to you concerning a serious matter. 
 
On April 21, 2005, LRB published an article titled ‘Blood for Oil?’ written by Boal, 
Clark, Matthews and Watts. Much of this article – including both theory and fact – is 
plagiarized from our own work, primarily The Global Political Economy of Israel (Lon-
don: Pluto, 2002). Enclosed is a reply article, titled ‘The Scientist and the Church’. 
The article illustrates the plagiarism. It also explains the broader reasons behind it. We 
trust you will publish it. 
 
Looking forward to your reply. 
 
Cordially, 
 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler 
 
To be honest, we didn’t exactly ‘trust’ the London Review of Books to publish our 
paper. We have had enough experience to know better. Le Monde, for example, agreed 
to publish our short conference article titled ‘The End of Liberalism?’ (Bichler and 
Nitzan 2003) – but quickly reneged once its Editor in Chief, Serge Marti, got to read 
the text. Similarly, Alternatives Internationales commissioned a French version of our 
‘War Profits, Peace Dividends and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ (Bichler and Nitzan 
2002) – only to reject it for being ‘too economistic’. That latter paper, re-submitted to 
the London Review of Books, was politely turned down by the editor, Mary-Kay Wil-
mers, with no reason given.  
There was of course no malice involved. We were simply ahead of our time and 
out of the loop. Recall that in the early 2000s, stagflation, dominant capital and accu-
mulation-through-crisis were bizarre heresies. To be politically correct, you had to 
write about the imperatives of growth, cheap oil and American hegemonic stability.  
   
 
 
 
290 | The Scientist and the Church 
  
But the times, they are a-changin’. The unpleasant reality demands ‘revisions’ to 
the theory. And, so, without much commotion, the lines are switched. What was ri-
diculous only a few years ago is now suddenly part of the dogma. Soon enough, it is 
posted on the front pages of the London Review of Books.  
Obviously, no sensible editor would wish to expose such a racket, particularly one 
soaked in plagiarism. Within three days, we received a polite reply: 
 
May 18, 2005 
 
Dear Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 
 
I read ‘The Scientist and the Church’ with interest and would be very happy to publish 
a 1000-word letter setting out your argument in our next issue, which goes to press at 
the end of the month. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Mary-Kay Wilmers 
 
It was unwise to reject us outright (there was a potential legal matter here). But 
there was no need to try too hard, either. It was enough to offer us ‘some’ space. One 
thousand words in the Letters to the Editor section seemed more than sufficient to 
keep us contained. 
To be on the safe side, the editor also passed on our cover letter and article to the 
Pacific Quartet. In no time they sent us an affidavit, full of pretentious modesty. You 
could almost sense the panic: 
  
May 18, 2005 
 
Dear Professor Nitzan: I am enclosing a letter from RETORT, the authors of the 
‘Blood for Oil?’ article published in the London Review Books, written in response to 
your recent communication with the editor. I am afraid I have no email for Professor 
Bichler but I presume you can forward a copy to him. We all look forward to your 
response.  
 
Michael Watts 
 
 
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Dear Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler: 
 
We received from the London Review of Books your long argument, which at least in 
some major respects concerns our piece ‘Blood for Oil?’ which appeared in the April 
21st issue of the LRB. We are deeply distressed and dumbfounded at your response, 
in particular because the LRB piece was a heavily edited (by LRB) version of one 
chapter (the only chapter on oil) from our just-published book from Verso Afflicted Pow-
ers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War in the full version of which we repeatedly 
feature, fully credit and highly praise your otherwise unjustly ignored work.  
 
The main problem with the LRB piece is that in its extensive and rigorous edit of the 
original chapter, to fit the journal’s length constraints and house style, LRB excised all 
our annotations, including the considerable recognition of and citation to your work 
which appears in our full ‘Blood for Oil?’ chapter. In the section of the book’s chapter 
(pp. 67-72) which deals directly with your theses, we are explicit that we are rehearsing 
your work and endorsing the originality and power of your argument, directly citing 
you six times, and beginning the section with a reference that reads: ‘We are deeply 
indebted to the brilliant analysis of the political economy of oil offered by Jonathan 
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler in The Global Political Economy of Israel’. We begin the 
following section by saying ‘We take our distance here from Nitzan and Bichler’s anal-
ysis’, once again announcing that what had preceded was a rehearsal of your work, not 
something we claimed as our own. Finally, in our bibliographic Endnote, we say flatly 
‘The best political economy of global oil is Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 
The Global Political Economy of Israel’. It is terribly unfortunate that you had seen none 
of this when you read the LRB piece. 
 
Moreover, nowhere in the book do we claim or even suggest that the Blood for Oil? 
chapter contains original research by us on the material conditions of oil, or purports 
to be a study of oil within academic or ‘policy’ social sciences. In other words, the 
book’s chapter in no way ‘competes’ with your exhaustive empirical work or with your 
original analytical work. Instead, the book as a whole makes clear that it is intended 
as a political intervention concerning the current state of global politics, of which the 
commonly-held Blood for Oil thesis is an unavoidable piece. The ‘Blood for Oil?’ chap-
ter is just one part of a much larger polemic, an argument about the state of the world, 
which inevitably must consider work done by many oil ‘experts’, prominently includ-
ing you (in contradistinction to most writing on oil which conspicuously ignores your 
work). Again, because you only saw the edited version of the chapter in LRB, you 
missed, crucially, this contextual setting of the chapter. 
 
Finally, we also understand your complaint about the LRB piece as part of a long-
festering struggle you have been fighting within left academic/intellectual communi-
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ties over recognition of your work. Although we strongly disagree, as the rest of Af-
flicted Powers makes patent, with what seems to be your inclusion of us in the world of 
Marxist orthodoxy which has excluded you from official circles of debate about oil 
and capital, it seems that your (mis)placing of us within that wider struggle has pro-
vided much of your animus here. The sad irony is that in ‘Blood for Oil?’ we were 
attempting to do our part to draw your tremendous work out of the shadows, not con-
sign it deeper. (And ultimately we believe that Afflicted Powers will wind up sending 
many people to your work who would otherwise not have known of or been drawn to 
it.) 
 
Of course, you may well disagree with our substantive arguments in the full ‘Blood for 
Oil?’ chapter, and indeed with the conclusions we draw from your work. We would 
welcome such commentary from you. But we hope that you will first read the full 
Afflicted Powers – we have asked Verso to get you a copy as soon as possible – before 
you make any assessment about its relationship to your work. We count ourselves 
among your great admirers, and are sure that this admiration and the extent of our 
debt to you is fully (almost fulsomely) acknowledged in the book. Regardless of what-
ever you will have to say by way of substantive criticism of our treatment of the Blood 
for Oil hypothesis, we very much doubt that, when you see Afflicted Powers as a whole, 
you'll go on believing us to be part of the extended claque of Marxist orthodoxy, and 
that you will then respond within the spirit of comradeship with which we drew upon 
your work. We are on the same side. 
 
On behalf of Retort. 
 
Leyland Stanford would have been proud of such sleek disciples. The Retort Quar-
tet is utterly sincere (‘deeply distressed and dumbfounded’). It was all one big misun-
derstanding, they insist (‘sad irony’, ‘terribly unfortunate’). Regrettably, the editors of 
the London Review of Books weeded out the numerous credits (‘excised all our annota-
tions, including the considerable recognition of and citation to your work’). By con-
trast, the book overflows with recognition. It states clearly that Retort merely repro-
duces our work (‘we are explicit that we are rehearsing your work and endorsing the 
originality and power of your argument’). Furthermore, when it comes to oil, Afflicted 
Powers has no claim for originality in the first place (‘nowhere in the book do we claim 
or even suggest that the Blood for Oil? chapter contains original research by us on the 
material conditions of oil’). No doubt, ‘we are on the same side’. 
But, then, the story sounds a bit too compelling. Editors can certainly do nasty 
things to manuscripts. We know it from our own experience. In most cases, though, 
the authors have to approve the final galley proofs before the paper goes to print. Is it 
possible that the London Review of Books first ‘excised’ all of Retort’s annotation and 
then published the truncated version without Retort’s approval? The easiest way to find 
out is to ask: 
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May 20, 2005 
 
Dear Mary-Kay Wilmers: 
 
We received the enclosed letter from Michael Watts. In this letter, Mr. Watts claims 
that the LRB ‘excised all our annotations, including the considerable recognition of 
and citation to your work’. We would appreciate if you could kindly clarify for us 
whether the final proofs of ‘Blood for Oil?’ were approved by the Retort authors. 
 
Cordially, 
 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler 
 
 A few days later we received her unambiguous reply (our emphasis):  
 
May 26, 2005 
 
Dear Jonathan Nitzan, 
 
Yes, the final proofs for 'Blood for Oil?' were approved by Retort. 
 
I hope you can see your way to writing a letter setting out your argument: perhaps a 
correspondence in the LRB would be the most effective way of airing your disagree-
ments with Retort's position. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Mary-Kay Wilmers 
  
Joseph Goebbels used to say that if you tell a big enough lie and keep repeating it, 
people will eventually come to believe it. This insight proved a fitting basis for post-
modernists on which to build their booming business of ‘narratives’, ‘mass communi-
cation’ and ‘virtual’ piracy.  
In her email, the editor made another attempt to minimize the damage, trying to 
have us air our ‘disagreements’ with Retort via ‘correspondence’. We admit to being 
somewhat surprised with the terminology. We did not know that, in politically correct 
newspeak, plain theft has become ‘disagreement’. Better wait for Afflicted Powers. 
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Afflicted Powers 
 
Eventually, the book arrived in the mail. We read it. The situation was much worse 
than we had thought. The book contained the very same plagiarism as the article, and 
more. 
Afflicted Powers begins by dispelling all doubts. In their second paragraph the Retort 
authors declare that all of them – individually and as a group – knew exactly what they 
were doing: 
 
After preparatory work by the four of us separately and together, each one of 
the quartet took responsibility for the first drafting of a chapter. Every para-
graph was then subjected to scrutiny, discussion, and multiple revisions by 
all four. (Afflicted Powers, Retort 2005: XI, our emphasis) 
 
The overall method of plagiarism is spelled out a few paragraphs later. Appar-
ently, the book consists of two types of text – documented and undocumented. 
  
Following the example of the Junius Brochure, at points in the book certain 
arguments and assertions are made without resort to the formal critical ap-
paratus of scholarship; footnotes there are few, the larger canvas of rele-
vant literature largely invisible. At other points, the nature of the subject at 
hand demands a level of historical and empirical detail (even exegesis) in 
order for the book’s criticism of the present to be sustained. (p. XII, our em-
phasis) 
 
The documented parts are rather impressive in their detailed attributions. The Re-
tort authors carefully annotate even the most trite facts and claims with detailed refer-
ences and quotations. The main exception to this rule is the work of Nitzan and Bich-
ler. Apparently, this ‘larger canvas of relevant literature’ does not demand footnotes. 
It does not require the ‘formal critical apparatus of scholarship’. It is best kept ‘invisi-
ble’.  
In their affidavit, the Retort authors state that there is only one part of Chapter 2 
which deals ‘directly’ with our theses (section VI, pp. 67-72). This is a plain lie. Retort 
would have been correct to say that there is only one part that deals ‘explicitly’ with 
our work; the rest of the chapter deals with it ‘implicitly’ – namely, through plagiarism.  
 
  
Form and Content 
 
The overall structure of Chapter 2 – the central chapter of the book – bears a surprising 
resemblance to two of our articles – ‘It’s All About Oil’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2003) and 
‘Clash of Civilization, or Capital Accumulation?’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2003). These 
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papers begin by presenting the conventional creed. They explain, in point form, the 
accepted logic of why the new wars are supposedly ‘all about oil’; the papers then 
debunk these arguments, point by point; finally, they offer our own alternative expla-
nations. 
The Retort authors lay out this very structure, explicitly. Moreover – and contrary 
to their sleek affidavit where they insist that they merely ‘rehearse’ our theses and claim 
‘no originality’ – here they take full credit, repeatedly. Notice, the frequent use of ‘we’ 
and ‘our’: 
 
Let us set out our ambitions for this chapter as unambiguously as we can. 
The first aims to identify the broad contours of the Blood for Oil account – in 
the process putting the thesis itself in the strongest form we can manage. The 
second goes on to expose the actual complexity, and the heterogeneous form, 
of the oil argument when it is deployed as anything more than a slogan (and 
in so doing we hope to demonstrate that the argument itself, pursued at all 
seriously, compels its users to move beyond oil as such). We then provide our 
own reading of oil politics; namely a synoptic view of the constitutive role of 
oil in American empire, but one that exposes, and questions, Blood for Oil’s 
Malthusian underpinnings – its presumption that the control of oil led ineluc-
tably to war, and most of all, its unwillingness to situate oil on the larger land-
scape of capital. Finally, we turn to the occupation of Iraq, and try to situate 
American policy in the Middle East in relation to the full spectrum of capital’s 
need and appetites over the past decade. . . . What follows is sometimes tech-
nical, not to say tortuous. We see no way out of this. . . . The Blood for Oil 
argument claims to provide an account of capitalist politics. We believe it 
does not. Our obligation to the reader, therefore, is to establish what a genu-
ine account would consist of. (Afflicted Powers, Retort 2005: 42-43) 
 
As usual, the Retort authors work wholesale. In converting Nitzan and Bichler’s 
view into their own ‘genuine account’, they plagiarize everything – from the form, to 
the contents, to the language. Begin with the very rationale for their title, ‘Blood for 
Oil?’: 
 
Retort #9: ‘If there was a single political 
thread tying the anti-war mobilizations 
together, it was undoubtedly the refrain 
of “No Blood for Oil”’ (Afflicted Powers, 
pp. 40-42). 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘If there is any 
agreement among the pundits, this 
surely must be it: the coming war on Iraq 
will be fought largely over oil’ ('It's All 
About Oil', 2003: 8, original emphasis). 
 
When done with the title, the Retort authors move on to borrow our point-form 
specification of the conventional reasoning of the war: 
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Retort #10: ‘‘In our tally, the Blood for 
Oil argument might mean that the war 
was launched for any (or all) of the fol-
lowing reasons, or through some con-
catenation of them’ (Afflicted Powers, p. 
50, emphasis added) 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘The gist of the ar-
gument [regarding the coming war in 
Iraq] is simple enough, and could be 
summarized as follows’ ('It's All About 
Oil', 2003: 8). 
 
In ‘It’s All About Oil’, we enumerate five related reasons, listed in bullet form. On 
pages 51-52 of Afflicted Powers, the Retort authors reproduce this same format with a 
hodgepodge of twelve bulleted reasons. The tenth bullet strikes a cord:  
 
Because war represented, as in other energy conflicts, a means to restore flag-
ging corporate profitability, low oil prices, and general order within the oil 
system worldwide. (p. 52)  
 
In other words, with a few strokes of the keyboard, the least conventional of rea-
sons – the view of the Iraq invasion as an ‘energy conflict’ – has suddenly become part 
of the convention. Note that this is the first place in the book where the Retort authors 
mention ‘energy conflicts’. Yet, there is no explanation as to what these conflicts are, 
how they work and how they are connected to corporate profitability (and, of course, 
no reference to Nitzan and Bichler who invented the concept in the first place).  
Instead we are told that the Iraq war is just like ‘other’ energy conflicts. Presuma-
bly, the reader already knows precisely what ‘energy conflicts’ are, and that the Iraq 
war qualifies as one. The reader also knows – probably from watching Fox News – 
that these conflicts typically ‘restore’ flagging corporate profitability. The only glitch 
is the bizarre reference to low oil prices. Is it true that ‘energy conflicts’ produce low 
oil prices? And if so, how would low oil prices restore the profits of oil companies? Is 
this a sophisticated tactic of hiding one’s sources (since Bichler and Nitzan talk about 
high prices)? Or is it simply the unfortunate typo of a plagiarist?9 
9 The Retort authors use this tactic of ‘appropriation-by-trivialization’ throughout the text. For 
instance, on page 47 of their book, they refer to the first part of the twentieth century as ‘the so-
called era of “free-flowing oil”’. So-called?! So-called by whom?! So-called where?! This is the 
first time the concept appears in the book. But since it is ‘so-called’ – i.e. familiar enough to have 
acquired a well-known nickname – there is no need to reference its source. Or consider the 
discussion of ‘scarcity’ on page 63 of their book. There they write: ‘An examination of [crude 
oil] inventories (a common way to estimate the desires of buyers and sellers) confounds ex-
pectations further’. Inventories as a common way to estimate desires?! Where is this method 
common?! Who uses it?! Even a half-trained economist would not make this claim. Moreover, 
and as already noted, our discussion of the ‘scarcity thesis’ explicitly debunks the notion that 
changes in inventories could proxy ‘excess demand’ as ‘excess supply’. But since the Retort 
authors convince themselves that this is in fact a ‘common’ method – i.e. well known and fre-
quently used – they feel free to both distort our critique and plagiarize our research in the same 
swoop.  
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Having listed the accepted reasons for the war, the Retort authors set the stage for 
their ‘own’ view: 
  
Retort #11: ‘So much for the prosecu-
tion case. . . . But the argument, under 
closer scrutiny, turns out to be rather 
more complex and unstable’ (Afflicted 
Powers, p. 50) 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘These views all 
ring true . . . [but] . . . As it turns out, 
the situation is a bit more complicated’  
('It's All About Oil', 2003: 8-9). 
 
The beginning of the millennium was marked by exceptionally low oil prices – so 
much so that even The Economist of London was tempted to conclude the world was 
awash with oil. OPEC was clearly helpless, and The Economist went so far as to predict 
a further drop in oil prices, perhaps to $5 a barrel (Anonymous 1999). It was in this 
context that we raised the obvious – yet unasked – question: what was the point of 
launching a war to make oil cheaper when it was already practically free? The Retort 
authors were obviously struck by the same lightning:  
   
Retort #12: ‘Given all this, why would 
the companies or the Bush Cabinet be-
lieve that it required an invasion to put 
things right? . . . Indeed, why open the 
box at all? . . . War is rarely a vehicle for 
price stability . . . but perhaps that is the 
point’ (Afflicted Powers, pp. 65-66). 
Nitzan and Bichler: ‘Under these cir-
cumstances, and assuming it is indeed 
‘all about oil’, shouldn’t the cartel be 
left alone to pursue its futile maneu-
vers? Or perhaps OPEC’s ineffective-
ness is precisely the problem? ('It's All 
About Oil', 2003: 8). 
 
Of course, the Retort authors do not stop at the structure. The detailed content of 
their book chapter – their so-called ‘genuine account’ – plagiarizes and distorts our 
work precisely in the same way as their London Review of Book article. Since we have 
already exposed this plagiarism earlier in the paper, there is no point in reproducing it 
here. Suffice it to say that the eight plagiarized ‘quotes’ from their article, individually 
numbered from Retort #1 to Retort #8, could all be found in Chapter 2 of Afflicted 
Powers.10 Six of these eight quotes appear without any reference to Bichler and Nitzan 
– and, indeed, appear before their names are even mentioned. The two remaining 
quotes contain references to our work; but as we illustrate later, these references are 
grossly misleading.  
 
  
10 For those interested, the quote from the London Review of Books article, numbered Retort #1, 
appears in Afflicted Powers on pp. 47-48; Retort #2 appears on p. 48; Retort #3 on p. 59; Retort #4 
on pp. 63-64; Retort #5 on p. 64; Retort #6 on pp. 67-68; Retort #7 on pp. 68-69; and Retort #8 
on p. 54. 
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The Stamp of Property 
 
The main difference between Chapter 2 of Afflicted Powers and the article in the London 
Review of Books is the language. In their article, the Retort authors tend to plagiarize 
our claims in the ‘abstract’. Occasionally, they use the prefix ‘in our view’; but, for the 
most part, they simply provide the explanation or assertion, leaving it to reader to 
connect the obvious dots to Retort. Their book chapter is far less subtle. Here, the 
Retort authors stamp their proprietary claims all over the plagiarized text. Consider 
the following illustrations, with our emphases added:  
 
In our tally, the Blood for Oil argument might mean that the war was 
launched for any (or all) of the following reasons, or through some concate-
nation of them. (p. 50) 
 
How, then, do we position oil [original emphasis], and the global reach of the 
supermajors, in our interpretation of the Iraqi invasion? (p. 55) 
 
How, then, does this history affect the Blood for Oil argument in the case of 
Iraq? In brief, we go on to argue the following. First, there was no shortage, 
or impending shortage, of oil during the time war was in the planning state. 
Second, war was in no sense a structural or strategic necessity; indeed it rep-
resented a high-stakes gamble, not least for the oil industry itself. There was a 
record – long and ignominious – of proven alternatives to military force, as 
the recent history of both imperial and American oil reveal. And third, as we 
have stated previously, a narrow focus on oil qua commodity cannot grasp 
the larger capitalist complex of which oil is a constituent part. (p. 59) 
 
We begin with the specter of shortage. . . . Our view is that scarcity and price 
– the twin sisters of Mathusian pessimism – provide no ground on which the 
Iraq war can or shod be located (p. 59)  
 
In our view, the very formulation of the Blood for Oil hypothesis concedes 
too much to this magical point of view. As we have said before, it substitutes 
oil (as one sector or industry) for a dominant capitalist core, and fixes on the 
character of a single commodity at the expense of the systematic imperatives 
of capital in general. (p. 67) 
 
 
‘Giving Full Credit’: A Case Study of Referenced Plagiarism  
 
We now arrive at Retort’s saving grace, the section of their book that supposedly ‘deals 
directly’ with our theses (Section VI, pp. 67-72). This is where Nitzan and Bichler are 
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first mentioned (cited ‘six times’); it is where the Retort authors are ‘explicit’ that they 
are merely ‘rehearsing’ our work; where they endorse ‘the originality and power’ of 
our argument; where they declare their ‘indebtedness’; where they ‘fully credit and 
highly praise’ our ‘otherwise unjustly ignored work’.  
As already noted, the Retort authors ‘deal’ with our work not only in this section, 
but throughout Chapter 2 – and mostly before our work is even mentioned. But let’s 
leave that aside for a moment and concentrate specifically on the pages of this oasis of 
honesty. 
The Retort authors do mention our names several times, but it is hard to know 
exactly what they reference. The first paragraph of Section VI, found on page 67, ends 
with a footnote in which the Retort authors announce:  
 
We are deeply indebted to the brilliant analysis of the political economy of oil 
offered by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler in The Global Political Econ-
omy of Israel  
 
Evidently, the Quartet has internalized the lessons of advanced Taylorism. It is much 
cheaper to dispossess with a little gift than with an expensive stick. Give the natives 
glass necklaces; decorate your subjects for patriotic bravery; hand the blacks their Ban-
tustans; give the Palestinians their Westbank-Gazustans; make your workers ‘employ-
ees of the month’. It costs nothing and it works well. So well that even here, in their 
rare moment of gratitude, the Retort authors could not resist the temptation. Their 
indebtedness notwithstanding, they attribute the actual contents of the paragraph not 
to the ‘brilliant analysts’, but to themselves (‘In our view. . . . As we have said be-
fore. . . ’.).  
The next paragraph (pp. 67-68) ends with a footnote referencing page 227 of The 
Global Political Economy of Israel. On the face of it, this looks like an honest attribution. 
It is not. The content of this paragraph is the same as the plagiarized text quoted in 
Retort #6. The Retort authors pretend to reference this content, but in fact they do not. 
The bulk of Retort’s argument here is taken not from page 227 of our book, but from 
page 228. There, we draw on the works of six different authors, synthesizing their 
views about the converging interests of OPEC, Western governments and the oil com-
panies. Our own synthesis fully references these authors. By contrast, Retort references 
neither this synthesis nor the original authors. 
But if so, why do they end this paragraph with a reference to the wrong page in 
our book? The answer is simple. The last sentence in the paragraph quotes the words 
of Sheikh Yamani. This quote is given on page 227 of our book. In other words, it is 
Yamani’s words – and not the wider argument – that the Retort authors reference. Yet, 
even that reference is misleading. In fact, the quote from Yamani originates not in our 
own book, but in a book by Richard Barnet. We reference Barnet; Retort does not even 
mention him. In this way, the unsuspecting reader is led to believe that the thrust of 
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the argument in this paragraph is Retort’s, while Nitzan and Bichler merely supply the 
decoration. 
This smokescreen method is also applied elsewhere in the book. For instance, 
when dealing with the conventional reasons for the invasion of Iraq, the Retort authors 
write:  
 
Shock and awe offered the prospect, as Thomas Friedman said at the time, of 
killing two birds with one stone: ‘Destroy Saddam and destabilize OPEC’. 
(Afflicted Powers, Retort 2005: 46, emphasis added) 
  
But that is not exactly what Friedman said. In the Guardian, from where he is 
quoted, he used a metaphor from American salesmanship:  
 
If that scenario prevails, you could look at an invasion of Iraq as a possible 
two-for-one sale: destroy Saddam and destabilise Opec at the same time. 
(August 6, 2002, emphasis added) 
 
The killing-of-birds metaphor comes from The Economist, as quoted in our article:  
 
It might seem, then, that knocking out Mr Hussein would kill two birds with 
one stone: a dangerous dictator would be gone, and with him would go the 
cartel that for years has manipulated prices, engineered embargoes and other-
wise harmed consumers. (The Economist, September 14, 2002; cited in 'It's All 
About Oil', 2003: 8, emphasis added) 
 
On other occasions, the Retort authors are less careful in covering up their trail. 
On pages 72-73, for instance, they provide evidence for neoliberalism that presuma-
bly comes from the United Nations:  
 
Ninety five percent of all regulatory changes during the 1990s, as inventoried 
by the UN World Investment Report, were aimed at liberalizing capital controls. 
The tripling of bilateral investment treaties in the first half of the same decade 
was almost wholly aimed at removing ‘barriers’ to foreign investment. 
 
Unfortunately, the Retort authors never bothered to check the World Investment 
Report itself. They simply copied these ‘facts’ from a footnote on page 266 of The Global 
Political Economy of Israel (Nitzan and Bichler 2002). Had they actually read the Report, 
they would have realized that these ‘cited’ facts do not appear there. They were com-
puted by us, calculated from the raw data provided in the Report. 
Back to Section VI of Chapter 2, the next paragraph in line (pp. 68-69) is one 
where Nitzan and Bichler are ‘fully credited’ – or so it seems. In this paragraph, the 
Retort authors attribute to us the concept of the ‘politicization of the oil sector’, the 
   
The Scientist and the Church | 301 
concept of ‘commercialization of the arms industry’, and the concept of ‘Weapondol-
lar-Petrodollar Coalition’. The entire attribution is condensed into two sentences. 
Since there is no explanation for these terms, no reader could possibly understand what 
they mean. Furthermore, the attribution is specific to these concepts, and only to these 
concepts. The rest of the paragraph contains the plagiarized text of Retort #7. It in-
cludes a discussion of the ‘Arma-Core’, data on the financing of arms exports, statistics 
on the distribution of corporate profits, and more – all taken from our work without 
any reference.  
The plagiarism feeds into the next couple of paragraphs (pp. 69-70). Here, the Re-
tort authors introduce numerous additional claims and facts – from the redistribution 
of global income to the redistribution of global arms imports, the correlation between 
OPEC’s oil revenues and Middle-East arms imports, the interaction of ‘energy con-
flicts’ and ‘oil-fuelled militarization’, ‘danger zones’ and oil price movements, among 
others. All of these claims and facts are taken from Nitzan and Bichler. Yet, only two 
– the correlation between oil revenues and arms imports and the notion of ‘tension 
without war’ – are explicitly referenced. Each attribution occurs in the middle of a 
paragraph. Each specifically references the item in question, and only the item in ques-
tion. Since all the other claims, facts and concepts are not referenced at all, the obvious 
conclusion is that they must be Retort’s. The sole exception is ‘danger zones’ – a con-
cept that Nitzan and Bichler invented and the Retort authors, in their infinite arro-
gance, attribute to . . . ‘the industry’!  
The next paragraph (pp. 70-71) begins the process of disengagement. Like in the 
London Review of Books, the Retort authors are all too happy to ‘take their distance’, 
only here they do so with much more fanfare and far greater assertiveness:  
 
We take our distance here from Nitzan and Bichler’s analysis. The kind of 
political servo-mechanism they point to, precisely calibrating the oil/arms 
nexus – and setting the tempo of American rule more broadly – is in the end 
too perfunctory, too mechanical. For the significance of oil, we have been 
arguing, derives as much from. . . . We are not fully convinced that the oil-
arms-military-engineering-construction-finance-drug nexus was brought to 
crisis point by the ‘peace dividend’, by low oil prices, and by the 1990s explo-
sion of the high-tech sector [as presumably argued by Nitzan and Bicher]. But 
we are confident that the transnational constellation of capital . . . must be 
assessed. (Afflicted Powers, Retort 2005: 70-72) 
 
Of course, like with Sharon’s ‘disengagement’ from the Palestinians, at this point no 
reader could possibly know what it is precisely that the Retort authors ‘take their dis-
tance’ from. With so much plagiarism, smokescreens and misleading references, the 
dividing line between ‘Nitzan and Bichler’s analysis’ and Retort’s ‘genuine account’ 
has practically vanished. But, then, that is the whole purpose: eviscerate the content 
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and dump the corpse. From now on, it is we, Retort, who ‘have been arguing’, we who 
are ‘not fully convinced’, we who are ‘confident’.  
 
 
More Correspondence 
 
The conclusion is crystal clear. There was never any misunderstanding. On the con-
trary. The Retort authors knew precisely what they were doing.  
For the sake of good order, we emailed the following summary letter to the London 
Review of Books.  
 
June 12, 2005 
 
Dear Mary-Kay Wilmers, 
 
Thank you kindly for the clarification and invitation for a correspondence. We want 
to apologize for our delayed response. We were travelling and did not have regular 
access to email. We also received Retort’s Afflicted Powers and took the time to carefully 
read and assess its contents.  
 
With your permission, we would like to summarize the situation as we see it and to 
suggest a different course of action. 
 
SUMMARY: 
 
(1) The Retort authors write Afflicted Powers. The main chapter of the book, titled 
‘Blood for Oil?’ is essentially a reproduction of our work. A small part of this re-
production is attributed to us explicitly. The bulk of it is straightforward plagia-
rism.  
(2) The Retort authors re-write this material into an LRB article (or let the LRB editors 
rewrite it for them). The re-writing is done in a manner that presents almost our 
entire argument, including theory and facts, as if it were their own.  
(3) The Retort authors approve the final proofs of the LRB article. 
(4) In response to our draft article, ‘The Scientist and the Church’, Michael Watts 
blames LRB for ‘cutting us out’. 
 
The situation, then, is worse than we originally thought.  
 
In his letter to us, Michael Watts states that there is one section in Afflicted Powers that 
deals directly with our theses (pp. 67-72) and that the Retort authors are explicit that 
this section merely rehearses our work.  
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This statement is misleading, to put it mildly. In fact, the entire thrust of Ch. 2 – in-
cluding the main questions it asks, the way it presents the argument and the answers 
it gives – is an appropriation of our work (with plenty of errors and gross misunder-
standings on the way). In ‘The Scientist and the Church’ we provide eight long quota-
tions to demonstrate the plagiarism in the LRB article. Six of these eight quotations 
appear in Ch. 2 of the book without any reference to our work and indeed before our 
names are even mentioned. Finally, as in ‘Blood for Oil?’ in this chapter too the au-
thors have the audacity to caricature our work that they so skilfully appropriate as ‘too 
perfunctory’ and ‘too technical’. This is a necessary step. Once minimized, our work 
can be easily absorbed into their own deeply contemplated framework.  
  
We have already heard from several people about that ‘brilliant LRB piece’. Little did 
these people know that, if fully referenced, that brilliant piece would amount to no 
more than a book review. It certainly wouldn’t qualify as a lead article in your maga-
zine. 
 
SUGGESTION: 
 
Personally, we are puzzled by your suggestion that we write a 1,000-word letter. Retort 
was given over 8,000 words for their plagiarism. We feel that, in the interest of fairness, 
the least that LRB can do is to publish ‘The Scientist and the Church’ in full.  
 
And there are other reasons:  
 
(1) This piece should be of great interest to the progressive LRB readership. 
(2) We are dealing here with a serious intellectual matter. Radical thinking has been 
stultified by repressive orthodoxy dressed in progressive clothes. Not to expose 
this process is to enhance it further.  
(3) The issue has possible legal implications. An economics professor was expelled 
from the Hebrew University for such plagiarism.  
 
The substance of ‘The Scientist and the Church’ cannot be summarized in a 1,000-
word article, and it will be completely diluted if fractured into a series of short accusa-
tions and responses stretched over several issues.  
 
We hope and trust you will agree with us and publish our paper in full.  
 
Respectfully, 
 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler 
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The obvious answer arrived a few days later: 
 
June 16, 2005 
 
Dear Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 
  
Thank you for your message of 12 June. It is not our policy to run essay-length re-
sponses to pieces that we've published. We would be happy, however, as I said be-
fore, to consider a response for publication on our letters page: 1000 words is consid-
erably longer than we usually allow for a letter. The deadline would be Wednesday 
22 June. 
  
Best wishes, 
 
Mary-Kay Wilmers 
 
There was little we could do to penetrate this wall. It was time to conclude: 
 
June 16, 2005 
 
Dear Mary-Kay Wilmers, 
 
Thank you very much for your reply of June 16. 
 
We understand your policy regarding standard responses. However, ‘The Scientist and 
the Church’ is not a standard response – just as ‘Blood for Oil?’ is not a standard piece. 
‘Blood for Oil?’ is largely plagiarized from our work. You have published this long 
plagiarized article – probably without checking it or, alternatively, after having re-
moved references to our work. You now insist that we restrict ourselves to a short 
‘reply’, knowing full well that the substance of our essay cannot be summarized in 
1000 words. This expediency may be consistent with your formal policy regarding let-
ters, but it also suggests an effective ‘partnership’ to the plagiarism. 
 
Cordially,  
 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler 
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A Dialectical Conclusion 
 
Twentieth-century Marxists produced some remarkable insights. The path-breaking 
works of Georg Lukács, Michal Kalecki, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, Paul 
Baran and Paul Sweezy, Harry Magdoff, Josef Steindl, Michael Kidron, Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Cornelius Castoriadis – among others – have enriched our imagina-
tion and deepened our knowledge.  
But these were all intellectual rebels, people who contested Marxist orthodoxy. 
The orthodoxy itself moved in the opposite direction. Having been taken over by Len-
inism-Stalinism, Marxism gradually lost its scientific footing. Increasingly, it assumed 
the structure of a church, complete with it own clergy of party officials and other gate-
keepers. Rigidity hastened its decline. Eventually, it was eclipsed and partly overtaken 
by a more predatory church, assembled under the rubric of ‘post-modernity’. 
The ‘postist’ fashion emerged in the 1980s. It first took hold in North American 
universities, from where it subsequently spread to the rest of the academic world. Its 
practitioners – whether post-Nazi, post-liberal or post-Marxist – are united in their de-
nial of novelty, enlightenment and progress. They flood the ‘academic space’ with riv-
ers of meaningless words, indecipherable ‘texts’ and deconstructed ‘discourses’. They 
smother scientific creativity by tolerating and encouraging critical ignorance. 
There is no need for new research, for new explorations, for new inventions. The 
academic postists already know it all. They possess the up-to-date insight, the most 
progressive opinions, the authoritative last word on every subject. They know every-
thing on ‘imperialism’, the ‘American Empire’, and ‘military neoliberalism’ (or is it 
‘neo-military liberalism’?). They think ‘dialectically’, not ‘mechanically’. They grasp 
reality ‘in-depth’ without ever having to conduct scientific research. And they know it 
all in the name of Marx – the same Marx who tried to create a revolutionary science; 
the same Marx who tried to uncover the concrete contradictions that underlie the cap-
italist totality; the same Marx who challenged the idealism of mechanical/bourgeois 
science, its evasion of contradictions, its dodging of criticism.  
Surrounding these experts is an efficient network of communication. The publish-
ers that put out politically-correct books, the magazines that promote them with up-
lifted chapters, the academic friends who review them in refereed journals, the popular 
media that endorse them in talk shows. These are all connected, sometimes loosely, 
sometimes more tightly, and always dialectically, to the new church of postmodernity.  
Of course, like all fortified dogmas, this church too is bound to collapse. It is the 
inevitable dialectic – the only dialectic that the ‘critical experts’ can know nothing of.  
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